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Prediction of regime change is a constant challenge to intelligence organizations. What intelligence lessons can be learned from the fall of the Shah in 1978?

Why did the US intelligence community fail to predict the fall of the Shah? What failure theory explains it best? What lessons may be drawn from it? Why was Israeli intelligence more successful in this case? What may we learn combined from the US failure and the Israeli success? How does the case match theory on Regime Change and what may we learn?

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with the “Fall of the Shah” in 1978 from the perspective of intelligence concerning Regime Change. It compares the US and Israeli intelligence effort using intelligence failure theories in combination with intelligence success. The dissertation builds on released documents from the US National Security Archives as well as a variety of secondary sources. It argues that the US failure was caused by mistakes on multiple levels, the lion’s share within policy making and analysis, but also that comprehensive understanding of the case requires an intermixture of theories. Further, several relevant lessons learned can be drawn and the intertwinement of intelligence and Covert Action is highlighted.

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1 Introduction

"*For one thing, predicting revolutions is very hard"*[1].

Forecasting regime change is an important but difficult task for intelligence organisations. Of special interest are authoritarian regimes, likely being more difficult to penetrate from an intelligence perspective. The "Fall of the Shah" is such a case and valid to revisit because of its accepted value as a case for studies in political/economical intelligence as well as having triggered policy makers to reconsider warning systems capable of detecting political instability[2]. Furthermore, not so long ago, the "Arab Spring" surprized the world and reiterated the difficulties of forecasting popular revolutions and the "need to improve intelligence agencies' ability to meet this task", as Bar-Joseph notes[3]. A great benefit of the case of the Shah is the possibility to compare failure and success in warning and predicting the outcome.

This dissertation argues that mistakes on several levels caused the failure to detect the fall of the Shah. First, relevant collection was scarce and constrained by both resources and policy. This limited intelligence was not analysed in an adequate and scholarly manner with sufficient depth and the analysis failed to consider the biographical perspective. Second, the intelligence community lacked resources and mandate due to policy level preconceptions and priorities, leading to organisational limitations in several ways. Furthermore, the failure can most comprehensively be explained through a combination of failure theories, from collection related aspects via analytical and cognitive challenges to political and organisational influences. Finally, several general lessons learned may be drawn, ranging from the importance of relevant collection assets, through the usefulness of structured analytical techniques, to organisational recommendations and policy maker receptiveness. To demonstrate how the US intelligence failure occurred, this dissertation initially highlights challenges related to case studies, followed by a literature review and a case chronology. Subsequently, the dissertation examines the causes within collection and analysis and continues with organisational and policy level causes to reach a conclusion on the failure. The material is then studied through three "failure theories" in a comparative analysis to see which one best explains the failure. Those results are corroborated with results from the previous examination to catalyze general lessons learned. To further increase the rigor of the examination, the dissertation brings on a comparative study with the Israeli success in predicting the Shah's fall. Finally, the dissertation's conclusion and some ideas for further research are presented. Over twenty general lessons are drawn, demonstrating the complexity and the range of intelligence and its tradecraft. This illustrates the usefulness of the case when improving intelligence performance. Further, using several failure theories and combining with a successful case proved very rewarding. Likewise, the theory of Regime Change proved to fit the case and rendered recommendations for indicators and warnings. Finally, the favourable effects of combining intelligence and covert action for creating policy opportunities related to authoritarian regimes is underlined.

Case studies have been used throughout history to generate knowledge. Concerning intelligence, case studies are important but house dangers like lack of vital but classified

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[1] Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq war*, Cornell University Press, Ithaka and London, 2010, 26

[2] Joseph Caddell Jr. & Joseph Caddell Sr. "Historical case studies in intelligence education: best practices, avoidable pitfalls", *Intelligence and National Security*, 32:7, (2017): 894-895, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2017.1328854 and Abram M Schulsky and Gary J Schmitt, Silent Warfare, 3rd edition, Potomac Books, 2002, 59

[3] Uri Bar-Joseph, "Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36:5, (2013):719,

evidence, drawing to strong inductive conclusions or a cherry picking of either case or evidence. A good case study should draw on sufficient primary and secondary source material and be watchful of hindsight bias. Similar, enough time has to have passed and the complexities of the case uncovered[4]. These aspects are accommodated within the "case of the Shah". A single case study is a very limited amount of data but by using theoretical and methodological tools the "broader significance of specific situations" and lessons to learn can be revealed[5]. Nevertheless, conclusions from a single case has to be taken with caution. This dissertation strives to balance those dangers and uses a deductive approach, going from specific findings to more general conclusions and uses several theories and angles to capture the complexity. More specifically, it uses Dahl's "*Intelligence and Surprise Attack*" (2013), grouping of "Intelligence Failure" theory into three "schools"; traditionalist, reformist and contrarian. The traditionalists assert that collection has worked and attributes failure mainly to analysis and policy interpretation of analysis. Framework theory is provided by scholars like Wohlstetter and Betts, while cognitive problems are covered by Heuer. The reformists take a more organizational view. They concur concerning collection but blame failure on organizational or bureaucratical malfunctions like insufficient sharing, rather than cognitive problems and faulty analysis. Prominent reformist scholars are Wilensky and Zegart. The contrarians argue that failure could have been avoided with improved collection and warning. Scholars like Kahn and Levite represent this view[6]. Dahl's grouping is useful because it illustrates different views on what may cause failure as well as where cognitive biases are seen as significant. Additionally, Dahl emphasises the importance of also studying intelligence success to draw correct conclusions. This dissertation follows that call with a comparative study of the Israeli side of the case, which was successful. Turning to the case itself, a popular view among intelligence scholars seems to be that it is an intelligence failure where analysis and assessment, though based on weak collection, are the main culprits[7]. For this dissertation, classification allowed only limited access to primary sources, but a satisfying access to secondary sources and together these sources build an acceptably comprehensive foundation. The dissertation is situated within Intelligence Failure theory and strive to fill a gap by drawing on several failure theories and comparing with Intelligence Success to broaden the perception of the case and identify general lessons learned from the "Fall of the Shah".

The primary sources are sixteen intelligence documents ranging from RFI's, through Memorandums to NIE, mainly from the CIA but a few also from State Department and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). They were written between 1951-1978 and released declassified in the 2000's, the last one 2013. The documents likely represent only a small sample of the whole documentation produced, reflecting mainly the analytical effort and not collection or organizational matters, but it was the amount possible to access. Hence, the examination provides more of an indication than strong causal evidence, but the correlation with secondary sources adds explanatory value. Concerning secondary sources, Jervis "Why Intelligence Fails" (2010) covers the last part (1977-78) of the intelligence effort and is well cited source. It includes a comprehensive post-mortem analysis of the failure on governmental request and is rated exemplary when illustrating "intelligence pathologies and

[4] Caddell, "Historical case studies in intelligence education", 889-904.
[5] Erik J. Dahl "Getting beyond analysis by anecdote: improving intelligence analysis through the use of case studies", *Intelligence and National Security*, 32:5, (2017): 563, 569-570.
[6] Erik J Dahl, "Intelligence and surprise attack", GUP, Washington, 2013, 7-15
[7] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 26, Schulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare*, 62-63, and several scholars in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008; Richard J. Kerr, "The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000", 42-43 and John McLaughlin, "Serving the National Policymaker", 77-78 and Jack Davis, "Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts", 158-162 and James B Bruce, "The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector Relationship", 196-206.

failures in analytic tradecraft" even if a limitation is the short time span[8]. Jervis had access to secret material and primary sources and focuses on analysis and cognitive problems. Even so, Jervis notes some important organisational issues as well. He does not penetrate collection and policy role in the failure in similar depth because that then was outside his mandate. With that, Jervis' material provide ammunition for the traditionalist schools' focus on analysis but also some revisionist related. Jervis has been criticised for having a too narrow focus in time and failure spectrum, but other articles compensate the dissertation for this. The role of policy is tackled by Daugherty "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", (2001) who attributes the failure more to the policy level, pointing at "presidential policies from late 60's to 1970's" which deliberately limited the collection and subsequent analysis on Iran. The belief among US leadership was that Iran continued on a stabile path under strong leadership of the Shah and this led the intelligence effort to focus elsewhere. There was even a tendency during the Carter era to disregard intelligence that contradicted policy goals[9]. Daugherty draws on released intelligence reports, governmental policy documents as well as books and memoirs from the top policy level to support his claims. Correspondingly this brings evidence for a traditionalistic view. A similar but more contrarian tone has Donovan "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution" (1997) who agrees Iran was a difficult case but that enough information about the severity of the unrest was available and collected, but not connected to an analytical effort strong enough to reach through the confirmation bias the policy level[10]. Donovans' source base also ranges from governmental and intelligence documents to memoirs of high-ranking officials of that era, including personal interviews. Representing different angles and schools, these scholars anyhow provide strong evidence concerning the policy level role in the failure. Recent research by Abdallah, "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates" (2017) attributes the main cause for failure to the collaborative "requirements and priorities process" rather than singularly to either intelligence or policy[11]. Further, she notes that collection received relevant resources and started to improve after a "mandate shift" following the severe riots in November 1978. Her view has reach to all failure schools, but the focus on mandate, budget, interagency cooperation etc points to the revisionist school even if she states her independence from "failure schools" and claim they have too narrow perspectives. Abdalla's middle way of focussing on the interplay between consumer and producer has good explanatory reach and move focus from blame to shared lessons learning. However, there is always the question of what comes first, the policy requirement or the intelligence warning that existing requirements need attention, so that argument may go either way. A summary of the literature is that it covers all schools of failure albeit not to the equivalent depth, specifically literature supporting the traditionalist view being the richest. This is compensated partly by awareness of the problem and partly by the aspects and structure of the comparison.

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[8] James J. Wirtz, "The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy", *Intelligence and National Security*, 29:1, (2014): 1-18, Accessed 16 August 2019. DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2012.748371

[9] William J. Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence", 14:4, (2001):449-484. Accessed 8 December 2019. DOI:10.1080/08850600152617119

[10] Michael Donovan, "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", *Intelligence and National Security,* 12:1, (1997): 143-163, Accessed 6 May 2020. DOI: 10.1080/02684529708432403

[11] Abdalla, Neveen S. "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates: A model to examine the US requirements and priorities process and its impact on the outcome of national security and foreign policy events". Brunel University Research Archive, 2017, 3. Accessed 21 March 2020.

2 Chronology and causes behind the US failure.

As initial step and foundation for further analysis, the dissertation presents a case chronology and demonstrates the causes behind the US intelligence failure. Those causes range from restrained and badly prioritised collection, followed by shallow and not adequate analysis, biased further by policy level preconceptions and priorities. The narrow looking analysis also failed to consider the biographical view, which could have revealed either medical problems or the wavering personality of the ruler. Similar, organisational malfunctions and influences and inferences from policy level added detrimental effects to the case. These causes also gain support from findings in CIA's internal reviews.

An overall consideration is that Iranians have perceived themselves manipulated by external imperial powers throughout history, fostering a sentiment of paranoiac mistrust against such attempts[1]. On the closer scale, "between 1960 and 1979 Iran was transformed" through a number of factors, as Yapp stresses. The population grew from 23 to near 40 million and the cities emerged as the urbanisation and industrialisation accelerated, leading to the industrial sector being at par with agriculture. Correspondingly, the proportion and number of university students and employees in manufacturing industry grew as well. Roads, railways and ports contributed to improved communication and facilitated the shift to industrial expansion, manifested by a yearly average GDP growth of 12 percent. Major changes also occurred in social life, the number of schools doubled, literacy doubled, healthcare improved, and entertainment multiplied. It was a stunning change, financed mainly by oil revenue. The trajectory of this modernisation turned important layers of the population against the regime and finally, fuelled by Khomeini's instigation, led to regime change[2].

The chronology begins in 1953, while fearing communist influence Britain and USA sponsored a coup that overthrew the radical Premier Mosaddeq, who manoeuvred to nationalise oil and increase his power at the cost of the Shah's. The first attempt failed, and the Shah fled the country while Mosaddeq attempted to assert his power.[3] Doing so he misinterpreted some of the internal dynamics in Teheran and demonstrations went out of hand[4]. As the situation developed it provided opportunity for a second coup attempt which reinstated the Shah. Later in 1958 as the regime in nearby Iraq was toppled by Baathists, the Shah became anxious about Soviet threat and influence[5]. In 1960 the Shah made attempts towards democracy, but this led to a crisis where he met forces he could not control and was "demonstrating an ambivalence" in handling them[6]. However, 1961 the Shah dismissed the Parliament and ruled without it for two years[7]. In 1963 major disturbances erupted in Teheran and military dealt harshly with them[8]. The main opposition party, National Front was crushed and mainly survived among exiles. Subsequently, the Shah "steadily asserted his personal

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[1] Richard W Cottam, *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1988, 3-15

[2] Yapp, M. E. *The near East since the First World War : A History To 1995*. London: Routledge, 1996, 330-331, 340-343

[3] Mokhtari, Fariborz. "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue." *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 3 (2008): 457-88. Accessed May 11, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/25482541.

