

**Food Security in Swedish Crisis and Contingency Policy:
What's the problem represented to be?**

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ABSTRACT

Most countries in the Global North have enjoyed relative food security over the past decades, but recent events such as the Covid-19 pandemic have highlighted how global food supply chains are fragile and susceptible to be affected by a range of disturbances. In Sweden, a revived interest for civil defense planning has led to a policy shift with new government instructions to plan for food security in the event of a crisis or war. The increased interests for food security have raised questions around domestic agricultural vulnerability and the possible implications of import-dependence in Sweden, as well as how vulnerability can best be mitigated. This thesis presents a discussion on how 'food security' is problematized within Swedish crisis and contingency policy to explore how proposed policy solutions are embedded in political, material, and moral values. Using the theoretical framework "What's the problem represented to be?" (WPR) highlights how Swedish crisis policies are imbued with neoliberal governmentality and a reliance on market forces to promote food security. The thesis concludes that the continued priority of 'productivism' and a view of agricultural sector as normal part of the market, has imposed terms of reference upon which crisis and contingency policy can provide practical solutions designed to ensure food security during a crisis or war.

Keywords: Food Security | Crisis and Contingency policy | Sweden | Responsibilisation | Civil Preparedness | Governmentality

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1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, the issue of food security has received widespread attention from states, intergovernmental bodies, NGO's and the academic community. A majority of food security literature is dedicated to understanding the implications and repercussions of food insecurity in the Global South. Less attention has been given to the role of food insecurity in the Global North and the implications it can have on state resilience during a crisis. The increased threat of issues such as climate change, hybrid warfare, and market failure has meant that many country's food supply chains are more vulnerable than ever. Most countries have determined that the traditional approach of increasing domestic production and stockpiling has become too costly, and instead opted to utilise different market mechanisms to pursue food security (Larsson 2021). The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) asserted in 1996 that "food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets dietary needs and food preference for an active and healthy life" (2006:1). It is often assumed that people in the Global North, and specifically in Scandinavia, are 'food secure' in terms of having enough food for a healthy life. Hence, the issue of food insecurity in wealthy countries is often overlooked, as the main focus is on studying the challenges of ensuring food security in countries which are threatened by famines. Yet, the role of food security in the Global North has received increased attention from the media, politicians, and the academic community, especially in light of the perceived increased threat of "hybrid warfare" and the possible threat it poses to countries supply chains (Borch and Kjærnes 2016).

In Europe, most countries rely heavily upon global food systems and international trade to meet their food consumption needs, which have led them to be highly vulnerable to disruptions in the supply chain. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the fragility of food supply chains, with the European Food Banks Federation (FEBA) reporting that of their 29 country-members over 80% reported an increase in their population seeking emergency food assistance, as well as reporting that food production was slowed or altogether halted as a result of labour shortages in the initial phases of the pandemic (2020: 2). The problems that have been exposed by the pandemic are varied and multifaceted, but the main structural weakness with regard to the food system can be said to be the reliance on the "just-in-time"

(JiT) distribution model, which uses algorithms to track consumption patterns over time to avoid having to stock extra inventory. Furthermore, the reliance on a poorly paid migrant labour force has been identified as a weakness among contemporary European agriculture, as the travel restrictions imposed during the pandemic barred access to seasonal workers which illustrated how essential seasonal workers are to farmer's ability to harvest (Ranta and Mulrooney 2021).

The reappearance of food security discourse in Europe can be linked to a host of geopolitical pressures such as the weakness of international food supply chains due to bilateral trade agreements and 'trade wars', the increasing commercial power of transnational agri-food corporations in tension with nation-state regulations, and domestic political concerns about the financial and environmental costs of productivist policies (McMichael 2009). Whilst "food security" has commonly been discussed as a singular discourse which, at its most basic conception, refers to a situation in which people lack adequate food to meet their basic needs, its articulation in reality has embodied a range of specific imaginations of problems and appropriate solutions. Thus, the ontological basis for the concept of food insecurity must be understood as a product of an ongoing politics of knowledge, in which the 'problem' itself is a result of an intricate system of beliefs (Borch and Kjærnes 2016). It is necessary to challenge the presumption that policies on food insecurity are responses to problems that are independent of the policy process, and instead attempt to examine implicit assumptions and representations of the 'problem' that policy on food security purports to address.

1.1 AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION

The aim of this thesis is to critically engage with the topic of food security in Swedish crisis management and contingency policy, by exploring how proposed solutions are shaped by political objectives and dominant discourse of what constitutes "food security". In doing so, the thesis contributes to the field of security and crisis management by furthering our understanding through contextualization how food security and associated policy proposals are shaped by discourses and rationalities related to implicit representations of the "problems" that they purport to address. Furthermore, the thesis fills a research gap within literature on food security in Sweden, by questioning the processes by which policy proposals relating to food security arrive at conclusions of appropriate strategies. By adopting a critical

discourse analysis framework, the thesis argues that Swedish crisis and contingency is heavily shaped by a productivist and neoliberal view of agriculture which has set limitations on which proposals are made intelligible in relation to food security. Accordingly, the research question in this thesis is:

How has 'food security' been problematized in Swedish crisis and contingency policy?

To explore my research question in more detail I will include a further set of sub-questions.

- *What assumptions underpin the representation of 'food insecurity' as a problem in Swedish crisis policy plans?*
- *Which elements are left unproblematized in Swedish crisis and contingency policies relating to food insecurity?*

1.2. BACKGROUND OF SWEDISH FOOD SECURITY

The Swedish approach to food security within crisis and contingency policy has shifted significantly since the end of the Cold War. During the 20th century Swedish food policies were largely shaped by its experience of the First and Second World Wars and were driven by two dominant conceptualisations of security threats, the first being that Sweden's import supply chains would be cut off in the case of a large-scale war in Europe, and the second being an armed attack on Swedish territory. To counter the first potential threat, a contingency system was built around the premise of stocking state-owned agricultural inputs such as diesel and fertilisers which could replace imports for up to a year. Furthermore, conversion plans were developed to detail how the Swedish agriculture sector was to produce sufficient quantities of food with adequate nutritional content, as well as outline how agricultural staff could be ensured to meet production demands. For the second threat, it was assumed that a majority of infrastructure and production facilities would be destroyed, which

justified the rationale that Sweden also needed to include staple foods in state-owned stocks (Eriksson and Öhlund, 2020). After the end of the Cold War, Sweden's strategy on food security changed drastically. By 1987, Sweden had sold half of their stocks containing staple food and agricultural input and instead opted to pursue voluntary agreements with private businesses where they would pledge to work towards building robustness and resilience within the food production sector. In 1990 an agricultural policy reform was implemented, which was dominated by ideals of market liberalisation. The changes to agricultural policy included elimination of all internal market regulations, where export subsidies were abolished, and any annual price-review were terminated. Further, the reform limited the government's responsibility for action in instances of crop failures (Eriksson, Fischer, and Ulfbecker, 2020). When Sweden joined the EU in 1995, it was believed that Sweden's ability to continue trade during a time of crisis or war was guaranteed, leading to a justification for dismantling and selling the last state-owned food stocks. The Government bill (1998/99:74) reformed several aspects of civil defence policy, and it was stated that the solidarity principle within the EU, WTO, and the increased internalisation of agriculture business, meant that trade would continue even during a time crisis (Larsson and Sjöqvist, 2021). Thus, Sweden further affirmed its belief in the ability of free market reforms to be a solution for food security in crisis or war.

Since joining the EU and by proxy the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the issue of agricultural and food supply has largely been viewed as an issue which falls under the jurisdiction of the EU. Yet, Sweden has been one of the most ardent critiques of CAP, arguing against any measures which regulates the agricultural sector and stating that the agricultural sector should be "subject to the same, market-determined, conditions as other economic sectors" (Schwaag Serger 2001: 86). Consequently, Sweden have criticized the EU for being too interventionist, inflexible, and complex (Elgström and Sundström, 2016). During recent EU negotiations on CAP, the guiding principles for the Swedish government have been significantly reducing expenditure, increasing market orientation, strengthening competitiveness, and strengthening environmental ambitions (Näringsdepartementet, 2020:21: 4D50A3). As of 2020, Sweden is determined to be 50% self-sufficient in food production, with only 100% self-sufficiency in three areas for food, namely sugar, carrots, and cereals. In 2015, the Swedish Parliament passed a bill that advanced a return to "total national defense", which defined the supply and distribution of food during a crisis as a core element of national defense (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund 2021).

The employed definition in this thesis of food security as "all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets dietary needs and food preference for an active and healthy life" (FAO 2006:1), may be constitutive of an ideal goal to be achieved in peacetime. Consequently, a period of crisis and war may call for less ambitious goals especially in respect to "food preferences" and "active and healthy life". Elements of food security during a crisis must rather be viewed as a question of resilience in which minimum nutritional needs must be met at all times (Larsson and Sjöqvist, 2021). Over the past few years it has become evident that Sweden has limited control and influence regarding the market-based global food system, with public reports stating that the supply chain is highly susceptible to any disturbances or fluctuations which leaves Sweden highly vulnerable to experience food insecurity to a degree by which minimum nutritional needs cannot be ensured (Jordbruksverket 2021).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will focus on developing a relationship between this thesis and previous research within the field of food security. As there is limited research engaging with the topic of food security in crisis and contingency policy, the following chapter outlines and discusses a number of different but interconnected research areas. The first section gives an overview of literature engaging with what constitutes a “policy” and different interpretations of the nature of policymaking. The second section examines crisis and contingency policy to evaluate how it differentiates from other policy areas, followed by an overview of how different European countries have developed their crisis and contingency plans. The final section provides an overview of the main debates of EU agricultural sectors and food production, and highlights dominant discourses relating to neoliberalism, protectionism, and nationalism within the food production system.

