Constitutional Crisis and Securitisation
A Political Discourse Analysis of Sweden’s Courtyard Crisis,
6-18 February 1914

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Abstract

In February 1914, Sweden faced a time of constitutional crisis, dubbed the Courtyard Crisis, when King Gustaf V publicly distanced himself from Prime Minister Karl Staaff and the Liberal Government over differences of opinion regarding the Swedish defence. Behind this, however, was also a dispute between two different political systems. On the one hand, there was the current form of government based on monarchical rule, and on the other hand, the advancing form of government, a government based on parliamentarism.

This thesis is concerned with explaining the tension that arises between, on the one hand, different forms of government, and, on the other hand, aspects of decision making in the process of securitisation. To do this, the thesis uses Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s securitisation sectors, though limited to the military, political, and societal sectors, as entry points for the analysis and uses political discourse analysis to analyse the language used by the Left and the Right during parliamentary debates held between 6 and 18 February 1914.

The thesis concludes that, though the results were not conclusive, the Courtyard Crisis can be used as an example to explain the tension between different forms of government by showing the difference in ideas between the two powers of state in Sweden and how these affect the decision making in the process of securitisation.

Keywords:
Borggårdsfalten | Borggården | Court Yard Crisis | Constitutional Crisis | Courtyard Speech | Government Crisis | Gustaf V | Karl Staaff | Konstitutionskris | Parliamen tarism | Political Discourse Analysis | Regeringskrise | Securitisation | Securitisation Theory | Sweden
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1. Introduction

When King Gustaf V of Sweden on 6 February 1914 held his, now famous, Courtyard Speech (Borggårdstal), he did it in front of more than thirty thousand farmers from every corner of the Swedish provinces. The farmers had gathered in, and beyond, the courtyard outside the Royal Palace with the purpose to, as Birgersson, Hadenius, Molin, and Wieslander described it, “declare [their] loyalty to [the King] and [their] willingness to sacrifice for the defence.” The Courtyard Speech was the culmination of a two-year long political debate, dubbed the defence battle (försvarsstriden), between the Right and the Left. In many aspects it was dominated by the defence question (försvarsfrågan) and whether the military should receive more money for a strengthening of its resources or if they should receive less money and use the surplus towards social reforms instead. However, as argued by Zetterberg, the defence battle was a doubled-edged struggle. This is, briefly stated, because, it was also about the Left’s desire to curtail the King’s influence on the military and instead increase the political influence. Furthermore, behind this, was the Left’s aspiration to fully introduce parliamentarism as Sweden’s constitution. This would make democracy and popular sovereignty the country’s form of governance instead of the current form of governance which is based on a two powers of state system where the executive power is in the hands of the king and not the elected politicians.

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1 Note: All translations in this thesis are the author’s own unless otherwise stated.
2 Note: It can also be referred to as the Bailey Speech (Qvarnström, 2014).
3 Engström, 2021, p. 11.
5 Note: For the sake of simplicity, and unless otherwise indicated, the Right will refer to the King and the General Electoral League (Allmänna valmansförbundet), today known as the Moderate Party (Moderaterna), while the Left will refer to the Free-minded National Association (Frisinnade landsföreningen), today known as the Liberals (Liberalerna), and the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna) (Asker, 2007, pp. 72-73). Furthermore, the General Electoral League, Free-minded National Association, and Social Democrats were the three largest parties after the 1911 General Election (Kungl. Statistiska centralbyrån, 1912).
The Courtyard Speech became the beginning of the end for Prime Minister Karl Staaff and his Liberal Government who four days later, on 10 February 1914, handed in their letter of resignation and opened up for the appointment of a caretaker government (ämbetsmännaregering or expeditionsregering) – a government containing “conservative high officials and businessmen without previous political experience” and without any (official) party affiliations\(^8\) – on 17 February under the leadership of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld with the primary objective to reach an agreement on the defence question and then hand over the political responsibility to a new government after the general election in September.\(^9\) This period in Swedish history, from 6 February to 17 February 1914, has become known as the Courtyard Crisis (Borggårdskrisen)\(^10\) and is described by scholars as a constitutional crisis between the King and the Liberal Government.\(^11\)

In security studies the interdisciplinary approaches are many, and the use of history and security studies is not anything new. However, what many scholars do when combining history and security studies is to use their chosen historical case to explain or provide a background for a contemporary security issue as part of their research problem.\(^12\) This thesis project wants to challenge this combination by applying Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s securitisation theory to an event in the past. For this reason, the choice fell on the use of a single case study and the Courtyard Crisis, not only because of its historical significance in Sweden but also because of its definition as a constitutional crisis. A constitutional crisis can be used to study the process of securitisation because of its impact on a country’s political system, which for Sweden meant

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\(^8\) Qvarnström, 2014; Söderpalm, n.d.

\(^9\) Post- och Inrikes Tidningar, 10 February 1914, p. 2; Dagens Nyheter, 11 February 1914, p. 1; Svenska Dagbladet, 11 February 1914, pp. 5-6; Dagens Nyheter, 17 February 1914, p. 1; Svenska Dagbladet, 17 February 1914, p. 8; Dagens Nyheter, 19 February 1914, p. 7; Dagens Nyheter, 6 March 1914, p. 1; Svenska Dagbladet, 6 March 1914, p. 6; Odelberg, 2014, pp. 216–218; Birgersson et al., 1984, p. 76.

\(^10\) Note: It can also be referred to as the Bailey Crisis (Qvarnström, 2014).

\(^11\) See, for example, Brusewitz, 1951; Hadenius, 2007; Esaïasson, 2010.

\(^12\) James, 2011, p. 90.
that, even though it was seen as a country with monarchical rule until 1975, the King’s political impact was essentially non-existent by 1917. For a successful securitisation to occur the following steps need to be taken for it to happen: a recognised securitising actor needs to make a speech act identifying an existential threat towards a referent object in front of an audience accepting the extraordinary measures deemed necessary for the referent object’s protection. Exactly what this means will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. Since the securitisation theory is focused on what discourse is being used during the securitisation process, the method that will be used during this thesis is political discourse analysis. The method will analyse the language used in the parliamentary debates held between 6 and 18 February and focus on what the Left and the Right say about the Courtyard Crisis and their, by the author identified, referent objects.

1.2. Aim and Research Question

The aim of this thesis project is not to advance securitisation theory but to use the Courtyard Crisis to try and shed light on the process of securitisation. This will be done by answering the following research question:

- How can the Courtyard Crisis of 1914 be used to explain the tension that arises between, on the one hand, different forms of government, and, on the other hand, aspects of decision making in the process of securitisation?

To help answer the research question, the aim is to look at the discourse used by the Left and the Right in response to Gustav V’s Courtyard Speech and the speech act that begun the securitisation process that resulted in in the Courtyard Crisis.
1.3. Previous Research
Previous research on the Courtyard Crisis as part of the defence battle and the defence question is extensive, which would be expected. The time between 1911 and the outbreak of the First World War is one of the most written about periods in Swedish political history.\(^{13}\) Scholars have discussed the defence battle through everything from its impact on Swedish society to the military and party politics, and Swedish history books have at least one passage discussing the Courtyard Crisis.\(^{14}\)

In Brusewitz’s *Kungamakt, Herremakt, Folkmakt*, posthumously published in 1951, a number of essays about Swedish politics at the beginning of the twentieth century have been compiled to present the development process of parliamentarism in Sweden between 1906 and 1918. In it, several essays discuss the relationship between the monarchy and the politicians of the time. Five of the essays discuss the time period discussed in this thesis, with two of them focusing on the Courtyard Crisis. One on the actual event and consequences of the Courtyard Crisis and one on its background while the other focuses on Staaff, the formation of Staaff’s government in 1911, and the relationship between the King and the politicians from the Right – an “intimate communication” which “took place as long as [Staaff’s] government was in place.”\(^{15}\)

Odelberg’s *Med kungen som verktyg* from 2014 looks at the prehistory of the Courtyard Crisis, and up until the middle of February, with the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin’s role in it as a starting point. Hedin wrote the pamphlet *Ett varningens ord* which gave rise to the defence battle. Odelberg uses a wide range of different source material to provide as detailed a picture as possible of this time in history and of, as Odelberg describes Hedin, “this strange man who

\(^{13}\) Hadenius, 2008, p. 35.
\(^{15}\) Brusewitz, 1951, p. 51.
rose to the position of one of the nation’s greatest heroes ever but ended up as persona non grata because of his stubborn admiration for Hitler.”\textsuperscript{16} However, what makes Hedin interesting for this thesis and why Odelberg’s book about him is described here, is because of the informal power Hedin had over the Crisis. Hedin had no political position but based solely on his fame as an explorer, his writing skills (he was one of the co-writers of the King’s Courtyard Speech\textsuperscript{17}), and his status as the nation’s greatest hero, he managed to influence Swedish domestic politics like no other non-politician before or after him has done.

