

The Wonderful Trinity in a Globalized World

by *Lars Wedin*

“IF STRATEGY IS done badly, humans can die in large numbers.”¹

Strategy is, as this quote shows, a serious business. Yet, the word “strategy” is used in so many contexts that it risks losing its meaning. In the Swedish 2004 “white paper” on the future of its defense forces the word is used 61 times – but not once either in the meaning of “grand strategy” or of “military strategy”. However, this is exactly the meaning of strategy in this article.

There are many definitions on strategy. The original term, in its modern sense, was coined by Paul Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy in 1771:

Warfare is the science of the general, which the Greeks call strategy, deep science, sublime, which includes many other branches of science, but is based on tactics ... In order to create plans, the strategist combines time, means and a number of interests.²

Obviously, great captains formulated and adhered to strategic plans much earlier, but the term as such did not exist. Instead, one generally referred to the “art of war” or, more specifically, to “grand tactics”³ or “the sublime parts” of tactics.⁴

It is interesting to note that the first part of the definition by Joly de Maizeroy highlights strategy as a “science”, while the lat-

ter part describes strategy as an art, something that is to be created. This dualism is very important: using strategic theory, the strategist creates a strategy in order to solve a certain strategic problem. Raymond Aron, and later Lucien Poirier, wrote about strategy as a “praxéologie” – a science with a practical purpose.⁵

This ARTICLE concentrates on strategic theory. It discusses some important notions with particular relevance to small states and to issues regarding symmetry-dissymmetry-asymmetry. It also puts special emphasis on uncertainty and surprise – two elements which tend to make strategic action very difficult.

What is strategy?

There are many possible definitions on strategy depending from what angle one wants to analyze the phenomenon. The most classic one is provided by Carl von Clausewitz: “the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the Object of the War.”⁶ Generally, older definitions tend to emphasize strategy as a warfighting tool – the science of the general – while modern ones are broader in scope.

In a general sense, strategy is about the achievement of political goals. This goes back to the fundamental understanding that “War is a mere continuation of policy

by other means".⁷ This characterization by Clausewitz, fittingly called the Formula by Aron⁸, provides the basis for Western strategic thought: war should only be fought for political goals; war is an instrument for policy and not vice versa. This insight, however, is older than Clausewitz. Already in a letter to Frederick II of Prussia in 1746, Marshal Maurice de Saxe wrote: "Your Majesty knows very well that the military part always is subordinated to the politics."⁹

After World War II, Sir Basil Liddell Hart saw the need for a definition of strategy going beyond the Clausewitzian definition, which only treats military aspects; the notion of Grand Strategy was born. This, he argued, aims "to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or a band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy".¹⁰ Essentially, grand strategy, so defined, is not confined merely to actual war but includes aspects "beyond the war to subsequent peace".¹¹

As the definition of Liddell Hart is connected with war, we also need a more general definition applicable also to situations of non-war. Lucien Poirier has formulated such a definition, which he later uses as a basis for the development of a taxonomy of strategic concepts: "The science and art of maneuvering forces in order to reach political objectives".¹²

These two definitions treat the purpose of strategy. They are, however, static – they do not take into account the basic fact that strategy is used in situations where two (or more) parties have conflicting objectives: the political project of the One is met by a counter-project of the Other. André Beaufre offers such a definition that builds on the dialectics between the two opposing sides: "It [strategy] is therefore the art of the dialectic of force, or more precisely, the art of the di-

alectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute."¹³

From these three definitions, one could draw a number of conclusions about strategy in a modern sense. The following is from a strategic dictionary by François Géré:¹⁴

- Strategy is about the transformation of a real situation in accordance with a political project;
- There is a conflict, but not necessarily a war, between projects necessitating active strategic thinking and active strategic action;
- There is a dynamic interaction between the One and the Other and their projects;
- The probability of violence is more than zero;
- Strategy is in the service of a political project.

In creating a strategy, the strategist must find a balance between objectives on the one hand and ways-and-means on the other hand.¹⁵ The objective should lead, or at least contribute, to the fulfillment of the political project. In order to achieve the objective, there must be an action or a maneuver. In order to act, the strategist must figure out how that action could be undertaken – the ways – and the means required. If the means needed for the preferred way are not at hand, or cannot be created in time, the strategist must find another way to achieve the objective. If there is no set of ways-and-means available, the objective cannot be achieved. If there is no achievable objective that leads to the political project, the project has to be abandoned. General Vincent Desportes has used the image of a three-legged stool, where the legs are objectives, ways and means. The stool will stand upright only if there is a balance between

the three – in all other cases, the stool will limp.¹⁶

There are many other important notions in strategy. Together they form what Colin S. Gray calls the grammar of strategy.¹⁷ We will look at some of them in the discussion that follows.

The Wonderful Trinity

One of Clausewitz's main theories is the "wonderful trinity", which describes war in two different perspectives: character of war and actors. Later, he adds a third which contains the objectives of war. While the first two ones are closely linked to each other, the third one is apparently more loosely connected to the others. As we will see, it is useful to treat all three in a way inspired by the famous Rubik's Cube.¹⁸

This trinity has been much discussed and criticized, in particular with regard to modern wars. The criticism, however, is often the consequence of a too rigid reading. Let us look at the three trinities (*Table 1*).

In a war, all three "characters of war" are present: blind instinct or passion, probabilities and chance (unforeseen incidents, surprises, hazard, and friction), and rea-

son (decision, objective, organization of means).²² Depending on the character of a particular war, one or two are the most dominant. In the same way, all three kinds of "actors" are present but the balance between them is a variable.

Now, Clausewitz saw war as a mixture of these factors.²³ The people – the German *Volk* includes people and nation²⁴ – are most often ruled by passion while governments represent reason. As the General, or the commander to use a more general word, will have to overcome contingencies of various forms, he will have to have a free activity of the soul or a creative spirit.

However, if we see these first two trinities as parts of a Rubik's Cube and manipulate it, there could also be other combinations. Sometimes it is the government which stands for the creative spirit and sometimes it is the people that are characterized by reason while the government is dominated by passion.²⁵ For example, during the wars of the the French revolution passion and people played a dominant role while later, during the wars of the empire, reason and government – identical with the commander – were more dominant.