2.1. WHAT IS A ‘POLICY’?

At its most basic, ‘policy’ is the principles and practices pursued by a government to achieve social, political, and economic outcomes (Fawcett, 2010). ‘Policy’ is mobilised in a range of situations and is inherently a form of governance with the aim of encouraging certain behaviours while discouraging others. The two most mainstream approaches to understanding policy is the “policy cycle” approach and the “policy analysis” approach. The first approach views policy as a logical succession of stages, for example identification of problem, evaluations of options, decisions, and implementation (Bridgman and Davis 2000; Parsons 1995). The second approach is concerned with the development of a methodology which can be used to determine the outcome of specific actions and enabling comparisons between alternatives to determine likely outcomes (Jenkins-Smith, 1990). William Jenkins conceptualises policy as a “set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them” (Jenkins, 1978: 15). Such a definition translates the process of government into a pattern of goal-directed action and assumes that policy is a process of choice by rational decision-making. To describe policy as a choice of decision-makers assumes that the action follows from the

decisions, that they could have chosen something else, and a different action would have been pursued.

These rational models for understanding policy making have been challenged by scholars engaged in critical policy analysis who have questioned the value neutrality of the research method underpinning 'rational' models of policy making. Rather, emphasis is placed on the complex nature of the policy process and how policy making involves a variety of different actors, situations, decisions, and goals. The attempt to single out policy from its contextual setting is not possible, as major public policies are most often an accumulation of previous commitments, rather than a "choice" made at a certain point in time (Parsons, 1995). The setting of policy-making is continuously shifting, as a result of a shift in political leadership, an alteration to the external political environment, a new proposal advanced by a powerful group, or a number of other changes which may take place (Anton, 1969). Politics, when mentioned, is often viewed as being external to the policy process, driven by the logic that the application of "scientific criteria" to a policy problem separates it from the political realm. However, critical policy analysis argues that policymaking can never be separated from politics, as it is the political which offers a framework for making policy choices and (Hallsworth, 2011).

Those engaged in post-structuralist theories have extended the understanding of policy making to incorporate the ways in which discourses regulate knowledge and produce policy outcomes. Policy is by and large a concept which represents an idea and a way of analysing and making sense of a complex process of governing. In this view, policy is understood as a wider system of social relations framing what is said and done, in which "policy is a way of labelling thought about the way the world is and the way it might be, and of justifying practices and organisational arrangements" (Colebatch, 2009:8). Consequently, policy is not simply understood as a response to existing conditions and problems, but rather a process by which both problems and solutions are created. As will be discussed at more length in the methodology chapter, this thesis assumes a WPR understanding of policy making which challenges the presumption that public policies are responses to problems that are independent of the policy process, and instead illustrates how policies contain implicit representations of the "problems" they purport to address (Bacchi, 2009).

2.2. POLICY-MAKING AND CONTINGENCY PLANS: A BLACK SWAN?

Policy designed to prepare for unknown risks and unanticipated crisis face a number of key challenges which single them out from many other types of policy making. Paradoxically, a crisis which we are prepared for is by definition precluded from becoming one. That is, a crisis is defined by uncertainty and requires the ability to prepare for new and unimagined threats, precluding the government from routinizing crisis management policy (Ekengren, Boin and Rhinard, 2014). As Clarke (1999) suggests, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more likely it is that the policy designed for contingencies will not be relevant. One of the main features of research on crisis management or contingency planning is the division between those who believe that it is possible to develop policies aimed at mitigating threats, and those who believe that the institutionalization of procedures and processes are not adequately suitable to prevent widespread damage ('t Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin 1993; Hillyard 2000).

Within literature on crisis and contingency policy, there is a strong normative element present, as there is an epistemological assumption that the destructive implications of a crisis can be prevented, prepared for, or managed by adhering to certain principles and procedures within an institutional structure, most often the government. There are a number of articles which detail the importance of “good practice” of worst-case scenario thinking and early warning systems (Bracken 2008; Schwartz 2003), contingency planning for multiple potential crisis (Alexander, David 2012; Perry and Lindell 2007), and recovering and rebuilding of integral infrastructure (Coppola 2021; McEntire 2014). These articles highlight the underlying logic that certain practices and procedures can mitigate or prevent a crisis from happening, and that neglecting to engage with rules and procedures generates and exacerbates the risk of failure. In contrast, there are number of scholars who have highlighted crisis management failures despite detailed contingency plans existening, which indicated that while planning documents can be highly detailed and account for various probable scenarios, they must nonetheless be rehearsed, evaluated, and updated to hold relevance in a crisis (Boin and McConnell 2007; Eriksson and McConnell, 2011).

What is understood as a potential “crisis” can, however, be said to be embedded in political discourse by nature of what is determined to be “extraordinary”. Olsen, Kruke and Hovden (2007) argue that the issue of crisis preparedness has tended to be discussed in terms which denies the basic fact that societal safety and crisis preparedness are inherently political

phenomenon. What may be regarded as a good solution within policy to ensure crisis preparedness may be regarded differently when time passes or may vary from society to society. Dilemmas and value choices are always open for political negotiation as threats and dangers may vary depending on who analyses the issue. Thus, they question much literature on crisis preparedness and contingency planning by arguing that it is not “an economic or technical entity that can be optimized on the basis of ‘rational’ calculations of costs, benefits and probabilities” (2007, 14). With the increased attention paid to complex crisis such as hybrid warfare, climate change, or market changes which induce product shortages, many have come to determine certain social problems to be reliant on political judgments rather than benign scientific issues. That is, policy on crisis and civil contingency are viewed as particularly difficult as they are often argued to contain poorly defined policy “problems” (Alford and Head, 2017). Thus, several articles have highlighted the importance of the policy “problem” and the subsequent impact that this has the policy process, as well as more generally the point of inquiry from the academic community. Yet, there is a significant absence of literature which explicitly questions and analyses how problem representations impact the policy arena within crisis management and contingency planning. Whilst it is acknowledged that policy problems are often “complex”, less attention has been paid to unravelling the implications that the construction of a problem has. Thus, this thesis attempts to contribute to research on crisis and contingency policy by filling a research gap by employing a WPR framework to question how the ‘problem’ of food security impacts the policy process and subsequent proposed solutions.

2.3. CONTINGENCY PLANS WITHIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

At the EU-level, a contingency plan for food security was developed as a response to the covid-pandemic and supply induced shortages within Europe. The contingency plan outlines areas for improvement in the form of establishing a permanent European Food Security Crisis preparedness and response Mechanism (EFSCM) whose task is to map vulnerabilities of the EU food supply chains and develop recommendations for ways to reinforce the diversity of sources within the supply chain (European Commission 2021). There are no substantial policy proposals yet for how this is to be achieved, as it is still under review. Currently it is a domestic challenge for each state to decide upon their own contingency plans and how food

security is to be achieved. There is little academic attention paid to how individual nation states approach food security, and whether their conceptualisation of what constitutes the 'problem' in food security policy matters for how European countries prepare for a potential crisis. However, there are several government reports commissioned to identify threats which could disrupt food availability. The following section reviews different European country reports on food supply vulnerability to further understand how contingency plans are contextual and influenced by different threat perceptions.

The UK have identified several potential future threats that could impact the availability of food, such as energy shortages, commodity shortages, cyber threats to IT systems used for food production and nuclear fallouts. Consequently, the UK emphasise the necessity of "flexibility" and have opted to pursue policies based on an international and cross-boundary approach. That is, coordinating policy with other international actors in the food system, but also to coordinate food security policy with policy in other sector including energy, land use and biodiversity (Kirwan and Maye 2013). The term "sustainable intensification" to advocate for methods such as genetic modification, genomics, and nanotechnology to "deliver more food from less land, resources and energy (Foresight 2011: 170). A German report on the future of agriculture stated that a key component of ensuring food security was developing new technologies which will increase productivity despite any limits of natural resources (Commission on the Future of Agriculture 2021). Poland have expressed that a key priority is to diversify supply chains and investing in research and innovation, as well as investment in storage and distribution networks (Government of Poland 2017). In Italy, part of a contingency plan involves projects aimed at strengthening logistic solutions to support agri-food supply chains, agricultural mechanisation, and investing in "research and business". A French report on agriculture and ensuring food security focused on the possible development of hi-tech solutions and the convergence of diets (Dorin and Paillard, 2011).

