



# Försvarshögskolan

## Självständigt arbete (30 hp)

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<p><i>Pushes and pokes: Towards understanding Swedish ‘mid-range’ security policy-making</i></p>		
<p><b>Abstract:</b> This thesis investigates the recursive relationship between strategic culture, security policy-making, and Swedish security policy, aiming to provide further insights into change and continuity in policy norms and practices. Using a case-study methodology, and Bloomfield’s (2016) norm-dynamic framework, it analyses the Swedish Parliament deliberations regarding two, ‘mid-range’ defence and security cooperations with NATO. The results show how security policy is influenced by political actors, who actively assume roles to defend and contest security policy, depending on temporal and institutional contexts. Furthermore, the study has proven valuable for understanding both what lies behind a smaller state’s policy status quo, and its steps towards more momentous security-policy decisions. The recursive relationships within and aspects of security policy-making, underscores the significance of strategic culture as contextual. The thesis hopes to invite research into other ‘mid-range’ decisions for broadening this insight.</p>		
<p><b>Keywords:</b> Security policy, parliamentary democracy, strategic culture, norm-dynamics, Partnership for Peace, Host Nation Support</p>		

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## Introduction

Radical security policy decisions naturally have far-reaching effects on military strategic practice. For instance, the 2002-2004 Defence Decision (Bet. 2001/02:FöU2), partly a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, was pivotal for transforming Swedish security policy, its Armed Forces, as well as the country's strategic culture. The fact that the 'people's defence' concept thereby was gradually abandoned in favour of an 'interoperable' and 'expeditionary' force was significant to national self-image (Åselius, 2005:41). Conversely, the more routine-based, regulatory policy decisions are found at the other end of the spectrum. These decisions, for instance the appointment of certain positions in the Armed Forces (Bet. 2016/17:FöU4), have more limited effects on the actual, strategic practices. Situated somewhere between these polar opposites are the 'mid-range' policy decisions. Here, security policy is defended, quietly leading to reinforced status quo of norms and strategic culture; or contested, resulting in important, but perhaps not ground-breaking, policy transformations. Though they may not cause public debates or popular up-risings, they are certainly not insignificant. On the contrary, they are consequential for creating, controlling and using military power. Therefore, these 'mid-range' policy deliberations are the focal point of this study. What makes them interesting is how they illustrate the 'push' and 'poke' of security policy, and institutionalised norms. Irrespective of being controversial enough to be openly debated by the public, the decisions still have had significant impact on the Swedish Armed Forces (see e.g. Prop. 2004/05:5; Bet. 2015/16:UFöU:4). Over a longer stretch of time, these cases of parliamentary policy-making are inevitably part of "the ever-evolving product of the many efforts peoples make to explain their past, understand their present, and anticipate their future" (Gray, 2007:9): In short, the slow-evolving, enabling and limiting structure of strategic culture itself. By letting a couple of these Swedish security policy decisions take centre stage, this thesis would like to give the 'mid-rangers' due attention.

In 1994, just a few years after the Soviet Union collapsed, the Swedish Parliament (*the Riksdag*) approved of joining the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative (*PfP*). In 2016, two years after Russia's annexation of Crimea, the Riksdag ratified NATO's Host Nation Support agreement (*HNS*). Both are designed to facilitate defence cooperation with NATO units, and for conducting multilateral exercises within Swedish borders (Skr. 1993/94:207; Prop. 2015/16:152). As for the policy decisions themselves, they are neither

extreme nor routine, thereby placing them both in the, albeit widespread, ‘mid-range’ spectrum. The way they were deliberated by the Riksdag is intriguing. With just a quick glance at the protocols, some particularities appear: Regarding the PfP-agreement, there is a sense of parliamentary unity in the security policy discussions. As for the HNS-agreement, the Riksdag comes across as more divided. Even though both were eventually voted through, there is something subtly perplexing about these policy-making events, and maybe not that easily measured, weighed or explained. This study argues that the norm-dynamics within strategic culture had an important influence on the parliamentary decisions in both cases. Understanding underlying mechanisms for how they were debated differently, can perhaps unravel some of the interdependencies between strategic culture, policy-making and strategic policy itself.

There is plenty of research on power-struggles between governments and parliaments that involves sending troops abroad (see e.g. Peters & Wagner, 2011; Raunio & Wagner, 2017; Noreen, Sjöstedt & Ångström, 2017; Oktay, 2018). Also, several works investigate security policy transformation in more powerful European states (Walsh, 2006; Wagner et al., 2017; Thomson & Blagden, 2018; Mello & Peters, 2018; Brattberg & Valásek, 2019). However, security policy-making in militarily less resourceful and/or non-aligned states, such as Sweden, is still quite unexplored. Policy decisions in these countries, that are not a direct response to exogenous shocks, or involves deployment of military power abroad, appear even less investigated. This gap in research means some aspects related to strategic culture in more subservient security policy-making may be overlooked; i.e., occurrences that could define a country’s stepping-stones towards more momentous security-policy decisions. In an effort to contribute to that understanding, this study will address *the interdependency between Swedish strategic culture, the ‘pushing’ and ‘poking’ in the Riksdag deliberations, and the influence this has on the country’s security policy.*

The investigation involves two cases: The parliamentary deliberations in 1994, concerning NATO’s PfP initiative, and in 2016, regarding the HNS framework agreement with NATO. Indeed, the two are linked: Without the PfP-agreement, which opened up for new ideas concerning security and defence cooperations, the HNS-agreement would most probably not have happened. Nevertheless, instead of examining aspects of path dependency (see e.g. Avant, 2000), this study explores the reasoning that follows norm-dynamic

studies (Bloomfield, 2016). To better understand change and continuity in security policy-making, it focuses in particular on ‘*windows of opportunities*’, a discursive mechanism used by political actors to defend and contest policy status quo (Bloomfield, 2016:310). As I have identified the cases as ‘mid-range’ policy-making instances, the sources are expected to display less obvious windows of opportunities. Paying attention to discursive nuances in the deliberations will therefore be instrumental.