In the third trinity, Clausewitz lists the

Table 1

<u>The character of the war</u> ¹⁹	<u>The actors</u> ²⁰	<u>The objectives</u> ²¹
Violence, hatred and animosity; blind instinct	The people	The will of the enemy
Probabilities and chance; free activity of the soul (creativity)	The General and his Army	Military power
Subordinate nature of a political instrument; reason	The government	Country

Body	Physical element: military power (arms, organization, doctrines...)
Mind	Intellectual element: assigns the objective, structures political (power) relations ...
Heart	Spiritual element gives the basic underpinning or fundament of politics. Ideology

Table 2

three basic objectives for war: armed forces, the will, and country. Traditionally, war has been fought over territory (*country*), where the destruction of the *military power* or the enemy's forces has constituted the means to that end. However, a complete victory also requires that the *will* of the enemy is broken. Quite obviously, it is possible to establish a link between this trinity and the first one: will and passion, enemy forces and commander, as well as between territory and government. Other combinations are also possible as we manipulate the Rubik's Cube, now with all three factors.

As this is not a ARTICLE about Clausewitz but about strategy in general, it might be acceptable to propose a variant of the trinity inspired by the French philosopher Jean Guitton who in his turn based it on Blaise Pascal.²⁶ (Table 2)

Now, as war is an endeavor between two (or more) parties with conflicting goals, it is quite possible that the setting of the cube for the One is quite different from the setting of the Other's. This leads us to the issue of symmetry, dissymmetry, and asymmetry.

War is never symmetric

"Asymmetric wars" have become something of a buzz-word and are often presented as something new. This is, however, far from the truth. Take three examples: the co-

lonial wars, the wars of the French Revolution and Empire against Great Britain, and the Finnish Winter War

The colonial wars were waged between forces armed and organized according to Western strategic culture, which usually differed from that of their opponents – today often referred to as "insurgents"²⁷ – in a considerable way. The latter could be of quite high standing but were, as a rule, less effective. These wars can be described as asymmetrical as the opponents had inherently different cultures and aims.

In such asymmetric wars, the balance between the various parts of the trinity is quite different between the One and the Other. *Operation Allied Force* against Serbia in 1999 could illustrate this point. For NATO this was by definition a Crisis Management Operation but for Milosevic it must have been a war about vital interests: the status of Kosovo and, ultimately, his own power. Table 3 depicts the trinities of the two opponents.

The wars between Great Britain and France, on the other hand, were symmetric as both the One and the Other wanted to change the status quo to their own advantages. They were also fought between Western states with, basically, the same level of technology and culture. But their grand strategies were asymmetrical as Great Britain relied on an essentially maritime strategy

	<u>NATO</u>	<u>Milosevic</u>
<u>Government</u>	16 (19) democratic states, no vital interests are threatened. ²⁸	1 dictator whose vital interest, his power, is threatened
<u>Commander</u>	Complex organization governed by a council of democratic states (NAC) with a relatively vague objective.	An army completely in the hands of a dictator with a clear goal – keep Kosovo in Serbian hands.
<u>People</u>	Diversity, clearly driven by the "CNN-effect".	In the hands of the dictator and with strong sentimental links to Kosovo.

Table 3

against the continental strategy of France. The choice of strategy was, in principle, given by the geostrategic situation of the two adversaries but also because of their different cultures – the British as an island country depending on maritime trade, while the French power was based on agriculture and stately organized manufacturing.²⁹ With time, the British maritime strategy helped giving the coalition armies a dissymmetric advantage over their French opponents. That is, there was no fundamental difference between the armies of the two sides but the coalition became successively stronger.

More usual than symmetric conflicts are dissymmetric ones. Here, the opponents basically share the same strategic culture but their aims are different: "one side wants to win, the other not to lose."³⁰ This is the classic situation of a European small state in (potential) conflict with a more powerful neighbor. The Finnish Winter War is a good example.

When we look at the level of military strategy, symmetry is more frequent. However, to win, it is normally necessary to find and explore an asymmetric advantage. In fact, it is hard to imagine a perfect symmetric war – and if there was one, it would lead to mutual destruction or to a stalemate. As Desportes has written: "every victory, basically, is asymmetric."³¹

Let us look at World War I. Here all belligerents preferred offensive strategies. This symmetric situation led to stalemate and a war of attrition. In 1918, after the failed German Michaeli-offensive, the situation became increasingly dissymmetric to the benefit of the Allies.

At sea, however, one could talk about asymmetry as the geostrategic situation differed so much between the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet. The result was the asymmetric warfare where convoys of the Entente fought with German submarines.

"War among the people" or modern Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) are usually asymmetric in many ways. The Western side uses organized military force which is technologically superior to its adversary. The latter, consequently, tries to find an asymmetric way of fighting to get an advantage. Terrorism, IEDs, and information warfare are three typical techniques.

To conclude, symmetric situations imply that the One and the Other have symmetric objectives, both want to win (or not to lose) and they basically wage war according to the same principles. But to win, it is necessary to find an advantage. This could completely change the situation into an asymmetric one as happened in Japan after the atomic bombs. At the very least, it

is necessary to get a sufficient dissymmetric advantage for the other to give up.

Consequently, issues of symmetry, dissymmetry, and asymmetry must be treated carefully.

They tend to be more of buzzwords than strategically meaningful.

The objective

From the trinity we have learned the three basic objectives: the military power that must be reduced to impotence, the country that must be conquered and the will of the enemy that must be subdued.³²

Clausewitz makes an important difference between two kinds of “real wars” fought for political purposes. The first kind is fought with the aim to overthrow the enemy, the winner dictates the peace. The second one seeks a limited objective and, consequently, to a negotiated peace where the result of the warfighting is an important, but not the only, argument.³³

World War II is an example of the first kind; a total war with an unlimited political project: the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. When translated into a strategic objective, this project meant total victory for the allied forces, an occupied country and a broken will. Hence, all the three objectives mentioned above were aimed for and ultimately achieved by the Allies.

But most wars are not of the first kind, but of the second. This is particularly true for modern wars. This means that there is no more a direct link between military success and the achievement of the political objective. As a consequence, strategy becomes immensely more complicated.