[4] Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, 105-109.

[5] Roham Alvandi, "GuestEditor'sIntroduction: Iran and the Cold War", *Iranian Studies*, 47:3, (2014): 374-375, Accessed 8 Dec 2019

[6] Cottam, *Iran and the United States:*, 122-124

[7] Yapp, *The near East since the First World War*, 332

[8] Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, 130-133

rule", populating government and the institutions with supporters that just carried out his will[9]. As the economy grew, the Shah increased military spending and became the US single largest arms customer in 1968[10]. Internally, during the 1970-s there was a growing and more organised religious opposition against the regime, against its' secular ambitions and corrupt appearance[11]. Externally, asserting regional influence Iran intervened in Oman 1972-75 to defeat Marxist rebellion and US became dependent on Iran for regional stability[12]. Further, the Shah was perceived as a regional strategist and Iran developed a special relationship with US, even if his level of military expenditure was controversial in both countries[13]. In 1975-76 the unexpected economic downturn in Iran was substantial, causing discontent and frustration among several layers of populace[14]. "Protest began among middle class intellectuals in May 1977". The protests initially were met mildly and with concessions, but that had the opposite effect and demonstrations escalated, complemented by students taking to the streets in November 1977. In January 1978 the religious classes joint the protests and with that began a 40-day rioting circle[15]. The discontent was fuelled by messages from Ayatollah Khomeini on tapes distributed locally in the mosques and cities[16]. The protests were met with a mix of repressive and appeasing measures, in august 1978 the disliked Resurgence Party was disbanded, Islamic calendar reinstated, and night clubs closed, but on 7th September a major demonstration was met with troops, leading to the death of several people. In October 1978, waves of strikes brought a large portion of the industry to a halt, which added new strains on the government. The Shah's next step was the appointment of a military government in November 1978, but after very large demonstrations of December in Teheran the government began to dissolve, and mutinies occurred in military units. The Shah's last counter was appointment of a Prime Minister from the National Front, Shahpur Bakhtiyar. Bakhtiyar told the Shah to leave Iran, which he did on 16th January 1979. On February 1st, Ayatollah Khomeini returned from Paris and on the 11th Bakhtiyar fled the country. The revolution was a fact[17].

The failure occurred due to mistakes and shortfalls in several areas. Relevant collection was scarce and both resource and policy-constrained. The dynamic between collection and analysis was not effective and the following analysis was biased, shallow and not developing hypothesis for alternative outcomes. Further, it did not have impact on policy enough to change the priorities in time. Jervis illustrates that collection was hampered because Iran was a low priority target since long and no available assets could collect on the sentiment among the populace, only the views of the leading cadre were accumulated. Similar, US collection assets were constrained from meeting the opposition and mainly gathered "information on sensitive domestic matters from the Shah secret police" (SAVAK). A related problem was the lack of intelligence personnel with relevant language skills in Farsi. This

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[9] Browne, Nicholas, 'British Policy on Iran, 1974 – 1978', Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1979, accessed from Foreign and Commonwealth Office Website, http://centralcontent.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf1/iran-document-british-policy-on-iran, (last visited 29/03/11), 1 and Yapp, *The near East since the First World War,* 333-336

[10] Stephen McGlinchey & Andrew Moran, "Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 27:3, (2016):523. Accessed 16 August 2019.

[11] Yapp, M. E. *The near East since the First World War : A History To 1995*. London: Routledge, 1996, 340

[12] Browne, 'British Policy on Iran, 1974 – 1978', 1-2 and Alvandi "Iran and the Cold War", 376-377.

[13] Stephen McGlinchey & Andrew Moran (2016) "Beyond the Blank Cheque: Arming Iran during the Ford Administration", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 27:3, 527-533, accessed 16 August 2019.

[14] Browne, 'British Policy on Iran, 1974 – 1978', 2-3 and Yapp, *The near East since the First World War*, 341

[15] Browne, 'British Policy on Iran, 1974 – 1978', 5 and Yapp, *The near East since the First World War,* 341 and Ivor Lucas (2009) "REVISITING THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SHAH OF IRAN", *Asian Affairs*, 40:3, 419, Accessed 16 August 2019

[16] Lucas, "REVISITING THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE SHAH OF IRAN", 420-421.

[17] Browne, 'British Policy on Iran, 1974 – 1978', 5-7 and Yapp, *The near East since the First World War*, 341-342

problem is at least two folded, first the risk of totally disregarding information, secondly inability to interpret information correctly and within a context. The language barrier restricted the US contacts to secular middle class and left the sentiment among the masses and the instigating tapes from Khomeini outside reach[18]. Further, the Shah's deteriorating health and degraded ability to pursue a strong leadership was undetected, even if French intelligence probably had knowledge[19]. Noting the reliance on the Shah's rule, a biographical approach tending to authoritarian elites and related mechanisms would also have been appropriate[20]. Such attempts were made, but never developed[21]. The limited collection did contain some warning signs, but analysis failed to grasp them. Further, the collector – analyst relation was not working well, meaning analysts did not appreciate how limited the collection was and that basing assumptions on it was dangerous, leading to "the triumph of faulty assumptions over the absence of needed information"[22]. Continuing on analysis, several different mistakes can be identified. From examination of primary sources two things should be highlighted. First, the shift from scepticism about the Shah's prospects to survive as ruler during the 1950's to the almost cemented perception that he was a formidable ruler during late 1960's and 1970's. An additional observation from the examination is that the analytical cold war focus on the Soviet threat seem prioritised in some assessments and likely diverted attention from the internal problems in Iran. Second, the overly single-outcome forecasting of the assessments from the later era. This is also noted by Jervis, arguing that there was a reasonable synthetises of available information and intelligence, but the underlying key assumptions were not questioned, like the Shah's will to use force and the oppositions ability to work together. Further, when evidence was interpreted and when analysis was pursued, it was heavily based on previous assumptions and estimates. The concept that the Shah's regime was strong was colouring interpretation and analysis, overly sensitive to consistency[23]. Such foreknowledge about the regime was built on expertise but was more a "habit of thought" than based on reliable evidence[24]. Compared with the chronology, it can be seen that the Shah was rather hesitant than decisive in crucial moments like the coup in 1953, the democratisation attempts in early 60´s and the demonstrations and rioting in 1977-78. Several assessments were also heavy on description and weak on analysis, and this was combined with a lack of understanding of the impact of religious leaders[25]. This indicates lack of contextual understanding in the analysis, which might be attributed to mirror imaging[26].

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[18] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 16-26

[19] Jonathan D. Clemente, "In Sickness + in Health", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 63:2, (2007): 38-66, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2007.11461061 , and Ardavan Khoshnood & Arvin Khoshnood, "The death of an emperor – Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and his political cancer", *Alexandria Journal of Medicine*, 52:3, (2016): 201-208. DOI: 10.1016/j.ajme.2015.11.

[20] A. Newson and F. Trebbi, "Authoritarian elites", *Canadian Journal of Economics*, Volume 51, Issue 4, November 2018, 1088, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/caje.12362 and Schulsky and Schmitt, *Silent Warfare,* 55

[21] Abdalla, "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates", 137-138.

[22] James B Bruce, "The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector Relationship", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008, 196-197

[23] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 16-26

[24] James B Bruce, "Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008, 173-174

[25] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 16-26 and Richard J Kerr, "The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008, 47

[26] "mirror-imaging is the presumption that any antagonist will think, act, and behave according to the rules, norms and logic of the protagonist" from Robert Callum (2001) The Case for Cultural Diversity in the

Data from primary sources support this view and that CIA leadership only began questioning it in August 1978. Conclusively, collection was suffering from lack of priority and the limited intelligence was not analysed in an adequate and scholarly manner with sufficient depth. The narrow looking analysis also failed to consider the biographical view, which could have revealed either medical problems or the wavering personality of the ruler.

Other important causes were the diminutive organisational capacity dedicated on Iran, similar to the interagency cooperation deficit. This in turn emanates from a filter on requirements and priorities-based policy level uninterest and preconceptions of Iran. Concerning organisation and capability, the resources dedicated to Iran were scarce. CIA had only three such analysts, whereas neither State Department Intelligence (INR) or Defence Intelligence (DIA) had a political expert on Iran. The CIA had a small station in Teheran which "produced little political intelligence". Another aspect was that CIA was compartmentalised in a functional rather than geographical manner, political analysis did not meet economical counterparts. This meant that the economic problems of Iran were not necessarily analysed for political consequences and vice versa [27]. Jervis also comments on "the importance of the norms, informal organizational dynamics and incentive structure" of the day. In depth research and exploring alternative scenarios was rare. Likewise, the incentives were to "publish in the National Intelligence Daily and the Presidents Daily Brief", encouraging more current, storytelling and short papers rather than background, analysis, discussion and evaluation. Review was not on peer basis, merely hierarchical[28]. Further, during late 70's the CIA saw huge reductions where the Directorate of Operations decreased with 800 positions, likely hampering the HUMINT ability that would have helped to discover the populace sentiment[29]. Expanding to the policy level, several causes for failure appear also here. As Abdalla states, the requirements, priorities and budget did not give intelligence a real chance until after the "mandate shift" in late 1978[30]. Arguably, the low intelligence priority set on Iran from policy level hampered collection and intelligence production. The policy makers obviously also had a "habit of thought" concerning the Shah's strong leadership and the long-term stability in Iran, which made them vaccinated against contradictory intelligence assessments[31]. Likewise, even if better analytical habits would have mitigated part of the failure, this "climate of opinion" probably had a detrimental impact on the intelligence community's ability to produce accurate forecasts and warnings[32]. Concludingly, there were organisational limitations in several ways, combined with and sometimes caused by policy level preconceptions and priorities. The intelligence community therefore lacked resources and mandate to fully detect and analyse with the growing instability in Iran.

Intelligence Community, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 14:1, 25-48, DOI: 10.1080/08850600150501317

[27] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails* 16-26

[28] Robert Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq war*, Cornell University Press, Ithaka and London, 2010, 16-26

[29] William J. Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 14:4, (2001): 456. Accessed 8 December 2019.

[30] Abdalla, "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates", 128-133.

[31] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 449-484. and Donovan, "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", 143-163.

[32] Cynthia Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise*, Centre for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2002, 157. Accessed 23 January 2019. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA476752

The examination thus conclude that the failure was caused by malfunctions in several areas, it is difficult to assign the full blame to one singular organisational, analytical or policy related target. The policy and resource constrained collection could not deliver evidence hard enough. Examination of primary sources indicate a healthy scepticism about the Shah and regime stability especially during the 1950's but also illustrate a shift towards cementing the assumptions on regime stability in the later period. The assigned importance to the Shah should have prompted a biographical intelligence effort. Similar, the important players, factions and dynamics (i e development – wealth distribution – populace expectations, modernisation – religiosity, arms race - economy) should have been closely monitored. Furthermore, the analytical side of the house subsequently fell prey to several cognitive and methodological traps. This was likely enhanced by a policy induced filter, "climate of opinion", ranging from requirements and priorities, through organisational resources and aversion to contradictory intelligence, to a focus on the Soviet threat. The case of the "Fall of the Shah" thus house causes for failure that fits all the "Failure Schools of Thought" and both primary and secondary sources reflect this well, as seen above. This dissertation determines that failure emanated from multiple causes but finds that the lion's share originates from the analytical and policy level area.