The aim of the study is two-fold: The primary aim is to cast some light on the recursive relationship between Swedish strategic culture and ‘mid-range’ policy-making in the Riksdag and the influence this has on Swedish security policy. A subordinate aim is to evaluate the explanatory power of Bloomfield’s (2016) analytical framework of norm-dynamics in the two, selected cases. In this study, Bloomfield’s (2016) ‘discursive mechanisms’ are understood as the performative power of specific communicative strategies, in turn influencing political deliberations and policy-making (Zuckerstein, 2015:292).

With the following lay-out, I begin with reviewing research on security policy-making represented in parliamentary democracies. As the analysis is supported by strategic culture theories, I review some of their central ideas, and discuss the study’s research design and sources, including Bloomfield’s (2016) analytical norm-dynamics framework. In the second half of the thesis, results from the two cases are presented and discussed. Next, I suggest some answers to *the interdependency between Swedish strategic culture, the ‘pushing’ and ‘poking’ in the Riksdag deliberations, and the influence this has on the country’s security policy*. The conclusion summarises what the study does and does not manage to answer, and reflect on other, plausible responses. In the concluding remarks, I evaluate the explanatory power of Bloomfield’s (2016) framework, and propose some interesting, future paths to explore.

## **Security policy-making in democratic parliaments**

Research on security policy-making in parliamentary democracies often involve the influence from legislative/executive structures, formal/informal processes, and left-wing/right-wing party politics. Several works analyse the dynamics between the executive and the legislative levels (see e.g. Dieterich et al. 2010; Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010; Peters & Wagner, 2011; Österdahl, 2011; Oktay, 2018; Wagner, 2018). A useful starting

point for entering into other sub-divisions in the field, is found in the extensive analysis of Dieterich et al. (2010). Their main arguments evolve around ‘parliamentary war powers’<sup>1</sup>, and constitutes something of a research groundwork in this field. Central to their discussions is the military aspect of international security policy-making (Dieterich et al., 2010:8). Within the same area of interest, Wagner (2018:123) contributes by investigating government-parliament as an integrated entity, which strives for policy agreement, especially regarding the deployment of military forces. A contrasting perspective to this is to investigate the impact of different party politics on parliamentary decision-making (Sieberer, 2006:172), and in particular regarding the deployment of force (Wagner et al., 2017:21). A continuation of this research could be found in arguments on the dynamics of parliamentary bargaining, and its ability to unlock legislative constraints to enable security policy to transform (Oktay, 2018:108). Other influences on security policy-making are found in competitive, polarised politics as well as party unity (Petersen, 1988:152, 159), such as the highly politicised Swedish-US weapons trade during the Cold War (Nilsson & Wyss, 2016:338) or the deployment of US troops in Denmark and Greenland (Petersen, 1988:150).

Yet another approach to explaining policy change and continuity is found in research by Legro (2000:419, 430), who offers a linear concept where an initial collapse of ideas is followed by political contestation, which, in turn, would lead to consolidation of new policies. A somewhat similar framework of cause-and-effect is found in Walsh’s (2000; 2006) discussions: Policy change, he argues, could be regarded as a consequence of earlier, failed policies, for which prevailing ideas and paradigms are influential (Walsh, 2000:485-487). In later research, Walsh’s (2006:490) model draws an arrow from failed strategic policy to new policy ideas. Though demonstrative, neither Legro (2000) nor Walsh (2000) discuss the different facets of, or nuances in deliberations that lead up to these normative ideas. Absent from their discussions is an investigation into *why* a particular policy (or paradigm) is considered as failed or *how* this could be contested or defended. This is partly addressed by Raunio and Wagner (2017), who contemplate the indirect effect that plenary debates have on policy-making. They find that parliamentary constraints can be avoided if governments frame an issue as a matter of national security, as this traditionally creates parliamentary consensus (Raunio & Wagner, 2017:6). Béland’s (2009:704) discussions go further, investigating the relationship between policy

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<sup>1</sup> Parliamentary influence on the use of military force in operations.

debates and institutional culture. He argues that ideas are based on social assumptions and are simultaneously ingrained in the build-up of security policy (Béland, 2009:705-706). Put together, they constitute the power of both sanctioning and questioning existing policies (Ibid.). This entangled relationship between beliefs, concepts and policy-making, is also demonstrated by Carstensen and Schmidt (2016). Basing their arguments on a constructivist framework, they claim that policies can become woven into the background structures of society itself, and thereby gradually become de-politicised (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016:329).

To conclude, depending on one's point of departure, the research ranges from the more dichotomous explanations of 'parliament versus government', to the interpretivist approach regarding norms and ideas. However, solely focusing on effects of 'parliamentary war powers' does not seem sufficient in itself to pick up nuances in security policy-making in less obtrusive cases. Instead, the strong influence from parliamentary practice regarding the efficacy of security policy-making, (Möller & Bjereld, 2010:368; Österdahl, 2011:157), and the powerful dynamics within political, discursive context (Béland, 2009:702; Noreen, Sjöstedt & Ångström, 2017:149), speak more to this study's area of interest. Adding to this, Mello and Peters (2018:12) point to the effects on security policy-making by parliamentary deliberations, as this is where policy norms are contested and defended. Though valuable in its own right, research struggles to elucidate some of the mechanisms behind security policy-making itself, and how these may lead to decisions with more far-reaching effects on strategic practices. Perhaps reasonable then, to go beyond what has been described so far. As a general point of departure, this study assumes that culture and normative rationales are pivotal to behaviour (see e.g. Swidler, 1986; Kier, 1995; March & Olsen, 1998), and that there is a dynamic between strategic culture and policy-making. In what follows, I introduce some of the strategic culture theories and scholarly discussions that add useful perspectives to this study. These ideas may help unveil the structures that hold norms and practices together on the strategic level, and provide different ways, and an analytical tool for understanding change and continuity in Swedish security policy.

## **Strategic culture: Theory to practice**

To appreciate subsequent discussions in relation to strategic culture theories, it is almost impossible to bypass the influence of the scholarly disputes between Johnston (1995) and Gray (1999). In search of conclusive and falsifiable explanations, Johnston (1995:35) cautions against using strategic culture as an analytical tool because of its limited explanatory power. It is easy to agree with Johnston (Ibid.:44) that the intrinsic relationships between culture and behaviour makes culture a difficult concept to use. His solution is to follow the positivist paradigm, and find independent variables that would predict strategic behaviour (Johnston, 1995:47-49). This is, however, contested by Gray (1999:55; 2007:2), who asserts the value of culture as the structure that moulds strategy itself. Instead of chasing verifiable proof of how strategic culture causes certain behaviours, Gray (1999:56) defends the interpretive approach, rather than using culture to anticipate strategic outcomes. In later discussions about the positivist-interpretivist debate, there are arguments claiming that neither of them sufficiently explains, nor determines change and continuity in strategic culture (e.g. Bloomfield & Nossal, 2017:287-288; Libel, 2020b:354; Haglund, 2004:489).