Zetterberg’s \textit{Militärer och politiker} is a study on military professionalisation, innovation, and international influence on the Swedish defence drafting committees (\textit{försvarsberedningar}) 1911-1914 published in 1988. In it, he focuses his empirical material on the interplay between the politicians and the military in the time before the Courtyard Crisis. Zetterberg concludes his study by interpreting the empirical results through three theoretical perspectives: 1) the defence question as an element of the social organising skill in the modernising process, 2) the defence question as an element in the drafting committee process between the politicians and the military profession, and 3) the defence question as an expression of a new social “governing philosophy.”\textsuperscript{18}

The historical research of the Courtyard Crisis is as said quite extensive. However, the same cannot be said within the field of security studies, and especially in connection with the securitisation theory, here the research seems to be non-existent. Considering the amount of research that exists on securitisation theory and the Courtyard Crisis, it is interesting that no one has combined these before. The author’s hope is that this thesis will fill part of this gap,

\textsuperscript{16} Odelberg, 2014, p. 8.
\textsuperscript{17} Hedin, 1951.
\textsuperscript{18} Zetterberg, 1988, p. 86.
while also contributing to the existing research that combines historical cases with securitisation theory and the limited selection of research which either use the historical case to shed light on the theory or use the theory to shed light on the case.

In her article “The Queen’s speech: Desecuritizing the past, present and future of Anglo-Irish relations” from 2015, Donnelly analyses different gestures of reconciliation made by Queen Elizabeth II during a state visit to the Republic of Ireland in 2011 by adopting Copenhagen School’s concept of desecuritisation. The discussion on desecuritisation might not be of particular interest to this thesis, but for Donnelly’s article to make sense, one must understand the historical conflict between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and why the Queen’s state visit is of such importance to the reconciliation and (de)securitisation process on the Anglo-Irish relationship. Donnelly explores the bilingual speech act made by the Queen when she chose to open her speech at Dublin Castle by speaking in Gaeilge. An interesting aspect to take away from Donnelly’s article is that it contends that the Queen’s visit challenges the idea that securitisation (and desecuritisation) has a clear beginning and ending. The same can be argued about the Courtyard Crisis which, though it has a quite clear beginning, does not have a clear ending, because the consequences from the Crisis continued for several decades, and it could even be argued that it in some instances still affects Swedish politics. An example of this is, for instance, the impact the crisis had on the political influence of the Liberal Party, which has never reached the same levels of support as before 1914.

Jutila’s article “Securitization, history, and identity: some conceptual clarification and examples from politics of Finnish war history” from 2015 uses the framework of securitisation to study extreme history politics. In it he introduces three ways in which history and

19 Donnelly, 2015.
securitisation can be connected: 1) how history can serve as a facilitating condition of securitisation, 2) how history can be explicitly used to strengthen a securitising move, and 3) how history, or a specific interpretation of it, can be a referent object of securitisation.\(^{20}\) Jutila explores this by discussing history’s role in the securitisation of national identities. He illustrates it by looking at how Finnish politics have used examples from Finnish war history when making a securitisation move. Jutila concludes that when constructing national identities historical myths are essential, especially when viewed from a societal perspective. As he puts it, “History can serve as a facilitating condition for securitization or be used to support a securitizing move, but securitizing history in its own right is extremely difficult.”\(^{21}\)

### 1.4. Thesis Outline

This thesis project will be structured as follows. Chapter one introduced the thesis project and its aim and research question together with previous research on the subject. Chapter two will introduce securitisation as the thesis project’s theoretical framework. Chapter three will first discuss the method for the thesis and then go on to discuss the material and any limitations that have been identified plus selected research challengers that was experienced during the thesis project. The chapter will conclude with an empirical background. Chapter four contains an analysis of the Courtyard Crisis through a discussion of the parliamentary debates held in the weeks following Gustaf V’s Courtyard Speech. Chapter five will, through a discussion of the findings in the analysis, try and answer the research question posed in this chapter. After this, a conclusion of the thesis project and suggestions for further research will also be given in chapter five.

\(^{20}\) Jutila, 2015, p. 930-933.

\(^{21}\) Jutila, 2015, p. 941.
2. Theory
This chapter will introduce Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s securitisation theory. It will then discuss the importance of securitisation sectors for Buzan et al. before explaining the use of three of them for the thesis’ analysis and the reason for not using all of them. To conclude, the chapter will identify the Courtyard Crisis’ referent object(s), securitising actor(s), and its existential threat(s).

2.1. Securitisation Theory
In 1998, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde published their book Security: A New Framework for Analysis in which they argue the case for a widening of the security agenda in defiance of traditional security studies.22 The new framework argues that “security is a particular type of politics applicable to a wide range of issues.”23 It argues that security should not be restricted to two sectors: military and political, as in traditional security studies, but should be able to encompass three more sectors: economic, environmental, and societal.24 Furthermore, Buzan et al. argue that the new framework “offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization (emphasis added),” that is, the framework can be used to understand who it is that can securitise a subject and under what conditions it can be done.25

But before we dive into Buzan et al.’s Security, it can be good to mention Ole Wæver’s “Securitization and Desecuritization” from 1995, which is said to have been first with introducing the concept of securitisation as a speech act.26

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26 van Munster, 2012.
Desecuritization,” Wæver argues that it is the utterance of the word security by a state representative that is the securitisation act and by doing so the state representative moves a particular challenging development into a specific area and principled level.27 This allows for the state to use all means necessary to block the challenge from becoming a threat to the state. Furthermore, because it would be characterised as an existential threat and a challenge towards the state’s sovereignty, state representatives “would not be limited in what [they] could or might do.”28 As Wæver then goes on to say, “Under these circumstances, a problem would become a security issue whenever so defined by the power holders.”29 What a security problem does for the state, Wæver argues, is trying to undermine the political order in the state, but by trying to “use the instrument of securitization of an issue,” the elites can gain control over the issue.30 As said, by making use of securitisation, the state representatives give themselves a way to use whatever means they deem essential for the protection of the political order.

Let us return to Buzan et al.’s Security. As mentioned, they believe that a new framework for security studies is needed to be able to encompass the new security issues that had been on the rise during the Cold War and the book sets out a comprehensive framework to make this possible.31 The securitisation theory by Buzan et al. and the Copenhagen School consider a security issue to be constructed when securitising actors, defined as the actors who want to securitise an issue – for example, political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, or pressure groups – declares a referent object to be existentially threatened.32 That is, a referent object is something that has “a legitimate claim to survival,” which usually means that what the

28 Wæver, 1995, p. 56.
29 Wæver, 1995, p. 56.
30 Wæver, 1995, p. 54.
31 Buzan et al., 1998.
The securitising actor refers to is the state, but it can also refer to, for example, sovereignty, identity, or ideology. Furthermore, when the securitising actor constructs a security issue, he, or she, does so by following a certain security, language rhetoric, the earlier mentioned “speech act.”

The speech act, which is central in the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory, is based on John Austin’s language theory and suggests that it is the utterance itself that is the act and not what is said: “By saying the words, something is done.” It might be argued that the important thing for the speech act is not what words are said but that they are spoken. For it to be identified by scholars of securitisation, it needs to follow a certain rhetorical structure, a “grammar of security” needs to be constructed: “a plot that includes existential threat, no point of no return, and a possible way out.”