Whilst both Sweden and Finland have adopted to strategy of 'total defence' in which maximum defence capability is obtained through coordination and collaboration between the military and civil defence, their policies on food security have evolved differently. Sweden's integration into the EU resulted in a shift in discourse around agricultural self-sufficiency, as it was believed that the free market and solidarity principle within the EU would be sufficient for building a food security strategy. In contrast, Finland was influenced by the Baltic countries struggle for independency, and instead came to believe that the state needed to maintain more centralised preparedness in case of an emergency (Pursiainen 2020). Finland

have explicitly stated that market functions do not always have the capacity to sustain basic functions in a time of crisis. Thus, they developed food stocks which can supply the entire population with 2500-2800 calories per day for six months to a year, as well as maintaining a level of self-sufficiency which is estimated at around 80% (Wither 2020). In Norway, an invasion of territory is perceived as more likely now than in the previous 20 years, which has resulted in a renewed sense of urgency in developing a robust strategy on food security. The strategy on food security can be divided into three different policy approaches; the first focuses on securing the supply chain, the second is a public-private partnership in which businesses are legally bound to help resolve any serious supply problems, and the third is stockpiles of emergency provisions (Richards, Kjærnes, and Vik 2016). In contrast, Denmark have not identified food insecurity as a significant threat in their emergency plans. The overall objective of the Danish contingency plan is to utilise collective societal resource to return to 'normality' as quickly as possible, and instead opt to put emphasise on the practice of preventing and limiting consequences of a crisis when they occur. As Denmark is a net exporter of many types of food, food security has most often been discussed in terms of ensuring production effectiveness. Thus, food security policies have mostly been designed to protect the agricultural sectors profitability by strengthening mechanisms which prevent threats such as an outbreak zoonoses (MSB 2016).

A key similarity between different European country reports on securing food supply during a crisis, is the emphasis placed on technological solutions to increase food production, strengthening purchasing power, and securing supply chains. Emphasis is placed on productivity through research and technology, access to inputs markets and trade (Jarosz 2011). Yet, there are differences in the perceived belief in market-forces and its ability to ensure the continuous flow of food supply, with countries like Finland and Norway who have opted to invest in state-owned stockpiles as an insurance against significant disruptions to a global supply chain.

2.4. EUROPEAN AND SWEDISH AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The role of food security in crisis management policy cannot be discussed without understanding the main factors which influence Swedish agricultural politics. A number of

studies have been conducted to analyze the resilience of Swedish agriculture and its ability to withstand food production during a crisis, signaling a consensus that import-dependence, a highly specialized agricultural sector, and a dependence on importing agricultural inputs has meant that Swedish farming is firmly dependent on the global food system to ensure that availability of food (Eriksson, Fischer, and Ulfbecker 2020; Larsson and Sjöqvist 2021). It is therefore important to consider how the global food system operates and how it influences Swedish crisis and contingency policies relating to food security. As Sweden are members of the EU, the Swedish agricultural sector is incorporated into the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and shaped by supranational policy making. At its inception, CAP was designed around principles of “increase agricultural productivity” and “ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers” in 1968 (Boulanger and Philippidis 2015, 22). With technological advancements and added stimulation to increase production caused by higher food prices, overproduction became an issue in the EU. Subsequently, agricultural surplus was exported and sold cheaply outside of the common markets which caused conflict with other actors in the world market. Consequently, a reform to CAP was made in 1992 which reduced support prices, and instead opted for direct aid payments which decoupled the link between support and production. The reform oriented CAP in a more liberal, market-oriented direction. Agricultural trade is centred around the concept of economic competitiveness as the vital component of the global food supply chain, with land-use policies based around the principle of promoting increased productivity.

Critics of the new CAP argue that by fostering competitiveness and exports of European agribusiness, the EU ignores the main challenge concerning food security for countries in Europe today, namely import-dependence (Boulanger and Philippidis, 2015; Cadillo-Benalcazar, Renner, and Giampietro 2020; Kareem, Martínez-Zarzoso, and Brümmer 2018). Since the 1980’s, a majority of Western countries switched from being net exporters to net importers of food, which has resulted in a majority of countries suffering from food trade deficits and growing expenses for purchases of staple food such as cereals, dairy and vegetable oils (Candel, 2014). When examining the issue of food insecurity in Europe, there is a clear divide between the academic community and the governance institutions who analyse food policy with the goal of optimising resilience in the face of a crisis. The academic community largely discusses food security in terms of governance and uses the term “food system” to examine a number of actors to discern what interests are at play. Several scholars have argued that due to changed power relations, the state is no longer the

key arena for decision-making of food policy, but rather that corporate interests plays such a key role in food supply and play a major role in intergovernmental policy regimes (Clapp and Fuchs 2009; Coleman, Grant, and Josling 2004; Lang 2010). The main debates around policy on food security in Europe is to what degree ‘big business’ dominates the field, and whether the agricultural sector is governed by neoliberal and market-oriented rationalities.

2.4.1. NEOLIBERALISM IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Several scholars argue that agri-food policy is steeped in neoliberal logic, in large due to dominant agricultural practices being based on ‘productivism’, which is a system based on improving productivity through expanding the volume of production by utilising factors of production more effectively (Gray and Lawrence 2001). The most dominant features of a productivist system is the emphasis places on specialisation, intensification and economic concentration. The current agricultural system of productivism is described as driven by neoliberal logic, in which neoliberalism is defined as a set of pro-market values, ideas and policy settings that are designed to promote national and international competitiveness by reorienting the role of government and private enterprise (Glassman 2006:8). Several scholars have argued that agriculture has traditionally been viewed in terms of “exceptionalism”, in that it was assigned special status as agriculture was assumed to be different from other economic system and key to maintain a functioning society. But due to increased influence of international institutions like the World Bank and World Trade Organisation (WTO), it has now changed to the to the point where the agricultural and food production sector is viewed as normal part of the market which has enabled the commodisation of land, allowing foreign investment and speculation with little regulatory buffering to prevent food-producing land from being exploited (Daugbjerg and Feindt 2017; Jarosz 2011; Lawrence, Richards, and Lyons 2013).

An additional argument put forward concerning neoliberal governance, is that policy documents on food security utilises neoliberal discourse in so far that it increasingly places responsibility for addressing hunger upon the individual. That is, whilst the “solution” to food insecurity is argued to be competitive entrepreneurial individuality, deregulation of international trade and privatisation of social services, the objective of food access is nonetheless defined in terms of individuals abilities to pay for it on the global corporate

controlled marketplace. (Larsson 2021; Lawrence, Richards, and Lyons 2013; Pyysiäinen, Halpin, and Guilfoyle 2017). Consequently, whilst the food market is highly shaped by modalities of international institutions, transnational agribusiness and consumption demands from primarily the middle and upper classes, there is still the expectation that communities ought to be resilient within the constraints placed on them within the global food system. The notion of food security is no longer argued to be derived from achieving food self-sufficiency, or from a rapid increase in food production. Rather, it is a matter of achieving economic growth and alleviating poverty as to increase the individual's ability to access food.

2.4.2. EU, PROTECTIONISM AND FOOD NATIONALISM

Whilst there is a great deal of literature which argues that European agricultural politics is underpinned by a neoliberal logic, there is historically competing discourse around EU agriculture, namely that CAP is protectionist. Historically, CAP's protectionist features of price supports and subsidies coupled with high tariffs on imports resulted in increased agricultural production which exceeded the domestic need. The increased production enabled some of the surplus to be sold competitively on the world market, which led to intense criticism worldwide. A number of scholars have highlighted how CAP encouraged the practice of selling excess agro-food production to poorer regions at below cost-price (dumping) which destroyed the livelihood of local producers and increases dependency in agricultural net importing regions (Goodison 2007; Laroche Dupraz and Postolle 2013). Yet, with the 2003 CAP reform and the 'decoupling' of support payments from production, as well as the reduction in export funds, was a clear step in revoking this harmful practice. As from 2013, the EU fully committed to reappealing the use of export refunds and opted to pursue more market-oriented practices advocated by the WTO.

The discourse of protectionism and CAP has over the past decade become less relevant in the academic sphere due to the reforms to support payment and export refunds, and instead given rise to a competing discourse of "food nationalism". The concept of "gastronationalism" has become more prevalent in literature on food security and is employed to analyze the ways in which food production and consumption can sustain emotive power of national attachments, as well as highlight how nationalist sentiments shaped the production and marketing of food (DeSoucey 2010; Ichijo and Ranta 2016). EU governance on food production and distribution

has in sorts created a backlash in nationalism, for example as the EU hygiene standards limited the production of certain raw milk cheeses which sparked outrage in France (MacMaoláin 2007). Research on gastronationalism illustrates how claims of exceptionalism are often based on notions of cultural tradition and ties to national identities. DeSoucey (2010) uses the case of foie gras in France to illustrate how external claims about the morality of animal welfare is countered by claims about the salient role of history and tradition in sustaining cultural identity in France, and how it can act as a marker of national self-identification. Consequently, policy discourse about the protection of culture in the face of homogenizing markets is employed to criticize cross-national cooperation.

To summarize this chapter, there are a number of well-developed research fields relating to crisis and contingency policy (Alford and Head 2017; K. Eriksson and McConnell 2011; 't Hart, Rosenthal, and Kouzmin 1993), as well as extensive research on global food systems and European agriculture practices (Boulanger and Philippidis 2015; Clapp and Fuchs 2009; Gray and Lawrence 2001). In addition, a few studies have detailed how the Swedish agricultural sector is made vulnerable to disruptions in global supply chains (C. Eriksson, Fischer, and Ulfbecker 2020; Larsson and Sjöqvist 2021). However, given the previous research review, there is a gap relating to the critical engagement with domestic crisis and contingency policies and how they problematize the issue of food security. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the fragmented research field on food security, by examining how food security is discussed within the context of crisis and contingency policy in Sweden.