Scholars tackle this dilemma in different ways: For instance, Bloomfield and Nossal (2007:307) argue that there is continuity in a country's strategic culture, despite various governments being in office. Change, on the other hand, is understood as a long-term, evolving transformation (Ibid.:295). This is much in line with Gray's (2007:17) ideas about cultural transformation as a slow and arduous process, further slowed down by people's inherent resistance to change. Contrary to arguments inclined towards the abstract, a very hands-on, analytic framework is provided by Libel (2020a). Certainly more in agreement with Johnston (1995), Libel (2020a:697-698) focuses on discourse's influence on actions, and makes an investigation into the process from policy crisis to policy change. In a consecutive article, he discusses the competitive nature of strategic subcultures, and the influence this may have on policy change (Libel, 2020b:358). Regarding the practice within parliamentary democracies, Libel (2020b:361) considers change as the result of discursive processes in strategic subcultures.

Turning back to constructivism, the way culture shapes behaviour, and how politics is both seen as competition for, and distribution of power, is found in later works by Gray (2010:37, 107). He claims that the same questions regarding political stakes, and desired



strategic effects, apply to both researchers and strategists (Gray, 2010:16). In particular, the political objectives and the direction these give, would be essential for understanding the perpetual relationship between the two (Ibid.:18). As a bridge between Johnston's (1995) positivist and Gray's (1999) constructivist approaches, Haglund (2004:492, 495) proposes causality in constructivist approaches, pointing to the impact of narrative aspects on foreign and security policy-making. In his later research, the importance of metaphors in security policy used by political collectivities, is claimed to be a valuable asset for operationalising strategic culture theory (Haglund, 2011:509-511).

As for theories on norms and norm-contestation, these are regarded as important perspectives in strategic culture theories. For instance, Panke and Petersohn (2016:3-4) argue that norms can be both institutionalised and culturally embedded, however also challenged, and thereby transformed. Significantly, depending on context, and mechanisms behind norm-contestation, the outcome may be that norms survive, become weakened or die completely. In short, institutionalised procedures and regulations in and of themselves are considered influential to behaviour (Ibid.:4-5). The endurance versus transformation of norms is a centre-point in Bloomfield's (2016) discussions as well. Above all, he emphasises the impact of policy-makers' roles, and the discursive mechanisms they use (Ibid.:312). His framework comes across as useful for connecting strategic culture with the importance of both temporal and institutional contexts. During crises and/or normative shifts, the discursive mechanisms offer ways to contest and defend policies (Ibid.:326). Similar to Panke and Petersohn (2016), he draws attention to the influence of norms in policy-making processes, the impact of roles played by political actors, and the inherent power of political institutions (Bloomfield, 2016:312). Though he recognises there is a role-spectrum, Bloomfield (Ibid.:311) focuses on the actor-dynamics between the ideal types of the *norm-entrepreneur*, who incites policy-changes, and the *norm-antipreneur* who seeks to avoid them. These actors may employ different discursive mechanisms to realise policy change or defend its status quo, for example by attacking what is viewed as a normative problem, or undermining a newly established norm (Ibid.:323). Lastly, and functioning as a bottom line, Bloomfield (Ibid.:321) emphasises the impact of 'entrenched norms', i.e. heavily institutionalised norms with a long lineage. These are considered especially difficult to change for norm-entrepreneurs, and readily defended by norm-antipreneurs (Ibid.).

In sum, the explanatory power of different strategic culture theories has undergone extensive debate. Even though these theories appear to run the risk of being both the starting-point, and the finish-line of all arguments, they also provide ways to make sense of entangled and abstract relationships, adding viewpoints that are not limited to falsifiable answers. Understanding how security policy-making could be influenced by defending and contesting fundamental norms and ideas, lie at the heart of this thesis. Although it is elusive and entangled, this dynamic relationship comes across as central to the deliberations and decision-making in the selected, ‘mid-range’ cases. In what follows, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen instruments to get to the core of this.

Before all else, the research design and analytical tool are not randomly picked. Instead, they are expected to be useful for investigating, and understanding both change and continuity in security policy-making. Also, the study expects the case-study methodology to be suitable for evaluating the explanatory power of Bloomfield’s (2016) framework. Moreover, a qualitative, contextual analysis, opens up for a broader, constructivist interpretation of results (Crasnow, 2012:658; Denscombe, 2021:123; Kay, 2009:47-49). This is expected to be useful as the study is largely interested in the nuanced differences both within and between the PfP and HNS cases. The two cases are selected as I have found them illustrative of ‘mid-range’ instances in Swedish security policy-making, when different security policy paths were contested and defended. Furthermore, the results from the analysis are considered transferrable (Denscombe, 2021:101) to other cases in parliamentary democracies. As part and parcel of parliamentary democracies, and as a key aspect of Swedish strategic culture, security policies are supported and contested in the Riksdag plenary debates. Therefore, the sources consist of relevant Riksdag debate transcripts, committee analyses and propositions, thereby assumed to have a high level of credibility and authenticity (Bryman 2018:544). Identifying and delimiting the appropriate data, becomes important to define the cases’ boundaries (Denscombe, 2021:104). Undoubtedly valuable for an even deeper understanding of the changing security policy landscapes during an extended period prior to the two agreements, the analysis is, however, narrowed down to two, precise years. For the PfP-agreement, this means the Riksdag debates, and selected documents in 1994. As for the HNS-agreement, the analysis focuses on 2016, the year of the final Riksdag decision.