As a professor at the French War Academy, the future Marshal Ferdinand Foch used to insist that his students, each time they

started to think about a new problem, asked themselves: “De quoi s’agit-il?” (What’s it all about?).³⁴ Indeed, understanding the situation, choosing the objective, and then finding balancing ways-and-means are the key issues in strategy.

As war is an instrument of politics, it follows that the relationship between politics and strategy is crucial. Strategy is “politics in action.” Without strategy, politics cannot be transformed into action and political objectives cannot be met.³⁵

For military strategy, the issue is to formulate an achievable objective that underpins the goal of the comprehensive strategy in its mission to implement the political project:

The general military strategy is the science and art of maneuvering the forces of physical violence – the armed forces – in order to make them contribute to the success of the comprehensive³⁶ strategy charged to fulfill the objectives of the general politics.³⁷

This formula contains a very important aspect; namely the existence of two objectives on different levels. The political goal states the purpose (*Zweck*) or the long-term objective while the military objective is more immediate (*Ziel*).³⁸ The difference between the two notions could also be described as success *with* the war and success *in* the war, respectively.³⁹ In fact, to make a success *in* war lead to success *with* the war is one of the key issues in strategy. It often fails. Napoleon provides a good example. He could never transform his long row of victories into a decisive strategic advantage leading to peace.

Frequently, the aim of the war changes over time because of the difficulty to predict

the course of events during a war and how objectives change with time. One reason for this is that “Once arms speak, the outcome is more important than the origin.”⁴⁰ *Operation Iraqi Freedom* (OIF) was meant to be a war of the first kind of war: it aimed at complete surrender (“We will accept no outcome than...”).⁴¹ But, it ends (if it indeed has ended) by a negotiated end-state.

OIF is also an example of not answering the question “De quoi s’agit-il?”. As Clausewitz has pointed out: “Theory, therefore, demands that at the commencement of every war its character and main outline shall be defined according to what the political conditions and relations lead us to anticipate as probable”⁴² The US “neocons” had a clear idea of the war’s meaning and outcome, but this was not based on factual analysis but on ideology; “mind” was superseded by “heart” to use the trinity of Guittou. To use Clausewitz’s trinity: government was ruled by passion instead of representing reason. And it is somewhat difficult to say that the commander was an example of “creative spirit”.

The political project was stated as: “It is a fight for the security of our nation and the peace of the world, and we will accept no outcome but victory.”⁴³ The comprehensive strategy’s objective was: “And our mission is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.”⁴⁴ This led to a military strategy aimed at the destruction of Iraqi military power followed by a short occupation of (parts of) Iraq. It was supposed that the third element in Clausewitz’s trinity, the will, would be no problem as the Iraqi people was supposed to transform its country to a peaceful democracy. Hence, this was a complete Clausewitzian strategy.

Now, seven years later, we know that this

strategy was much too simplistic as it led to a prolonged war of counter-insurrection. The US hardly became more secure and world peace was not furthered. Six weeks of success with the war led to six years of struggling. The armed forces were not sufficiently destroyed, the country could not be completely occupied and the will was not conquered.

The issue of *will* links back to the first and the second trinity. A common way of attacking the will of the enemy is to weaken or dissolve the link between the people, the army, and the government. This could be done by substituting *reason* with *blind instinct*, or more precisely despair. As an example the bombing of the German population had as one of its prime goals – the industrial base was the other – to divorce the people from the government and the Nazi party. *Will* is also the main aim of terrorism: to show the people that the government and its security forces cannot protect it. The occupation of the country is then a consequence of terrorism that eventually leads to surrender of the government and subdual of the people.⁴⁵

Another way to put this issue is to use the theory of legitimacy launched by Kalevi J. Holsti. He makes a difference between vertical legitimacy: “authority, consent, and loyalty to the idea(s) of state and its institutions”. Horizontal legitimacy, on the other hand, “deals with the definition and political role of community.”⁴⁶ By attacking the will of its adversary, the Allies aimed at weakening the vertical legitimacy of Nazi government.

It is interesting to note that the fight for vertical legitimacy – often referred to as “winning hearts and minds” – in CMOs is symmetrical: both “peacekeepers” and insurgents want to achieve it while denying it to the opponent. The ways-and-means,

however, are inherently asymmetric.

But when strengthening the vertical legitimacy of government becomes the principal issue, then the role of military strategy must change. It is not enough to support directly the comprehensive strategy; it must also support and coordinate with other strategies: police, humanitarian aid, etc. The issue of comprehensiveness cannot be confined, so to speak, to the top but must imbue all the various strategies needed. In fact, comprehensive strategies are very difficult both to develop and, in particular, to implement.⁴⁷

Finally, it should be recognized that the strategist is limited in his choices of objectives and ways-and-means by issues of law and legitimacy. He needs to ask himself three questions.

The first one is whether the objective as such is ethical – we are back to “*de quoi s’agit-il?*”. Will the fulfillment of the objective lead to peace – preferably a better peace?

The next question is whether the ways-and-means are ethical given the importance of the objective: “...at what point of destruction does a war cease to be a justifiable instrument?”⁴⁸ This issue is particularly pertinent in today’s Crisis Management Operations that are fought “among the people”.⁴⁹ Soldiers and sailors represent their countries and are part of their societies. Hence, the societies that send them cannot dissociate themselves from their actions. This is one reason why the issue of “ways-and-means” – transformed into Rules of Engagement – is an inherently political responsibility.

Finally, will the opinion support the objective given ways-and-means to reach it? A government may, to a certain extent, take part in operations without having the approval of a majority. If Churchill had bowed to public opinion, he would have asked for

peace in summer 1940. But an unpopular policy is fragile. This was shown when the government in Madrid, after the 2004 bombings, was forced to take home its troops from Iraq. Another example is the “Highway of Death” at the end of operation Desert Storm. Here it was demonstrated that the public was not only sensitive about own losses but also about those of the enemy.

To this, one might add environmental aspects. If one sees the environment as part of our “cultural property”, there is already guidance in international law regarding this issue.⁵⁰ However, so far relatively little interest has been demonstrated in this regard. This will probably change. It could be anticipated that the ever more powerful environmental lobbies will put restrictions on military activities including during operations. This is probably particularly true for Scandinavian states like Sweden and Finland

These three questions above could also be based on the trinity of Guitton: do we have enough “body” to do what we want, does our “mind” find it reasonable, and is it defensible according to our “heart”?