3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical stance proposed through the WPR framework and discusses key concepts such as “problematization” and “subjectification”. The second section gives an in-depth account of the conceptual checklist and subsequent questions proposed by WPR to guide the analytical process. The third section outlines the material utilized in this thesis and describes the method which guided the identification of themes within the policies. The final section highlights the limitations of the research and briefly discusses some of the difficulties that accompanied research into food security within crisis and contingency policy.

3.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The thesis utilise a type of critical discourse analysis called “What’s the problem represented to be?” (WPR) developed by Carol Bacchi. WPR provides both a methodological framework with a set of questions used to guide the policy analysis process, and a theoretical stance influenced by Foucault inspired poststructuralism. As a theory, WPR aligns with Foucault’s notion of discourse as “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own invention” (Foucault 1977: 49). Thus, using a WPR approach to policy analysis allows us to challenge the presumption that public policies are responses to problems that are independent of the policy process, and instead illustrate how policies contain implicit representations of the “problems” they purport to address.

As is indicative of the name of the method, a key concept when analysing policy is so-called “problematizations”, which encourages approaching analysis from a problem questioning perspective, rather than the more conventional problem-solving perspective. By examining “problematizations” the focus shifts to understanding how policies or proposals create or produce “problems” by identifying the assumptions and presuppositions that lie dormant in the way a specific issue is conceptualised. Furthermore, as problematization refers to the ways in which problems are produced and represented, it is also a practice of governance. The concept of “problematizations” as governance is closely tied to Foucault’s notion of

discourse as “socially produced forms of knowledge”, as WPR argues that knowledge ought to be understood as a cultural product and “unexamined ways of thinking” (Bacchi 2009). The main analytical task is enquiring the discursive practices involved in creating knowledge, and how they place limitations on what can be thought or said about the problems under consideration. As the core conception of a policy rests upon the assumption that a policy can “fix” a problem by identifying its existence and rectifying it, an undisputable element of policymaking is also contextualising the problem based on previous knowledge and subsequent assumption (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016).

Another crucial concept within the WPR framework is “subjectification” and refers to the production of provisional “subjects” through policy practices. Policies create and encourages characteristics and behaviours for subjects by creating a “repertoire of conduct”, by promoting identities which are deemed to be desirable (Bacchi 2009). Thus, this approach views policies not as a reaction to people who exist, but rather as a force for shaping what is possible for people to become or be. That is not to say that governments determine what kinds of subjects we become, but rather illustrates how policies “elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents” (Dean 2010: 32) Subjects become an extension of politics and a product of power-knowledge relations, which challenges the assumption that people are rational and “enlightened” and emerges separate from their political environment. WPR therefore constitutes a distinct approach to policy analysis which interrogates “policies as productive (or constitutive)- making things come to be” (Carol Bacchi and Susan Goodwin 2016, 53). As with the process of “subjectification”, WPR also highlights similar process for “objects” and “places”. In the case of WPR, objects are essentially concepts and categorisations that play a prominent role in governing practices, such as “development”, “sustainability”, “wellbeing” etc. The same can be said about “places” in which geographical and spatial elements (such as Europe, the state, rural) go unquestioned, and the activities involved in shaping territories and populations are taken for granted or neglected as an object of analysis. In many instances, such concepts have a certain taken-for-granted status where it is assumed to be fixed in its nature, rather than as process which is shaped by government specificities. A post-structuralist perspective intends to highlight the processes involved in the formation of concepts and categories as “objects”, by reflecting on the ways policies tend to conceptualise problems in the forms of binaries and dichotomies, e.g., national/international, developed/developing, or secure/insecure (C. L. Bacchi 2009). Conceptualising objects or places as dichotomies often

implies mutual exclusivity, which has the potential to create qualitative hierarchies. Furthermore, this leads to a habit whereby places or objects are treated as the context for policies, rather than as produced, reproduced, and constructed by policies. This way of neglecting to consider objects and places as constructed, means that the “what”, “where” and “how” of policy is disregarded (Carol Bacchi and Susan Goodwin 2016). Thus, it is important to consider the technologies and logics which are involved in the production and rationality underpinning these objects and places.

An important point made within WPR is that it is not solely an impassive analytical tool, but that there is also an element of advocacy to WPR analysis. The aim is to understand the unquestioned premises of “problems” in policies and processes, but also to understand how some problem representations benefit members of one group at the expense of another. By directing attention to the practices involved in making what appears to be self-evident, WPR highlights how problems, subjects, objects, and places are “made”, but also importantly, notes that they can be “unmade” by denaturalising these concepts so as they become open for possible modification should they be found to reproduce damaging practices for specific groups of people.

3.2.WPR QUESTIONS

The WPR approach to policy analysis provides a conceptual “checklist” that guides the analytical process by using a set of six questions to probe how “problems” are represented in policies (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 20) . These six questions are:

1. What’s the ‘problem’ represented to be in a specific policy or policy proposal?
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’?
3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about?
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences?
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted and replaced?

The first question aims to identify a place to start the analysis, by identifying possible problem representations. This question “works backwards” as it starts by looking at a proposal and then working to understand what is problematised. The objective is not to identify intentions behind a particular problem, or to understand the discrepancies between what is promised and what is delivered. Instead, the aim is to identify the desirability of a certain condition, by examining how “solutions” communicate implicit problematisations, and what assertions are made through the specific problem representations (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016: 20).

The second question aims to examine how a particular problem representation is made possible by identifying the meanings that need to be in place for it to make sense or be intelligible. The “meaning” is constituted by presuppositions, assumptions, knowledges, and discourses and constitute the very foundation of why it has been identified as a problem. This involves identifying how the problem is constructed by examining the concepts and binaries, such as public/private etc., it relies upon. Furthermore, it involves reflection upon possible patterns in problematizations which might signal the operation of a certain type of political or governmental rationality (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 21).

The third question involves outlining how possible practices have produced a specific problem representation. Consequently, it involves identifying forms of discursive practices that create forms of knowledge paradigms. The question is closely interrelated to Foucault’s notion of genealogy, where the aim is to destabilise essentialist notions of concepts, by examining the processes and procedures involved in the production of “truth”. It inspires questions like “what types of knowledge are disqualified in the problem representation?”, “which objects/subjects have been produced?” and “which culture-bound concepts require history?”. Thus, this question heavily focuses on how forms of authority for knowledge is created by considering competing problem representations and how/why they are not as prolific (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 23).

The fourth question is largely concerned with de-stabilizing an existing problem representation by drawing attention to silences and or unproblematized elements of the problematisation. This question is designed to consider how different practices can produce contrasting problematisations. Thus, it involves examining possible “failures” within the policy to acknowledge limitations or inadequacy in the way the problem is represented (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 23).

The fifth question involves considering the effects of the problem representation, and any possible political implications. This is done by breaking down the implications into three different analytical categories, namely discursive effects, subjectification effects and lived effects. Discursive effects refers to the way in which the “terms of reference” for a certain problematisation establishes a set of limitations on what can be thought and said within that policy environment. The aim is to consider if the policy intervention closes of avenues for people, and if so, what effects it may have. Subjectification effects illustrates how the “subjects” are implicit in the problem representation and how they are produced specific types of subjects. It highlights how discourses make certain subject positions available, and how if the position is assumed, it renders a person intelligible to society at large. Here, it is also relevant to consider is the policy sets groups of people in opposition to one another, for example as “employed” versus “unemployed”. It makes visible the political implications, and whether its effects reinforce a social status quo. Lived effects, as an analytical category, directs attention to the material impact of problem representations. For example, it draws attention to how access to resources is contingent upon categorisations and how discursive and subjectification translates into people’s lives in a material way (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 23–24). The last question is designed to emphasise the existence and possibility of contestation, by destabilizing taken-for-granted “truths”. Thus, it requires us to consider the means through which problem representation achieve legitimacy and pay attention to how representations become dominant (Bacchi and Goodwin 2016, 25).

3.3. SOURCE MATERIAL AND METHOD

To analyse how food security has been constructed as a problem in Swedish civil contingency policy, the selected source material is principally public documents from state from primarily government agencies such as the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), the Swedish Food Agency (Livsmedelsverket), the Swedish Government (Regeringen) and the Swedish Board of Agriculture (Jordbruksverket).

- Jordbruksverket. Sveriges nationella beredskapsplan för foder- och livsmedelskedjan. Fastställd 2020-10-15.

- Jordbruksverket och Livsmedelsverket. En robust livsmedelsförsörjning vid kriser och höjd beredskap- åtgärder och arbetsformer som stärker förutsättningar. 2021.
- Regeringens proposition 2020/21:30. Totalförsvaret 2021-2025.
- Regeringens proposition 2016/17:104. En livsmedelsstrategi för Sverige- fler jobb och hållbar tillväxt i hela landet.
- Regeringen. Dir 2018:79. Ansvar ledning och samordning inom civilt försvar.
- Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU). SOU 2019:51 Näringslivets roll inom totalförsvaret.
- Försvarsdepartementet. Ds 2017:66. Inriktning av totalförsvaret och utformning av det civila försvaret 2021-2025.
- MSB och Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet (SLU). Livsmedelsproduktion ur ett beredskapsperspektiv- sårbarheter och lösningar för ökad resiliens. 2018.