When comparing with internal reviews and analysis produced within a near timeframe of the failure (five years) this dissertation has only been able to retrieve two such CIA documents. The first is a memorandum reviewing estimates on Iran from the period 1960-1975, all in all ten papers[33]. Initially, the review highlights the higher frequency of the estimates in the 60´s than the 70´s. Likewise, the focus shifted from Iranian internal affairs during the 60´s to external affairs during the 70´s. Concerning quality, NFAC comments that "the analytical and estimative quality was better during the first part of the 1960s than afterwards" and managed to capture the competing dynamics of security, development and modernization within an autocratic context. The review also notes the change concerning how the estimates view the regime with 1966 being a turning point that later is solidified in 1968. The view of these estimates is that the regime is stable, the Shah is in control and the opposition is too fragmented to form any viable alternative. The review further suggests that this "estimative thrust prevailed through 1978". The review ends with pointing at the puzzling question why the shift came in the late 1960, does not provide an answer but raises some possible explanations like a decreasing quality of analysts, that the growth of the Iranian military looked reassuring, that it was influenced by US policy towards Iran, caused by organisational restructuring within the Bureau for Intelligence and Research (INR). The second CIA document dated January 1984 is from the Senior Review Panel (SRP) to the Director of Central Intelligence[34]. The document includes references to an earlier SRP report in December 1983 and deals with follow up questions from the DCI and presents four bullet points. The first bullet comments the aborted NIE of August 1978, that it showed no assessment of alternative outcomes, rather focused on continuity of the regime, illustrated by its title "Iran: Continuity Through 1985". This NIE was never considered by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and was eventually terminated in February 1979. The second bullet deals with speculations about the question of succession. The SRP argues that such speculation existed but only with regards to succession in case of death or assassination, but no hypothesis concerning the survivability of the regime itself. Likewise,

[33] CIA document - NFAC document from 18 July 1979 (released 2012) – Memorandum for Dr Bowie, Subject; earlier estimates on Iran.

[34] CIA document January 1984 (released 2006) – from Senior Review Panel (SRP) to Director of Central Intelligence – Subject: Intelligence Estimates on Iran, in Senior Review Panel Report on Intelligence Judgements Preceding Significant Historical Failures: The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting.

no consideration was paid to the Shah's physical and mental condition and what influence that might have. Further, it was not until late November 1978 that concerns about regime change occurred, and the likely alternative was a military government. The third bullet concerns a senate briefing by Director of NFAC in late September 1978 where the main message was that the Shah would manage the current instability, using a combination of reform and military might. Finally, in the fourth bullet SRP argues that the reliance on SAVAK for information on Iranian internal affairs was detrimental for collection and analysis.

Taken together, these documents demonstrate an understanding of some of the causes for failure but they neither present a comprehensive picture, nor an in-depth analysis of the roots. This could be explained by CIA's satisfaction with the report written by Jervis in 1979, which had such perspective and was requested by the CIA. However, the documents stand for themselves and does not reference Jervis' report. Looking more in detail from the intelligence core functions perspective, some conclusions may be drawn. Concerning requirements, it is not addressed directly but there is a speculation about that US policy towards Iran may have influenced the analysis. Nevertheless, the analysis of the impact of requirements or policy influence is lacking. Turning to collection, the limitations of collection regarding reliance on SAVAK for information is mentioned, but there is no reasoning on resources allocated, the mix of collection sources or why analysis anyway seemed to perform accurately early on, likely with a limited collection base. Nevertheless, malfunctioning collection is identified. Moving to analysis, evidence is more plentiful and comments on a shift both in quality and in narrative, which combined brought the estimates down a road of inference and anchoring where the regime was seen as stable. The lack of biographical analysis is highlighted as well as the absence of alternative scenarios until very late on but even so, a religious based radical government was not considered. Moving to a comparison with the dissertation's findings, it seems that limited and biased collection presented the analytical staff with material that led them down a dangerous road without methods and procedures to counter effects from cognitive hurdles or "climate of opinion". Further, the shift in quality and view of the regime is also noted but left unexplained. Overall, the impression from these two sources is that the dissertation's conclusions concerning what caused the failure cannot be rejected, rather are supported. Next, a failure theory comparison follows to find best fit and lessons learned.

3 What failure theory provide best explanation? Possible lessons to be learned?

Theories are helpful when creating models for examining cases, to see what they tell us about the case. Following Dahl's previous schematic of failure theories, the dissertation will examine and compare the traditional, revisionist and contrarian views to identify respective explanatory value concerning the case. This is done firstly to see whether a single framework is dominant or sufficient and secondly to generate related lessons to learn. Representing the traditional view is Bett's process analysis theory combined with Heuer's psychological theory. Betts' perspective focuses on analysis or policy-maker side, exemplified by the view that failure "have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision maker" [1]. As a detailed complement concerning analysis Heuer's perspective is that human factors cause failure, perception traps like mirror imaging as well as cognitive bias and lack of strategies for analytical judgement[2]. Heuer's typology of cognitive biases is a triptych, namely "evaluation of evidence", "cause and effect", and "estimation"[3]. Next, the revisionist view is represented by Zegart's organizational perspective which relates failure to organizational structures, culture and misleading incentives[4]. Thirdly, the contrarian view is represented by Levites' perspective. Levite claims that improving collection and the warning function is possible as well as partly overcoming cognitive obstacles. The key is constructing a system with threat indicators and warning function, robust both against cognitive challenges and antagonistic surprise[5]. These recognized theories provide distinctively different perspectives and are central for a successful examination of the case. Below is an illustration of the comparison. Lastly, after a discussion on best fit, some possible lessons learned are generated and presented.

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[1] Richard K Betts, *"Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable"*, in *World Politics*, vol 31, No 1 (Oct., 1978), 61 https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009967 and Phythian, "The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction." In Politics and Policy, vol 34 nr 2, (2006), 402.

[2] Richards J Heuer Jr, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 3rd edition November 2003, 3-6, 42-46, 69-72, 115-121.

[3] Ibid, 111-160.

[4] Amy B Zegart, *Spying Blind*, Princeton University Press, 2007, 62-64.

[5] Ariel Levite, "Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited", 345-349.

The Failure School with best fit – illustration 1(2)



Figure 1: The analytical tool derived from different failure schools. The font size is related to the significance of the aspect, the larger – the more significant it is for the school.

Beginning with Betts and the emphasis on policy maker mistakes, there is substantial evidence of such in the case of Iran even if it is mainly based on secondary sources. The low priority by policy level given to Iran on intelligence matters had detrimental effects on the collection and the organisational body that could back up the effort, clearly noted by Jervis, together with the diminutive number of experts on Iran[6]. Consequently, the intelligence system could only produce "sporadic intelligence collection in Tehran and limited analysis in Washington"[7]. For details on collection related to failure, it is well covered within the contrarian school section. Collection is neither main cause for failure, nor without blame. This fits with the traditionalist view that collection is not the main cause for failure. From primary sources, The State Department RFI from 1975 notes that latest NIE on Iran came 1969, which confirms a low priority. Daugherty and Donovan argue that policy makers clearly had a "habit of thought" regarding the Shah's strong leadership and the long-term stability in Iran, which made overly resistant to intelligence assessments contradicting this view[8]. A second wave effect is that such "climate of opinion" is damaging for the intelligence community's ability to produce accurate forecasts and warnings, increasing the risk of self-constraining circular reasoning[9]. Moreover, the Carter administration were prone "to disregard intelligence", as Daugherty puts it. Curiously, there is evidence that Carter had some personal sceptics thoughts about the stability, but he did not alter the policy or increase resources[10]. Similar, US policy also constrained US collection assets, meaning information mostly came from liaison with SAVAK and hardly ever from the opposition[11]. Turning to requirements and priorities process, Abdalla points at both policy and intelligence leadership as responsible for mistakes leading up to failure. However, that still adds responsibility on the policy side for causing the inability to detect the problems[12].

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[6] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 16-26

[7] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 449-484. and Donovan, "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", 143-163.

[8] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 456. and Donovan, "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", 143-163.

[9] Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise*, 157.

[10] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 450, 462-463.

[11] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 16-26

[12] Abdalla, "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates, 128-133.

Moving to the analytical side we know that limited collection was followed by assessments drawing to strong judgements on this ambiguous base[13]. It has to be acknowledged that the assessments produced after the "mandate shift" in November 1978 were correct and CIA then "proved to be remarkably accurate"[14]. The dissertation now looks closer at the specific cognitive biases that are important since analysis is a mental process containing incremental weaknesses which influences "perception, memory and information processing". "We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive", stemming from culture, organizational norms or training. As a result, people have cognitive lenses, mind-sets, through which they understand the context surrounding them and new information is "formed to fit the existing pattern"[15]. Starting with *"bias in evaluation of evidence"*, one example is "absence of evidence" which in the case of the Shah is clearly present since the limited collection carried no real evidence of threats to the regime, which in turn confirmed the existing assessments. Absence of evidence is inherent in intelligence. Therefore, it is vital that analysts have methods to deal with them, like alternative hypothesis or grading of confidence and related mistakes. Another evidence-related bias is "oversensitivity to consistency", meaning overly confident on very little data that fits consisting pattern. The primary sources convey several such examples especially after the noted "shift" in the 1960's. First, the Key Assumptions about the Shah as leader "under the Shah's strong leadership, Iran may continue the path" (1973) and having resources to crack down on any opposition "determined to assert his and Iran's prerogatives" (1968) comes through in the assessments, but are never really challenged. A further bias is "coping with evidence of uncertain accuracy", which relates to plausible information coming from a questionable source[16]. Weighing of evidence, multiple sources and source validation are remedies against such errors[17]. In the case of Iran, the sources had reliability but did not provide a comprehensive view of internal problems, hence the validity should have been rated low[18]. Heuer's' second parameter concerns *"Biases in evaluation of cause and effect"*. This comes into play when narratives are constructed, with coherence often being a dominant aspect. Intelligence analysts consequently frequently are historiographic storytellers rather than scientific researchers using hypothesis falsification[19]. Beginning with the aspect of "Coherence and narrative" which concerning Iran is demonstrated in the lack of alternative hypothesis and unchallenged assumptions. These mistakes are noted by Heuer himself, commenting that the case of Iran "when evidence is lacking or ambiguous" led analysts to fall back to background knowledge, actually falling prey to conformational bias[20]. Likewise, the understanding about the regime was based on expertise but more like a "habit of thought" than based on reliable evidence[21]. Finally, Heuer's third aspect, *"biases in estimating probabilities",* meaning use of simplistic rules of thumb for rough estimates or assessments anchored in previous ones, and the ambiguity of the language of probabilities. First, the "Anchoring effect" which tricks the analyst to rely too heavily on previous estimates when constructing new ones. This effect is seen in the belief that the Shah would continue to

[13] James B Bruce, "The Missing Link: The Analyst-Collector Relationship", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008, 196-197

[14] Michael Donovan (1997) "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", *Intelligence and National Security*, 12:1, 157

[15] Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 1-15

[16] Ibid, 115-126

[17] Philip H. J. Davies & Kristian Gustafson (2017) Weighing the evidence: the BCISS Iraq HUMINT Analytic Matrix Exercise, Intelligence and National Security, 32:7, 909-915 DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2017.1328860,

[18] Richard J. Kerr, "The Track Record: CIA Analysis from 1950 to 2000", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008, 47

[19] Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, 127-129

[20] Ibid, 36-37

[21] James B Bruce, "Making Analysis More Reliable: Why Epistemology Matters to Intelligence", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, 2008, 173-174

handle the challenges[22]. Secondly, bias related to "expression of uncertainty", meaning that ambiguous probabilistic language allow interpretation biased from your beliefs. The sources demonstrate that neither confidence levels or probabilities were clearly and concisely communicated in the assessments.

As alternative and revisionist standpoint, Zegart's organizational perspective relates failure to organizational structures, culture and misleading incentives. Beginning with structure it is clear that the resources dedicated to Iran concerning organisation and capability were scarce and reflected the low priority. The number of intelligence analysts or political experts in the intelligence community were in singular numbers. The CIA station in Teheran was small and focused externally on Soviet threat. Until the appearance of serious civil unrest in the beginning of 1978, the political section was staffed at such a low level that it was generally unable to follow internal issues[23]. Further, CIA was compartmentalised in a way that hampered geographical focus and comprehensive assessment[24]. Moreover, the huge CIA reductions in the 70's where the Directorate of Operations lost 800 positions, likely had a detrimental effect on the overall HUMINT capability[25]. During the first half of 1978 there was a flow of low-level reporting that painted a fairly correct and gloomy picture, but it could not penetrate the "noise"[26]. In a smooth working organisation, this would have been picked up. Looking outside, the interagency cooperation was not fluent enough to facilitate some kind of peer review and the procedures for producing a NIE were slow and lengthy. This was further complicated by "the policy conflict between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance"[27]. There were sporadic initiatives of community cooperation, but they were based on personal initiative and not systematically implemented as routines[28]. Additionally, the imperfections of the Requirements and Priorities process demonstrate organisational flaws that played a part in the failure[29]. Following up with culture, Jervis notes that the CIA analysts did not have a scholarly attitude towards incoming material but worked more like journalists and they were also reluctant to contact outside researchers[30]. Together, this was not fostering alternative thinking and creativity. Incentives are closely related to culture and the incentives at work at the time did not stimulate hypothesis challenging or research methods. Instead, working with and publishing in current and fairly shallow products that had high level readers were the thing to strive for. The Presidents Daily Brief (PDB) and the National Intelligence Daily were prominent examples and pushed incentives towards news related storytelling rather that deep and thorough background analysis including discussion about source base and methods[31]. These findings correlate with a study of "Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community" by Johnston (2005) almost 30 years later, indicating that such culture and those incentives were strong and unyielding to change[32].