The transformation of an issue by a securitising actor into a security issue is done in a process of securitisation, defined as, a process through which the issue is “presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.” This lifts the issue from the politicized discussion and takes it beyond the established rules of politics and “frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” Securitisation then renders the issue as too important to be exposed to the normal haggling of politics and reinforcing that it should be dealt with swiftly and decisively by top leaders and prior to any other issue. Thus, securitisation can be argued to be a more extreme version of politicization because it is grounded in the logic of survival, which grants

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34 Wæver, 1995.
35 Austin, 1975.
37 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 33.
40 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29.
the issue its level of priority of action, because if the threat is not taken care of now it will be too late, “and we will not exist to remedy our failure.”

However, for a speech act and securitisation to be successful, there is one more threshold that needs to be crossed. As Buzan et al. describe it, “the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.” That is, for an issue to be securitised it needs to be accepted as such by the targeted audience, defined as “those the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue.” Otherwise, securitisation does not happen, and the discourse would only be considered a securitising move. The audience’s acceptance of the securitising move is reasoned to be greater if the securitising actor has a position of authority in society, but there must also be an understanding between the audience and the securitising actor that the issue has been designated security status. The requirement of an audience accepting a securitising move makes it possible to ensure that securitisation remains an intersubjective and socially constructed process.

Buzan et al., and the Copenhagen School, may build their framework on how to successfully perform securitisation and that a successful securitisation has many advantages. However, they claim that naming something “security” represents a failure, securitising actors should be able to deal with issues as normal politics. This is why desecuritisation is “the optimal long-range

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42 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25.
43 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 41.
44 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25.
45 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27, p. 33.
46 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 31.
47 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29.
option” since it means that issues are not framed as existentially threatened and, therefore, do not need emergency measures found outside the political sphere and still inside “the normal bargaining process of the political sphere.” Desecuritisation then allows for an open political debate where discussions are not kept behind closed doors.

2.2. Securitisation Sectors

With the rise of a new perception of threats arising after the Cold War, Buzan et al. saw a need for a widening of the security agenda. The new perception, Buzan et al. argue, saw a new international system which “was going to be decentralized and regionalized in character” and, therefore, security analyses needed to take this into consideration when analysing threats. Meaning that security analysts need to take into consideration threats to sectors beyond the traditional security sectors, i.e., the military and political sectors. Buzan et al. argue that this makes it possible “to adopt a more diversified agenda” by including societal, economic, and environmental issues when studying security. The sectors make it possible to identify specific types and distinctive patterns of interaction for analysis, which confines the scope of inquiry into more manageable proportions by reducing the number of variables in play, since each sector highlights a certain part of the system. However, to achieve complete understanding, Buzan et al. argue, it is necessary to finish an analysis by assembling the parts found in the different sectors and see how they relate to each other.

48 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 29, 4; see also Wæver, 1995.
Furthermore, Buzan et al. suggest, that the types of interaction in the different sectors can look as follow: the military is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the societal is about relationships of collective identity; the economic is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; and the environmental is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.\textsuperscript{54}

Having identified a way of looking at the types of interactions in each sector makes it possible to identify the different variables in play each sector. Although some, such as the state for example, can appear in more than one sector.\textsuperscript{55} However, examples of these different variables could be the liberal world economy as a referent object in the economic sector, threats to the survival of the biosphere in the environmental sector, or politicians as securitising actors in the political sector.\textsuperscript{56}

The importance of the sectoral approach for Buzan et al.’s securitisation framework is threefold.\textsuperscript{57} One, using a sectoral approach enables a strong link to traditional security studies to be maintained since the monosectoral approach of traditional security studies makes it easy for it to fit into securitisation’s multisectoral approach. Thus, maintaining interoperability between the old and the new by enabling the latter, i.e., securitisation, to smoothly incorporate the insights from the former, i.e., traditional security studies. Two, using a sectoral approach reflects the reality of what people are doing with the language when “security” is added onto the sector designations. A behaviour, which, despite that it in the discourse often reflects an impulsive or superficially tactical move and only intended to “raise the priority of a given issue in the general political melee,” is a vital part of the securitisation process.\textsuperscript{58} The sectors then

\textsuperscript{54} Buzan et al., 1998, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{55} Buzan et al., 1998, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{56} Buzan et al., 1998.
\textsuperscript{57} Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 195-196.
\textsuperscript{58} Buzan et al., 1998, p. 196.
constitute distinctive arenas of discourse where a variety of different values can be the focus of power struggles and where each move can generate deeper political consequences. The rhetoric of the sectors results in a need for analytical follow-up to understand how the consequences of each move could unfold. Three, using sectors “provide a way of understanding the different qualities of security that are features of the wider agenda.”

Even though some qualities of security are shared across the sectors, each sector has, as shown above, its own securitising actors, referent objects, dynamics, and contradictions that cannot be understood in relation to other sectors but need to be understood in their own terms.

The securitisation sectors are of importance for this thesis because they are going to provide the key entry point for analysing the Courtyard Crisis. However, only the military, political, and societal sectors will be used for the analysis, while the environmental and economic sectors will not. The environmental sector will not be used because there are no arguments to be found in the empirical material that would justify an analysis based on the environmental sector, so it would not add anything to the thesis discussion. When it comes to the economic sector, on the other hand, it could be argued that the sector should be one of the key entry points for the analysis since the defence battle began due to disagreements over military spending. However, this would mean using material found outside of the selected empirical material and therefore the economic sector will not be used for this thesis. The other securitisation sectors, on the other hand, have all been deemed to be of relevance when analysing the Courtyard Crisis because arguments for their referent objects’ existential survival can be found in the empirical material.

This chapter has introduced the securitisation theory and provided the key entry points for the analysis of the Courtyard Crisis by discussing Buzan et al.’s securitisation sectors. The next

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chapter will discuss the chosen method, selected empirical material for this thesis, its limitations and selected research challenges that was experienced during the thesis project. It will also provide an empirical background. However, before that, an identification of the referent object(s), securitising actor(s), and existential threat(s) from the different sides during the Courtyard Crisis will be given. For the Right, the referent objects are the monarchical rule, i.e., the current political system, and the King’s role as commander in chief of the military, while their existential threat is parliamentarism. The main securitising actor for the Right is the King, who has been given that status through the 1809’s Instrument of Government (1809 års regeringsform), but also the Right’s elected politicians in the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen).

For the Left, the referent object is complete parliamentarism, i.e., emphasis on power should be on the elected members of the Second Chamber (andra kammaren), while their existential threat is the current political system where the King, the First Chamber (förrsta kammaren), and the Second Chamber share the power. The main securitising actor for the Left is Prime Minister Stauf and his Cabinet, who have also been given that status through the 1809’s Instrument of Government, but also the Left’s elected politicians in the Parliament. For the sake of simplicity, each sector’s referent objects, securitising actors, and existential threats will also be described again in chapter four.
3. Method
This chapter of the thesis will discuss the chosen method for the analysis of the Courtyard Crisis of 1914. It will do so by first introducing the overall field of discourse analysis and then go on to discuss political discourse analysis. Furthermore, the chapter will discuss the selected empirical material and certain limitations to it and the thesis. The chapter will then go on to discuss selected research challenges before concluding by providing an empirical background divided into two parts. The first part will discuss the political climate in Sweden at the start of the Courtyard Crisis, while the second part will discuss the King’s Courtyard Speech.

3.1. Field of Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “the analysis of spoken or written texts that contain more than one sentence, including their social context.” Cambridge Dictionary’s definition gives a simple explanation of what exactly it is discourse analysis wants to achieve. However, as with many methods of analysis, there is more behind it. Scholars of discourse analysis are of the belief that anyone who can speak or write constructs the social world around them through active participation. Discourse analysis is argued to be widely associated with and within poststructuralism, whose scholars believe that the material world might not be rationally or objectively independent from how we conceptualise the world because, depending on our perception of something, we create a particular reality.

The term discourse then is about the mode of interpretation of language and, according to Milliken, what it does is examine the political impact of the adaptations of different modes of

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60 Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.
61 See for example, Neimeyer & Levitt, 2001.
representation over others. Discourse is therefore also about the revelation of power, legitimacy, and the status that comes from different collaborations of people to build the physical world that we live in. One can argue that what discourse does is provide us with the resources that are needed for us to create meaning, which in the end becomes the set of rules that we live by every day. Weldes describes this as discourses being the “sources of power” where the “dominant discourses become common sense.”