Subsequently, Bloomfield's (2016) framework is chosen as the study's analytical tool. There are several discursive mechanisms within this framework, that norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs use to influence policy-making (Ibid.:323). Analysing all of them and for both roles, would undoubtedly have provided more extensive results. Nonetheless, I have focused on a discursive mechanism used by both sides - exploiting *windows of opportunities*. Two key aspects in Bloomfield's (Ibid.:312) discussions pertain to the roles the actors play, and the power of the institution they belong to. In this study, the Riksdag and its processes represent Bloomfield's (Ibid.) 'institutions' and the 'roles' are played by Swedish parliamentarians. The analysis' sounding-board is constituted by the Swedish security policy context and its strategic culture. This, in turn, is seen to have its crux in Sweden's non-alignment, and its solidarity through humanitarian support (Åselius, 2005:39; Christiansson, 2010:8; Ångström & Honig, 2010:680). As for institutional norms, the parliamentary consensus culture is key (Drent & Meijnders, 2015:16), especially regarding security policy issues (see e.g. Österdahl, 2011:153-154). Combined, they constitute the 'entrenched norms' in both cases (Bloomfield, 2016:321). Thus, they are formative for the way windows of opportunity are exploited by norm-entrepreneurs/norm-antipreneurs, and for inciting change or preserving continuity (Bloomfield, 2016:322-323). Lastly, at least three contextual factors (Ibid.:312) appear to have key importance around the times of the PfP- and HNS-agreements: The Cold War, Sweden and the European Union, and Northern Europe as a region (Åselius, 2005:35-39). It is worth pointing out that in its original form, Bloomfield's (2016) framework is applied to norm-contestation/norm-preservation in multinational organisations. This means that his 'actors' associate to states, not individual members of a parliament (Ibid.:324). The institutional processes are obviously not comparable to that of Swedish political tradition or legislative practice. Moreover, Bloomfield's (2016) investigation is more focused on the norm-antipreneurs and their mechanisms to preserve policy status quo, rather than the norm-entrepreneurs and policy change (Ibid.:312). Perhaps most importantly, the two cases in this study represent 'mid-range' security policy events, whereas Bloomfield (Ibid.) investigates instances that have had more far-reaching effects, one being the United Nations Security Council's Responsibility to Protect principle (Ibid.). Bearing this in mind, the analysis will have to look for windows of opportunities that whisper, rather than shout. Maintaining a critical eye and countering effects of my own cognitive biases,

will hopefully balance some possible pitfalls. As a final remark, all quotes from the sources are, to the best of my ability, my own translations.

## **Unravelling ‘pushes’ and ‘pokes’ in security policy-making**

This study has stated two aims: First and foremost, to analyse elements related to strategic culture and their influence on parliamentary policy-making in ‘mid-range’ cases. The results are expected to address *the interdependency between Swedish strategic culture, the ‘pushing’ and ‘poking’ in the Riksdag deliberations, and the influence this has on the country’s security policy*. The PfP-agreement in 1994, and the HNS-agreement in 2016, have been selected, and the analysis has focused on ‘windows of opportunity’ (Bloomfield, 2016:310), to understand how political actors use this discursive mechanism to preserve or contest security policy status quo. The secondary aim – to evaluate Bloomfield’s (2016) analytical framework - will be addressed in the concluding remarks.

### ***The Partnership for Peace deliberations***

The early to mid-1990s was transformative for international relations and security policy-making. A reformed geostrategic environment led to smaller states broadening their security concepts (Posen, 2006:149; Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2016:483-484). European states – Sweden included – grappled with this new landscape of international relations and security situations. Ambiguities blurred clarity, causing old ideas to lose ground to extended foreign policy ambitions (Noreen, Sjöstedt & Ångström, 2017:148; Thomson & Blagden, 2018:585). This context is key for understanding how and why fundamental norms are contested and defended (Gray, 1999; Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007; Bloomfield, 2016; Panke & Petersohn, 2016). For the PfP deliberations, two circumstances stand out as especially important: Leaving the Cold War behind, and joining the European Union. Moreover, Swedish security policy had enjoyed a long history of non-alliance, (Prop. 1993/94:100), and ‘solidarity’ as a concept had long been considered synonymous with aid programmes and human rights (Prot. 1992/93:67). At the time, the Minister for Foreign Affairs represented a right-wing party, often associated with norm-entrepreneurs in security policy (e.g. Wagner et al, 2017). Contrary to this, her introductory speech on security and foreign policy indicates that norms can be stronger than ideas based on party affiliation: “[...] poverty is still getting worse, which places heavy demands on our soli-

curity.” (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 1). Interestingly, she omits the word ‘non-alignment’. Instead, she emphasises reinforced, international and regional security cooperation, including the European Union, “to play the role befitting our responsibility and tradition and according to the requirements of a new era.” (Ibid.). Recognising what is expressed, but considering what is not, her statement indicates a subtle challenge to the reigning security policy norm of non-alignment.

Then again, the subsequent debates also convey shared, political aspirations. This sense of parliamentary uniformity suggests a common foundation for actors who are usually on opposite sides in debates. This points to Bloomfield’s (2016:316-317) discussions on how fundamental norms are built on beliefs with profound legitimacy, and power to overrule new practices or ideas. Similarly, concepts and policies may become part of a de-politicised cultural framework, as reflected by Carstensen and Schmidt (2016:329). Thus, in the following statements, elements of Swedish strategic culture are indicated:

The particular world order of the Cold War is slowly disappearing into the past. A new order is laboriously being formed [...] Sweden will be able to participate in close cooperation between East and West, which we all have strived for and which is now a possibility. (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 1)

PfP is a concrete effort of creating cooperation. [...] This is incredibly important, and therefore the Left Party – maybe surprising to some – supports Sweden’s participation in PfP. (Prot. 1993/94:99, Statement 3)

Nevertheless, the deliberations provide examples of both policy-contestation and policy-preservation. Beginning with the norm-entrepreneurs, the PfP-initiative seems to constitute the most prominent window of opportunity to challenge security policy stasis. Analysing the statements, the agreement comes across as a springboard for reinforcing the transatlantic link, and forging new security policies, thereby suggesting possible, future policy norms. Embracing this initiative provides a window of opportunity for challenging the tradition of non-alignment:

The value of the [PfP] initiative consists not least of the broadly intended European participation. It is also a confirmation of a continued, American commitment to European security [...] (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 1)

Sweden's intention is to utilise the PfP-cooperation for developing the collaboration with NATO with the intention to increase our own capability and that of other states. (Prot. 1993/94:UU18, section 4.1.2)