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[22] Donovan "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", 148.
[23] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 453.
[24] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 16-26
[25] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 456.
[26] Donovan "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", 144-145
[27] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran", 460-472.
[28] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 22
[29] Abdalla, "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates, 128-133.
[30] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 22-23
[31] Ibid*,* 24-25
[32] Rob Johnston, "Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community", Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 2005, 9-29

Yet another angle is the contrarian and according to Levite we should examine collection instrumentals and the warning function to explain failure and establish the possible improvements. The challenge is constructing a system with finetuned threat indicators and warning function. Looking first at collection on Iranian internal affairs the limitations that constrained it both by policy and resources were clearly detrimental. The lack of language experts and experts on Iran as well as no HUMINT assets made collection on Iranian internal issues difficult[33]. As a result, CIA collection on internal Iranian affairs was "minimal from the 1960s through the 1970s"[34]. However, according to Donovan there were incoming reports that reflected the actual situation, but they drowned in the system because the "alarming information was given such a low classification"[35]. Similar, the reports concerning the Shah's attitude and health from the US Embassy as late as summer 1978 were often contradictory[36]. Moving to the warning issue and warning function, Abdalla argues that there were warnings provided in the intelligence assessments, but they were not resulting in any higher priority to Iran or other rectifying actions[37]. The primary sources do convey the risk of the regime losing the grip, rather the overall message and most likely scenario until late 1978 is that the Shah will prevail. None of the documents reflect a thorough warning system with indicators and indications, which in itself is a substantial indication. It could be argued that if there had been such a system in place regarding Iran, effects of it would have been seen in other assessments. Unfortunately, the evolving trajectory of the crisis in Iran coincides with the opposite direction and demise of the US warning system, which could be part of the explanation concerning the lack of warning[38].

Summing up the theories, an initial reflection is that the sources provided most material for the traditionalist school and least for the contrarian. This can be explained by a number of factors; my access to primary sources was limited, the general conception of the case as an analytical failure, policy makers passing the blame, imperfect search methods for the dissertation, or that it is just a relevant reflection of the nature of the case. The most likely seem to be a combination of the general conception of the case combined with its nature, which has "biased" the previous research. Another issue is how to look at collection. Should collection be blamed for not collecting relevant intelligence or is the fault a requirements and priorities one? Likely, collection did a fair job considering constraints, restraints and "climate of opinion". Nevertheless, a fresh thinking and learning collection organisation would have evaluated and questioned their own material better. The dissertation correspondingly finds that it was neither the main culprit, nor without fault. Shifting to an overall view of the case material, all schools did bring out valuable explanations from the material which demonstrates that the case has complexity and is not just an analytical failure, even if

[33] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 17-19
[34] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran, 453.
[35] Donovan, "National intelligence and the Iranian revolution", 144-145.
[36] Daugherty, "Behind the Intelligence Failure in Iran, 465-466.
[37] Abdalla, "Requirements, Priorities, and Mandates",128-133.
[38] John A. Gentry & Joseph S. Gordon (2018) "U.S. Strategic Warning Intelligence: Situation and Prospects", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 31:1, 22-25

evidence point to analysis being a major contributor to the failure.

The Failure School with best fit – illustration 2(2)

Traditionalist School	Revisionist School	Contrarian School
Collection	**Structure**	Collection
Analysis	**Culture**	**Indicators & Warnings**
Policy Level	**Incentives**	

*Figure 2: The amount of evidence gathered by each aspect. A substantial amount is represented with **bold** letters.*

Beginning with the traditionalist school, it can to a great extent explain the failure. It clearly demonstrates the important role of the policy level and the detrimental impact it can have in all parts of the intelligence cycle; wrongly prioritised requirements, hampered collection, "climate of opinion" bias on analysis and finally disregard of the disseminated product. The school also provide deep insights into the analytical domain and cognitive pitfalls. Moving to the revisionists, their view also demonstrate why things went wrong. From intelligence cycle perspective; the requirements and priorities process malfunction, the lack of interagency cooperation in collection and analysis, the culture and incentives diverting analytical tradecraft and putting premium on dissemination of products of lesser stature. Hence, the revisionists to a fair extent can explain the failure. However, the explanatory value is different. Looking at analysis, the traditionalists can find analytical mistakes leading to the failure and explain them from a cognitive perspective, but the revisionists provide another angle which explains why the analysts and the organisations could not mitigate those problems. This is a helpful contribution and clearly increases our understanding. Last, the contrarian school, which demonstrates the problems of distinguishing relevant information in collection but also that even limited collection can be tuned. The contrarians also lift the issue of warnings and indicators, adding explanatory value to causes for failure. The school has a more limited approach than the other two but clearly has additional value and may to a certain extent explain the failure. Concerning the best fit, this dissertation finds that the traditionalist school has a very good fit in the case of the Shah and matches the dissertations' demonstrated view on what caused the failure. However, it also stands clear that the traditionalists explanations only can reach so far and that a comprehensive understanding of the case must consider findings from all three schools.

Following, the dissertation will use the intelligence core functions as framework for structure and presentation of the generated lessons learned. This does imply knowledge about the dynamic nature of the intelligence cycle and interrelated mechanisms - like the interactive dynamics between priority, collection, analysis and warning[39]. However, it is worthwhile to begin with some overall considerations concerning the nature of intelligence. As Betts point out, there are inherent problems that cannot be "fixed", rather where you just need to "strike a balance". An example is the integrity of intelligence versus political pondering and policy relevance. Other examples are need for secrecy versus need for sharing, competition between timeliness and accuracy, conflicting collection requirements and protection of sources, and "physical limitations of cognition"[40]. This means that adjustments have to be weighed carefully, no matter if the relate to organisation, methods or procedures. With this structure and this mindset, the dissertation now approaches the lessons learned from the case.

Concerning requirements and priorities; As Abdalla points out, the mandate level functions must be tuned to support the intelligence effort. This includes adjusting priority level, budget and resources, functional interagency cooperation and operational mandates. The adjustment should be handled within a "collaborate requirements and priorities process" between policy level and Intelligence Community leadership. There has to be a long-term focus combined with a flexibility to adjust as situation develops or warnings sound, so that the intelligence system has time to develop collection capabilities and relevant analytical expertise while maintaining an agility towards new areas of interest. When assigning priorities, even friendly states and regimes that are of strategic importance must be followed and analysed thoroughly. Further, the danger of a policy generated "climate of opinion" must be countered with qualitative procedures and analytical tools so priorities are set with fresh eyes.

Concerning collection, the case illustrates the importance as well as the challenge of collection on intent, ranging from leadership assertiveness to sentiment among the populace when forecasting revolutions. Preferably this should be addressed by SIGINT and HUMINT which traditionally have that capability, wherefore resources must be allocated to them in timely manner[41]. Additionally, the modern context with openly available information i e in social media would need strong attention and give good understanding of popular sentiment as well as group related instigations, meaning OSINT or "SOCMINT" has a major role in predicting revolutions[42]. As a benefit, understanding and engagement with the relevant media platforms opens possibilities for policy initiatives and influence through covert action. A related lesson learned is the need for language skills and contextual understanding, meaning collection must house such skills relevant to the target in enough numbers. Another specific related to authoritarian states is the importance of biographical

[39] Herman, Michael. *Intelligence Power in Peace and War* (Cambridge: CUP 1996) page 284-287 and Philip H J Davies, Kristian Gustafson and Ian Rigden, "The Intelligence Cycle is Dead, Long Live the Intelligence Cycle: Rethinking Intelligence Fundamentals for a New Intelligence Doctrine" in Mark Pythian ed. *Understanding the Intelligence Cycle* (London: Routledge, 2013), 63-64.
[40] Richard K Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p 3-4, 15.
[41] Michael Herman, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*, 82-83.
[42] Sir David Omand , Jamie Bartlett & Carl Miller, "Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)", *Intelligence and National Security*, 27:6, (2012): 803-806.

approach/intelligence, including the medical aspect, to correctly understand and assess leadership and noteworthy mechanisms. As the collection flow increases, a high-fidelity system for detecting, classifying and collating important information must also be in place. This to avoid that important information is missed due to low-level classification or other reasons. An important dynamic between collector and analyst is a well working Indicators & Warnings system, structured and calibrated to fit the context.

Concerning analysis, several lessons may be drawn. Intelligence analysis is a craft often built on ambiguous evidence under the influence of cognitive biases. Thus, it must have strong analytical methods, procedures and training that brings awareness of biases to everyone involved. Secondly, use of relevant structured analytical techniques (SAT) that counter biases are crucial. The case illustrated biases present in all of Heuer's triptych. Accordingly, the lessons speak for use of SAT's covering the whole spectrum. Early on, use of chronologies, environmental scanning and sorting tools, network analysis and structured brainstorming should be helpful. With this, evidence can be sorted in time and connected, evaluation and rating are facilitated and the likelihood of missing important information decreases, and more alternatives are considered. This would also help identify if you have a very limited collection base, as in the Iranian case. Continuing, cross impact matrix can clarify relations between variables and/or players, like political, religious or popular leaders. The key assumptions check is clearly missing in the case and would have been of great value, challenging the important assumptions of regime stability and use of force. Further, indicators can be used to detect "changes towards an undesirable condition, such as political instability", which seem like a clear learning from Iran. Likewise, generating alternative scenarios more in depth or analysis of competing hypothesis (ACH), where the idea is to "refute hypothesis rather than confirm them", would have highlighted alternative outcomes and given better substance for probabilistic language in the judgements. Towards the end of the process, a structured self-critique illuminates the crucial analytical tools, steps and pitfalls being used and reflection over information gaps or analytical dangers the judgments may be prey to. Conclusively, this helps to correctly assess the level of confidence and communicate it, which not was done concerning assessments on Iran[43]. Consequently, continuous training of personnel to these standards is a major way to achieve the goals.

Concerning dissemination, a primary concern is to begin with the producer – consumer dimension and ensure the receptiveness of the intelligence consumer, as Dahl stresses[44]. The case illustrates several malfunctions in this aspect. A lesson to learn is to improve the relation with consumers and policy makers, encouraging a dialogue concerning their needs and intelligence' capability to match it as well as adding opportunity orientation to the analysis[45]. Using a clear probabilistic language that also conveys level of confidence is helpful and helps building a relation of trust. Further, the case displays a lack of sharing and speed in production. To capitalise on the technological trajectory since 1978, it is possible to increase speed and sharing by disseminating through a collaborative network, as long as the counterintelligence and security aspects are balanced[46].

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[43] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails,* 24-25, 189-194 and Richards J Heuer Jr and Randolph H Phearson, *Structured Analytical Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, ISBN 978-1-60871-018-8, chapter 3.
[44] Dahl, *Intelligence and surprise attack*, 23-25
[45] John McLaughlin, "Serving the National Policymaker", 71-75.
[46] Timothy J Smith, "Predictive Warning: Teams, Networks, and Scientific Method", in R.Z. George and J.B. Bruce (Eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence*, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, 276-277.