Scholars then use discourse analysis to analyse the way language creates different patterns that have become socially accepted as discourses. However, as with other disciplines, they are not in full agreement over the best way to conduct a discourse analysis. This has led to several subdisciplines of discourse analysis. Hodges, Kuper, and Reeves discuss some of these in an article from 2008, for example, formal linguistic discourse analysis, empirical discourse analysis, and critical discourse analysis. However, since Hodges et al.’s article came out, other methods have been developed. One of these is political discourse analysis and, because of its focus on political discourse, is a good match for the thesis’ chosen case study since the Courtyard Crisis of 1914 is centred on the political debates of the time. Next part of this chapter will therefore discuss political discourse analysis.

3.2. Political Discourse Analysis

According to Dunmire political discourse analysis consists of inter-and multidisciplinary research with a focus on “the linguistic and discursive dimensions of political text and talk and on the political nature of discursive practice.” She argues that political discourse analysis

65 Hodges et al., 2008.
recognises, as with discourse analysis overall, that it cannot operate solely within a linguistic and discursive framework but needs to draw upon other disciplines’ methods, frameworks, and contents for the analysis of its research, most often concerning socio-political issues, to be adequate.  

Furthermore, Dunmire defines political discourse analysis as being concerned with the understanding of the nature and function of political discourse and in criticising the role discourse plays in “producing, maintaining, abusing, and resisting power” in society. She bases her definition on van Dijk’s explanation of political discourse analysis from 1997 where he explains that it can refer to either “the analysis of political discourse, defined as the text and talk of politicians within overtly political contexts, or a political, i.e., critical, approach to discourse analysis.”

What needs to be taken into consideration when analysing anything that has to do with politics is that the definition of political discourse, and therefore political discourse analysis, can take many forms. Dunmire and van Dijk’s definitions are two forms it can take. Thirdly, Kampf defines political discourse as “talk and text produced in regard to concrete political issues (language in politics) or through the actual language use of institutional political actors, even in discussions of [non-political] issues (language of politicians).” Lastly, Fairclough and Fairclough define political discourse analysis as a critical perspective that “focuses on the reproduction and contestation of political power through political discourse” as “attached to political actors” when they are inside the political context, “i.e., contexts which make it possible

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67 Dunmire, 2012. This is also argued by, for example, Cap (2006), Chilton (2004), Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), Kampf (2015), and to some extent van Dijk (1997).
70 Kampf, 2015, p. 3.
for actors to exert their agency and empower them to act on the world in a way that has an impact on matters of common concern.”

The above-mentioned definitions by van Dijk, Dunmire, Kampf, and Fairclough and Fairclough combined will constitute the methodological framework for this thesis. It will be defined as follows: *political discourse analysis uses a critical approach to analyse speeches held and texts written by actors in a political context where they use their power (a power given through election, constitution, or influence) to influence the outcome on matters of social concern according to their belief of what is best for society.*

With the definition of political discourse analysis adopted for the thesis, let us look at how the method will be used to analyse the empirical material. Political discourse analysis will be used to critically analyse the arguments used by either side of the Courtyard Crisis. It will look at how the discourse in each sector is used to argue for why their constitutional belief should be the dominant form of government. Furthermore, the method will be used to look for how power is voiced through each sector’s security discourse. Next part of this chapter will discuss the empirical material on which the method is to be used.

### 3.3. Material and Limitations

This part will discuss the empirical material which is used in this thesis and any of its identified limitations. As mentioned above, the thesis is centred on the political debates surrounding the Courtyard Crisis of 1914, a critical point in Swedish political history to understand the development of parliamentarism in Sweden. The fact that the political debates are central is reflected in the main material that has been selected for the thesis’ analysis. The empirical

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material that has been used during the thesis is five different parliamentary debates held after the King’s Courtyard Speech held on 6 February. They have been chosen because they discuss the speech, the King’s constitutional role, the Swedish constitution, and/or the ministers’ constitutional roles. Furthermore, three of these parliamentary debates were held in the Second Chamber (on 7, 11, and 18 February) and two were held in the First Chamber (on 7 and 18 February), which means they represent all sides of the Swedish Parliament.

One could argue that the King’s speech should also be used as part of the main empirical material since it was the speech that was the starting point of the discussion of a constitutional crisis in Sweden and, therefore, was of significance for how the debates played out. Scholars have also argued that the Liberal Government’s opposition had the King’s ear and greatly influenced the King’s views. However, for better use of the speech, it would have needed to be supplemented with other sources, such as royal proclamations published nationwide in 1914 by *Post- och Inrikes tidningar* or comments made by the King during, for example, Cabinet meetings (*konselj*) or from private conversations. Though the published proclamations are easy to get hold of, they are available to look at in the National Library of Sweden’s (*Kungliga Biblioteket’s*) microfilm archive, getting hold of primary sources containing comments from the King within the set time limit of the thesis writing was not possible. This, together with the fact that it was not part of the parliamentary debates, meant that it did not meet the set criteria and therefore has only been used to understand the empirical background.

The parliamentary debates have, as stated above, been selected for their relevance to the discussion surrounding the Courtyard Speech and constitutional changes. To keep the number

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72 See, for example, Nyman, 1957; Wichman, 1967; Hadenius, 2007.
73 Note: *PoIT* is Sweden’s official body for nationwide, legal announcements (Helmersson & Oscarsson, n.d.).
of sources manageable inside the time frame of this thesis, any debates discussing constitutional changes before the King’s speech or after the first appearance of Hammarskjöld’s caretaker government in the First and Second Chambers have not been looked at. Limiting the parliamentary debates to this time period could have some bearing on the overall analysis of this thesis. This is because discussions about constitutional crisis, or if it was time for a constitutional reform, together with the defence question continued up until the outbreak of the First World War in September when a party truce (borgfred) was agreed upon: a united and strong front to the outside world was seen as more important than political differences.\footnote{Carlsson, 1980, p. 478.} However, as previously stated, within the scope of this thesis project there was not enough time to include these too.

The majority of the material used in this thesis is in Swedish, which means that any quotes taken from these have been translated into English during the writing process by the author. This means that there might be some inconsistency in sentence structure or correct use of a specific phrase or word choice. However, if there are any, these should not interfere with the reliability of the thesis’ analysis and its conclusions.

### 3.4. Research Challenges

This thesis project turned out to be a harder project than expected and provided many challenges. One of the biggest challenges concerns the use of the interdisciplinary approach and the combination of historical research and security studies. Strangely enough, the author had difficulty finding literature with a similar interdisciplinary approach making it hard to anchor the thesis project in existing research. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary approach means a need
to balance the importance of theory in security studies with the more relaxed view on theory in history.

Another challenge concerns the research puzzle and the application of securitisation theory on a historical event retrospectively. As the analysis will show, there was only so much that could be studied within this thesis project. For a more thorough analysis to be considered, the research scope, together with the time given, would have needed to be extended beyond this thesis project.

3.5. Empirical Background
This part of the thesis will provide an empirical background to the material. The background will be presented in two parts. Firstly, a discussion of the political climate in Sweden at the start of the Courtyard Crisis will be provided. Secondly, the King’s Courtyard Speech will be discussed.