However, even when the strategist is able to discern a completely legal and legitimate objective and ways-and-means to achieve it, the result is often not as expected. Friction and surprise may make the best plan fail.

Surprise – things never go as planned

A basic problem is that power – defined as the capability of a political actor to force another to accept its will – can only be measured approximately. If it was possible to make exact measurements, “wars would not occur, since the results would be known in advance.”⁵¹ The reason is that war is a human endeavor: “The Art of War has to deal

with living and with moral forces, the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute and positive.”⁵² This is also the meaning of the trinity; the characteristics of a war depend on the balance between blind instinct, contingencies, and reason. Obviously, when passion dominates reason, war becomes increasingly irrational and distances itself from the Formula. Diabolization of the enemy easily leads to such a situation. When the enemy becomes the incarnation of the Bad and of Satan, no compromise is possible.⁵³

Friction is one of Clausewitz’s best known ideas: “Everything is very simple in War, but the simplest thing is difficult.” “Friction is”, he continues, “the only conception which in a general way corresponds to that which distinguishes real War from War on paper.”⁵⁴

Adherents of the school of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) have sometimes proposed that modern information technology would abolish friction. Dominant Battlefield Awareness (DBA) would give a perfect view of the battlefield, which would lift the Clausewitzian “fog of war”. There have even been American (and Swedish) generals who believed that digitalization of the battlefield would lead to the insignificance of Clausewitz.⁵⁵ Recent history, however, has amply shown that maybe friction has taken new forms; it is anyway still an important factor. Clausewitz will continue to be studied when Admiral Owens is long since forgotten.⁵⁶

One reason is that war is led and fought by human beings and not machines or as Desportes has put it: “A technology is just a technology; it cannot change the war which primarily is dominated by human factors.”⁵⁷ Another is the fact that strategy cannot provide a perfect answer. It is always limited by three factors: imperfect information, impossibility to envisage all possible solutions,

and incapacity to see all possible future consequences of the proposed strategies.⁵⁸

Friction is also, according to Clausewitz, not just about lack of knowledge about the terrain, the weather, and the whereabouts of the enemy. Friction is also a result of the fact that war is a dynamic duel between moral forces, as pointed out in Beaufre’s definition. This duel, he continues, takes the form of a battle for freedom of action: “Each side trying to preserve freedom of action for itself and denying it to the enemy”.⁵⁹

The issues of friction and hazard have been nicely summed up by Churchill: “One should never, never, never believe that a war will turn out to be easy...”.⁶⁰

Surprise is a common strategy to create an asymmetrical advantage and to maximize the friction affecting the enemy. Surprise could be defined as a “physical and psychological condition which results from a sudden and unexpected occurrence.”⁶¹

Already authors during classical antiquity like Polyen and Frontin discussed how to use surprise to get an asymmetric advantage: *stratagems*.⁶²

Clausewitz does not discuss surprise in great depth. However, he gives the following definition, where he underlines the moral aspect of surprise: “When it [surprise] is successful in a high degree, confusion and broken courage in the enemy’s ranks are the consequences...”

He also underlines that surprise is easier to realize on the tactical level than on the strategic level, the one that is of interest to us here.⁶³

One current definition of strategic surprise is: “Strategic surprise may serve to shatter an adversary, in a moral and psychological sense, thus ending a conflict, or to turn the moral balance of the war upside down, without necessarily achieving a tactical victory (the Têt offensive in 1968).”⁶⁴

Another definition, less linked to war, is "strategic surprise is an occurrence, not anticipated, which is of great impact and shakes the foundation of a state."⁶⁵

One could imagine that there would be a symmetrical relationship between the offensive "surprise" and the defensive "be surprised". This is hardly the case. It is much more usual that a government becomes surprised than that it succeeds in deliberately surprising an adversary.

There are two basic modes of strategy: real and virtual. While the former aims at the physical destruction of the forces of the enemy, the latter is directed against his will. A victory built on physical destruction will also have implications for the will of the enemy. Conversely, an enemy whose will is weakened by our virtual strategy will be easier to defeat.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 is a good example of a strategic surprise carried out in a real mode, where the objective is to: "reduce or annihilate the capacity to react and the liberty of action of the Other."⁶⁶ The Soviet "Sputnik", on the other hand, can be seen – besides the technical success as such – as a strategic surprise in the virtual mode aiming at "reducing the will of the adversary."⁶⁷

These two examples also highlight that surprise is linked to risk. Both Japan and the Soviet Union had a strategic advantage but it was of short duration. In both cases, US reactions inversed the game. Edward N. Luttwak writes about the strategic paradox: a bad road may be the best exactly because the adversary does not envisage its use. As a consequence, surprise has a price: the use of the bad road may lead to a slower build-up of forces. However, it is supposed that this price will be outbalanced by the psychological effects of surprise.⁶⁸

As a consequence, a tentative surprise

that fails may be very dangerous. As Clausewitz wrote: "If we surprise the adversary by a wrong measure, then instead of reaping good results, we may have to bear a sound blow in return;"⁶⁹

If the offensive strategic "surprise" is relatively unusual, the defensive "be surprised" is quite usual. This fact depends on a tendency of governments, commanders, and others to be surprised by events even if these were not meant to be surprising. The Fall of the Wall is an example: the East-German government did not at all envisage bringing it down. But down it fell and everybody became surprised also by its strategic effects.

In the military strategic field, it is possible to identify four types of surprise.⁷⁰ To begin with, there is technological surprise which results from the use of a new weapon. The effective use of submarines against merchant ships during the Great War is one example. It is also an example of a surprise that could have been avoided – there were those who anticipated their use in this regard but they were dismissed as that view did not fit into current thinking. Another example is the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. Here there was surprise on two strategic levels: a direct one causing the capitulation of Japan and an indirect one, not intended, with more far-reaching consequences; namely the balance of terror.

Secondly, there is the geographic surprise. The attack comes where the defendant did not expect it. The classic example is the German attack through the Ardennes in 1940; another is D-day in Normandy.

The third variant regards time. A classic example is the Yom Kippur War, launched by a coalition of Arab countries during an important Jewish holiday.