Moving from the core functions and the cycle to crosscutting issues arisen from the reformist viewpoint, culture and incentives of the intelligence organisation merit a closer look. There is a valid argument that more internal openness between analysts and peer review of assessments would increase quality, as Jervis notes[47]. Likely, such measures would have positive cultural effects and could preferably go hand in hand with internal training programs that addresses several of the analytical challenges mentioned earlier. A similar recommendation by Jervis is the strengthening of middle management to "provide appropriate critical scrutiny", raising new questions as well as the intellectual and methodological barrier, which also improves the cultural stature. He continues to suggest a function that broadly evaluates intelligence products in hindsight, using "retrospective analysis of a wider range of cases" to reflect, challenge and train analysts and staff [48]. Such actions would put a qualitative approach and learning at the centre of intelligence business and make positive change easier. Regarding incentives, they were evidently rewarding current and shallow products, like the Presidents Daily Brief. Changing incentives to encourage analytical depth, evaluation of evidence and alternative solutions comes out as lesson learned. Change management of the culture and incentives is likely very important considering that "culture eats strategy for breakfast"[49]. Revisiting Johnston's study of US Intelligence Culture shows that culture was unyielding to change throughout several eras of reform, indicating both the difficulty and the importance of such management [50]. Revisionists also address organisational structure as important, and here are lessons to learn too. Internally, an attention to team composition could increase the analytical quality by enhancing creativity and generation of alternative hypothesis as well as mitigate biases like "mirror imaging"[51]. A relevant level of diversity likely increases the "batting average"[52] of the assessments as well as overall performance. A related aspect is the effort it takes to build analytical expertise in an area[53]. This implies that analysts must be allowed to work on a subject for several years, likely travel to the area and if possible, work there for a period of time. Continuing with external structural issues, the interagency cooperation and sharing too was limited in the examined case and when it occurred often based on individual initiative and not institutionalised. The obvious remedy is structured and institutionalised cooperation between the intelligence agencies, with processes and procedures that reflects a cooperative mindset, meaning getting cooperation "culturalised". It could be beneficial not only for analyst – analyst relation but also for analyst – collector ditto. This could be enhanced by job rotation, which would increase understand and trust between people and, on aggravated level the organisations. For counterintelligence and security reasons this has to be balanced with care and evaluated regularly. On similar note, Jervis recommends increased cooperation with scholars and researchers outside the IC and that would broaden the

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[47] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 22-23

[48] Ibid, 187-188

[49] Attributed to management guru Peter Drucker, who argued that culture trumps strategy in business. Strategies for Influence, accessed 18 May 2020, https://strategiesforinfluence.com/peter-drucker-coaching-tips/

[50] Johnston, "Analytical Culture in the US Intelligence Community", 9-29.

[51] Robert Callum, "The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence Community", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 14:1, (2001): 25-48.

[52] The term "batting average" is used by Betts to illustrate the possible marginal improvements that are possible in intelligence. Betts, Richard K. "*Enemies of Intelligence*", New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, 18.

[53] Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails*, 195.

understanding and analysis but also houses obvious concern from a security perspective. This could be accommodated with pinpointed measures and thorough vetting of personnel and likely has to be used selectively.

Regarding policy related issues, the case demonstrates a lack of policy level receptiveness, well illustrating Dahls' earlier point on criteria for successful warning. The "habit of thought" was apparently wrong and resilient to contradictory intelligence. Even worse, the Carter administration evidently disregarded intelligence. A clear lesson is that the consumer–producer relation as well as policy maker receptiveness has to be maintained and tendered regularly. Building trust can be done by training of policy level personnel in intelligence challenges, bringing their expectations to realistic levels. Another related recommendation previously mentioned is to make assessments more opportunity oriented, which also will enhance policy maker interest.

A further observation concerns organisational ability to retain knowledge. The US, together with the British demonstrated a substantial knowledge and understanding of Iranian internal politics prior to and during the coup in 1953. The dynamics with the communist backed Tudeh party, the military sentiment and popular support for the Shah were fairly skilfully balanced against the cards Mosaddeq played until he went too far and lost the popular momentum and support of the military. The US main characters on scene, Roosevelt and Henderson were connected to relevant players and managed to time the sentiment of patriotism within Iran with a second coup effort and after Mosaddeq's demise, the Shah could return[54]. This knowledge about Iranian affairs likely had some breadth and extension within the CIA and US government at the time even if CIA role and competence related to the coup was overestimated[55]. Further, it likely had some reminiscence but might have faded out as staff personnel and analysts were replaced. This could partly explain why the assessments made in the 1950's were better than the ones produced later. A generated lesson learned is that organisations must be able to institutionalise knowledge, maintain it as well as challenge it as new evidence is collected.

[54] Mokhtari, Fariborz. "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue." *Middle East Journal* 62, no. 3 (2008): 480-485. Accessed May 11, 2020.
[55] Cottam, *Iran and the United States*, 105-109.

	Requirements	Collection	Analysis	Dissemination	Organisation	Policy level
	Tune mandate level functions	Collect on intent of leadership and populace	Use I&W in dialogue with collection	Meet policy maker need	Internal openness and peer review, evaluate earlier products	Improve receptiveness via training
	Collaborative process	Priority to Humint, Sigint and Socmint	Use SAT relevant to the case	Opportunity orientation	A systematic ”storage” of knowledge.	Engage with opportunity orientation
	Analyse also Friendly but Important states	Improve language skills and contextual knowledge	Training on danger of biases	Speed and sharing via collaborative network	Strong middle management, diverse team composition.	Safeguard the consumer-producer relation
	Counter ”climate of opinion”	Biographical (incl medic) approach	”Communicate with intelligence”		Incentive to scholarly analysis	
		High fidelity system	Confidence level and WEP		Allow time to build expertise	
					Interagency improvements	

Figure 3: An overview of general lessons learned from the US failure on the "Fall of the Shah".

In conclusion, there are clearly general lessons to be learned from several aspects of process, organisation, and tradecraft. They are summarised in the overview above. The next step is to compare these to lessons from the Israeli intelligence success that predicted the “Fall of the Shah” and managed to extract Israeli citizens in time.

4 The Israeli intelligence success – comparison with lessons from the US failure

Both US and Israel were present in Iran and considered it an important ally, but their assessments differed. This dissertation now turns to Dahl's view that also success must be examined to fully understand a case and solidify lessons learned. Correspondingly, the analysis of the case is complemented with a review of the Israeli success. The chapter initially builds on context and chronology, then looks at success factors and finally at similarities and variations with lessons from the US case. This review is mainly built on Professor Bar-Joseph's comparison of the US and Israeli intelligence estimates since very few other sources were found. Consequently, strong conclusions may not be drawn on such limited source base, but interesting tendencies, similarities and variations can be observed and motivate further research. Bar-Joseph's comparison of the Israeli success and the American failure brings additions to the previous literature, not only by the comparison itself but also by the number of interviews with key Israeli players. They add detailed insight on the Israeli assessment process concerning Iran and why it was successful, even if they may be coloured by hindsight bias. Bar-Joseph argues that this difference can be traced to the intelligence assessments on the regime stability. His comparison draws on two aspects; comparing the intelligence estimates themselves and comparing the tools the two respective states used[1]. One limitation is the short perspective in time which does not cover how assessments evolved from the coup 1953. However, Bar-Joseph uses a similar timeframe as Jervis and thus the selection has a comparative value to his. Another limitation is the lack of detailed examination of the estimates/assessments from an analytical perspective, so cognitive mistakes or successes are not presented in similar depth. Likewise, organisational aspects like culture and incentives are not in focus, leaving important parts out that could verify findings by the revisionist view. Additionally, this dissertation focuses on what the Israelis did and why they were successful, wherefore Bar-Josephs' specific comparison with the US is mainly left out. Similar, originating from his focus on analysis, mainly lessons matching the traditional failure school view could be expected. However, his article is good enough for an overall comparison of general lessons learned since it brings out aspects instrumental to Israeli success. Similar, some complimentary sources originate from people with insight and positions relevant to the case; Gary Sick served on the US National Security Council under the Ford and Carter administrations and Yossi Alpher served in the Israeli Mossad during that period[2].

At the onset, Israel clearly had better reach into Iranian society through the Jewish community living there. Several of the important Israelis in the Iran-Israel relation could trace origins to Iran or Iranian culture. Similar to the US, Iran had low priority for Israeli intelligence. Nevertheless Bar-Joseph notes, "they accumulated excellent understanding of the country and could cultivate close relations" with key Iranian players. Further, Israel and Iran shared a common skepticism against the Arab nationalism, which they together with Ethiopia and Turkey countered with a latent cooperation called "peripheral alliance", born in the late 1950's. Following Israeli military successes and industrial expansion Israel had become one of the Shah's prime partners. This was followed by pipeline construction, letting Iranian oil

[1] Uri Bar-Joseph Forecasting a Hurricane: Israeli and American Estimations of the Khomeini Revolution, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36:5, (2013): 719- 721.

[2] With reference to the "Admiralty Code", this dissertation rates their credibility as high and the information as "probably true" as in Philip H. J. Davies & Kristian Gustafson Weighing the evidence: the BCISS Iraq HUMINT Analytic Matrix Exercise, Intelligence and National Security, 32:7, (2017): 911-912.
DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2017.1328860

being shipped from Eilat. "By the mid-1970s the cooperation between the two states deepened and yielded an intensive Iranian-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation" [3]. This cooperation peaked 1977-78 with a costly secret project concerning Israeli fighter jets and ballistic missiles. Bilateral cooperation's led to 1977 around 1500 Israelis worked in Iran, with Israeli schooling and regular flights to Israel provided[4]. Looking at the key personnel in Teheran, both the Israeli military attaché and the Mossad station chief in Teheran had language skills in Farsi and substantial regional knowledge. The Israelis also had local sources in significant numbers with access to various important parts of Iranian society[5]. Therefore, Israel had better informal reach to the Iranian opposition via local sources and noticed warning signs. From March 1977, Israeli key personnel informed the Prime Minister about possible risk of Israeli ballistic missile sales ending up in "hostile hands in the likely event of a regime collapse". The demonstrations and violent riots of early 1978 got key personnel at the Israeli Embassy to see a shift, doubt the readiness of the police and the insight that the Shah misunderstood the sincerity of the situation. In March 1978 the Israeli Embassy renewed their warnings to Israeli leadership about a regime collapse leading to "Israeli-made strategic weapons" getting into wrong hands. Further, the main challenge to the regime had shifted from liberals and communists to the Islamists. At this point, Foreign Minister Dayan was reluctant to accept the warnings, but Israeli government and Israeli companies anyway began internal preparations against a possible regime change in Iran. After further violent protest in May, the Israeli assessments in June to the top leadership highlighted that the process "challenging the Shah has started; this process is irreversible and will ultimately lead to his fall", even if they could not predict the speed[6]. In July, the military attaché began bringing sensitive documents back to Tel Aviv. On 19th August, the burning of Rex Cinema in Abadan killed 430 moviegoers and the day after the Israeli acting ambassador requested an Israeli emergency plan. During August, the Israeli emergency planning took shape. Interagency cooperation was illustrated on 30th August as the Embassy housed a meeting with representatives from Foreign Ministry, Mossad (Intelligence Service), Israeli Defense Forces and the SHABAK (Security Service), after which all requested their home agencies to join and form an Emergency Committee. The crises escalated in September 1978 and martial law was enacted on 7th September. Subsequently, Israeli evacuation planning accelerated but with secrecy, not to let the Shah think they had lost faith in him yet. The number of Israelis had shrunk from 1500 to 1000 and the remaining ones were listed and prepared for evacuation while the Embassy started burning secret documents. In October and November, the Israelis picked up signals that high-level Iranians prepared for exit and had lost hope in the regime. By the end of November, Israel had evacuated most of its citizens[7]. Israel also managed to extract the secret files concerning the advanced weapon systems via an El-Al flight[8]. Further, the Israelis received secret proposals from the Royal Court to eliminate Khomeini but refused involvement. As the situation developed and Khomeini declared the Islamic Republic, the Israeli Embassy was stormed by angry demonstrators, but the remaining 33 Israeli staff could escape to preplanned hideouts and later on 18th February left Iran with US flight. Israel made most things right during the crisis, the assessment and the emergency planning. The remaining 33 were there because Israel had some expectations military coup but the "rapid disintegration of the Iranian military surprised the Israelis"[9].

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[3] Bar-Joseph, "Forecasting a Hurricane",721-722 and Alpher, Yossi. *Periphery*, *Israel's search for Middle East allies*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2015, 29-32.

[4] Alpher, *Periphery*, 16.

[5] Bar-Joseph, "Forecasting a Hurricane",724

[6] Ibid",728-730

[7] Ibid",731-737

[8] Gary Sick. "The Adolescent Revolution", *Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 1995, Vol. 49, No. 1, (Summer 1995): 145-166

[9] Bar-Joseph, "Forecasting a Hurricane",737

Bar-Joseph attributes the Israeli success mainly to the language skills and cultural knowledge that enabled the Embassy to work with local sources, and key analysts to correctly assess the situation. They could even participate disguised in local demonstrations and "read the local papers and listen to the local media as well as to Khomeini's cassettes", which gave access to vital information. Bar-Joseph notes that the interviewed key Israelis unanimously rate these skills crucial and enabling them to "sense" the revolution coming, more than an actual scholarly analysis. Further, the ambassador, the Mossad station chief and the military attaché were all seasoned in similar authoritarian contexts. A certain contextual factor is the previous intelligence failure in 1973 that may have made them more alert to indications. Israel also shared their estimates with the US, which is not apparent in the primary sources this dissertation examined, unless they just confirmed the US view. The reason for this might be that the Israeli estimates show that despite being better off with sources, Israel did not see a credible threat to the Shah prior to late 1978. As for operationalizing the intelligence, "the Israeli lines of communication, decision-making apparatuses and processes and the implementation of those decisions were simpler and more efficient". The access to policy makers was good and they in general were receptive to the developing assessments, even if Foreign Minister Dayan initially was hesitant. The interagency cooperation evidently functioned well, especially on local level in Iran where the Intelligence, Security, Military and Foreign Policy representatives were dynamically working together for a joint cause[10]. As a result, Premier Begin conveyed the view that the Shah was finished to Egypt and US at the Camp David negotiations in September 1978[11]. Conclusively the reasons for Israeli success can be attributed to better collection, mainly due to language and cultural skills, leading to more accurate analysis free from historical inference followed by higher political receptiveness combined with a more agile system for operationalizing the judgements into policy and action.