3.5.1. The Political Climate
To understand the political climate in which the Courtyard Crisis arose, we must go back to the appointment of Staafl as Prime Minister in September 1911. But first, a look at the political system in Sweden. At the time, the Swedish Parliament was based on a bicameral system in which any new legislature needed to be agreed upon in both chambers and get the seal of approval from the king, who had the executive power. As it says in 4 § of 1809’s Instrument of Government: “The King has sole authority to rule the kingdom in the way this instrument of government prescribes.”75 The members of the First Chamber were elected through an indirect election by the country councils and municipal assemblies in the larger towns, because elections

75 Riis et al., 2008, p. 134.
to councils and assemblies were based on a graded voting scale, the more wealth or property a voter had the more votes they got. This meant that the First Chamber was considered to represent the educated and the elite, and only men who fulfilled certain criteria relating to age, income, and wealth could get elected to a seat. The members of the Second Chamber, meanwhile, were elected through a direct general election where any man who owned a property to a value of at least one thousand Swedish crowns (riksdaler), leased an agricultural property to a value of at least six thousand Swedish crowns, or had an annual income of at least eight hundred Swedish crowns were eligible to vote.\textsuperscript{76}

The 1911 general election was the first time in Sweden based on universal male suffrage to the Second Chamber and proportional representation, while the First Chamber had its graded voting scale lowered, “thereby limiting the difference between the rich and the less well-off.”\textsuperscript{77} It was in this developing parliamentary system that Staaff was elected, where close to half a million voters had been added to the electoral register since the suffrage reform two years earlier, which gave the so-called “lower” classes a louder voice and a chance for more influence.\textsuperscript{78} The move to universal male suffrage might have started to reduce the gap between the different social classes and the Second Chamber might have started to be more representative of the “real” Sweden that was under development. However, there were still many loud voices in motion against this, and not just in the conservatively controlled First Chamber but also among the more conservative members of the Left.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{77} Hedenborg & Kvarnström, 2015, p. 221; Lindblad, 2015.
\textsuperscript{78} Hedenborg & Kvarnström, 2015, p. 221-222.
\textsuperscript{79} Esaiasson, 2010; Lindblad, 2015.
Before the general election in 1911, Staaff and the Liberals made three main electoral pledges: to do an audit of the defence system, from which the results would be used to formulate regulations over military expenditures, with a promise of rapid reduction, and a more effective conscription period; to an implementation of parliamentarism with emphasis on power belonging to the directly elected members of the Second Chamber; and a local veto for every municipality on the selling of alcohol, as well as the investigation of a total ban on alcohol.80 After the election win, Staaff considered the pledge of parliamentarism as fulfilled, as Esaiasson puts it, “the King had accepted what the popularly elected advisers wanted to do,” even if he was not happy with a liberal-led government.81 However, the King’s displeasure would continue throughout Staaff’s term of office, and the leaders of the Right could often be seen arriving at the castle after a meeting between the King and the Liberal Government. Furthermore, the longer it took for the Left to present a solution to the defence question that all sides were happy with, the more the discontent grew among those in favour of a strong national defence, something which the Right used in their quest to undermine and try to remove Staaff from office. Staaff did his best to try and turn the tide in a speech held in Karlskrona on 21 December 1913 in which he presented a defence proposal deemed as the best compromise between the demands of the Right and the pledges made to the Left before the 1911 election.82 But it was too little, too late for the opposition who had already set the plans in motion that would bring the King to hold his Courtyard Speech in front of the gathered farmers on 6 February 1914.

80 Dagens Nyheter, 22 May 1911, p. 4; Svenska Dagbladet, 22 May 1911, p. 7; Grimberg, 1963, p. 125; Esaiasson, 1990, pp. 112-113.
81 Esaiasson, 2010, p. 100.
82 Esaiasson, 2010, pp. 105-106; Staaff, 1913.
3.5.2. The Courtyard Speech, 6 February 1914

The Courtyard Speech became the King’s way to publicly show his frustration with the slowness of solving the defence question and his disagreement with some of the pledges made by Staaff during his Karlskrona Speech (Karlskronatal). In his speech, Staaff deferred to give a definitive answer on the time of conscription for new soldiers until after September 1914 and the general election to the Second Chamber. Staaff was a strong believer in keeping election pledges and since he had promised voters in 1911 that they would get a say on the defence question, he argued that this would “let the people themselves sit down and think about the different options” before a decision was made.83 This frustrated the King, who believed that the different parts of the defence question should, and could, be solved as a whole and without delay.84

In his Courtyard Speech, Gustaf V emphasises that since time immemorial “the kingdom’s security has rested on the foundation of the firm and unwavering trust between King and people”85 and that when “the concern for the security of the motherland” has been at its greatest, it is the monarch that the people have turned to for guidance.86 This is while, at the same time, it is “Sweden’s peasantry who have been the rock” the King himself has been able to “rely on […] in both good and bad times.”87 The trust that exists between them is like a double-edged sword, it makes it both easier and more trying to perform the “royal duties” needed for “the protection of the country’s sovereignty,” nevertheless, it is a trust he “promises not to let down.”88 Implying that the government has, when not “working together for the defence of the

83 Staaff, 1913, p. 36.
85 Starkenberg, 1914, p. 5.
86 Starkenberg, 1914, p. 8.
87 Starkenberg, 1914, p. 7.
88 Starkenberg, 1914, p. 11.
kingdom,” as the King sees it, not been listening to what the expertise considers necessary for the army and navy to be ready for mobilization, if needed.89

If people had had any doubts about the King’s personal views before the Courtyard Speech, they did not by the end of it. Gustaf V had made it quite clear that he was not of the same opinion as Staaff and the Left, and, as Dagens Nyheter puts it, “a clean break with the government that bears the constitutional responsibility for the governing of the country” had been made.90 Advisors to the King had, in the days leading up to the day of the speech, tried to bring about some changes to the speech hoping to stave off the constitutional crisis they feared could arise.91 A fear that proved to be true.

This chapter has discussed the thesis’ method for analysis by first introducing the overall field of discourse analysis. It then went on to discuss political discourse analysis, the chosen analytical method for the thesis. The chapter then discussed the selected empirical material and some limitations to the empirical material and selected research challenges that was experienced during the thesis project. Lastly, the chapter concluded by providing an empirical background to the Courtyard Crisis divided into two parts. Part one discussed the political climate in Sweden at the start of the Courtyard Crisis, while part two discussed the King’s Courtyard Speech. The next chapter will analyse the empirical material.

89 Starkenberg, 1914, p. 13-14.
90 Brusewitz, 1951; Dagens Nyheter, 7 February 1914, p. 3.
91 Brusewitz, 1951, p. 67; Odelberg, 2014.
4. Analysis

This chapter will analyse the empirical material introduced in chapter three by using political discourse analysis. The analysis will discuss the impact that the Courtyard Speech had on the following two weeks’ parliamentary debates. To do this the securitisation sectors identified as relevant in chapter two will be used.

4.1. Military Sector

The most common referent object in the military sector is the state, however, other political entities might also be considered referent objects. In extreme circumstances, Buzan et al. also identify threats to the survival of the armed forces as an argument to elevate armed forces to referent object status.\(^92\) In the case study for this thesis, one could argue that the armed forces have, to a certain extent, been given referent object status since part of their existence is threatened by the decision to reduce military spending.

Modern states, which are grown from the “Westphalian conception of international society,”\(^93\) are defined by the idea of sovereignty and the right to self-government of a chosen territory and its population – making the state’s territory another option to be given referent object status in the military sector. This also means that the state has a right to assert and defend itself from challengers found both inside and outside its territory that might be seen as a threat to the state’s existence, which might effectively be done with the use of military force.\(^94\) There is a need also to mention that, even though they are conceptually distinct, there is “the partial interchangeability of force and consent in the process of government” that link the military and

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\(^{92}\) Buzan et al., 1998, p. 22.
\(^{93}\) Buzan et al., 1998, p. 52.
\(^{94}\) Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 49-50.
political sectors together. As with the state, this link faces in two directions: “inward, into the domestic construction and life of the state, and outward, to its position in relation to the other members of the international system.”

A military response can prove to be most effective against these threats making the military sector’s capabilities dependent on political relations inside and outside the state.

The securitising actors of the military sector are then usually state representatives, mostly meaning actors in the government bureaucracy who have been given the power and influence in matters of national security by the larger population. However, as Buzan et al. argue, one cannot assume that “the state is always coherent,” a democracy can have many voices who engage in the discourse of securitisation.

As in the chosen case study for this thesis, for example, both King Gustaf V and Staaff and his Cabinet had the right to speak as securitising actors because they had been given the power over national security through 1809’s Instrument of Government. However, there is also an argument that can be made for the politicians in both the First and Second Chambers for having had the right to speak as securitising actors, which can also be backed by 1809’s Instrument of Government. Therefore, for the case of this analysis, the politicians in the First and Second Chambers represent the military sector’s securitising actors.