Finally, there is the surprise caused by new doctrine – a new way to use force. The maneuver war, to use contemporary phras-

ing, carried out by the armies of Napoleon is a striking example. The use of guerillas during the Vietnam War is another – in spite of French experiences just a couple of years before.

Michael Handel has offered an answer to the question of why surprises happen in spite of the fact that, with hindsight, they could have been avoided. According to his “theory of surprise”, it is quite usual that intelligence officers have all the necessary information to understand what will happen. However, the problem is often that they do not understand it or that they cannot discern the important signals in the noise. Other factors are “inertia over openness”, and “wishful thinking over realism.”⁷¹

Another quite usual problem is “mirror thinking”, when an actor assumes – consciously or subconsciously – that the other will think along the same lines as himself. Also here *Operation Iraqi Freedom* is a good example. Apparently, the American administration thought that the liberated Iraqis would by themselves become a peaceful, democratic society. The American doctrine had prescribed that its superior technology would be able to finish the operation after a brief and relatively limited operation. That worked out just as long as the adversary permitted the war to be fought along these lines.

A variant of the same problem are psychological and/or philosophic inhibitions. At the time of the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US forces had a relatively low readiness. A basic reason was that the Americans could not imagine that the Japanese would be able to plan and carry out such an attack. Hence, the Japanese trump was the American ignorance regarding Japanese military capabilities and an arrogance against anything Japanese.⁷²

“Self-deterrence” is another recurrent

phenomenon. In this case, the defender understands more or less what is going to happen but does not dare to act; typically because he is afraid of provoking the Other. Obviously, this is a fear that the Other is happy to add fuel to. A typical example is the German occupation in 1936 of the demilitarized zone along the Rhine. This area was of vital interest for France as a glacis against Germany. In spite of that, the French did nothing. The public opinion was completely against any action that could lead towards war; the Ministry of War was afraid of provoking the Germans and the army overestimated the German capacity. In reality, the Germans had planned to abandon immediately in the case of French counter-moves. With the Rhine zone occupied, France had lost the liberty of action that might have saved Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. Fear of war and to provoke made the war inevitable.⁷³ Self-deterrence is a notion with particular relevance for small states living beside big ones.

Self-deterrence is closely linked to a syndrome called political hysteria. This occurs when a government or a people are confronted with a problem that cannot be solved without more or less complete rethinking of status quo and basic values. In such a situation it is not unusual that the state or the people refuse to accept the problem and hide behind selective realities, false explanations and so on.⁷⁴ For example, the assumed Soviet submarine intrusions in Swedish waters during the Cold War did cause such a hysteria.

The “ostrich-phenomenon” is yet another variant. It happens quite often that the high command refuses to understand that existent doctrines are obsolete, usually due to technological advances. The glorification of the offensive before the Great War is a good example. The Boer War and the

war between Russia and Japan had demonstrated that the new weapons – in particular the machine gun and the barbed-wire – had made the defensive stronger than the offensive. In spite of this, all belligerents entered the war with offensive doctrines.

The French revolution, the Fall of the Wall, and the 11th of September are all events that could be characterized as “ruptures”. A “rupture” is a major change in the security field that provokes developments which are difficult to predict.⁷⁵ The main event is rather brief but it has, in each case, been preceded by a development that was not understood. Afterwards, it has taken a long time before the situation again became stable – but then the strategic chessboard had fundamentally changed.

In all these cases, the event might have been foreseen and surprise avoided; more easily in some cases than in others. But, it is often first with hindsight that relevant factors can be identified. Investments in intelligence may reduce the risk of being surprised, but history seems to demonstrate that this will never be enough – states and their leaders will become surprised. As a consequence, strategic adaptability and flexibility is of paramount importance. This is particularly true for a small state, which by definition has less liberty of action and resilience than a big one.

From Trinity to Globalization

There is abundant literature about the so-called new wars. Will the armed forces of the West mainly fight among the people – irregular wars – as argued by Sir Rupert Smith or will war among major states also be a fact of the future as argued by Colin S. Gray?⁷⁶ Jean Dufourcq and Ludovic Woets argue that we are now at the end of the cycle that started with the peace of Westphalia

in 1648, where the nation-state was the basis for international security. A new cycle, of which we know very little, will not begin until after 2020.⁷⁷

Now, this article is about strategic theory. Gray argues that “that enormous changes in the tactical and operational grammar of strategy matter not at all for the nature and function of war and strategy.”⁷⁸ Castex, on the other hand, wrote that “strategic procedures are less subdued than tactical procedures by changes in armament....But, finally, they change anyway, and this point should never be lost.”⁷⁹ In fact, new developments – the coming of the nuclear age, for example – often provoke a crisis in strategic thinking that forces us to read the present theory with new eyes. The strategic workplace is always busy.⁸⁰

With these ideas in mind, it should be valuable to come back to the “wonderful trinity”. For convenience, it is reproduced in *Table 4*.

Blind instinct, creativity, and reason. These factors are at least as important as ever. We expect governments, especially Western ones, to be guided by reason (strategic analysis made by security councils and the like). However, this is not always entirely true; the decision by Bush to attack Iraq seems to be more based on ideology – blind instinct – than reason. On the other hand, at least in the West, the information age should lead to a general public more governed by reason than by blind instinct. The view of war as primarily evil makes an important difference between contemporary wars and those of times gone by. It is, for example, difficult to imagine the Great War being fought today. “The real revolution in military affairs concerns primarily the social dimension of strategy, which is closely related to the demographic context and the evolution of the mentalities in western states.”⁸⁴

<u>The character of the war</u> ⁸¹	<u>The actors</u> ⁸²	<u>The objectives</u> ⁸³
Violence, hatred and animosity; blind instinct (passion)	The people	The will of the enemy
Probabilities and chance; free activity of the soul (creativity)	The General and his Army	Military power
Subordinate nature of a political instrument; reason	The government	Country

Table 4

Chance, probability, hazard, and friction form the battlefield, now as before. Modern technology has reduced some of these effects but also added others. Nevertheless, today's commanders have relatively small possibilities to use their possible creative spirit as strategy is made in a political process. Operations are led by committees; be that in the EU or in NATO. The creative spirit today, contrary to the time of Clausewitz, has rather its place on a tactical level. The "strategic corporal" is an expression of this trend.