As the aim of the thesis is to assess how policies on civil preparedness and crisis management have problematized the concept of food security, a choice was made to focus on government policies and relevant state agency policy proposals to capture general themes within discourse on food security in Sweden. Given that the selected material dealt with civil preparedness, there was an unavoidable intertextual nature to the policies whereby the documents reference other policy areas (for example relating to defense capabilities or more general agricultural policies) which all have their own problem representations, meant that the scope had to be limited to certain key areas. Large documents were electronically scanned for words “food security”, “food industry”, “preparedness” and “food supply chain”. The analysis then begun by focusing on the first question: What’s the problem represented to be?. To do this, solutions were identified and then “worked backwards” to identify what the implied problems were in the policies (Bacchi 2009: 48). Next, the process involved identifying themes within the documents, and examine the policy texts to determine if the identified representations were deeply permeated in the policy text, or merely a passing comment or statement. Since the selected material was in Swedish, all quotations used in this thesis were translated into English.

Having selected the source material and identified problem representations, it became apparent that further boundaries were necessary. Q3 which would involve creating a full

genealogy of the issue food security in Swedish civil contingency policy, was not feasible due to the scope of this essay and would require different material. Furthermore, WPR Q6 on how representations of these policies have been produced and defended, was also determined to fall outside of the scope of the aim of the essay as it is more closely aligned to the analytical endeavor of creating a genealogy. Whilst being mindful that excluding certain questions from the framework limits the ability of the analysis so account for the historical evolution of the concept of food in Sweden, Bacchi herself acknowledges that the emphasis on different WPR questions may sometimes vary depending on the aims of the study (Bacchi 2009, 14).

3.4. LIMITATIONS

There are a number of limitations of this thesis which need to be acknowledged. As the selected theory and methodology is a critical discourse analysis, the approach of the thesis is to understand the unquestioned premises of “problems” in policies and possible ramifications of these “problem representations”, not to offer any policy proposals or normatively engage with what ought to be done. Furthermore, when conducting policy analysis of documents, one primarily captures the description of the problems and solutions relating to the ideas and perceptions of a governing body, it does not necessarily reflect the actual efforts and measures undertaken by the government. That is, there may well be discrepancies between policy proposals and actual government action that is not identified within this study. Whilst the source material was selected from several different governing bodies to attempt to capture general themes within crisis and contingency policy, the selection nonetheless imposes a limitation as other relevant policy material can be impactful on how the issue of food insecurity is constructed in Sweden. For example, whilst there is some engagement with Swedish domestic agricultural policy in order to contextualize the current state of Swedish food production, it does not form a basis for this thesis. Consequently, due to the scope of this thesis it was necessary to limit the research to analyzing crisis and contingency policy, with only a limited engagement with agricultural policy.

A final limitation to note is that the issue of food security is a complex field which is closely intertwined with a host of other policy areas such as contingencies for critical infrastructure and energy, environmental standards and its policy implications, or international trade

agreements and regulations. Thus, a necessary prerequisite to achieving a coherent analysis of the food security was to exclude policy proposals aimed at sustaining or securing aspects of food supply which are more in line with critical infrastructure.

4. ANALYSIS

This chapter will present the analysis of food security in Swedish crisis and contingency policy by using the WPR framework, and focuses on identifying dominant problem representations, underlying presuppositions or assumptions within the policy proposals, silences, or unproblematized elements, and finally the implications of dominant problem representations. The analysis identifies several dominant problem representations in the policy material, namely vulnerability of global food supply chains, unclear mandates and processes for ensuring food security, and lastly the necessity of individual responsibility. Having identified dominant problem representations in crisis and contingency policy, the second section accounts for the occurrence of neoliberal governmentality within the policies to understand the rationality underpinning policy solutions. To build upon the analysis, the third section identifies possible silences by highlighting how environmental variability and the threat it poses to global food supply chains is left unproblematized, as well as discusses Finland's food strategy to highlight how Swedish policy neglects to promote "resilience" within their policy proposals. The final section of the analysis discusses the possible repercussions of the current problem representations and discusses the ramifications of Swedish agricultural politics and how neoliberal and market-focused policy proposals can have a material, social and moral impact on society and individuals.

4.1. Q1: WHAT'S THE PROBLEM REPRESENTED TO BE IN SWEDISH CRISIS AND CONTINGENCY POLICY?

The first question is designed to analyze what assertions are made about food security and what proposals for change are outlined within the selected policy documents. Within crisis and contingency policies, several themes were identified as being indicative of dominant problem representations. The following section will discuss the main themes identified as dominant problem representations, namely; global food supply chain, unclear mandates in responsibility for securing food supply, and the perceived need of individual responsibility.

4.1.1 VULNERABILITY IN GLOBAL FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS

The most recurrent proposition for strengthening Sweden's food supply resilience during a crisis is to promote an environment where Swedish agricultural businesses are increasingly competitive actors within the global and domestic market. A government policy from 2020 states that:

In order to secure food availability, a functioning domestic agricultural and food production industry is required in conjunction with the continuous flow of goods without interruption in the food chain. Competitive agricultural and food businesses and a high Swedish market share are important prerequisites (Prop 2020/21:30 p. 143).

Ensuring competitive agri-businesses is viewed as important as it increases Sweden's purchasing power and ability to procure input, seasonal workers, and transportation if a crisis were to ensue (Prop 2020/21:30 p.144). Furthermore, the increased strength of domestic agri-businesses is not only seen as being a prerequisite for being competitive within global markets, but also as being favorable to increasing demand and consumption of Swedish produce which may mitigate some of the problems associated with import-dependence. As is stated in the government's proposition for a Swedish food strategy, "cross-border cooperation, trade and integration into global markets are crucial to promoting positive development in large parts of the world. Increased national food production can create conditions for increased consumption of Swedish food" (Prop 2016/17:104 p. 14). Several policies underline the fact that Sweden is import-dependent and cannot meet the Swedish population's food demand through domestic production. To improve the strength of agri-businesses in Sweden, it is proposed that "productivity needs to evolve and prioritize a successful commercialization of the strengths that exist in Swedish production to create profitability in the food sector" (Regeringen 2017, 18)

The Swedish Defense Committee stated in 2017 that it "believes that food security needs to be achieved through stockpiling of essential food to ensure food supply in the event of a crisis" (Försvarsdepartementet 2017: 42). Yet, other policies disregard the proposal of stockpiling on the basis that "increasing food stockpiling would be very expensive while only

ensuring a limited amount of the populations total need” (SOU 2019:51). The Swedish government cautiously agreed to consider and evaluate the role of stockpiling to determine “if food stocks under state or private auspices can be an efficient and cost-effective measure” (prop 2020/21:30: 144). The selected policies indicate that the “solution” of stockpiling is a contentious proposal, and generally viewed as a costly insurance with undetermined implications. Thus, whilst there are divergences between policies on their approach to stockpiling, it is generally discussed as being of secondary importance to ensuring competitive agri-businesses.

The proposed solutions are broad, yet indicative of a problem representation where the overriding concern is the vulnerability of food supply chains and dependence on an external global market. As the Swedish food system is dependent on imports and therefore susceptible to experience vulnerability due to disruptions in the supply chain, a clear concern relates to how one can secure the continued flow of essential agricultural input as well as the procurement of food produce. There appears to be no indication of a logic of “exceptionalism” within the selected policies, rather it is emphasised that the agricultural sector is no different from other economic sectors and viewed as requiring the same market-based solutions as other sectors. Consequently, whilst a “problem” is identified as being reliant on global markets and a highly dispersed supply chain, the proposed solutions are at the same time designed to continue relying upon the very mechanisms which leaves the food system susceptible and vulnerable to a crisis. The tension between the problem representation and the subsequent proposal is indicative of neoliberal logic, and will be discussed further in question 2.

4.1.2. PUBLIC V PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY

Another theme identified in the source material was the emphasis placed on the need to outline who is liable for ensuring food supply during a crisis. There is a tension between different policies relating to where responsibility for ensuring the continuous flow of food supply during a crisis is to be placed. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency stated that “the primary aim should be to resolve who is liable during long-term disruptions to society, and who is the lead and organize the operation of re-establishing food supply in case of a disturbance” (MSB and SLU 2018: 24) Several policies reference the so-called

“vistelsebegrepp” to indicate that municipalities are the primary responsible actor for ensuring health of their inhabitants, with the government stating that “municipalities and regions need to develop their strategy for food security” (Regeringen 2020: 145). Furthermore, the national strategy for food security states that the “basis for societal crisis preparedness relating to food security in municipalities” (Jordbruksverket 2021, 11). Whilst several policies identify municipalities as the primary actor for ensuring food security during a crisis, there are no substantial or concrete proposals for how this is to be achieved or even guidelines developed to indicate how municipalities ought to develop contingency plans. Consequently, whilst some policies propose that municipalities need to increase resilience and mitigate impacts of food supply shortages, there is an absence of specificity concerning the terms of reference for how municipalities are to work towards ensuring food security during a crisis.

