



Explaining the unexplainable? The North Korean Conundrum

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1.0 Introduction

1.1 Intent

Miller & Narang (2018) in *North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What Can We Learn From Its Successful Nuclearization?* Explores how the main body of theoretical frameworks available failed to explain North Korea's ascent into a nuclear power. Our main body of theories in (non)proliferation has thus failed to explain the phenomenon of what today can be argued is the tenth proliferator. This is quite puzzling as to why a field active since arguably the first nuclear device was constructed and largely popular during the cold war has failed to explain North Korea's ascent into a nuclear power. Why can't we explain North Korea's nuclear success with our current theories? Has the research community overlooked or focused too much on certain theories? Have some theories been neglected? Is the North Korean conundrum unexplainable? There are many questions to such a puzzle and this thesis's intent is not to answer them all but rather two questions that may offer some explanation to the North Korean conundrum.

The purpose of this thesis is therefore to first see if we can find a theory that can be plausible to explain North Korea's continued nuclearization based upon the criteria made available in the previous work of Miller & Narang (2018). This theory, if we find one is what we may call a plausible overlooked theory. This theory may then together with other theories or alone provide plausible evidence that the North Korean conundrum can be explained with theories available to us and therefore is not unexplainable. When this is done the follow up question would be what possible implications for non-proliferation policy the overlooked theory or theories may imply.

1.2 Questions

Question I: Can we find a theory that may have been overlooked, in regard to Miller & Narang's (2018) work that can be plausible in explaining how North Korea managed to continue to develop its nuclear programme?

Question II: What possible implications for non-proliferation policy does the overlooked theory bring to the table?

1.3 Method

"Flow"

In order to present a valid case we must first review the criteria Miller & Narang (2018) places upon the theories they intended to use in explaining North Korea's successful nuclearization. Then we may delve into the different theories that they found were lacking in explaining North Korea's successful nuclearization. When this is done and we have the building blocks for overlooked theories and we may start looking for them. This marks the start for question one. If a theory is found that adheres to the criteria it will first be reviewed. Once this is done an operationalization will be made and then analysed with the subject being North Korea and the particular context from which the theory adheres. Once this is done an extended analysis will follow with one or more reference objects, this to see if our found theory can be made plausible

on more cases than North Korea. Following these analyses there will be a discussion and possible critique against the theory that will be presented in combination with the conclusion. This marks the end of question one and the beginning of question two. Question two will be centred on the discussion rather than an actual analysis. Examples of areas within non-proliferation or actual policy that the theoretical findings may affect will be present here. This marks an end to question two. Finally a conclusion will be presented where the findings and the conclusion of the thesis in whole will be presented, and at the very end the source material is presented.

“Material”

In regard to sources the discussion about source material is to be primarily discussed here. Due to the lack of information from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (also known as North Korea) and the lack of actual information about North Korea’s nuclear program a lot of the information available may or may not be accurate. The material that is primarily available is material composed by a third party often analyzing something gathered by yet another party. This can lead to a lot of inaccuracy when fact-finding turns into guesswork. In order to remedy some of the critique a criteria list has been created by the author. The academic sources used in this thesis are bound by the follow criteria. 1: Published by researchers in a recognized paper/platform/university. 2: Relevance for theory or analysis. 3: The source material is the most up to date available in a specific topic or has insights that a more recent source material does not. This criteria list is also limited in time regarding the date 2018 due to Miller & Narang’s (2018) work being published at this time, and the purpose of finding a theory that could have been overlooked by them, not one that may have been unavailable to them at the time. This could be argued is the end of a timeline regarding the overlooked theory. By following these three criteria the author hopes to alleviate some of the concerns regarding the sources of for example North Korean domestic policy or the North Korean economic situation. It is also worth noting that many authors are studying North Korea since it is somewhat unique in both its governance and economic system. This limelight in the research community could also weigh up for the lack of public information due to more attention given to the events in North Korea by researchers. When discussing what period of time the empirical material is gathered from there is no effective start on the timeline other than the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) up till today, since North Korea still exists and is still actively pursuing nuclear weapons. When it comes to Question I it is important to note that what we search for is a theory that could have been used by Miller & Narang in their work in 2018. Therefore the purpose is not to form a new theory but rather use what we already have at our disposal, and then prove that this theory is plausible. Depending on what theory we find, the method of analysing it with North Korea as our empirical example may differentiate. Although we do wish to make it plausible not only for us today but for Miller & Narang (2018) as noted above, thus we may search for previous analyses or research into North Korea that may go hand in hand with our found theory. There is also a considerable risk when searching for a theory one wants to explain a phenomenon, it can lead to wanting to make a theory adamant in order to prove a point. This is although not what we are trying to do here, the main objective is to find a plausible theory. The keyword being plausible, in order to try and make it perhaps more legitimate our theory will also be discussed regarding other cases of states who sought nuclear arms. This extended analysis will be very brief and it’s intent is not to overshadow our analysis on North Korea with our found