In irregular wars like Afghanistan, the insurgents (or terrorists or liberation fighters, depending on one's outlook) show a mixture of passion, creative spirit, and reason. Their use of technology to find asymmetric advantages certainly shows creativity. Terrorist acts are planned with reason (even if they are evil in our eyes) to get most effect. But as their struggle is a part of Jihad, it is based on ideology, so passion seems to be the overall characteristic. On the other hand, this could also be seen as a political choice, i.e. belonging to reason.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, it is hard for a Westerner to understand the act of a suicide bomber as something else than an act of passion.

Two relatively new elements are war as a

way of life and the search for economic gain. The first element is demonstrated in areas where war has been endemic for a long time like Congo or Colombia. Here soldiers have no other prospects than fighting. This often leads to a fusion between war and organized crime. Furthermore, Private Military Enterprises (PME) play an ever more important role in Western warfare for logistics, as life-guards, etc. A writer like Herrfried Münkler sees the growing importance of private actors driven by economic rather than political objectives as one of the most important new factors in warfare.⁸⁶

The people, the General, and the government. In modern states, it is debatable if one could talk about *Volk* – people and nation.⁸⁷ All European states have a large number of immigrants who do not necessarily see themselves as part of their new nation. In virtually every Crisis Management Operation, the adversary has relatives or supporters living in participating states. This fact gives important opportunities for (dis-) information campaigns, and in the worst case, for terrorist acts as in London in 2005. The global use of the Internet and new media like twitter and facebook makes it even more difficult for a modern govern-

ment to create support for costly undertakings in faraway countries. To put it in another way, both vertical and horizontal legitimacy of governments are affected. The information age reduces the vertical legitimacy both by giving opponents a stronger say and by disseminating information, including on a scale hitherto unknown. At the same time, horizontal legitimacy is reduced by the increasingly diverse populations living in Western countries.

The Western commander is usually no longer subordinated to his own government but to an organization like the UN, the EU, or NATO. This is in itself a source of friction or, as Churchill has said: "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them."⁸⁸ His command is severely strained by political issues that do not necessarily have anything to do with the war effort. In particular, his liberty of action is constrained by caveats; national limitations regarding the use of their forces.

This, however, is nothing new. The instructions received by the British Admiral Sir John Norris for an expedition in the Baltic in 1716 in the context of the Great Nordic War form a nice example of political muddling: ... "You should observe no measures towards Sweden where the assistance of [king George's I] fleet shall be necessary to deprive them of any signal advantage, or where your joining the Danes may procure them some signal advantage. But without one or the other of these two cases you are not to give the Danes such a degree of assistance as may be interpreted to amount to an open rupture with Sweden."⁸⁹

The issue is nicely summed up by General Wesley Clark, SACEUR⁹⁰ during the Kosovo War in 1999: "What we discovered increasingly was that the political and strategic levels impinged on the operational and tactical levels. Or, to put it another way,

any event in modern war has four distinct, unique components: tactical, operational, strategic, and political. Sometimes even insignificant tactical events packed a huge political wallop. This is a key characteristic of modern war."⁹¹

The commander's adversary may still be a military commander but more often than not there is no clear commander, nor a government on the other side. We could, following the analysis by Castex, call him the "disturber."⁹² The disturber usually consists of a number of groups with more or less different agendas.

Another element, which certainly was not there in Clausewitz's times, consists of the various NGOs. They will normally make a point of their independence from the military and its strategy while trying to make a strategic difference. Their numbers are staggering; in Afghanistan there are more than 100 big and 1000 small NGOs.⁹³

The traditional paradigm is that war is fought between states. From the Social contract by Rousseau, we are used to see war as a relation between states, not between man and man.⁹⁴ As the war in Georgia has shown, war between states is still relevant. A conflict in the Nordic area should almost certainly adhere to this paradigm. But, when fighting the disturber, wars are fought between coalitions, albeit composed by states, on the one hand, and individuals or more or less loose groupings on the other. An interesting aspect is that the soldier, airman, or sailor always belongs to a state but is not operationally subordinated to his or her government. This seems to be especially true for air operations in Afghanistan where air operations are completely integrated under an Air Component Commander.⁹⁵

The will of the enemy, military power, and country. In the fight against the disturber, the strategic center of gravity is no

more the destruction of the enemy's forces⁹⁶ but, as we have seen, the issue of vertical legitimacy: the accepted right to rule.⁹⁷ To neutralize the forces of the disturber is still important but a precondition, not a goal. It is (or should be) obvious that you do not win hearts and minds – strengthening your legitimacy – by bombing but by providing a hope for a better future. To this end, the country – or relevant parts thereof – needs to be secured or, in Clausewitz's terms, "occupied".

The fight against the disturber has led to a new interest in colonial strategies. The "oil spot" method, developed and implemented by Marshals Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey around 1900, is now the basis for NATO's strategy in Afghanistan. There is a need for caution, though. Gallieni and Lyautey wrote with the aim of colonisation. The ideal soldier was to become a colonist and, as such, a basis for a militia able to defend the new colony.⁹⁸ Today's forces, on the contrary, spend very little time in the area, seldom learn the language of the people, and do only to a limited extent live with the people – all prerequisites for the original "oil spot" strategy. And, obviously, the aim is not to colonize. Thus the *Ziel* is the same as in Gallieni's time but the *Zweck* is quite another. The insurgents may perhaps be excused for not always understanding this difference.

In a more general sense, "country" in the word's territorial sense is a much too limited notion.

To "country", one needs to add "flows" of information, energy, people, and all other commodities needed in a modern society. Thus, even a small country has vital interests far away from its territory. Conversely, wars fought far away may have repercussions at home as witnessed by the terrorist bombings of Madrid and London. As a

consequence of these developments, defense takes a much wider meaning than before. Defense is protecting shipping in the Indian Ocean but it is also general protection at home. Defense and general security, external and internal, must be integrated in a modern national strategy.