Other policies highlight the responsibility of private businesses as being an essential prerequisite of ensuring food security. Whilst proposed solution to mitigating vulnerability as a result import-dependence and reliance on global supply chains is to foster strong agri-businesses, there was still an expressed need to impose requirements on private businesses within the food and agricultural sector to take on responsibility for cooperation with Swedish government during a crisis. A problem is highlighted by stating that “a large part of socially important activities that need to be maintained during peacetime crisis, heightened preparedness and ultimately in war is carried out by private businesses” (Regeringen 2018, 7). It is proposed by the Swedish agency of agriculture that a priority is to create:

A coherent, long-term, and sustainable contingency plan relating to food supply which presupposes collaboration with the private business sector. In the long run, contracts or voluntary agreements must be reached (Jordbruksverket 2021, 5)

The emphasis placed on ensuring the implementation of a legal framework for the cooperation between corporations and the government, indicates that there is an additional “problem representation” whereby the Swedish state does not have much power in relation to food governance. Because the provision of food is in the hands of agri-businesses, the state recognises that they must attempt to facilitate some control over private business in the case of a food crisis. Thus, one of the key problems of ensuring food security is that it is largely at

the mercy of external forces such as global markets, and that corporations are those who currently hold the means for influencing the flow and production of food.

4.1.3. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

The final “problem representation” identified in the selected material was that of individual responsibility to prepare for a crisis. Government policy states that “the individual bears primary responsibility for protecting his or her own life and property (...) only when the individual is no longer able to do so can there be an obligation on the part of the public to intervene” (Regeringen prop 2020/21:30: 134). It is specified that individuals ought to be able to sustain their own procurement and supply of food during a crisis for a minimum of one week (prop 2020/21:30 and prop 2016/17:104). Furthermore, it is stated that “in the event of a serious disturbance to society or war, citizen’s expectations of social services need to be considerably lower than under normal conditions in peacetime” (Regeringen prop 2020/21:30:133). It is reiterated that having a “prepared population” is part of the solution, as it allows the government to focus their resources on those who are most vulnerable, for example people in care-homes or hospitals. Thus, an identified ‘problem representation’ within policy on food security in a crisis, is the concern that the population would prematurely rely on the government to solve issues of food availability, which would drain resources too quickly. As a problem representation identifies the importance of increasing individual responsibility for crisis preparedness, a proposed solution is targeted education modules in schools on how to store food and water in homes in preparation for when/if a crisis was to happen. It is also stated that the government should regularly inform the public on how to prepare and store food at home (Jordbruksverket). Consequently, the general population are believed to not have adequate knowledgeable on how to prepare for a crisis and ensure that they have enough food to survive an initial few weeks without availability of food due to disruptions.

To summaries, there are a number of “problem” representations within the selected crisis and contingency policies relating to food security. Whilst there are tensions between policies relating to who ought to bear responsibility for ensuring food security, as well as diverging

views of the benefit of stockpiling, the general trend within policies on food security is that there are no practical recommendations or clearly outlined steering documents indicating what actions and objectives are necessary for ensuring food security during a crisis. The absence of specificity within the policies may be indicative of the fact that “food security” has become topical within the past few years and subsequently has not been prioritized within crisis management policy, meaning that the policy field is attempting to contextualize what the terms of reference are for this specific policy problem. Another possible explanation for why there is a lack of specificity in the policies may also be because of the highly complex nature of global food supply chains, and that the contrary approach, increased self-sufficiency, does not hold political appeal as it would require a re-structuring and re-prioritizing of Swedish agricultural politics.

4.2 Q2: WHAT PRESUPPOSITIONS OR ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPIN THIS REPRESENTATION OF THE “PROBLEM”?

Having identified dominant problem representations, the next question is designed to consider how it is/was possible for such proposals to be made, and which meanings and “deep conceptual premises’ (Bacchi 2009, xix) need to be in place for such proposal to emerge. Further, the question is designed to reflect upon possible patterns in the problematisations and whether there is a particular of governmental rationality which underpins the problem representation.

4.2.1. PRODUCTIVISM

Whilst several policies state that import-dependence was one of the main threats to Sweden’s ability to ensure food availability during a crisis, a commonly proposed solution was nonetheless to increase the strength of Swedish agri-businesses on the global market. It is stated that “in order to meet global competition, companies’ products and production processes must be constantly developed and improved, which requires high levels of knowledge and a favorable climate for innovation” (Regeringen 2017, 71). An underlining

assumption which has shaped policy proposals is the notion that increased productivity is key to ensuring food security. The Swedish national agricultural strategy states that a key goal to ensuring food security in a crisis, is by increasing productivity by expanding the volume of production, utilizing factors of production more effectively, and by specializing within the domestic agricultural sector (Regeringen 2017, p. 18 and 79). This is clearly indicative of a “productivist” logic which promotes the notion that food security is achieved by specialization and intensification of food production to increase profitability and international competitiveness (Lawrence, Richards, and Lyons 2013). The framing of food security as being mainly a question of production levels is firmly embedded within a wider paradigm of economic growth under contemporary capitalism, and neglects to consider pressures placed on the environment or the impact it may have on farm system resilience. A study conducted on Swedish agricultural policies included interviews with farmers who reported that the pressure of productivity and specialization has meant that it is increasingly difficult to mitigate the fallout of production if a crisis was to ensue. The study stated that farmers expressed the modern farming practices and material dependence meant that they were “in the hands of decisions made by the industry” rather than independent decision-makers (Eriksson, Fischer, and Ulfbecker 2020, 114). The prevalence of a productivist logic within the crisis and contingency policy reveals deeply ingrained beliefs in the capability of the market and its ability to produce stability during a time of crisis, whilst simultaneously neglecting to consider the implications and repercussion of contemporary farming practices on food resilience and the ability to sustain food production during a crisis.

4.2.2 DEVOLVING RESPONSIBILITY AND NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY

Another theme within policies on food security was the expressed concern of an unclear mandate for who bears the primary responsibility for ensuring food security during a crisis. A policy statement by the Swedish Civil Contingency agency states that “total defense and agriculture are two policy areas that are rarely discussed at the same time and belong to two different professions” (2018:25). The statement by MSB is further reinforced when analyzing the Swedish national agricultural contingency plan, which exclusively focuses on issues relating to food contamination, epizootic sickness among livestock and the spread of food-related illnesses (Jordbruksverket 2021, 24). The “problem” of food security during a crisis is

largely disconnected from broader agricultural policies and strategies and is framed as an issue which is largely external to political decision-making. Furthermore, several policies stated that “private businesses play an essential role in ensuring food security” (Försvarsdepartementet 2017: 31) and that creating a legal framework for cooperation between corporations and the government is a crucial aspect of ensuring food security (Jordbruksverket 2021:6). Within the selected policies, it is clear that responsibility is frequently assigned to a number of different actors with unclear mandates, yet there is only a limited indication of what responsibility the government bears for the issue of food security. The Swedish national agricultural strategy states that “the state’s role is primarily to create good conditions through, for example, terms and conditions on par with competitor countries and through strengthening the knowledge and innovation system” (Regeringen 2017, 124). Viewing the private sector as bearing responsibility for ensuring food security, whilst simultaneously positioning the state as an entity designed to strengthen private enterprise’s ability become competitive, functions to de-politicise the issue of food security. The unclear mandate concerning who bears responsibility for ensuring food security, as well as promoting the notion that private corporations are innovators of food resilience, is indicative of a neoliberal political practice involving a re-scaling of governance and the hollowing out of the nation-state (Jessop 2013). By devolving responsibility for food security to either municipalities or to private enterprise, whilst simultaneously also scaling regulatory capacities upwards (in this case by viewing the market as self-regulating), functions to keep any responsibility away from the state.

The devolved and dispersed responsibility for food security as a means of re-scaling governance also ties into policy proposals emphasizing the importance of individual “preparedness” and “responsibility” during a crisis. Larsson (2021) accounts for a shift in Swedish crisis and contingency policy in which responsibility is increasingly placed on individuals to be “ready” for a crisis and is linked to the notion of a “resilient” neoliberal subject. The shift to individual responsibility discussed in Larsson article is highly relevant when examining policies on food security, as similar sentiment is expressed concerning the necessity of individuals to bear more responsibility for ensuring their own food security. The Swedish Civil Contingency Agency expresses an aim to educate people on how to adequately prepare for a crisis by creating stockpiles which would sustain a family for up to two weeks in the case of a significant disturbance to food supplies (MSB and SLU 2018, 26). The shift to “responsibilisation” and individual preparedness is indicative of neoliberal governance and

a processes of the hollowing out of the nation-state, which qualifies the state to be able to justify fiscal austerity measures and minimize spending on security techniques such as stockpiling (Folkers 2019).

4.3 Q4: WHAT IS LEFT UNPROBLEMATIC IN THIS PROBLEM REPRESENTATION? WHERE ARE THE SILENCES?

The fourth question is largely concerned with drawing attention to silences and or unproblematized elements of the problematisation. The following section considers how different practices can produce contrasting problematisations. Thus, it involves examining possible “failures” within the policy to acknowledge limitations or inadequacy in the way the problem is represented. The analysis identifies possible silences by illustrating how the covid-pandemic sparked a nationalist wave which highlights the precariousness of global supply chains, how environmental variability poses a threat to the global food system, as well as a discusses Finland’s food strategy to highlight how Swedish policy neglects to promote “resilience” within their policy proposals.