theory but rather complement the found theory's plausibility in the scientific field of (non)proliferation. The timeline will be subject to that state or states in which the extended analysis chapter focuses on. When it comes to Question II which is a very nebulous question without straight answers, a discussion rather than analysis will be its core.

“Previous Theory/Theory”

Research in (non)proliferation is both varied and dispersed. In order to appeal to the reader of this thesis the author has therefore decided not to include a formal previous research chapter and instead place the previous research into the Miller & Narang Theory Review chapter to illuminate different theories available on the subject of nuclear (non)proliferation. This is for multiple reasons; one of them is to induce fluidity in the text that the author hopes is less rigid and more appealing to the common reader. Another reason is to review in short both the theory and conclusions that Miller & Narang's analysis has resulted in. Therefore the research presented by Miller & Narang (2018) that this thesis is largely built upon is also to be considered as previous research since no actual analysis is done by this author with the theories Miller & Narang (2018) presents on the subject of nuclear (non)proliferation.

In this thesis many different authors are used to make certain points. Many of these authors are cited or summarized in another authors words. This can prove to be quite dreadful for the reliability of the thesis itself. Therefore the author wishes to address this phenomenon which could be interpreted as problematic. Many of the authors presented in this thesis uses previous research to prove points and summarises them in their own works. These works for example Fry (2008) or Anguelov & Hornbeck (2015) and Miller & Narang (2018) are by this author deemed to have such quality that it should not become a reliability problem that they cite authors and this author cites their citation. This deemed quality stems from this author's random selection of citations that has been checked up and read by this author. The interpretation and facts from the randomly selected sources from which they cite can indeed be confirmed from this author, that it is a correct citation from these authors and not misinterpretation or falsification of secondary sources. In the Harvard system one should not normally use secondary sources in the reference list. In this case they will be included but labelled under the respective author who uses them, the reason for this is to illuminate this thesis further and increase transparency in order to make it easier for those who themselves also desire to check the validity and reliability of the source material.

2.0 Previous Work

2.1 Miller & Narang Theory Review

First we will explore the theories Miller & Narang (2018) uses in their study in order to try and explain the North Korean conundrum. The theories they use fill the following criteria. 1: They are applicable to multiple states/actors or can be applicable to a single state/actor 2: The theory must have a value and be able to provide the research community with empirical material to validate or refute. These criteria listed above are created by themselves to adhere to when doing their analysis (2018, pp.67-68). An example of a theory that does not meet Millers & Narang's

criteria is “no country has been able to prevent other countries from going nuclear if they are determined to do so”(2018, p.67). The reason stated is that it’s impossible to measure a states determination with any degree of certainty, “If a state does acquire nuclear capabilities, it was really determined; if it does not, it must not have been very motivated” (2018, p.68).

The realist model that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is the one offered by Alexandre Debs & Nuno Monteiro in *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation* (2016). Miller & Narang (2018) argues that this is the most complete realist model available on proliferation. The model is based upon that states must have both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. In realist theory this translates into a security motivation combined with time in which the state may act on its security needs until a credible threat appears which may cause more insecurity than the security benefitted by the nuclear programme (Debs, Monteiro 2016 cited in Miller, Narang 2018, pp.67-68). Why do Miller & Narang argue this theory fails? When the opportune window closes so should the nuclear programme. “Debs and Monteiro’s theory requires only that the proliferator perceive a credible threat of force. North Korea also likely perceived a credible threat of force..., but persisted with its nuclear program anyway.” (2018, p.68). The opportunity to proliferate was therefore at an end according to the theory presented by Debs & Monteiro (2016) but North Korea pushed through anyway, something they should not have done according to the theory. Therefore Debs & Monteiro’s realist theory fails to predict North Korea’s nuclear ascent (2018, pp.67-68).