Now turning to the combination of lessons from failure and success in the case of "the fall of the Shah". The strive is to perform a comparative analysis of possible similarities and variations and their consequences, as Davies and Gustafson advocates. Preferably a comparison is based either on similar cases with different outcome or different cases with a similar outcome. For intelligence cases, use of the core functions, meaning requirements, collection, analysis and dissemination, is recommended to bring structure to the comparison[12]. US and Israel worked on the same case but with different results. The generated lessons learned from the US failure are gathered in a core function framework to enable comparison. Israeli success factors are then matched to see if they are fitting, negating or additional.

[10] Bar-Joseph, "Forecasting a Hurricane",725, 737-740

[11] Parsi, Trita. "The Rise of Begin and the Israeli Right." In *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*, 68-78. Yale University Press, 2007. Accessed July 4, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1nppbj.11.

[12] Philip H J Davies and Kristian C Gustafson ed., *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 2013, 3-8

Israeli Success	Requirements	Collection	Analysis	Dissemination	Organisation	Policy level
Language skills and cultural understanding	Tune mandate level functions	Collect on intent of leadership and populace	Use I&W in dialogue with collection	Meet policy maker need	Internal openness and peer review, evaluate earlier products	Improve receptiveness via training
Local sources with reach into opposition	Collaborative process	Priority to Humint, Sigint and Socmint	Use SAT relevant to the case	Opportunity orientation	A systematic ”storage” of knowledge.	Engage with opportunity orientation
Policymaker receptiveness and “fast” non bureaucratic system.	Analyse also Friendly but Important states	Improve language skills and contextual knowledge	Training on danger of biases	Speed and sharing via collaborative network	Strong middle management, diverse team composition.	Safeguard the consumer-producer relation
Good interagency cooperation	Counter ”climate of opinion”	Biographical (incl medic) approach	”Communicate with intelligence”		Incentive to scholarly analysis	
Seasoned key personnel		High fidelity system	Confidence level and WEP		Allow time to build expertise	
Journalistic “nose” skills					Interagency improvements	

Figure 4: The Israeli success factors compared with the US lessons learned from failure.

Beginning with similarities, concerning requirements a similarity is the need for analyzing also a friendly but important state. Both countries did collect on Iran and produced assessments, even if the results differed. The Israeli success would not have been possible without the collection and analytical effort, so the result demonstrates a fit. Likewise, on the issue of a “climate of opinion” the Israeli case presents no evidence of such a climate restraining the intelligence effort, rather show a flexibility among a majority of the policy makers to accept new information. Consequently, this lesson learned also illustrates a fit. Concerning collection there is a clear fit between the language skills and cultural understanding, which evidently is vitally important. Related to this is the Israeli ability to use local sources while a lack of HUMINT or SIGINT was identified as detrimental for the US. Even the Israeli Embassy personnel could disguise themselves and mix with local demonstrators. This made it possible to collect on intent on all levels for the Israelis. Bar-Joseph neither mentions nor denies any SIGINT, such information may still be classified. Nevertheless, it is a good enough fit that HUMINT and SIGINT is important for collection on intent and the SOCMINT aspect can be satisfied for example with the Khomeini tapes. Likewise, the Israeli mentioning of local sources with broad reach also into the opposition as a success factor supports those collection disciplines. A further fit is the importance of collection on intent of both leadership and populace. Here is the dynamic between the popular support for the leadership or its’ ambition to topple it, at the same time as the leaderships’ ability to tame them or is intent to crush any opposition. This is where wrong key assumptions diverted the US assessments, while the Israelis scored better. Expanding to biographical intelligence and its similarity, the comparison indicates that this is important since the Israeli connections, understanding and assessment of the important players helped them to the correct assessment, even if they misjudged the resolve of the military. Finally, looking at a high-fidelity system that distinctively can find even low-level reports carrying important information, there is no direct evidence in Bar-Josephs article. Israel, being a smaller state may not have faced similar problems with bureaucratic layers as the US. The article points at a good working relationship combined with personal knowledge between the players in the Israeli agencies and that may have leveraged the flow of information. At least, it can be argued that a high-fidelity system is a good thing anyway and is a relevant lesson to learn.

Continuing with analysis and the use of I&W in dialogue with collection, Bar-Joseph mentions two indicators; dissent among Iranian students abroad and the increasing demonstrations. Howbeit, it is not evident that they were structurally used as indicators and collected upon, the article does not cover the Israeli system in such detail. On the other hand, the information available rather supports than negates the need for I&W, and the case for such a system from the US failure lessons is strong. Concerning dissemination, the lessons learned demonstrate a fit. The Israelis were meeting the policy maker needs in a timely manner for warning, they included at least defensive opportunities mitigating the effects of a regime change and they had an agile organization and system that enable maneuvering and evacuating Iran in time. Concerning organisational lessons, there is a strong similarity regarding the interagency cooperation, where lack of such promoted failure in the US case whilst a smooth and speedy cooperation supported success in the Israeli one. Further, evidence supports it on both strategic analytical level and locally in Iran. This points to interagency cooperation being a lesson/area where improvements can generate considerable positive effects. Looking at policy level lessons, the need for receptiveness is clearly confirmed. The two cases illustrate almost the endings of the scale, with the Israeli on the receptive end and US on the other. Likewise, opportunity orientation evidently is confirmed, since the Israeli case show intelligence being used for warning, adapting the arms deals and subsequent adjustment of emergency and evacuation planning. The lesson on safeguarding the consumer-producer relation is also supported but more indirectly. Israeli intelligence players demonstrate a close and well working relation with the policy level, as Bar-Joseph describes how the interaction plays out through the case.

Moving to variations, concerning requirements both countries assigned a low priority to Iran and both countries also viewed Iran as an important partner in the region. In the Israeli case, they anyway prioritized language and cultural skills, sent very capable personnel that penetrated the local environment and ran local sources. This difference could be just a matter of chance or an indicator of different interpretation of an acceptable “low” level. The Israeli track record of intelligence, the regional proximity and the common fear of Arab nationalism makes the latter explanation more likely. Bar-Joseph does not address the requirements and priorities process directly but notes that the developments in Iran were communicated directly to policy level, whose receptiveness triggered mitigations and emergency planning. This seemingly without adjusting the machinery Abdalla highlights (priority, budget, mandate, etc.) with her focus on “requirements and priorities process”. This could indicate that such machinery was not crucial for the Israel success of evacuating Iran in time. A small state like Israel likely had fewer layers of bureaucracy and obviously had shorter lines of communication, combined with better interagency dynamics. It could be counterargued that this actually demonstrates how important a well working “requirements and priorities process” is. The Israeli success seem to neither distinctively negate nor support the lessons learned regarding the tuning of mandate level functions and collaborative process. However, the argument behind those lessons is quite solid and the lessons should consequently be kept but to a degree depending on the bureaucracy at hand.

Proceeding with collection there is a variation concerning medical intelligence. Evidently the Israelis came to a successful assessment without knowledge of the Shah’s lethal cancer. In one way this indicates a lower importance of medical intelligence. However, knowledge of his illness some years earlier might have raised the question about his assertiveness and will to use force against dangerous opposition movements. Moreover, it may have given enough warning time to adjust and apply policy influencing Iran towards a different outcome or at least restricted military and economical agreements. Consequently, the medical intelligence aspect still is valid within the bigger framework of biographical approach. Concerning analysis there are variations if we look specifically at some lessons; use of SAT, training on bias, use confidence level and WEP, where Bar-Josephs article does not present further evidence to support those lessons. However, his examination did not have this in focus, and it can be argued that a successful outcome may override and hide areas that need

improvement. Further, examination of US primary sources concluded presence of bias and Jervis emphasis biases awareness and use of SAT as remedies against similar failure. This means that the lessons have value and should be kept. Nevertheless, a very interesting variation is that scholarly methods and academic rigor is marketed by Jervis and others as remedy for the US failure, while the key Israelis attribute a main part of their success to their ability to "sense" the revolution, rather a more journalistic skill. This indicates that there is no easy fix to the problem but also that intelligence tradecraft requires a combination of them both. In the case of Iran, it could be that the skill to sense the situation comes in earlier than the analysis phase, that in the role as collector with more proximity you can detect such signals. This illustrates the important dynamics of the collector-analyst relation and on a wider scale that the whole intelligence cycle is cross-dynamic. It may also be argued that tradecraft balance is important to consider when creating an I&W system so that it is scholarly rigorous as well as "journalistically" sensitive. Concerning organizational aspects there are several variations compared with the US failure. This can be attributed to either that the aspect is not much covered by Bar-Joseph, or that the organization is well working and not in need of much improvement. Considering that hardly any organization is perfected, there should be room for development even if the Israeli success indicates a trimmed and well working system. Thus, the likely explanation is that it is not covered in the literature. So, the findings from the US failure are neither confirmed, nor negated, with the exception of the need for improved interagency cooperation

Conclusively the comparison mainly solidifies the lessons learned, either by directly confirming (like language skills) or through implied observations (like receptiveness) from the success case. Overall, the table of lessons learned (or recommendations) generated seem to be useful. The limitations within the literature favors the traditionalistic perspective. Nevertheless, valuable lessons from other perspectives contribute to a comprehensive scheme for improvements, which confirms the value of attacking the case from several perspectives, failures schools and success. Dahls' remark on also comparing failure with intelligence success evidently brought additional substance to the lessons learned. The most interesting variation is related to the intelligence professionalism and the dynamic between scholarly and journalistic methods. The Israelis herald their ability to "sense" the revolution, while the US blame lack of SAT and academic research methods for a main part of the failure. This dissertation concludes that this is an area without easy fixes and where a balance has to be calibrated. Another interesting variation is concerning "requirements and priorities process" which gets blame in the US but seem unimportant in the Israeli success. Whether this is due to scale of organization, culture or source base is not clear. Concerning similarities, the strongest fit generates a solid argument for language skills and cultural understanding, backed up with sources that has broad reach that can provide basis for a good assessment. Following, good policy maker receptiveness will improve opportunities and results in operationalization, which in turn is strengthened by an institutionalized interagency cooperation. However, as Hofstede argues, finding a fitting organisational structure and managerial processes strongly depends on national culture. A concept that works well in one country cannot be exported with success to another country that is not culturally close[13]. Expanding on lessons from the case, an even better success would have been if intelligence had provided strong warnings in the early 70´s, enabling US or Israeli policy to adjust, adapt and possibly aid Iran to another outcome. There were warning signs concerning the resolve of the Shah during previous crises which could have been picked up. Likewise, his medical condition likely worsened his ability to withstand pressure. So, biographical approach and medical intelligence merit attention when analyzing an authoritarian entity. When constructing a I&W system, it should include such indicators and build on a dynamic interaction between collection and analysis. These results are next compared with Regime

[13] Gert Hofstede. 'Mechanistic and Organismic Structures: Does Context Determine Form?' in Pugh, D.S. ed. *Organization Theory* HD31.O73, Penguin Books, London, 5th edition, 2007, 233-246

Change framework.

5 The case of the Shah, intelligence lessons and Regime Change – a possible fit?

As noted by Jervis, Regime Change is difficult to predict. So far, lessons from the case has dealt with **how** to tailor and trim the intelligence system. For the best effect, it is good also to know **what** to look for, **where** to focus your effort. As noted earlier, a clear warning in the early 70's could have given policy makers room for manoeuvre. This dissertation attempts to do this by elevating the analysis of the "fall of the Shah" to the overall level of Regime Change and aggregating to recommendations for intelligence organisations when predicting such change. The first step is to discuss the match between the root causes of the case with the framework of Regime Change. The following step is to deduct overall areas/indicators where monitoring is recommended. Finally, a combined recommendation is generated. Looking first at the match, the evidence is brought together ranging from context and chronology to the lessons learned. The case demonstrated the important dynamics within Iran, i e development – wealth distribution – populace expectations, modernisation – religiosity, arms race – economy, nationalism – foreign influence. The Shah's failure to correctly understand, assess and manage those drivers led to his downfall. A similar case can be made with regards to the key players and actors. Looking at the US assessments, some of the dynamics and dangers were understood, but the inference of wrong key assumptions about the Shah seem to have taken focus away from the underlying problems. Further, the assigned importance to the Shah did not trigger a biographical intelligence effort.