4.3.1. THE COVID-19 CRISIS: NATIONALISM AND EXPORT RESTRICTIONS

Within policies on crisis and civil preparedness, it is clearly asserted that the achievement of food security is contingent upon the success and strength of Swedish agricultural businesses within global food markets. As discussed in Q1, Swedish businesses must be competitive on the global market to continue to procure food produce even if a crisis would lead to price inflation. The emphasis is thus placed on a “productivism” logic in which increased production and specialisation is viewed as essential to increase purchasing power and the resilience of the domestic agricultural sector. The notion of increasing competitiveness to procure in-demand products during a crisis, is based on a notion of utilizing market mechanisms to resolve structural weakness. The volatility of the global food market is more or less left unproblematized in the selected policies, with only a few policies problematizing supply chain vulnerabilities in the face of a crisis. The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted the effect that a global crisis can have on food production due to the dispersed nature of global

supply chains. In a policy proposal by the Swedish agriculture agency, it was stated that the pandemic has highlighted vulnerabilities in the Swedish food system:

The pandemic has highlighted that this is a challenge and shown which trade routes are critical (...) this insight makes it possible to plan and, to some extent, avoid similar future events, which should create increased robustness in the food chain (Jordbruksverket 2021, 11)

Whilst there is recognition that reliance on global supply chains is in fact a vulnerability in the Swedish food system, the statement illustrates a belief that critical products can be procured in the future through adequately planning for possible threats. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic sparked a nationalist turn in many countries. Several countries restricted exports of food to ensure that they had enough supplies for their own population. The Russian Agricultural Ministry proposed to limit exports of some grains such as wheat, to ensure their own food supplies amid the crisis, Kazakhstan banned exports on wheat, sugar and some vegetables in a measure to build stockpiles, and Vietnam suspended rice export contracts to ascertain that they had sufficient domestic supplies (Peters, R. and Prabhakar, D. 2021). Within the EU there was evidence of a nationalist reflex overriding the rules of the common market, with France receiving criticism and threatened with legal action by the EU for imposing export bans on certain medications which were used in the initial stages of the pandemic (Guarascio, F. 2020). Proposing that strengthening and increasing the competitiveness of Swedish agri-businesses is primary strategy for ensuring food security, is driven by a logic of utilizing market mechanisms to resolve structural weaknesses in the system. The problem representation neglects to consider and account for the fact that a “free market” may not operate as freely as during “normalcy” and that nationalist tendencies and the implementation on export bans can have a spill-over effect which de-stabilizes the global market and reduces the availability of certain products to the point where they might not be available on the market.

4.3.2. PRODUCTIVISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABILITY

As discussed previously, there is an apparent tension within the policies as they, on the one hand, identify import-dependence as a threat to Sweden’s ability to ensure food availability

during a crisis, whilst simultaneously proposing that increasing competitiveness on the global market is key to being able to secure the procurement of food during a crisis. The emphasis placed on increasing domestic agricultural productivity leaves significant elements unproblematized, of which the first is the environmental consequences of promoting increased productivity as the most significant metric of success. Rather than focusing on increasing farm system resilience, or considering sustainable farming practices, the core goal is increasing production to allow for economic growth through an export-oriented agricultural sector. The focus on productivism fails to problematize the consequences of increased productivity and the impact that modern industrialization of agricultural practices inevitable has damaging consequences for the environment (Altieri, Funes-Monzote, and Petersen 2012; Levidow 2015; Mooney and Hunt 2010). A second silence within the selected policies is that there is little acknowledgment of the fact that food production is highly volatile and susceptible to being negatively affected by factors external factors. The UN has stated that “in the next 30 years, food supply and food security will be severely threatened if little or no action is taken to address climate change and the food system’s vulnerability to climate change” (Porter, J.R. no date). Whilst global food production has increased largely in part due to cropland intensification and expansion over the past decade, negative effects of climate change such as rising global temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns and increased frequency of drought and heatwaves poses a significant threat to the global food system. Future projections of large-scale crop yield failures state an increase in the upcoming decades, with increased probability of synchronous global yield failure (i.e. the co-occurrence of maize, wheat, rice and soybean failures) predicted to occur once every three years (Caparas et al. 2021, 6)

The increased risk of crop failures has the potential to disrupt global market prices, import and export relationships, and self-sufficiency and may catalyze dramatic changes in the global agricultural market. Whilst climate variability and increased food prices are predicted to affect those already at most risk of hunger and malnutrition, for Sweden, who are only self-sufficient in the production of three produces (cereals, carrots and sugar), any disruption to global market prices could have widespread ramifications

4.3.3. DIVERGING APPROACHES TO FOOD SECURITY: SWEDEN AND FINLAND

The agricultural strategy of Sweden is based around the key objectives of creating a competitive food supply chain and generating growth through creating rules and regulations to facilitate a competitive food production (Regeringen 2017, 6). The national strategy for agriculture has naturally influenced policies in crisis management, where the same logic of open markets and competitiveness are viewed as solutions to potential crises. As discussed, there are a number of unproblematized elements of approaching food security through relying on the market and depending on the continuous flow of food produce from the global market. Consequently, looking at Finland's food strategy can offer further insights into possible silences within Swedish crisis and contingency policy relating to food security.

Finland's food system vision of 2030 outline a number of key objectives; the appreciation of food, to strengthen Finland's national brand, to ensure responsible food production and distribution, strengthening the role of the government as a coordinator, to promote the availability of food that is tasty, safe, highly nourishing and reasonable prices, as well as to increase collaboration among food system actors (Government of Finland 2016, 41). Whilst Finland also promotes free trade and a competitive economy as prerequisite for securing food access, they nonetheless state that market forces may not always support the aims of food security during a crisis. Consequently, it is stated that the best way of guaranteeing food security is to "maintain responsible domestic production and consumption" which signals a different approach from Swedish crisis policy which emphasizes international trade as the most important objective for food security (Government of Finland 2016, 30). The different approaches to food security are further highlighted through comparing levels of self-sufficiency, where Sweden are barley 50% self-sufficient in food production, whilst over 80% of consumed food in Finland is domestically produced (Government of Finland 2016, 33). Whilst Sweden appears to embrace a neoliberal logic within their policies on food security, Finland employ more "gastronomicalist" discourse within their policies. Finnish government policy on food security states that "food culture is vital for building national and regional identities (...) and strengthen Finland's country brand through high quality food and food tourism" (Government of Finland 2016, 25). The prevalence of "gastronomicalism" in Finnish strategy on food security functions to encourage citizens to eat local products as a principle of patriotism, whilst also ensuring that the domestic agriculture sector remains resilient which ultimately is viewed as beneficial from a crisis management perspective

(Wang 2021). When juxtaposing Swedish and Finnish food security policy, there is an obvious silence within Swedish policy relating to the intention and objective of domestic production. There are no policy proposals related to encouraging citizens to consume more domestically produced foods as a strategy of increasing self-sufficiency and resilience of the domestic food system. Instead, the premise of increased domestic production is framed as an objective for achieving economic growth through more exports. By not problematizing low consumption levels of domestic produce, translates into a policy environment which is fraught with a lack of specificity concerning techniques which would enable Sweden to be less import-dependent and thus not as pre-occupied by attempting to strengthen and secure complex global food supply chains.

Whilst stockpiling is an important security technique, most countries neglect to consider the measure due to fiscal austerity and budgetary constraints (Folkers 2019). As stated previously, the Swedish Defense committee has encouraged the government to consider stockpiling as a necessary pre-requisite to ensuring food security, but there remain concerns around the efficiency and cost of such a system. In contrast, Finland has one of the most extensive state-owned stockpiles in Europe, and views emergency stockpiling as an essential aspect of a comprehensive contingency plan to ensuring that society functions during a crisis (Folkers 2019). The covid-pandemic highlighted the benefits of Finland's state stockpiles, as whilst most other countries in Europe were scrambling to purchase the necessary equipment, Finland had an extensive stockpile of personal protective equipment and medicines which meant that they were less affected by the supply shortages resulting from hoarding and scrambling (Teir, P, 2020). The case of Finnish state-owned stocks highlights an unproblematised element in relation to Swedish food security strategy, namely that adequately preparing for a crisis is unavoidably a costly endeavour. Within Swedish crisis and contingency policies, stockpiling is largely dismissed as too costly, and therefore not considered as a core element of a comprehensive security strategy. Consequently, the political decision of assuming fiscal austerity within crisis management and total defence is left unproblematised and viewed as a "reality" rather than as a consequence of political decision-making concerning the allocation of resources. Thus, policy statements of stockpiling being too "costly" fails to acknowledge that there is a political rationality which underpins the cost-benefit analysis.

4.4. Q5: WHAT EFFECTS ARE PRODUCED BY THIS REPRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM?

The final question probes the analysis to question the potential effects produced by dominant problem representations. The effects have in part been discussed in previous questions, and as crisis and contingency policies have not yet been utilized in a real crisis in Sweden, it is not possible to identify the direct effects of the policy, as would be the case if one was to analyze policy implications of for example policy on homelessness or refugees. Consequently, the final section is slightly shorter and will mainly summaries the identified problem areas by indicating possible consequences of problem representations.