4.1.1. The Courtyard Crisis in the Parliamentary Debates, 6-18 February 1914

The Courtyard Crisis may have its origins in the defence question and military spending so one would expect that the language used in the parliamentary debates after the Courtyard Speech

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95 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 50.
96 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 50.
97 Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 55-6.
clearly should be linked to discourses found in the securitisation theory’s military sector. This turned out to also be the case and two referent objects with a connection to the military sector could be identified: 1) the safety of the Swedish territory, i.e., the safety of the state, and 2) the solution to the defence question, i.e., the continued existence of the armed forces. In both cases, the existential threat is the potential continuation of the Courtyard Crisis.

Firstly, let us look at the discourse used in connection to the safety of the Swedish territory as the referent object. Mr Lindhagen, a voice for the Left in the Second Chamber, argues that the split between the two powers of state and the Left and the Right threatens “the old free Swedish self-perception of independence” by making Sweden open for foreign influence which can in a worst-case scenario, make Sweden a target for Germanic vassalage.99 Furthermore, Mr Kvarnzelius, a voice for the Left in the First Chamber, also argues about the threat the Courtyard Crisis can have on the safety of Swedish territory. He argues that this “signal for division and discord [given by the King through the Courtyard Speech]” can weaken the national power working for the strengthening of “Sweden’s army and Sweden’s navy.”100 Mr Trygger, also in the First Chamber but a voice for the Right, chimed in on the threat the Courtyard Crisis can have on Sweden’s safety by using the King’s argument for how an agreement of the defence question is needed to “safeguard the country’s independence and self-government.”101 The fear of what the Courtyard Crisis could do to threaten Sweden’s safety was also reflected in an address made by the caretaker government to the two Chambers after taking office. In its address, the new government argued about the long-term impact the Crisis, and the politicians’ inability to put an end to the defence battle, could have on Sweden’s reputation abroad and

100 Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren, 1914, Nr 16, p. 5.  
101 Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren, 1914, Nr 16, pp. 9-10.
make Sweden a target for attacks from hostile outside forces.\textsuperscript{102} A fair argument considering how the security situation in Sweden’s vicinity was developing and the concern for growing antagonism that was spreading in Europe, and a concern that, if Sweden would need friendly support in the future, it could not be seen as an unreliable ally.

Secondly, the discourse used when the solution to the defence question is the referent object. Here too, is the safety of the Swedish territory used as an argument for the need to reach a defence agreement as soon as possible. Mr Trygger, for example, argues that the King, by holding his Courtyard Speech, tried to put the defence question above party lines, and that this is what the newly appointed caretaker government has promised to do to reach a solution to the defence question “for the security of the country.”\textsuperscript{103} However, other voices raised in connection with the solution to the defence question are concerned with its unresolvedness and its effect on the unity among the citizens. For example, Mr Hellberg, a voice for the Left in the First Chamber, does not agree with Trygger. He sees the King’s Courtyard Speech as interfering with the work that was being done on the defence question’s solution. Hellberg argues that the defence question had already begun to cease to be a one-party question and started to become a question of the whole population and by a government that had the support of a majority of the voting population.\textsuperscript{104} This concern was also raised by Mr Edén, a voice for the Left, as early as the day after the King’s Courtyard Speech in the debate about the King’s appanage taking place in the Second Chamber. In his address, he remarked that the Government was founded on the Parliament’s trust, who in turn are elected officials and thus represent the will of the Swedish people, who must then be allowed the responsibility for the solution of the defence

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 23, pp. 9-11.
\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 22, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 22, p. 9.
question without interference from outsiders.\textsuperscript{105} However, what both sides seem to agree on is that the outcome of the Courtyard Crisis needs to be a satisfying solution to the defence question, no matter who comes up with the solution, as long as it leaves Sweden with a defence and a Government and Parliament that the population can trust to protect them.

### 4.2. Political Sector

According to Buzan et al., the main concern of the political sectors is the “organisational stability of social order(s),” and at the heart of the sector are the existential threats toward the “constituting principle – sovereignty, but sometimes also ideology – of the state.”\textsuperscript{106} So, anything then that can question or challenge the recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority that considers itself the protector of the sovereignty over a territory or over an ideology that the state bases its values and norms and on which the political system decides to take action against can be seen as an existential threat in the political sector.\textsuperscript{107} Usually, then, the existential threats in this sector are directed toward the state’s internal and external legitimacy, its referent objects. For example, normally internal threats are directed toward challenging the legitimacy of the state’s political units, the government, or institutions by questioning the political values, government policies, or ideologies that define the state, while the external threats concern the external recognition of the state and the acceptance of its place in the “international system of equal and ‘like’ units” in the political system, i.e., its external legitimacy.\textsuperscript{108} However, this does not mean that it is the state’s sovereignty that the threat is directed at, but it can also be aimed at its ideological legitimacy – “its domestic pillar” – i.e., its internal legitimacy, without it meaning that the state’s recognition is being questioned.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{105} Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 18, pp. 7-9.
\textsuperscript{106} Buzan et al., 1998, p. 141, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{107} Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 143-44.
\textsuperscript{108} Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 144-45.
\textsuperscript{109} Buzan et al., 1998, p. 145.
For this thesis’ case study, one can argue that what is threatened is the survival of monarchical rule or the survival (or development) of popular rule, i.e., parliamentarism, and whether it is the conservative or the liberal/social democratic ideology that will persevere. They are then both a referent object and an existential threat; whichever applies depends to a great extent on whether you are a supporter of the Right or the Left. As in the military sector, the main securitising actors in the political sector are state representatives, for example, governments who, in democracies, have been elected and thus have been given a legitimate claim to rule over their sovereign territory with its claims being subjected to public scrutiny and questioning.\(^\text{110}\) Similar to the military sector and in accordance with 1809’s Instrument of Government both King Gustaf V and the Staaff Cabinet had the right to speak as securitising actors if we look at the chosen case study for the thesis through the perspectives of the political sector. However, as with the military sector, there is also an argument that can be made for the politicians in both the First and Second Chambers for having had the right to speak as securitising actors, which can also be backed by 1809’s Instrument of Government. Therefore, for the case of this analysis, the politicians in the First and Second Chambers represent the political sector’s securitising actors.

\textit{4.2.1. The Courtyard Crisis in the Parliamentary Debates, 6-18 February 1914}

Finding a link between the securitisation theory’s political sector and the discourse used during the parliamentary debates in connection to the Courtyard Crisis proved an easy task. This meant that identifying the referent objects through the lens of the political sector was quite straightforward. Both sides of the Courtyard Crisis saw the ideology of the other side and the continuation of the crisis as existential threats toward the Swedish constitution, therefore, with

\(^{110}\) Buzan et al., 1998, p. 145-146.
this as starting point, two referent objects have been identified: 1) the safety of the Swedish 1809’s Instrument of Government and the King’s prerogatives, i.e., the safety of the current constitution, and 2) the safety of parliamentarism and its development in Sweden, i.e., the safety of democracy and the developing ideology of the state.