First, the case is compared with the framework's dimensions and indicators. The Regime Change framework has a developed systematic and categorising in order to focus on relevant indicators and parameters for threat to regime survival. Teorell et al (2019) have studied regime change 1789 - 2016 and present an explanatory framework with five dimensions; hereditary, military, ruling party, direct election and confidence. Looking closer at the hereditary dimension, it implies a bloodline or lineage and mostly has a long-term ruling outlook. The question of succession has strong influence and predictable succession adds stability. The military dimension relates to situations where the threat or actual use of force is deciding accession or dismissal concerning ruling power. A coup d'état is the most obvious illustration of this dimension[1]. The case of Iran has clear linkages, the military coup in 1953 built on popular support but also on force and the will to use it. The question of succession was also impacting on the stability and the Shah had concerns for his young son. Teorell et al then looks at the ruling party dimension, building on a single party populating all significant posts in government. Following this, the deeper examination demonstrates the correlation between executive survival and extension of the suffrage, level of repression, and level of corruption[2]. Even here, the case illustrates some matching areas, the Shah had problems handling the election results and the following dynamics when he tried to introduce a democratic process in the 60's. Further, the populace' displeasure with the regime had roots in the level of repression and corruption. A complimentary approach by Hiroi and Omori (2015) argues that "the risk of a coup rises considerably during a period of a significant policy change in a society with a skewed distribution of income and one dominated by asset-specific production, such as oil, mining, and agriculture"[3]. This description to a great extent matches the situation of Iran under the Shah. Iran went through an unprecedented transformation, where the wealth was not equally distributed, and people were not involved in the policy change. Likewise, oil can be said to be the dominating economic resource even if

[1] Teorell, J., & Lindberg, S. Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789–2016. *Perspectives on Politics, 17*(1), (2019): 67-71. Accessed 17 December 2019.
[2] Teorell & Lindberg, "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures", 74-79.
[3] Taeko Hiroi & Sawa Omori, "Policy change and coups: The role of income inequality and asset specificity", *International Political Science Review*, 2015, Vol. 36(4) 441–456

industrialisation was spreading. Coming to the actual triggering of regime change, Edmond (2013) comments that galvanizing information must reach a sufficient number of the population but also that there is a balance between motivation for uprising and fear of reprisal, “Citizens are imperfectly informed about the regime's ability to resist an uprising and the regime can engage in propaganda that, taken at face-value, makes the regime seem stronger”. The fewer channels of information the regime has to control, the less likely a regime change. Conversely, as more channels become available, momentum for change increases[4]. Here, Iran again demonstrates a match, where the Shah could not control the media channels (like cassette tapes in Bazaars and Friday prayers), the instigating propaganda reached well into the populace and the Shah demonstrated hesitancy in the use of force. Concluding, the comparison is based on simplifications of the Regime Change framework and a condensed case study. However, with this taken into account the case of Iran seems to match the framework of Regime Change in an interesting way.

A second step is to extract areas where it is recommended to look for indicators that are helpful when forecasting a possible regime change. Such an extraction is suggested in the table below. This could be refined with the use of other data structuring tools like BESTMAPS or PMESII[5]. It is in no way a complete panacea for monitoring drivers leading to a revolution. Nevertheless, this could be an addition to the lessons learned concerning how intelligence organisations should tailor their work and links to the contrarian view that design and calibration of the I&W-system is very important to avoid intelligence failures.

Political	Economical	Societal	Military	Religion	External
Predictability of succession	**Distribution of wealth**	**Level of repression**	**Threat and will to use force**	**The impact of religion**	**Nationalism vs foreign influence**
Extension of suffrage	**Level of one-asset domination**	**Outreach of instigating information**	**Loyalty to the regime**	**The posture of religious leaders**	
Government ability to shape information domain	**Level of corruption**	**Number of information channels**			
		Level of motivation for uprising			
		Level of fear for reprisal			

Figure 5: Recommended areas/indicators generated from the case when compared to Regime Change framework.

[4]Chris Edmond, “Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change”, *The Review of Economic Studies*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (285) Oxford University Press (October 2013), 1422, 1443-1446. Accessed 28 April 2020. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43551563,

[5] BESTMAPS is Biographical, Economic, Sociological, Transportation & Telecommunications, Military Geography, Armed Forces, Political, Science/Technology. PMESII is Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure.

6 Conclusion (so what?)

At the start, this dissertation posed questions concerning the US failure to predict the "Fall of the Shah" in 1978 including a comparison with the more successful Israeli estimation. Regarding the question what caused the failure, the analysis show that the failure occurred due to a multitude of reasons. A too limited collection in combination with lack of language skills and deficient cultural understanding created a faulty intelligence base. The following analytical process anchored itself in the wrong key assumptions and did not compensate by using SAT's or similar methods and the absence of biographical approach added to the failure. Likewise, the organisational culture and incentives were not oriented to amplify the required analytical rigor. Furthermore, the case played out in a climate of opinion that likely hampered both generation of alternative scenarios and giving Iran a higher priority when allocating resources. The dissertation demonstrates mistakes on several levels and steps in the process but also notes that the greatest number and most severe ones emanate from the analytical and policy level area. Moving to which failure theory that provides the best explanation, most data point towards the "traditionalist" one with its focus on mistakes within the policy maker or analytical area. Traditionalist theory thus has the best fit. However, the "revisionist" and the "contrarian" theory make important additions to the understanding as well as the lessons learned, and their explanatory value is different. Traditionalists may identify analytical mistakes leading to the failure and explain them from a cognitive perspective, but the revisionists provide another angle which explains why the analysts and the organisations could not mitigate those problems. This contribution clearly increases our understanding of the case. Last, the contrarian school, which demonstrates the problems of distinguishing relevant information in collection but also that even limited collection can be tuned to give important intelligence. Further, contrarians highlight the challenge of warnings and indicators, adding explanatory value to causes for failure and indicating need for adjustment. Summing up results from the failure theories, the most comprehensive understanding is gained when they are used in combination.

Moving to the lessons learned of general value, more than twenty are generated through the different failure theories. This could be said to illustrate the complexity of intelligence and why there are few quick fixes, but rather a system that must be tuned. Worth highlighting regarding requirements are that the mandate level functions must be tuning the intelligence effort in an adaptive manner including friendly states of strategic value, bearing the "climate of opinion" in mind. With regards to collection, the challenge of collection on decisive actors' intent as well as public sentiment stands out. This must be matched by a relevant mix of SIGINT, HUMINT and SOCMINT and the collection system must have fidelity to detect even weak indications. Likewise, biographical intelligence with inclusion of medical aspects is important, especially in authoritarian states. Concerning analysis, handling ambiguous evidence under the influence of cognitive biases is challenging. Thus, there must be strong analytical methods, procedures and training in place as well as an organisational climate that fosters learning, peer review and critical questioning. Further, an openness concerning team composition that accommodates adequate cultural understanding and language skills is recommended. Managing culture and incentives seems vital when looking for analytical quality, since culture normally beats strategy. Similar, the importance of organisational ability to gain, institutionalise and maintain knowledge as well as challenging it as new evidence

appear is demonstrated. Likewise, the interagency cooperation should be institutionalised and based on positive cooperation. For dissemination, policy maker receptiveness is crucial for intelligence to be successful. This is likely established through mutual trust which takes time to build and must be balanced against the dangers of “climate of opinion”.

Turning to the Israeli success in comparison with the US failure, the findings demonstrate six major success factors on the Israeli side, ranging from adequate language skills and cultural understanding, via an agile organisation matched with policymaker receptiveness unto the ability by analysts and key persons to “sense” the coming shift. These success factors were matched against the lessons from the US failure for possible similarities and variations and the overall conclusion is that they complement each other to a great extent. Important examples from similarities; a strong fit generates a solid argument for language skills and cultural understanding, backed up with sources reaching the ruling establishment, all important aspects of opposition as well as the popular sentiment towards the regime. Following, good policy maker receptiveness will improve opportunities and results in operationalization, which in turn is strengthened by an institutionalized interagency cooperation. However, it also depends heavily on national culture and resources when finding a fitting organisational structure and managerial processes. Turning to variations, an interesting one is related to the intelligence professionalism and the dynamic between scholarly and journalistic methods. The Israelis herald their ability to “sense” the revolution, while the US blame lack of SAT and academic research methods for a main part of the failure. This dissertation concludes that this is an area without easy fixes, needing further analysis and where a balance has to be calibrated. Another interesting variation is concerning “requirements and priorities process” which gets blame in the US but seem unimportant in the Israeli success. Whether this is due to scale of organization, culture or this dissertation’s source base is not clear but merit further research.

Moving to possible causes for the result, the dissertation identified an overweight of sources related to the traditionalistic view on failure. This perception could be caused by imperfect search methods. Similar, a larger amount of primary source material might have given more detail and fine-grained evidence. Further, there seem to be a sentiment among intelligence scholars that the failure was caused mainly by analysts and policy makers. This may be due to that this actually was the case, as mentioned in the introduction and as this dissertation also argues, even if history often has multicausal nature. Nevertheless, the results carry the caveat of an uneven source base, even if counterbalanced by methodological safeguards. The result may also depend on the timeframe used for research. The US estimates were better during the 1950’s and 60’s as well as after the “mandate shift” in late 1978. Another approach could be applying for example organizational theory instead of failure theory, which might generate other causes and lessons to learn. Moreover, most of the literature is related to the US intelligence community and its culture and that also has a specific impact on the results. However, the lessons learned are generated with methods trying to balance possible bias, by the use of several theories and Dahl’s framework, the core functions and the search for similarities and variations. Even if strong conclusions should not be drawn on a single case, the lessons learned seem fairly valid and reliable.

The dissertation’s findings are important since they support the challenge of predicting regime change. Moreover, the “Case of the Shah” revived as relevant and interesting for increasing such knowledge. Consequently, improving intelligence organizational performance is key. The results indicate that failure theory in combination with intelligence success generates relevant lessons to learn, even if consideration for national cultures and resources must be remembered. The Israeli success show how intelligence brought warning, facilitating adaptation of the arms deals and subsequent adjustment of emergency and evacuation planning. Such warning is likely relevant for current and future cases. Moreover, early indications are better than late and for authoritarian regimes, biographical intelligence

including the medical factors should be included in the warning system. Likewise, identifying important dynamics to monitor is crucial, like development – wealth distribution – populace expectations, modernisation – religiosity, arms race – economy. Here, the calibration of the I&W system comes into play and the lessons from failure and success may be matched with research within Regime Change and Regime Theory to build relevant areas and indicators. The dissertation can only indicate the possible benefits and present a skeleton framework but this area merits further research. Another important conclusion points toward a beneficial cooperation between Intelligence and Covert Action departments, capitalising on access to popular sentiment through SOCMINT. Example of such benefits are the use of Covert Action knowledge to gain understanding of the forces at play within the country in question but also for discovering policy opportunities and possible exploitation of weaknesses among important stakeholders. Here SOCMINT could play an important role as a media channel. Other consequences for the field could be an increased use of the combination of failure theories with intelligence success. Expanding on this, theories for explaining intelligence successes in similar ways as failure schools would be valuable additions and would solidify the findings as well as the learning. Similar, comparative case studies of intelligence success and policy success could increase the mutual understanding between intelligence and policy.

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(Appendix 1 contains a detailed presentation of primary source examination)

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Appendix 1 page 1(3)

Primary source details; conclusions, analysis and date of access.

The sources are intelligence documents ranging from RFI's, through Memorandums to NIE, mainly from the CIA but samples also from State Department and DIA. They were written between 1951-1978 and released declassified in the 2000's, the last one 2013. The documents likely represent only a small sample of the whole documentation produced, but it was the amount possible for me to access. The method for examination was to look at several parameters; overall message, stable or fragile regime hypothesis support, key assumptions checked, alternative hypothesis examined, anchoring and mirror imaging, confidence level and words of estimative probability used.

From this examination of primary sources two things should be highlighted. First, the shift from scepticism about the Shah's prospects to survive as ruler during the 1950's to the almost cemented perception that he was a formidable ruler during late 1960's and 1970's. A specific example is the positively biased language used in the 1966 CIA memorandum "The Shah of Iran's current outlook". Second, the overwhelmingly single-outcome forecasting of the assessments are from the later era. The earlier papers present a deeper discussion on the internal challenges of Iran. An explanation in part for this shift could be an overall optimistic sentiment about development during the 1960's in combination with the successful economic growth of Iran. This could have been combined with a shallower analysis of internal problems, which could partly clarify the shift. However, this dissertation could not establish a thorough explanation as to why this shift occurred but notes that it is of interest for future research.