However, "deterritorialization" is a notion that has its limits when it comes to defense of the survival of the state. The most violent conflicts since 1990 have been fought over territory: Palestine, Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.⁹⁹

To conclude. The "wonderful trinity" is still valid as such. However, its components have to some extent taken on new values and some components need to be added. Castex seems to be right when he wrote that "It [the strategy] does not evolve much, but it evolves anyway."¹⁰⁰ Thus, the advice of Clausewitz is more important than ever: "Theory, therefore, demands that at the commencement of every war its character and main outline shall be defined according to what the political conditions and relations lead us to anticipate as probable"¹⁰¹ Not only theory, one might add but practice and experiences.

Finally a word of caution. This discussion is about changes that are happening now. It will first be with hindsight that we will be able to see the big trends in the development of the world. The strategist, however, cannot wait. He will – like Robinson Crusoe – need to use the tools that are at hand to solve today's problems.

Conclusion

What are the consequences for a small state – here Finland and Sweden – of these developments? One is obvious and has already been touched upon: globalization implies that strategic interests of also a small state

extend far outside its territory. It is thus impossible to let the strategic action come to a halt at the border. Isolation, as urged by some Swedish officers, is not an option if for no other reason than that it would lead to the world being led by great powers without any possibilities of influence for the small ones. Such a policy would lead to making the famous dialogue between the Athenians and the Melians during the Peloponnesian war, 431 – 404 B.C. relevant again: “...right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals of power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”¹⁰²

Secondly, it is not possible to make a choice between the ability to fight future wars as according to Smith or to Gray. There must be capability to do both. The old French notion of “three circles”¹⁰³ could constitute a valid basis. The first circle would encompass the area of vital interests for the survival of the state: the Nordic area including the Baltic and Barents Seas. In this area, the state must be able to act alone if necessary. The second would encompass the area of shared interests and solidarity: Europe and its approaches. Here the state must act together with other European states and, if possible, the US. The third circle, finally, is constituted by the rest of the world and is defined by the necessity to safeguard the vital flows of energy, information and so on but also to stop unwanted flows of trafficking of various kinds. To this one must add, the humanitarian imperative to reduce suffering. In this area, the small state can only act within coalitions of different kinds and has to, due to limited resources, make a strategic choice of where to act.

Thirdly, there is a need for strategic agility. This notion could be defined as compris-

ing five strands: responsiveness, flexibility, resilience, adaptability and acuity.¹⁰⁴

Responsiveness: there must be forces that are ready to act – fully trained and equipped. One could of course imagine a mobilization force as a back-up reserve but the main force cannot be dependent on mobilization.

Flexibility: military forces cannot be trained for just one scenario – for instance peace keeping. They must be able to adapt to sudden changes in the strategic and operational environment.

Resilience: military forces must be able to overcome losses meaning a need for both quality and numbers. But resilience must be applied to the whole society – citizens will not accept that there is no protection at home while significant forces are fighting faraway wars.¹⁰⁵

Adaptability: the military organization must be able to withstand strategic surprises. This is a question of mentality that must be underpinned by good education and training. It also requires knowledge of the world around us – even issues that for the moment do not seem to be strategically important.

Acuity or sharpness of understanding: this strand requires good research in the strategic field and intellectual people - officers, civil servants, and politicians – that have such an education in the strategic field that they can understand the issues.

To come back to the trinity of Guitton. A modern strategy needs a “body” that is responsive, flexible, and resilient. The “mind” must be adaptive while acuity must mark the “heart”.

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Notes

1. Gray, Colin S.: *Modern Strategy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 306.
2. Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé: *Traité de Stratégie*, Economica, Paris 1999, p. 59. All translations from French or Swedish to English by the author.
3. de Guibert, Jacques: *Essai général de tactique*, Economica, Paris 2004 (1772), p. 141.
4. de Saxe, Maurice: *Mes rêveries*, Economic Paris 2002 (1756), p. 159.
5. Poirier, Lucien: *Stratégie théorique II*, Economica, Paris 1987, p. 47.
6. von Clausewitz, Carl: *On War*, (translated by Colonel J.J. Graham) Barnes and Nobles Books, New York 2004, p. 127. Italics in the original.
7. Ibid, p. 17
8. Aron, Raymond: *Penser la guerre, Clausewitz. Part I, L'âge européen*, Gallimard, Paris 1976, p. 169. It should be noted that the quote is the most usual but that the idea as such is treated more exhaustively in Book 6B, which is also the basis for Aron when coining "the Formula".
9. Op. cit. note 4, Preface by Jean-Paul Charnay, p. 35.
10. Hart, Liddell and Basil H.: *Strategy. The Indirect Approach*, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, p. 335-336. It should be noted that he had a number of predecessors: Corbett, Castex and Beaufre all endeavoured to enlarge the original, military, notion of strategy.
11. Ibid, p. 366.
12. Op. cit. note 5, p. 105. The word "forces" is used in a very general – mechanical – sense and is not confined to "military forces".
13. Beaufre, André: *An introduction to strategy with particular reference to problems of defence, politics, economics and diplomacy in the nuclear age*, Faber and Faber, London, 1965, p. 22.
14. Géré, François: avec le concours de Widemann, Thierry; Blin, Arnaud; Pô, Jean-Damien: *Dictionnaire de la pensée stratégique*, Larousse, Paris 2000, p. 256.
15. Op. cit. note 5, p. 50-51.
16. Desportes, Vincent: *Comprendre la guerre*, Economica, Paris 2001, p. 102.
17. See op. cit. note 1, p. 270.
18. The Rubik's Cube is a 3-D mechanical puzzle invented in 1974 by Hungarian sculptor and professor of architecture Rubik, Ernő.
19. Op. cit. note 6, p. 19.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid, p. 20
22. Boëne, Bernard: "Inactualité de Clausewitz? Origines, termes et critique du débat contemporain", in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, Martin (eds.): *De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique contemporaine*, Economica, Paris 2008, p. 146.
23. Strachan, Hew: "Clausewitz en anglais : la césure de 1976" in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, Martin (eds.): *De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique contemporaine*, Economica, Paris 2008, p. 121.
24. Ibid, p. 103.
25. Ibid, p. 121.
26. Malis, Christian: "Clausewitz et la stratégie nucléaire", in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, Martin (eds.): *De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique contemporaine*, Economica, Paris 2008, pp. 274-275
27. Which is a curious way to describe a people fighting for its freedom against invaders.
28. One could, however, argue that the existence of NATO had been in danger if one had not acted against something that looked like genocide.
29. C.f. Mahan, Alfred Thayer: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660 – 1783*, Sampson Low, Marston & Company, London p. 29.
30. Aron, Raymond: *Peace and War. A Theory of International Relations*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2003, p. 33.
31. Desportes, Vincent: *La guerre probable*, Economica, Paris 2008, p. 38.
32. Op. cit. note 6, p. 21.
33. Op. cit. note 6, p. 8-9.
Op. cit. note 8, pp. 121.
34. Foch, F.: *Des principes de la guerre. Conférences faites en 1900 à l'École Supérieure de Guerre*, Berger-Levrault Nancy Paris Strasbourg 1919, p. 120.
35. Op. cit. note 12, p. 109.
36. Intégrale in the original text
37. Op. cit. note 12, p. 117.
38. *Ziel* and *Zweck* are German words, not immediately translatable to English.
39. Op. cit. note 8, pp. 92, 406.
40. Op. cit. note 30, p. 87.
41. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html>