Firstly, let us look at the discourse used in connection to the safety of the Swedish 1809’s Instrument of Government and the King’s prerogatives as the referent object. Supporters of Gustaf V saw the Left and the Staaff Cabinet as trying to put, as Mr Lindman, a voice for the Right in the Second Chamber puts it, a “muzzle” on the King by taking away his constitutional right to speak freely to the Swedish population “without first asking his Cabinet.”\(^{111}\) This is further argued by Mr Petersson, a voice for the Right in the Second Chamber, who says that “so far, the Swedish people do not want the King to be turned into a signature stamp, and to have his mouth sealed.”\(^{112}\) Mr Trygger, also a voice for the Right but in the First Chamber, also argues about this but saying that, as in accordance with 1809’s Instrument of Government, when people from around the country turned to the King for answers, it is not only the King’s right to speak, and to speak his mind, but it is his duty, especially when the question concerns the safety of the country.\(^{113}\)

Furthermore, several members of both the First and Second Chamber argued that, as in “in accordance with Swedish constitutional laws” the King is the one to rule and the Government his advisers.\(^{114}\) For example, Mr Petersson, who continues to use the opinion of the Swedish people to emphasise his arguments, says that the people “do not want the constitution to cease

\(^{112}\) Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 19, p. 20.
\(^{113}\) Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren, 1914, Nr 16, p. 9.
\(^{114}\) Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 19, p. 19.
to have effect” and that the Instrument of Government should be kept as it is, with two powers of state, king and parliament, “through whose cooperation all matters will be decided,” no matter the importance of the question, and who both will have their opinion heard.\textsuperscript{115} Another example is Mr Hildebrand, also a voice for the Right in the Second Chamber, who calls the parliamentary debates a place of “profound constitutional conflict of opinion,” where one side is of the same opinion as “is consistent with Sweden’s constitution, Sweden’s Instrument of Government,” while the other, he suggests, means a revolutionary attempt to suppress monarchical rule in favour of the advancement of government power.\textsuperscript{116} Mr Hildebrand emphasises this by referring to the preamble of the Accountability Act (\textit{Ansvarighetslagen}) which says that the Cabinet “shall only advise the king, but not rule together with him.”\textsuperscript{117} An argument also used by Mr Trygger in the First Chamber in a debate held the day after the Courtyard Speech.\textsuperscript{118}

There are also arguments during the debates that it is not only the King’s right to speak that is being attacked but to deprive him of his constitutional right to choose those he considers suitable and skilled to be his advisors, who are to be part of the government. For example, Mr Hildebrand argues that, as in accordance with 4 § of the 1809’s Instrument of Government the King has a right to choose the people that should be part of the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{119} He also argues that if this constitutional right, to name the advisors, is taken away from the King, then that is just another way for, in this case, the Liberals to abandon the Instrument of Government and where the King is standing next to the Prime Minister just to sign laws and nothing else.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 19, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 19, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 19, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 16, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 23, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 23, p. 17.
Secondly, the discourse used when the safety of parliamentarism and its development in Sweden is the referent object. The politicians who are arguing for the Courtyard Crisis as a threat to parliamentarism see Gustaf V’s Courtyard Speech as a break with the current constitution. Mr Staaff, the outgoing Prime Minister, for example, argues during a debate in the Second Chamber that the King is departing from the custom between regent and government to notify the Cabinet in advance of the content of public speeches containing statements concerning political subjects, such as the Courtyard Speech did, before holding them. Since, as Staaff argues, this is part of one of the constitutional principles, that the King’s legally elected advisors, those who determine the government policies, are not put in a position where the King, publicly, has made a promise they are not able to keep.

Others argue that the Courtyard Crisis, the result of the King’s speech, is a way to break with the democratic development seen in the country in the last century and the country’s transition to parliamentarism that is happening. For example, Mr Hellberg, a voice for the Left in the First Chamber, argues that “There has been a break in the constitutional development, which for decades has been proceeding smoothly and without interruption.” He then goes on to argue that what has shown itself with the Courtyard Speech is the King’s attempt to take over the political leadership from the elected government by the use of personal monarchy. These arguments are especially used in connection with the appointment of Hammarskjöld’s caretaker government. The Left sees their appointment as an example of going against the wishes of the people and a departure from parliamentary ways when the caretaker government does not

121 Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 19, p. 7.
123 Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren, 1914, Nr 22, p. 10.
124 Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren, 1914, Nr 22, p. 10.
represent those voted for by the majority of voters in the last election. As Mr Branting, a voice for the Left in the Second Chamber, puts it “It is not because of any confidence from the Swedish Parliament that this government has now taken a seat on the Cabinet benches [i.e., because of parliamentarism], but it is because of the confidence it enjoys from the representative of the first power of state [i.e., the King].” Here, Mr Branting is, for example, supported by Mr Edén, also in the Second Chamber and a voice for the Left, who argues that “there is something unnatural and unreasonable about such ministerial formation, as the one which just took place without parliamentary support.”

4.3. Societal Sector

Buzan et al. define the referent object in the societal sector as “large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state” and as “large, self-sustaining identity groups.” They suggest that these can be national or religious groups, but they also suggest that what they are “empirically varies in both time and place.” This makes it difficult to establish the hard boundaries that make it possible to identify the existential threats from the “lesser” threats in the societal sector, because as the collective identity (or identities) evolve and change to internal and external developments so too evolve and change the existential threats in response to this. One way to understand what the “current” referent object is, is to identify whatever large group carries the “loyalties and devotion of [the] subjects” and who can “create a socially powerful argument” that the group’s identity is under threat. This is because the existential threats in the societal sector are always centred on identity and against the survival of the community.

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125 Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 23, p. 11.
129 Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 22-23.
130 Buzan et al., 1998, p. 123.
131 Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 119-122.
Buzan et al. suggest that there are two ways society reacts to these threats: either by the community carrying out activities itself to meet the threat or by having the threat placed on the state agenda by trying to move it to the political, or in some cases the military, sector.\footnote{Buzan et al., 1998, p. 122.}

In the case of the thesis’ chosen case study, one can argue that the referent object is the Right or the Left depending on what side you are on in the defence question. This means then that depending on the side you are on, the other side’s ideas become the existential threat, while the securitising actors, as in the other sectors, become the people who are seen as leaders of the two different sides: King Gustaf V and Prime Minister Staaff. However, one can also argue that the newspapers or the politicians in the Parliament can be seen as securitising actors too, because of their ability to rally support for the different sides. Therefore, for the case of this analysis, the politicians in the First and Second Chambers represent the societal sector’s securitising actors.

4.3.1. The Courtyard Crisis in the Parliamentary Debates, 6-18 February 1914

As with the other sectors, there is a connection that can be found between the securitisation theory’s societal sector and the discourse used during the parliamentary debates. Both sides use arguments that can be found inside the societal sector and both sides see their ideological identities as being existentially threatened with the other side posing as the threat. To protect themselves from this threat, both sides use the Courtyard Crisis and the King’s Speech as a means of introducing measures to protect their collective identity, to protect their community. The logical option here would therefore be to have the Left and the Right as the societal sector’s referent objects. However, there is another option which both sides argue, though obviously in different ways, is under threat, and that is the idea of a Swedish identity. Therefore, with this
as a starting point, this part will use the idea of the Swedish identity as the referent object. Since the arguments for its protection look different depending on which side makes them, arguments made by both the Left and the Right will be highlighted.

Firstly, let us look at the discourse used when the Left is making the arguments. As described earlier, many of the arguments used by the Left focus on their belief in Sweden’s developing parliamentarism, and in their belief that Sweden should abandon the current system of two powers of state and instead centralise the power of state to the second chamber of the Swedish Parliament. For this to happen, the Left argues that the Swedish identity needs to represent a united nation and not the division into the upper nation (*den övre nationen*) and the lower nation (*den undre nationen*) as it is now. The upper nation, they argue, represents the followers of the Right and those in favour of a stronger defence, while the lower nation represents the followers of the Left and those who believe that the money the Right wants to put into the defence can be used for other things, such as social issues. Mr Lindhagen, in the Second Chamber, for example, argues that the goal of the development happening in Sweden “is to merge these two nations into one people, to understand each other’s different interests and take into account each other’s legitimate demands.”

To merge the two nations properly into one nation, where Sweden is understood to represent a people, not just a geographical concept, Mr Lindhagen argues, is what should be the Parliament’s focus, not the disunion that is happening because of the Courtyard Crisis. As Mr Kvarnselius, in the First Chamber, argued in the earliest debate, that if the powers of state became embroiled in an internal conflict, it would weaken Sweden’s national strength at a time when it, on the contrary, should be strengthened by zealous work on external and internal welfare.