The second theory that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is the one by Jacques Hyman in *Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians and Proliferation* (2012). Hyman’s theory is based upon the characteristics of the regime and leadership. North Korea has in Hyman’s view a neopatrimonial regime. The neopatrimonial regime is based upon incentives for loyalists instead of actual progress. This is why Hyman’s predicts North Korea to fail in its nuclear ambitions since a nuclear programme is too complex and requires a fair amount of cooperation and coordination between scientists, industries, engineers and the military. In his work North Korea is made the poster boy for this top down meddling and lack of progress, “it seems reasonable to assume that maintaining the snail’s pace would be the most North Korea could hope for.” (Hyman 2012 cited in Miller, Naramg 2018, pp.68-69). Miller & Narang in their analysis discover that North Korea can indeed manage complex tasks but may fail on other tasks “the pathologies of the Kim regime may have stymied food production, but not the nuclear weapons program” (2018, p.70). Therefore Hyman’s theory fails to predict North Korea’s nuclear ascent (2018, pp.68-70).

The third theory that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer’s work on Iraq and Libya in *Unclear Physics: Why Iraq and Libya Failed to Build Nuclear Weapons* (2016). Braut-Hegghammer’s theory is also based upon authoritarian regimes inability to conduct complex programmes or tasks. In this theory however it is not top down meddling but the constant fear of the next coup that results in complex programmes receiving less attention from powerful decision makers, this in turn allows the scientists to “sell snake oil” (Braut-Hegghammer 2016

cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.70). “weak states often lack the institutional resources to set up and operate nuclear weapons programs. This is particularly problematic in so-called personalist regimes, such as Iraq and Libya, whose leaders undermine formal state institutions and seek to govern through informal structures of patronage and control.” (Braut-Hegghammer 2016 cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.70). What is interesting here is that Braut-Hegghammer actually marks North Korea as a “strong state” (Braut-Hegghammer cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.70) whilst it fits the description of weak state characteristics such as coup-preventing and one-man rule. Why does this theory fail? Miller & Narang argues that the North Korean state has indeed weakened “Yet, precisely as the North Korean state has weakened, it has made the most dramatic strides in its nuclear weapons program. At the very least, this trend would seem to contradict the pattern expected by Braut-Hegghammer’s theory”(2018, p.70), therefore Miller & Narang argues this theory fails to provide an explanation on how North Korea has managed to gain such progress in its nuclear weapon programme (2018, pp.70-71).

The fourth theory that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is Matthew Fuhrmann’s supply-side argument as presented in *Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity* (2012). Fuhrmann’s theory is largely based on that states whom receive nuclear support even for peaceful purposes will gain a head start in an ability to proliferate. When discussing North Korea one of the poorest countries in the world his argument that North Korea could not achieve nuclear weapons without foreign support does seem palatable. “North Korea further underscores the significance of the technical base resulting from atomic assistance, with the North Koreans receiving Soviet assistance in the 1950s and 1960s.” (Fuhrmann 2012 cited in Miller, Narang, 2018, p.71). Why then does this theory fail? In Miller & Narang’s analysis with this theory they find a number of problems. 1: that if North Korea did receive assistance and should develop nuclear weapons, so should other states in threatening security environments who receive nuclear support. 2: In Fuhrmann’s own metrics (nuclear cooperation agreements) used to measure foreign support, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Egypt did in fact receive more support than North Korea did. North Korea also received less support than Ireland, Portugal, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Therefore this theory fails to predict North Korean nuclear success due to the low amount of support received in the 1950-60’s combined with other states who received much more support but failed to acquire the bomb (2018, p.71).

The fifth theory that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is Matthew Kroenig’s supply-side theory as presented in *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (2010). As the above theory this is also focused on technological assistance, in this case sensitive nuclear assistance in facilitating nuclear acquisition, which is defined as “the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technology or bomb designs.” (Kroenig 2010 cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.71). Why does this theory fail? In Miller & Narang’s analysis North Korea did receive some support from the AQ Khan network. This although cannot explain North Korea’s initial acquisition which relied on the use of plutonium and not enriched uranium from its indigenous built reactor and reprocessing facility. “starting in the 1970s, Pyongyang had minimal foreign assistance to its nuclear program, using publicly available information to mimic the designs of British reactors and

a Belgian reprocessing facility” (2018, p.71.). The self-made indigenous plutonium and self reliance rather than imported enriched uranium is therefore why this theory fails to explain North Korea’s nuclear progress (2018, p.71).