Despite Sweden's self-image as a bridge-builder (Åselius, 2005:26), these quotes instead emphasise the transatlantic link, tilting Swedish security policy to the west. The second quote clearly breaks with the culturally embedded, perhaps aiming for a transformation rather than a complete abolishment (Panke & Petersohn, 2016:6). This is quite apparent when European security is emphasised, challenging the concept of 'solidarity' to transform:

The premise of Sweden's interest is Swedish readiness to contribute to a collective, European security order. Sweden shares the core values expressed by PfP. (Prot. 1993/94:UU18, section 4.1.2)

It is imperative that we try to establish a coordination of the various patterns that are being constructed for security policy cooperation in Europe. (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 22)

These statements communicate Sweden's interpretation of its role within European security cooperations. Clearly, common values appear important and indicate a normative alignment, thereby highlighting international ties. Wedged between Norway (NATO) and the Baltic states (until recently part of the Soviet Union), geographical location also plays a part in how norm-entrepreneurs choose to exhibit Europe in their arguments (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007:289).

Lastly, because of the relative security-policy concordance in the Riksdag, some norm-entrepreneur statements come across as openly challenging fundamental norms. The following quote suggests a break point (Haglund, 2011:506) from old security policy norms, and to find new bearings for Swedish security policy:

Sweden should definitely not be a stranger to a defence-cooperation with the EU or NATO. Rather, Sweden should promote such a development [...] It is no longer possible to hide behind announcements about non-alliance and neutrality. (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 3)

To counterbalance these cues, norm-antipreneurs appear to exploit the promises of peaceful, democratic development in Russia. Arguments evolve around maintaining military détente in the region along with a “need for an all-European cooperation”, rather than defence alliances (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 2). Thus, the PfP-agreement is seen as “a continuation of this common security policy, preventive diplomacy and peace-building” (Ibid., Statement 6). The long-awaited end of the Cold War also suggests an opportunity to voice the risk of a new Cold War. For norm-antipreneurs, this becomes an opportunity to not only reiterate Sweden’s non-alignment and neutrality, but to reinforce its value-based importance:

For Sweden, the best way to create security is to maintain its non-alliance and neutrality, and to use this resource when creating relationships with Russia, building on trust and cooperation. (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 4)

The classic phrase regarding Swedish neutrality policy is non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war [...] Hence, in the past as well as in the future, Sweden sees itself free to take a stand, very actively, in different conflicts. (Ibid., Statement 24)

Moreover, to provide the PfP-agreement with cultural and historical characteristics, comes across as shepherding the initiative to become:

[...] devoid of characteristics of a relationship between NATO and the Eastern countries. NATO and the West European union are defence pacts of the West, born during the Cold War. (Prot. 1993/94:99, Statement 9).

This quote indicates a recursiveness between the nation’s strategic culture, its collective, historical experience and its security policy norms. As Kier (1995:70) argues, national history does not in itself produce policies, but what is considered as a policy breach also demarcates its normative boundaries. Indeed, these boundaries, even if they would be porous, would suggest an outline of the Swedish strategic cultural context (Haglund, 2011:505).

As a final example, the concepts of peace and stability are applied to influence the very perception of ‘security policy’ itself. This would indicate what is called ‘the logic of expected consequences’ (March & Olsen, 1998:949-950). Consequential and rational reasoning describe how actions that transform security concepts lead to expected outcomes:

Peace can never be established with violence...Therefore, the concept of security itself has to change from narrowly meaning the security of nations...to include the security of peoples. Thus, a comprehensive peace policy has to be formed... (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 33)

In sum, something of a settler spirit is reflected in the Riksdag deliberations about the PfP-agreement. In the wake of the Cold War, a new, geostrategic scenery is evolving, with Europe playing an especially important role for Sweden. Thus, there is an opportunity to reconsider, to reinforce or even to reinvent Sweden's international relations and security coalitions. It is in this context NATO's PfP-agreement is debated and forged by the Riksdag. The deliberations themselves seem to emanate from a shared outlook, even if political rivals contest and defend its fundamental norms. Also, the heritage of the reigning security policy, and institutional norms, appears quite resistant to transformation, at least in this case. Thus, contesting it becomes an uphill battle, which speaks to Gray's (2007:17) ideas on how change is met with obstruction ingrained in geopolitics and historical background.

The PfP-agreement itself provides the most prominent opportunity for norm-entrepreneurs to challenge old security policies, initiating a shift towards a tighter security collaboration with NATO, with the ultimate goal to join the alliance. For the norm-antipreneurs, however, the end of the Cold War functions more as a catalyst for defending the fundamental norms with noticeable variety. For instance, Swedish legacy concepts of peace, solidarity and non-alignment, become opportunities to reinforce normative strongholds, but also to reinvent them by adding new values. Defending what had been working for centuries comes across as a more logical choice for the Riksdag in 1994. Regarding the impact on the Armed Forces, the decision lead to international cooperation with both long-term allies and former antagonists from the Cold War era (Prot. 1994/95:103), although at least one, fundamental strategic policy-norm persevered - military non-alliance (Bet. 1993/94:UU18).

### ***The Host Nation Support deliberations***

By the time of the HNS-agreement in 2016, the Swedish Armed Forces had undergone significant budgetary cut-backs, prioritising expeditionary forces in international operations (Åselius, 2005:41; Aggestam & Hyde-Price, 2016:487; Friede, 2022:524). Moreover, Russia's appropriation of Crimea in 2014, challenged security policies throughout



Europe: Cold War threats re-emerged alongside terrorism, making security policy goals increasingly complex (Thomson & Blagden, 2018:587). Significant to Swedish security policy, the EU as well as the Nordic countries, became prominent in debates (Prot. 2015/16:69; Bet. 2015/16:UFöU4; Prot. 2015/16:111). Since the PfP-agreement, the idea of ‘solidarity’ had transformed into becoming more related to security and defence cooperation (Bet. 2014/15:UFöU5; Prot. 2015/16:69), than to poverty in third-world countries (Prot. 1992/93:67). Nonetheless, non-alignment was still officially expressed as contributing to stability and security in the area (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 1). Though the security situation in the region deteriorated due to Russia’s aggressive behaviour, an armed attack against Sweden was still considered unlikely (Bet. 2014/15:UFöU5, p.7). Nevertheless, the Defence Committee’s analysis concluded that the Armed Forces needed to enhance its capability of receiving military support from, and providing military support to, other countries (Ds. 2014:20, p.25). The framework for this was provided by the HNS-agreement, through a Memorandum of Understanding with NATO (Ibid., pp. 40-41). This Memorandum was presented rather as a complement to the existing PfP-agreement, and with limited practical meaning (Ds. 2015:39, pp. 32-33). Even so, the Riksdag did not ratify the entirety of the HNS-agreement until 2016. Recognising this context of contradiction and dissension, two conflicting viewpoints emerge. One concerns the norm-entrepreneurs’ response to the Swedish government’s threat-perception:

The government and their coalition parties haven’t agreed to anything else than a general, security policy analysis on pros and cons regarding Sweden’s international cooperation. [...] The People’s Party regret the debility and lack of realistic insight which is characteristic of the coalition’s security policy conclusions. (Prot. 2014/15:UFöU5, p.29)

The counter-arguments evolve around values and moral authority, primarily expressed by norm-antipreneurs. Using this strategy “would typically have its genesis in ‘ideas and practices that have been proven to be efficacious and [had] a prior legitimacy’ in those actors’ own pre-existing normative community.” (Achayra, 2013, cited in Bloomfield, 2016:317). In line with this, the following quotes indicate a normative reinforcement of non-alliance, and the original concept of solidarity:

The Host Nation Support reduces the credibility of our military non-alliance and provides no guarantees for increased military security for Sweden. (Bet. 2015/16:UFöU4, p.13)

Is Sweden going to follow a consistent and brave foreign policy, founded on explicit values, or is this going to be a country which becomes quiet [...] and which compromises with its values [...]? (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 71)

It is important to have this dissonance as a backdrop to better understand the contesting perspectives between policy change, and policy continuity, as well as the ideational distance and ‘incompatible-ness’ between the rival actors (Bloomfield, 2016:319). It is not improbable that a clear way ahead for the country’s security policy is hard to achieve. In fact, these uncertainties seem to open up for exploiting other opportunities. Cultivating closer ties to NATO, or indeed joining the alliance, are changes to security policy that norm-entrepreneurs seek to incite. Exploiting the different ways to interpret the ambiguous security situation in the vicinity, is indirectly and directly expressed:

We welcome the host nation support agreement with NATO as a part of our collective capability. [...] Madame Speaker! Today, we can see an increasingly aggressive, revengeful and nationalistic Russia [...] (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 66)

To meet increasing uncertainties, Sweden has to cooperate more with other countries [...] The aim of the current host nation support agreement with NATO is to build security together with others [...] (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 29)

In line with the objective to transform security policy, their arguments expand from this, emphasising the argument to join NATO, in order to meet the national and regional security threats:

[...] it’s impossible to disregard NATO as the key actor for security and stability in our part of the world. Therefore, I still call for concrete arguments for not even being willing to brave the discussion [of a NATO membership]. (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 5)

In fact, some statements point to the risks of *not* joining NATO, thereby “inviting the thief to come in” (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 49). Not only Sweden is seen to be at risk here, but the region, too:

Our neighbours – all but Finland – are NATO members. They regard Sweden as the weak link, devoid of thresholds, constituting a threat to their security. (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 47)

[...] we want to provide security to the Baltic states [...] We do that by applying for NATO membership, not by non-alliance [...] (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 13)

True to both military and political strategy, to achieve transformation, political support is key (Gray, 2010:18, 33). This unity may be achieved if both sides in the debate share the same the preferences (Sieberer, 2006:151). Another important aspect is the influence from the opposition's 'back-benchers'. They need to accept the policy transformation, which mitigates their possible impact in their political parties (Petersen, 1988:150-151). Because of parliamentary opposition, it seems that a more indirect way of inducing change, is to downplay the novelty of the HNS-agreement:

The HNS [...] is nothing new. It's been in reports a long time. Sweden is now writing an agreement with NATO, which is about managing nation support when military personnel come here for exercises. (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 20)

Swedish security-policy is based on solidarity [...] within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, paragraph 42.7. To realise this, Sweden needs to have the capability to provide and receive civilian and military support. (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 62)

This dynamic relationship between rivals, dove-tail with research regarding the influence of plenary debates on policy-making (Raunio & Wagner, 2017:13). In some circumstances, this means national interests may overrule ideology, making the practice of parliamentary peace and consensus have leverage in matters of security (Ibid.:3). Interestingly, in spite of Russia's aggressive behaviour in the vicinity, it appears that the increasing interdependence between countries may invalidate this in the deliberations. This indicates that international relations, and entangled threat perceptions, predominate domestic affairs and legislative-executive dynamics (Ibid.:7). The different intensity in debates, and executive-legislative disputes, compared to twenty-two years earlier, could be understood through this temporal context (Bloomfield, 2016:326). Therefore, it is not unlikely that the structure of Swedish strategic culture is wobbling at this time, and that norm-entrepreneurs exploit this opportunity by pushing for change:

Mister Speaker! As an organisation, NATO is essential to European security. Our security policy is practically dependant on NATO for providing and receiving help in

the event of war in our vicinity [...]. For us, the question isn't *if* Sweden will be a member, but *how*.<sup>2</sup> (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 27)

Comparable to the PfP-agreement, norm-antipreneurs enjoy a greater repertoire of discursive strategies, when defending policy continuity. According to Bloomfield (2016:321), this is considered especially true when a norm is institutionalised. The consensus culture in Swedish security policy (Drent & Meijnders, 2015:16), the long lineage of non-alignment, and the value-based foreign and security policy, collectively reflect Swedish strategic culture (Åselius, 2005:26). In concert, they influence the Riksdag debates profoundly. In that respect, the defended norm could be considered 'entrenched' (Bloomfield, 2016:321). Thus, it is not far-fetched that norm-antipreneurs attempt arguments founded on the institutionalised practice of the Riksdag itself. Institutionalised norms reverberates in research regarding parliamentary democracies. For instance, security policy consensus has been found desirable for legislative and executive components (Wagner, 2018:124). This may indeed become ingrained in a parliament's collective behaviour (Panke & Petersohn, 2016:4). Moreover, an institution, such as the Riksdag, can contrive security strategies out of its own, inherent culture, practice and norms (Gray, 2010:39). When their rivals go against this culturally ingrained behaviour, it serves as a window of opportunity to be exploited:

It's important that security policy doesn't wobble and that new messages where we're headed are suddenly communicated. I think we should stick together. I wish I could see that behaviour in the Moderate Party, as well. [Followed by applause]. (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 4)

There is no comprehensive investigation or analysis about the agreement's actual connotations for Sweden's non-alliance. Despite its significance, the Host Nation Support wasn't preceded by a broad debate. (Bet. 2015/16:UFöU4, p. 12)

[...] the Swedish approximation to NATO is characterised by gradual slips and sly changes without proper debate. (Bet. 2014/15:UFöU5, p. 27)

Resisting to normative change can also provide a degree of self-determination and control (Bloomfield, 2016:316). The possibility to create autonomy may become desirable in it-

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<sup>2</sup> Italics in original.

self, and open a window of opportunity to refine old security policy norms, while maintaining in line with existing ones. This may provide some agency in future discussions. Modified, but familiar, security policies are more easily defended than finding new strategies to avoid issues yet unknown (Ibid.:317):

There are plenty more keys on the piano to play and tools in the toolbox to use than military support to provide help and support, and so on. The debate is one-sided. (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 50)

Sweden's task in the world is to contribute to, and enhance the positive development. We can, and we will do this using our military non-alliance as a point of departure, our centennial tradition of democracy, enjoying 200 years of peace and having 250 years of freedom of press. (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 98)

We can never become a military superpower, and there is little use in becoming a minor cog in another military superpower's machinery. We are going to become a superpower of peace. (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 132)

To summarise, the results show pronounced, parliamentary dissonance, and contrasting threat perceptions in the Riksdag. Norm-entrepreneurs manage to exploit this opportunity to some degree. While seeking political support by downplaying the impact of HNS-agreement, they also quite openly let the agreement work as a push to put a Swedish NATO membership on the parliamentary agenda. Using the Lisbon Treaty (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statement 62), they launch the agreement as a pivotal step towards national, as well as regional safety. Meanwhile, the norm-antipreneurs pull in the other direction, casting doubt on the agreement, underscoring Sweden's role as a "superpower of peace" (Prot. 2015/16:69, Statement 132). Moreover, norm-antipreneurs exploit the fact that their rivals break the rule of parliamentary peace, reinforcing the fundamental norms, and limiting security policy transformation. Also, previous security policy norms are re-defined to counter new concerns. Thus, it appears that preserving policy status quo is not necessarily an aim itself. For future security challenges, it may even be undesirable. All told, political stakeholders have very different views in the deliberations preceding the HNS-agreement, leading to e.g. extensive logistics tasks later on for the Armed Forces (Ds. 2019:8).

Considering this, it seems reasonable that cultural structures work both as limiting, as well as enabling factors for security policy and strategy (Gray, 1999:55; 2007:2), and in

different temporal contexts. The two NATO initiatives for defence and security cooperation undeniably occurred during very different times. Following from this argument, it leads to quite different views on what is considered as possible and appropriate windows of opportunity for norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs, but also how they choose to exploit them. Regarding the PfP-agreement, a shared policy ambition, securing peace and democracy played a lead role. Two decades later in the deliberations concerning the HNS-agreement, the Riksdag appears to perform a more precarious balancing act with Swedish security policy. Illustrated in the results, the arguments are based on either countering Russia's aggressions with closer military collaborations, ultimately joining NATO, or maintaining a delicate regional stability by avoiding just that.

I close this thesis by stating some of its most salient conclusions, and by reviewing the explanatory power of Bloomfield's (2016) framework. Lastly, I suggest a few interesting, future paths in research to follow.

## **Conclusion: Looking inwards and moving forwards**

This thesis set out to follow a road seldom travelled in research. Using a norm-dynamic framework, and with an interpretative approach, it has investigated two cases of Swedish security policy-making, defined as 'mid-range' occurrences. The primary aim was to unravel the relationship between Swedish strategic culture, 'mid-range' policy-making and their influence on security policy. The second aim was to evaluate Bloomfield's (2016) norm-dynamic framework to facilitate that understanding. To address the interdependency between strategic culture and security policy I chose to follow Gray's (1999; 2007; 2010) viewpoints and ideas.

Both cases demonstrate that 'windows of opportunity' are exploited to contest and defend security policy norms. This discursive mechanism is used both by the norm-entrepreneur, and the norm-antipreneur – the 'ideal type' roles that political actors adopt (Bloomfield, 2016:311). Regardless of contesting, or defending security policy, they manifest subtler as well as more forceful strategies. Thus, the 'push' and the 'poke' are attributed to both. This invalidate a possible preconception about the 'ideal type' roles, and *how* norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs use this communicative strategy. Omitting 'non-alignment' from the opening statement in 1994 is a gentle, norm-entrepreneur 'poke', and

norm-antipreneurs use a good deal of ‘pushing’ to counter-act policy-transformation, for example, exercising the power of social norms in the Riksdag debates in 2016. This emphasises how dynamic these roles are, not least in terms of how they exploit their respective windows of opportunities, and that ‘change’ is related to both.

Furthermore, norm-antipreneurs display a wider range of communicative strategies, and appear to tailor them against their rivals’ arguments. Norm-entrepreneurs, on the other hand, exploit their windows of opportunity with less diversity, mainly exploiting the proposed PFP/HNS-agreements for transforming security policy, or destabilising the status quo. Also, the results indicate it is a demanding task to change these policies, especially if they have become self-reinforced. Regarding the institutional norm-dynamics of the Riksdag, it has an undeniable impact on security policy-making. In fact, it appears to contribute to security policies persevering for decades, and becoming deeply entrenched in Swedish strategic culture. Accosting these fundamental security policy norms means challenging strategic culture itself. Not surprisingly then, transforming security policy is a slow and uphill battle.

Context-dependent factors are also relevant to policy change and continuity (Bloomfield, 2016:333): In 1994, the end of the Cold War initiated the development of new norms, creating windows of opportunity for political actors to exploit. In 2016, a more entangled security situation gave rise to competing norms, but also less straightforward opportunities. This illustrates the way different, structural shifts in world-order have an impact on how norms and ideas arise or subside. Evidently, these norms influence communicative strategies used by actors, and the roles they take in the deliberations. Furthermore, the study has revealed that norms are multidimensional, and can be manifested in behaviours, written into policy documents, and expressed in debates and deliberations. Therefore, they cannot be investigated and understood separately, belonging to, and manifested in one or the other. Instead, they evolve and transform in relation to each other, and in relation to context, both temporal and institutional.