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133 *Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren*, 1914, Nr 23, p. 22.
135 *Riksdagens Protokoll Första Kammaren*, 1914, Nr 16, p. 5.
Secondly, let us look at the discourse used when the Right is making the arguments. Unfortunately, not many clear arguments about the Right’s idea of the Swedish identity can be found in the parliamentary debates. However, what can be understood through earlier described arguments is that they believe that the Swedish identity is embedded in the current political system and to protect the 1809’s Instrument of Government is to also protect the Swedish identity. This means that for this part no new arguments can really be described, they have already been talked about in the arguments discussed in the military and political sectors. However, to make it clear, a brief description of what these mean through the lens of the societal sector will be given. The Right believe that the Swedish identity is represented by the two powers of state system, a strong defence, and a king as protector of the people. As Mr Nyström, in the Second Chamber, put it “the Swedish people have since ancient times seen in the king the incarnation of the Swedish state and kingdom” and that “when the royal power has been pushed aside, as we have experienced several times before and which under the parliamentary system of governance will certainly happen, the Swedish people have had the worst of it,” especially those who have now asked the King to stand on the side of the defence in the defence question.136

This chapter began by describing the political climate in Sweden before the start of the Courtyard Crisis and King Gustaf V’s Courtyard Speech. The chapter then went on to analyse the discourse used by the two sides of the Crisis in the parliamentary debates held between 6 and 18 February. This was done by looking at the discourse through the lenses of the securitisation theory’s military, political, and societal sectors. The analysis identified six different referent objects, two for each sector and one for each side of the Crisis in that sector.

136 Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 19, p. 28.
Each sector shows the difficulty a political system with two powers of state has on the securitisation process since both powers of state need to be considered, as in accordance with the Swedish constitution, the 1809’s Instrument of Government. The next chapter of this thesis will discuss the findings of this chapter while answering the research question posed in the introduction of this thesis. Lastly, it will conclude what has been presented in this thesis project and offer some suggestions for further research.
5. Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter will discuss the findings in chapter four. It will do so by trying to answer the research question posed in the introductory chapter. After this, a conclusion of the thesis and suggestions for further research will be given.

5.1. Discussion

As seen in the analysis the more voices that are added to a debate the harder it is to make heads or tails over what is what in the securitisation process. This also meant that understanding the impact constitutional crisis, and in this case, the Courtyard Crisis, had on securitisation turned out to be more difficult than expected. However, there are some observations that can be made in connection to the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis. However, before discussing these observations, let us remind ourselves what the question was:

- How can the Courtyard Crisis of 1914 be used to explain the tension that arises between, on the one hand, different forms of government, and on the other hand, aspects of decision making in the process of securitisation?

As said earlier, the time of the Courtyard Crisis was a time of change in Sweden and many political contradictions fought to be heard.137 This thesis has centred on the beginning of the Courtyard Crisis and the impact the defence battle had on it. However, the defence battle was only a small part of the political game because every issue – whether small or big – were closely intertwined and played a part in the Courtyard Crisis.

As shown in the analysis chapter, the Courtyard Crisis is a good example to use when explaining the tension that arises between different forms of government. The Crisis begins because of

137 Eriksson, 2014.
discord between the two forms of government that want to control the political field in Sweden. It is a struggle between the old and the advancing political Sweden. The Left wants to modernise Sweden by introducing complete parliamentarism and allowing for more political influence on every aspect of Swedish politics, including the Swedish defence.\textsuperscript{138} The Right, on the other hand, is of the belief that the defence should not be politically controlled and that it needs to be strong for the good of Sweden.\textsuperscript{139}

Furthermore, Staaff’s liberal government was of the belief that the King should not add his own voice to the political playing field but stand behind the decisions of the elected ruling party. They wanted a cooperation between the two powers of state that allowed for more political influence on the King’s public speeches. This would allow any ruling party of the government to prepare for potential backlashes that could happen or to make changes to parts that could be seen by the majority of voters as going against what they had been promised in elections.\textsuperscript{140} The idea that the King should not be allowed to say what he wanted to the Swedish people was not well received by the King and his followers in and beyond the Swedish Parliament. It is here that the two different forms of government really do not agree, and which ends with Staaff’s Cabinet resigning and the Courtyard Crisis to reach its crescendo because without the King’s executive power, Staaff and the Liberal government do not have the support they need to govern.

When it comes to explaining the tension between different forms of government and aspects of decision making in the process of securitisation, the Courtyard Crisis can be used to identify two of these. What the Crisis does show is that one form of governance makes the decision

\textsuperscript{138} Zetterberg, 1988.
\textsuperscript{139} Odelberg, 2014.
\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren}, 1914, Nr 19, p. 3-9.
making in the securitisation process clearer, while the other one blurs that line and slows down the process.

A state with monarchical rule provides a clear picture of who it is that makes the decision on security issues, because the king, and only the king, has been given the power of securitising actor through a state’s constitution. Other people, for example, the cabinet, can give advice and try to influence the king’s decision but, in the end, it is the king that is the highest power and whose word becomes the accepted securitising move. As we can see in the Courtyard Crisis, the farmers turn to the King in their hour of need and not to the elected politicians indicating that they see the monarch as the one “who decides on the exception.”\textsuperscript{141} It also shows that the belief in protection from potential threats lies with the monarch and not the politicians, which may derive from the historical trust between the King and the people that Mr Nyström argued, and which was used as an example earlier.\textsuperscript{142}

While monarchical rule makes it clear who the securitising actor should be, parliamentarism blurs it. This is because any one of the elected politicians can become a securitising actor and make a securitisation move since the voters, by voting for them, have given them the power to name something as an existential threat. What this means for the securitisation process is that parliamentarism halts the process because discussions need to be had before a decision can be made. Furthermore, the decision then also needs to go through parliament for approval. However, arguments can be made that this was also the case of Sweden in 1914 with its two powers of state political system. Here one can argue that it was not only parliamentarism that halted the securitisation process but that adding the King’s voice to it even stopped it since the

\textsuperscript{141} Schmitt, [1922] 2005, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{142} Riksdagens Protokoll Andra Kammaren, 1914, Nr 19, p. 28.
Courtyard Speech had the outcome that the government resigned from office. This meant that new players were added to the playing field and the securitisation process became more protracted.

5.2. Conclusion
This thesis project aimed to explain the tensions that arise between, on the hand, different forms of government, and on the other hand, aspects of decision making in the process of securitisation. Here the Courtyard Crisis of 1914, and especially the parliamentary debates held between 6 and 18 February, was used as the thesis’ case study. For the analysis, three of Buzan et al.’s identified securitisation sectors – the military, political, and societal – were used as key entry points and political discourse analysis was used to analyse the language used by the Left and the Right during the debates. Though the results were not conclusive, they did allow for certain observations. For example, the Courtyard Crisis can be used to explain the tension that arises between supporters of monarchical rule and supporters of parliamentarism when opinions regarding the security of the state diverge. Furthermore, the Courtyard Crisis shows how the process of securitisation can be slowed down by parliamentarism because of its many different securitising actors, while monarchical rule makes the process short because of the clear designation of a securitising actor.

The thesis project challenged the normal interdisciplinary approach between history and security studies by applying a modern theory to a historical case retrospectively. Therefore, hopefully, providing a new way to consider the application of securitisation theory, while also contributing to existing literature on both securitisation and the Courtyard Crisis.
5.2.1. Suggestions for Further Research
The result of this thesis includes only a short time period of the Courtyard Crisis. Therefore, for future research, it could be of interest to include the time before the King’s Courtyard Speech, as well as the time leading up to the outbreak of the First World War when Swedish politicians reached a time of party truce. This would make it possible to include further arguments made by both sides but also make it possible to include the economic sector in the analysis.

Furthermore, it would be of interest to see what impact the Courtyard Crisis had in the long run on the political system in Sweden. Discussions on changes to the constitution kept popping up until the 1970s when Sweden introduced a new Instrument of Government (1974 års regeringsform). How does this new constitution compare to 1809’s Instrument of Government and are there differences in how they interact with Buzan et al.’s securitisisation theory? The Courtyard Speech was also the last time a Swedish monarch publicly interfered with Swedish politics without the approval of the government. Does this affect the interaction between the process of securitisisation and the Swedish constitution?

Lastly, how do the thesis’ results compare if the same research question were to be applied to a non-democratic country? Or even with another country with a similar political system as Sweden had in 1914? Could Jutila’s three perspectives introduced in previous research, together with the question posed in this thesis, be used to provide a more in-depth understanding of securitisisation theory and constitutional crisis in a democratic country, as well as in a non-democratic country?
6. Bibliography

6.1. Literature


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6.2. Empirical material