Another observation is the institutional interest in NIE's concerning Iran during 1975. The State Department is requesting a new one, remarking it was several years since the latest. The SSCI requests all NIE information produced 1971-75 concerning Iran. This can possibly be related to the then SSCI interest in the huge weapons sales to Iran. Anyhow, this interest from two major institutions indicate a renewed interest at that time as well as indicating Iran had a low priority prior to this.

Concerning the analytical quality, it stands clear that key assumptions were not clearly presented and/or challenged. Similarly, alternative hypothesis or scenarios were not developed, and neither was level of confidence presented or a structured use of WEP's. Conclusively, the quality of analysis was not sufficient, making it very difficult for intelligence consumers to evaluate or judge the assessments. There are indications of a shift towards higher quality in director Turners remarks in August on the draft NIE in 1978 but that was too late in the case of the Shah.

Overall, the examination illustrates the importance of agile collection, scholarly analysis and good communication between intelligence producers and consumers. The detailed method of examination of sources is presented below.

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Year	Document	Distribution	Overall message	Hyp Regime stabile	Hyp Regime will fail	Key assumptions noted	ACH used	Anchoring	Mirror image	Confidence level	WEP
1951, 18 March	CIA special estimate, "The Current Crisis in Iran"	Presid, NSC, IAC	Assass of Premier by relig extr due to oil nationalisation grievance. Regime still has control and threat of Soviet getting infulence is low. The Brits have influence but strong nationalist (NF) Iran against them.	Y	N	Yes, clearly in the beginning.	Alternative trajectory mentioned (britiish obstruction, Shah assass etc - leading to communist opportunity. However, not developed as altemative.	No indication	No indication	No mentioning	Medium! Use of : We believe, do not believe, possibility cannot be excluded..
1957, 6 August, release 2003	CIA, NSC Briefing, *Irans political stability threatened by the Shah's determination to rule supreme*	NSC	Strong miscontent with Shah among several power basis. However, no coalition against him presently, he is able to outplay opposition. A supreme rule might trigger them unite against Shah.	Y (but)	Y (but)	No	A discussion on the prospects and threat to Shah's rule but no viable alternative formed	No indication	No indication	No mentioning	No
1958, 15 Aug, release 2013	CIA, ONE, Memo for the Director, *Outlook for the Shah of Iran*	Internal CIA	The brutal regime change in Iraq has scared the Shah. No hard intel on possible coup in Iran. But, variety of other sources convey widespread dissatisfaction with Shah. Coup atmosphere is present but Shah could counter it with reforms. Believe regime will be more unpopular and	N	Y	Yes, not explicitly but come through in the text.	Yes, to some extent! A discussion on the prospects and threat to Shah's rule. Alternative scenario with successful and reforming Shah is developed, but not assessed as likely.		No indication	In discussion; mentioning only limitid knowledge of opposition strength and other indicators.	Medium! "We believe" used several times. (similar WEP to "Probable")
1966, 3 March, release 2005	CIA, Memorandum, no markings of origin, *The Shah of Iran's current outlook*.	Internal CIA	Shah finally act independ modern and progressive ruler, opposition disarray, succession secure, White revolution proceeds well, balancing US - USSR, percieved threat comes from Arabs and Iraq	Y	N	No	No	no indication	Perhaps in the way the white revolution is seen as well working	No mentioning, but surpisingly biased language in favor of the Shah. (triumphant return, Forceful charge, confidence grown, ..)	
1967, 5 June, release 2005	CIA, DoI, Intelligence Memorandum (incl a Talking Paper), *The Shah of Iran and his policies*	Internal CIA? Obviously written in preparation for a visit by the Shah to US.	Shah evolving new foreign policy, relying on US but widening to USSR and East block iot get more sources for military, economic and trade. Recent major weapons and trade deals with USSR. Wants US to contain Nasser. Wants recognition as leader of stabile state, in	Y	N	No	No, a short ending comment about the possiblity the Shah might not be able to control Soviet interests in Iran, but not developed.		Perhaps in the way the white revolution is seen as well working. The whole paper is more of a policy	No mentioning, but a small comment about very little information on the impact of reform on average Iranian. Similar comment on religious leaders opposition	No real trace
1971, 8 October, release 2006	CIA, ONE, Memorandum, *Nothing succeds like a successful Shah*.	Vice president staff, NSC staff, State Bureau, ISA and USIB agencies. Obviously written for the 2500 year jubiliee in Persepolis.	The Shah has done remarkably well for a man deemed too weak, fled the country, then put in place by external powers. Now, Iran is developing well thanks to favourable circumstances but clearly also the Shah, who is doing "Kings' business" seriously. Still with reforms, Iranian autocracy is not tolerant to opposition. Shah is confident, a popular and respected king. But the memo also points at problems.	Y (but)	N (but)	No, but indirectly readable , like 1 the Shah's skillful control of politics, 2 the economic growth of Iran, 3 the seemable success of White Revolution.	Yes, to some extent! A thorough discussion on the prospects and threat to Shah's rule. Several situations and indications of misscontent are evidenced (University, riots, assasssinations, SAVAK) Alternative scenario with more isolated Shah, out of touch with popular aspirations is developed, overspending on military and splendour while development reforms not	no indication	no indication	Yes, at the end there is a clear mentioning of "not entirely confident" and "possibilities rather than likelihood".	To some extent, at the end mentioning of "possibilities rather than likelihood".
1973, 26 jan, release 2005	CIA, DoI, Weekly Summary Special Report, *The Shah as Revolutionary*.	Internal CIA?	The Shah started with odds against him but has succeeded so far due to favourable circumstances, luck and a forceful personality. The vehicle of success is the White Revolution, undercutting opposition and gaining support. The major threat to stability is if the Shah should die in near future. The summary is built on a runthrough of reform and development, military, political, legislative, populace aspects of the situation. It warns that the success is built on a growing economy and that the plans now are bigger than the	Y	N	No, but indirectly readable , like 1 the Shah's skillful control of politics, 2 the economic growth of Iran, 3 the seemable success of White Revolution.	No , a short note on the unlikely risk of a coup.	Yes, ending with Shah's hitherto ability to control dissent indicate he will continue to do so. Also, a great similarity with the assessment of October 1971.	Perhaps in the way the white revolution is seen as well working		Uses the word "likelyhood" when stating the assessed outcome. Otherwise very little indication of WEP.
1973, February, release 2006	CIA, DoI coord but prepared by OER, Intelligence Memorandum, *Iran - the Shah's economic and military expansion*	Internal CIA?	Iran has had a decade of unprecedented growth. Teheran's military is regions' strongest. The rapid growth has increased division between rich and poor. Problems also with foreign dept and financing if the growth weakens. Under Shah's strong leadership Iran may continue the path. Irans' requirement to increase oil sales will balance off against western import. Unemployment and inequalities will not trigger regime change. Without the Shah, Iraninan	Y	N	Pretty clear that one is continued high growth rate to finance the ambitious programs, which in turn depend on oil revenue and financial credits. The future is assumed to be similar to the past. The Shah's continued strong leadership is also seen as a key assumption	No. Only the most likely scenario is presented, with some key assumptions	Yes, in the way the future is assessed to be like the past; growth, Shah leadership, control of opposition etc..		No indication	Uses the word "likely" when stating the assessed outcome. Otherwise very little indication of WEP.
1975, 5 March, release 2002	State Department, RFI to CIA asking for NIE on Iran	State Dep to CIA	No NIE has been produced on Iran since 1969, so now it is time. Prepare prior the Shah vist to US. Special attention to; domestic pol develop, eco dev and investment, OPEC, mil expansion incl Nuclear, regional outlook and Iran vs Soviet and China.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1975, 30 Sept, release 2004	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, RFI to CIA concerning prior NIE on Iran from 1971-1975	SSCI to CIA	Requesting a copy of any NIE on Iran and the Persian Gulf from 1971-75. Also including the names and organisations that were responsible.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1977, January	State Department, Bureau of Intelligence, Report, *The Future of Iran: Implications for the US*	State Department BoI, internal distr?	The question - Considering the Shah's autocratic rule and some of the US internal problems with accepting consequences for Human Rights, development, regional stability etc - how can the US balance? The following background description of Iran is; Shah rules from domestic threat, effective military and security support, he is in good healt and has a successor. Threats; a small but sharp terrorist threat capable of assassinations and discontent among intelligentia, the middle class and religious class. However, the discontent among these groups is more a state of mind than a readiness to act.	Y	N	Not explicitly. The support from the military and security org is initially mentioned as crucial for direct regime survival. The economic growth is mentioned as key to continued success for the Shah and Iran	No. There is a fairly broad discussion about several of the underlying problems in Iran and that they will become more accentuated in the future, but countered with the belief that the Shah will navigate them well.	Not directly to prior estimate. Yes, in the way the future is assessed to be like the past; growth, Shah leadership, control of opposition etc..	Perhaps in the way the underlying dissent is not understood fully.	No mentioning	No real trace
1978, 7 August, release 2005	CIA internal memo, from DCI to Dep Director National Foreign Intelligence	Internal CIA	Concerning the draft NIE of 1 August; questions about the Iran cap against Soviet, Iran miltary ability to upgrade, Mil training level, Economic problems, and - not displaying drivers and lynchpins, no ability to judge the judgements.	N/A	N/A	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE	N/A	N/A	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE
1978, 8 August, release 2005	CIA internal memo, from DCI to Dep Director National Foreign Intelligence	Internal CIA	Concerning the draft NIE of 1 August; continue to be concemed about, 1 overall organisation of paper, 2 the nonquantative nature of discussion, 3 the cathegoric statements instead of discussion and evaluation of pros and cons	N/A	N/A	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE	N/A	N/A	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE	N/A . But clear that DCI does want a better quality in the NIE
1978, 22 August, release 2005	CIA internal memo, from DCI to National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia, *Opponents of the Shah*.	Internal CIA	DCI wants info concerning opponents of the Shah, the mullahs and the communists and the connection inbetween., which DCI does not understand.	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1978, 6 Nov, release 2002	CIA internal memo, from Dep Dir Nat Foreign Assessment to DCI, *The Strategy for the Shah*.	Internal CIA	DDNFA states the Shah has very limited time to turn the situation around even if the new military government restores order. Underlying problems; the strikes are disasterous and are turning political, increase of nationalism and resentment against foreign involvement. The memo suggests what immidiate measures the Shah need to take; legislative, election, economy etc. The memo includes reports from US Embassy in Teheran and some of	N	Y	Some assumptions are implicit; the bureaucracy will support the mil government, the mil government is welcomed,	No, there is an overview of the main problems and a bit of discussion but no generation of scenarios or altemative hypothesis. Mentions National Front and Khomeiny but does not develop.	No indication	Perhaps in the way the underlying dissent is not understood fully. The role and impact of Khomeiny and the religous opposition is not covered.	No indication	Word like "likely" occur but there is no clear forecast with a use of WEP's
1978, October?, release?	CIA draft (with remarks) NIE of 1978	draft??	The last part - "Outlook", that could have presented judgements is not included (or finished). There is a thorough discussion, pol, mil, econ, relig. social about the problems and root causes. The White revolution has incressed the divisions in society, infuriated the mullahs and angered the populace. The growing intelligentia is voicing protest and the corruption is a obvious target to hit . Economic drawdown has crushed peoples expectations on delivery. " we believe the Shah still has a chance" is written.	N	N (but)	Some are mentioned; success military to retain order, successful elections to Majlis in 1979, Shah making sweeping concessions,	No, there is an overview of the main problems and a bit of discussion but no generation of scenarios or altemative hypothesis.	No indication	No indication	No real mentioning, bearing in mind that the Outlook Part is still missing and this is very much a draft. Sporadic notes "less certainty" concerning junior officers attitude..	No mentioning, bearing in mind that the Outlook Part is still missing and this is very much a draft.
1978 March, release ?	CIA, Intelligence Appraisal, *Iran; Religious inspired opposition*	Unclear?	Iran is a Shiite state which implies religion has greater influence than otherwise. The mullahs of Iran has a long history of opposing modernisation as well as a secular decision making on vital governmental issues. The Shah has managed to lessen the influence of mullahs through his modernisation.	N	Y	N/A	No	No	No indication	No indication	No

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

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2-doc-CIA-NSC Brief_Shah supreme rule_1957.pdf	20 januari 2020 11:56	112 K	Adobe...cume
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