Investigating what I defined as ‘mid-range’ security policy cases, has underscored their significance to security policy-making, and strategic culture transformation. The PFP and HNS-agreements show they are important enough to be indirectly or directly addressed in the opening statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, thereby clearly framing

them as consequential to Sweden's foreign and security policy. Also, the agreements themselves have had an immediate effect on the planning and execution of the tasks in all services of the Armed Forces, from the strategic to the hands-on tactical level. For instance, the PfP-agreement meant an increased participation of the Armed Forces in multinational cooperations and exercises, as well as in the Open Skies treaty<sup>3</sup> (Prop. 1998/99:74, p.25, 49). As for HNS, one of its most comprehensive consequences involved reinforced and improved infrastructure and logistics, involving field hospitals and storing ammunitions, along with other, fundamental, operational capabilities in the event of crises or war (Ds. 2019:8, pp. 164-169). Lastly, returning to Gray's (1999:50) ideas, the 'mid-rangers' show that they play an important role in the recursive relationship between strategic culture, military strategy, and policy.

Turning briefly to the secondary aim of the thesis, Bloomfield's (2016) framework largely retains its explanatory power when transferred from the multinational to the national, and from nation-state actors to individual, parliamentary representatives. For instance, his claim holds true, that any actor can assume the norm-entrepreneur as well as norm-anti-preneur role, and capitalise on the strategies available from both sides of the role-spectrum (Ibid.:333). Furthermore, creating agency for future debates by adjusting some institutionalised policy norms, is another norm-antipreneur strategy according to him (Ibid.:316, 321). However, applying the framework in this study has also revealed some pitfalls: It could only confidently address a few of the interdependencies between strategic culture, and the transformation/status of security policy in the two cases. The fact that Bloomfield is more focused on the cyclic nature of policies and roles may explain this (Ibid.:321). More importantly, his framework was applied on nation states and multinational organisations (Ibid.:324), and comes up a little short when applied to individual actors acting within the same institution and the same country. For understanding the influence of strategic culture on security policy (and vice versa) on a national level, the results provide clues, rather than undeniable and conclusive answers.

Apropos of the study's inability to provide full answers, it is fair to consider if other avenues for investigating this, could have reached further. Starting with alternative, discursive mechanisms, one might argue that norm-entrepreneurs were instead advocating

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<sup>3</sup> A treaty giving the member states the right to carry out reconnaissance flights over each other's territories.



for acceptable solutions to security problems (Bloomfield, 2016:323). Using the well-established PfP-agreement as a leverage for accepting an even closer cooperation with NATO, through the HNS-agreement would, in that case, exemplify this (Prot. 2015/16:111, Statements 20, 62). As I have already pointed out, this would not have taken the temporal context into account (e.g. Russia's annexation of Crimea) and how that could affect the roles played by parliamentarians (Bloomfield, 2016:312). Another argument to pursue would be that the Riksdag, and its processes have the power to influence policy concordance and policy contestation. Speaking to this, the sheer weight of the institutionalised norms could then have been considered significant enough to overrule other discursive mechanisms for norm-antipreneurs. Though the idea has value, this would mean disregarding that windows of opportunity have individual significance, and that they create different opportunities to exploit for norm-entrepreneurs and norm-antipreneurs alike.

As I mentioned earlier, the fact that the Riksdag approved of the PfP-agreement was likely a prerequisite for the HNS to be voted through. There is an element of path dependency here worth addressing (Avant, 2000:69): With the PfP-agreement (and the EU membership a year later), Sweden opened up for much broader, international security cooperations than before. This might have been instrumental for destabilising the security policy stasis. However, only investigating path dependency, would not have addressed the study's area of interest sufficiently well. For instance, some paths appear more legitimate at certain points, while others are ruled out. Overlooking what lies behind this would mean disregarding cultural mechanisms, social rules and practices that guide actors which role to adopt, which discursive mechanisms to exploit and which to avoid.

Yet another interesting aspect is party politics. Though policy ideas are developed by political parties, especially in ambiguous security policy situations (Béland, 2009:708), the results still show that traditional right-wing/left-wing perceptions do not suffice to understand change and continuity in security policy. For instance, the government was right-wing in 1994, and still the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to 'poverty' (traditionally a left-wing issue), as important to Sweden's foreign and security policy (Prot. 1993/94:65, Statement 1). Another example is the Left Party, that openly supported Sweden's participation in PfP (Prot. 1993/94:99, Statement 3). The fact that party ideology has limited importance to national strategic culture, is further supported in other research (Bloomfield & Nossal, 2007:307).

Admittedly, the study has not been able to draw out all that is essential to verify change and continuity in Swedish security policy. Still, the results have indicated some interesting shifts, including a few interdependencies between strategic culture and security policy. Looking ahead, the study has shown that there is more to be unravelled here. Clearly, the ‘mid-range’ decisions have a significant impact on creating, controlling and using military power. For military strategic practitioners, the results and conclusions in this study may provide a better awareness of how mechanisms in security policy-making influence future tasks to be implemented into their defence organisations. As for researchers, this study hopes to take inquiries further, and investigate different ‘mid-range’ decisions and how they may work as stepping-stones towards other, and possibly more momentous security policy decisions. Adding to this prompt, dramatic security decisions are dramatic for a reason - the urgency of an imminent threat to the security of a nation may force the hand. Conversely, routine security-making may have more limited effects on the actual, strategic practice. Investigating the broader category of ‘mid-range’ decision-making, especially their impact on a country’s defence force, should be useful to the strategic practitioner and provide a range of aspects to investigate for the researcher. A few have already been mentioned, such as norm-dynamics and path dependency or the agile characteristics of the norm-entrepreneur/norm-antipreneur roles. Also, there is much more to be said about the recursive relationship between strategic cultural norms, and their influence on political and military strategic practice. Expanding and digging deeper into this, would be valuable for interpreting further nuances in security policy-making. It would provide a better and deeper understanding for how security policy could be influenced and how this policy is implemented into defence organisations in militarily less resourceful states.

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