42. Op. cit. note 6, p. 648.
43. Op. cit. note 41.
44. Ibid.
45. Trinquier, Roger: *La guerre moderne*, Economica, Paris 2008 (1961), p. 14.
46. Holsti, Kalevi J.: *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, p. 84.
47. Cf. Rathmell, Andrew: "Adapting Government for Stabilisation and Counterinsurgency Operations" and Korski, Daniel: "British Civil-Military Integration: The History and Next Steps", *The RUSI Journal*, December 2009, vol 156, No 6, p. 8-13 and 14-25.
48. Op. cit. note 30, p. 160
49. Cf. Smith, Rupert: *The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World*, Allen Lane, Penguin books, London 2005.
50. Hayward, Joel: "Air Power and the Environment: The Ecological Implications of Modern Air Warfare", *Air Power Review*, Vol 12, no 3, Autumn 2009, p. 17.
51. Op. cit. note 30, p. 53.
52. Op. cit. note 6, p. 15.
53. Terray, Emmanuel: "Raymond Aron critique de Clausewitz: réflexions sur la guerre absolue", in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, Martin (eds.): *De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique contemporaine*, Economica, Paris 2008, p. 366
54. Op. cit. note 6, p. 58-59.
55. Colson, Bruno: "La stratégie américaine de sécurité et la critique de Clausewitz", *Stratégique*, No 76, p. 162
56. Admiral William Owens, Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff during the President Clinton's first term, was one of the major proponents of RMA.
57. Op. cit. note 31, p. 173.
58. Op. cit. note 16, p. 215.
59. Op. cit. note 13, p. 35.
60. Churchill, Winston S.: *Min ungdom: ett kringfläckande liv*, P.A. Norstedts & Söners förlag, Stockholm 1931, p. 24.
61. Op. cit. note 14, p. 260.
62. Polyænus, author of *Stratagemas*, lived in the second century A.D. and Frontin, author of *Strategemata*, between 40 and 103 A.D.
63. Op. cit. note 6, p. 156-157.
64. Chaliand, Gérard and Blin, Arnaud: *Dictionnaire de stratégie militaire des origines à nos jours*. Perrin, Paris 1998, p. 649.
65. CHEM (Centre des hautes études militaires). "La surprise stratégique." *Défense nationale et sécurité collective*. Mars 2008, p. 41.
66. Op. cit. note 12, p. 127.
67. Ibid.
68. Luttwak, Edward N.: *Strategy: the logic of war and peace*, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2001, p. 21.
69. Op. cit. note 6, p. 159.
70. Op. cit. note 2, p. 366-367.
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78. Op. cit. note 1, p. 270.
79. Castex, Raoul: *Théories stratégiques*, Tome I, Economica, Paris 1997 (1929), p. 19.
80. Poirier, Lucien: *Le chantier stratégique, entretiens avec Gérard Chaliand*, Hachette, Paris 1997, p. 41-43.
81. Op. cit. note 6, p. 19.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid p. 21.
84. Chaliand, Gérard: *Le nouvel art de la guerre*, l'Archipel, Paris 2008, p. 150.
85. Op. cit. note 22, p. 150
86. Münkler, Herrfried: *De nya krigen*, Daidalos, Göteborg 2004, p. 52.
87. Cf. the French debate in 2010 on what constitutes the national identity.
88. Winston Churchill quoted in Kiszely, John: *Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations*. Whitehall Report 1-08. RUSI London 2009, p. 1.

89. Quoted in Aldridge, David Denis: *Admiral Sir John Norris and the British Naval Expeditions to the Baltic Sea 1715 – 1727*. Nordic Academic Press, Lund 2009, p. 137. The author hints that Admiral Norris never did understand this instruction.
90. Supreme Allied Commander Europe
91. Clark, Wesley K.: *Waging Modern War*. Public Affairs, New York 2001, p. 10.
92. Cf. Op. cit. note 79, Tome V, p. 104-127.
93. Kiszely, John: *Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations*. Whitehall Report 1-08. RUSI London 2009, p. 13.
94. Op.cit. note 30, p. 112.
95. Interview at CESA (Centre d'études stratégiques aérospatiales) Paris 2009.
96. Op. cit. note 6, pp. 526-527.
97. Op. cit. note 46, p. 84.
98. Cf. Gallieni, Joseph: "Rapport sur la Conquête de Madagascar" in Gérard, Chaliand (ed.): *Anthologie mondiale de la stratégie. Des origines au nucléaire*, Robert Laffont, Paris 1990 and Lyautey, Hubert: "Rôle Colonial de l'Armée", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1900, p. 308-328.
99. Op. cit. note 22, p. 142
100. Quoted in Depeyre, Michel: *Entre Vent et eau. Un siècle d'hésitations tactiques et stratégiques 1790-1890*, Economica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, Paris 2003, p. 136.
101. Op. cit. note 6, p. 648.
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104. Shields, Ian: "Air Power and Agility", *Air Power Review*, Vol 12, no 3, Autumn 2009, p. 106
105. For a discussion of resilience, see Francart, Loup: "Résilience: de quoi s'agit-il?", *Revue défense nationale*, Février 2010 – no 727, p. 19-28.