4.4.1. DISCURSIVE EFFECTS

Discursive effects refer to the way in which the “terms of reference” for a certain problematisation establishes a set of limitations on what can be thought and said within that policy environment. The analysed policy documents on food security clearly utilises neoliberal discourse in so far that the solutions proposed are argued to evolve from entrepreneurial spirit, technological innovation, and increased competitiveness of Swedish agricultural businesses. Consequently, “terms of reference” has placed limitations on the ideas and proposals which can be produced in the policy environment. The modalities of neoliberalism dictates that the economy is to be organised around principles of deregulation, open-market access and competition to increase productivity and profitability. In this sense, the agricultural sector is viewed no differently from other economic sectors. The policies, therefore, reflect a general consensus whereby all solutions relating to food security must be derived from neoliberal logic premised on food security being attained through cost-effective measures, economic growth, and exporting in line with the Sweden’s comparative advantage. Within policies on food security, there is a clear dismissal of food practices which are not geared towards the global food system, as the national food strategy states that “shortcomings in the food market’s functioning are due to the historically large national focus of food production in Sweden (...) it is important that the food market is characterised by well-functioning competitiveness” (Regeringen 2017, 23). The promotion of a productivist agricultural system limits the opportunities for small-scale farming and more sustainable

farming practices which promotes biodiversity, as they are not viewed as adequately “specialised” to offer clear economic benefits.

4.4.2. SUBJECTIFICATION EFFECTS

Subjectification effects illustrates how the “subjects” are implicit in the problem representation and how they are produced specific types of subjects, and makes visible the political implications which act to reinforce a status quo. The premise of individual preparedness promoted in crisis and contingency policy, acts to compensate for the absence of public security measures like state-owned stockpiles as well as produces ‘subjects’ by encouraging certain characteristics and behaviors deemed as “desirable”. A government policy states that “the responsibility of the individual is important, not only for their own safety and security, but also a principle of solidarity so that those who most need help from the public sector in the event of a serious incident can receive that help” (Regeringen Prop. 2020/21:30 p. 113). By stating that it is a principle of solidarity for citizens to “prepare” for a crisis, a moral dimension is introduced where there is a distinction between the “good” individual who takes responsibility for their own safety and the “bad” individual who does not and subsequently is to blame for other, weaker people, not getting adequate help. This strategy of governing ‘expected behaviour’ plays a central role in the liberal strategy of governing, as it affords “a principle of objectivation as well as the standard of judgement: everyone is responsible for his or her own life” (Larsson 2021, 310). That individuals must prepare for a crisis and sustain household stocks of non-perishable food as well as water, neglects to consider the impact of class and the financial cost of being “prepared”. Not all household can afford the cost of household stocks, and the overcrowding may mean that there is no physical space in which stocks of food and water can be places. In addition, stating that individuals must assume responsibility so as to free up resources for those who cannot prepare for a food crisis, leaves questions of who is excused from being accountable for their own safety and being prepared for a crisis. Does it apply only to those who are able-bodied? Elderly people who still live at home? Those who are homeless or in temporary accommodation? The utilization of morality in discourse around the responsibility of individuals risks ostracizing individuals who are not capable of fitting into the ideal of a prepared citizen.

4.4.3. *LIVED EFFECTS*

As an analytical category, ‘lived effects’ directs attention to material impacts of problem representation and draws attention to how the allocation of resources is contingent upon categorizations within problem representations. As crisis and contingency policies further promote a productivist approach within the Swedish agricultural sector, it is worthwhile considering the material and economic impacts of promoting specialization and increased competitiveness of private agri-businesses.

An article by Burch and Lawrence argues that a shift has taken place in food culture from one where necessity and choice, dictated by locality, has shifted to one based on desire and choice, dictated by retailer contracts and price (2007). Food standards and the cost of compliance is often financially and technically demanding, which has meant that those farmers who cannot meet the strict conditions and cannot supply products to the supermarkets, are unable to find a market and must change production type or be “restructured” out of agriculture. Further, supermarkets like to deal with larger, more reliable, and compliant producers, which can act to penalize small-scale farmers (Vorley, 2008). The Swedish food-retailing is characterized by a few companies having an incredibly high market concentration, more so than most other European countries. In 2016 it was reported that only three companies held approximately 86% percent of the market share for food-retailing. The largest supermarket, ICA, control around 50% of the market, placing them in a situation where they could increase food prices with little pushback (Konkurrensverket 2018, 277). Consumer groups have expressed concern that such a heavy concentration of ownership in the food retail sector and the significant power asymmetry, stating that it may undermine competition and push food prices higher in the long run (Neurath and Malmström, 2016). The effects of a heavily concentrated ownership may in part be an explanation for why Sweden has some of the highest food-prices in Europe. In addition, the covid-pandemic may push Swedish food prices even higher as the largest farmers’ cooperative in Sweden expressed concern that food prices would increase with double figures during the year of 2021 as a result of the increased global demand on input such as fuel, arguing that it may result in the largest price increase witnessed in the last decade (Jensen, 2021). Consequently,

whilst the repercussions of current Swedish crisis and contingency policies are not measurable due to the fact that there has not yet been a need to use them, there are still financial and material ramifications of the pursuit and promotion of a productivist agricultural system. The justification that increased production and specialization of the agricultural sector is necessary to ensure the availability of food during a crisis, may in the long-term have damaging consequences.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis aimed to critically engage with the topic of food security in Swedish crisis and contingency policy, by examining dominant problem representations and any associated repercussions. In doing so, the analysis identified that both the problems and solutions posed within policies of food security are embedded in a wider political context which promotes and prioritizes a neoliberal and productivist approach to the agricultural sector and food production. By utilizing a WPR framework the analysis purported to answer the research question “how has food security been problematized within Swedish crisis and contingency policy?”, and in doing so found that the most reoccurring “problem representation” within the selected policies was identified as Sweden’s import-dependence and consequent vulnerability to experience food shortages in the case of disturbances to global food supply chains.

Paradoxically, the proposed solutions to the problem of vulnerability in the Swedish food sector, is to promote and encourage increased productivity to allow for greater exports to strengthen purchasing power on the global market. Structural vulnerabilities in the global food system arose in part due to policy decisions which focus almost exclusively on industrial production methods, specialisation and trade in food items through complex global supply chains managed by global agri-food corporations. As such, the very same policy decisions which have provoked Swedish vulnerability to experience food insecurity during a crisis, are also the proposed solutions for decreasing vulnerability. Producing more food for global supply chains neither guarantees protection against market failure nor ensures resilient domestic agricultural sectors. Having enjoyed relative food security over the past decade, the increased threat of climate change, along with structural fragilities within global food supply chains, highlight a need for states to undertake precautionary actions to be able to ensure food security in peacetime as well as during periods of crisis or war. Although global food supply chains have continued the distribution of food items despite the covid-pandemic, the crisis has nonetheless highlighted structural vulnerabilities in the global food system triggered by export restrictions, currency depreciation, and changing cost of transportation leading to highly uneven price effects which poses several risks to import-dependent states.

By examining how neoliberal logic underpins the current global food system, it is possible to highlight how discourses around food security and the subsequent allocation of responsibility is intimately tied to power structures and dominant political rationalities. The general trend within the selected policies was to endeavor to disperse responsibility away from the state, by

proposing increased individual preparedness, imposing legal or voluntary contracts for private businesses to assume responsibility for food availability, and to argue that municipalities need to shoulder a greater responsibility without the allocation of any additional resources. Driving responsibility for food security away from the state is indicative of re-scaling of governance, which is constitutive of neoliberal governance strategies, as it enables the state to continue promoting fiscal austerity measures. Larsson (2021) published an article in which he conducted a genealogy of the concept of “total defense” in Swedish crisis and contingency policy and concluded that that state’s expanded view of what constitutes a security threat has called for a new type of resilient neoliberal citizen who shoulders greater responsibility for their own security. The analysis on food security in crisis and contingency policy identifies a similar trend in which the individual is expected to initially account for their own food security through household stockpiles. Whilst the current food system is shaped by global agribusinesses and transnational institutions, it is nonetheless expected that communities ought to be resilient within a food system which places constraints upon the availability and accessibility of food (Lawrence, Richards, and Lyons 2013).

Whilst there is expressed concern at the national level regarding Sweden’s import-dependence and vulnerability to disruptions in global food supply chains, there is only limited official critique of the production focus and the neoliberal market system. Producing more food for global supply chains neither guarantees protection against market failure nor ensures resilient domestic agricultural sectors. By approaching the agricultural sector and the issue of ‘food security’ as no different from other mainstream development issues, in terms of requiring the same neoliberal remedies of trade liberalization and integration into global markets, food is made indistinguishable from any other products bought in society. Food security is therefore defined in terms of being an issue of purchasing power, rather than as an issue of sustainable food practices or lack of resilience. Consequently, it appears as if the current productivist trajectory will continue to be pursued, creating major concerns for food security in the future

5.1 FURTHER RESEARCH

At present, there is limited research addressing the role of food security in the global North, with the majority of published articles examining and problematizing the occurrence of food insecurity in the Global South. Whilst there is some research dedicated to analyzing food systems within Europe, more research is needed to explore how nation-states in the Global North attempt to ensure food security in a time of increased turbulence within global food supply chains. More comparative research is needed to offer additional insights into how different countries approaches to food security might be related to converging threat perceptions, difference in agricultural sector, or indeed specific political governmentalities. In the context of Sweden, future research ought to develop a clearer link between domestic agricultural politics and crisis and security policy on food security, to identify differences or similarities between the two different policy fields.

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