The sixth theory that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is Michael Horowitz military technology spread argument as presented in *The Diffusion of Military Power* (2010). Horowitz theory is mainly built upon the view of that spread of nuclear technology can be made similar if not equal to that of other military technology. “How hard is it actually for a determined proliferator to acquire nuclear weapons? The answer? Not as hard as you might expect, and this becomes clearer when you think about the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the context of other military technologies” (Horowitz 2010 cited in Miller, Narang, 2018 p.71). Why does this theory fail? Miller & Narang argues that oversimplifying nuclear proliferation into normal military acquisition theories overpredicts success. Especially in light of the international efforts to make nuclear weapon acquisition harder. States which had more opportunities to import together with more trade partners and somewhat larger economic bases such as Libya and Iraq failed. The theory thus fails Miller & Narang’s analysis (2018, pp.71-72).

The seventh theory that Miller & Narang (2018) presents is Narang’s own in as presented in both *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (2014) and *Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb* (2016/2017). Narang argues that the sheltered pursuit strategy under the USSR and then China allowed North Korea to proliferate under the cover of powerful allies. Once the active protection of the USSR and China was no longer available North Korea shifted into a hiding strategy. Then when North Korea was caught cheating on the agreed framework the United States did not attack. This Narang explains because of the perceived fear from the United States that North Korea during its sheltered pursuit had garnered enough enriched material for several bombs rather than the retaliatory threats against Seoul. (Narang 2014, 2016/2017 cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.72). Although in Miller & Narang’s analysis this does not explain how North Korea managed to continue with its program rather it explains why the United States did not pre-emptively attack North Korea and switched to carrots and sticks in the form of negotiations and sanctions (2018, p.72). This is also something that Narang regrets, Narang does not pursue any in-depth analysis of North Korea in *Nuclear strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict*. Narang did as many researchers in the field of (non)proliferation view North Korea unable to achieve nuclear weapons (Narang 2014 cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.72).

2.2 Miller & Narang Conclusions

Miller & Narang (2018) notes that in each of these theories presented above North Korea should have failed to successfully nuclearize and is way ahead of the expectations provided by all of the theories in total and in each theory separate. This leads Miller & Narang to classify North Korea as an outlier. They also draw three lessons from their analysis (2018, p.74)

- 1) That our theories may overestimate the power of preventive war threats in deterring states from pursuing nuclear weapons.
- 2) That determined leaders, even in dysfunctional authoritarian regimes, are not always doomed to fail in this pursuit.
- 3) That even poor countries can succeed at acquiring nuclear weapons based on indigenously developed technology.

2.3 Where do we go from here?

Another argued outlier is South Africa. Many of our available theories on (non)proliferation focus on states trying to acquire or acquiring nuclear weapons. There are very few of the theories we have available that could explain why South Africa gave up its nuclear program and disarmed its nuclear weapons once it had acquired them. In the scientific community and more specific in the field of (non)proliferation labelling two out of ten states who achieved nuclear power as outliers does not bode well. That could mean that 20% of the proliferators are simply unexplainable or at least not encompassed by our theoretical mainstay. This leads to what Miller & Narang calls for moderation on the scientific predictions and reappraisal of the theories we have, not a dismissal of them. In order to support the claim that there are outliers and always will be outliers, Miller & Narang brings Mark Bell's (2015) work on quantitative correlates of nuclear proliferation into the discussion (Bell 2015, cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.73). Bell's main contribution in this argument is that many of the quantitative correlates of nuclear proliferation although made popular are not necessarily reliable predictors.

Even if we accept that the theories are not reliable predictors, or that we will have prominent outliers in the future. We can still try and find a theory that can provide a piece of the puzzle that encompasses the North Korean nuclear success. In order to find such a theory the author will adhere to Miller & Narang's criteria, this to see if a plausible theory has been overlooked.

Where do we begin in such a diverse field? Miller & Narang (2018) actually gives an example of a field of theories that may yield interesting results when dealing with the North Korean Conundrum. "We argue that academic theories should reconsider the role of threats of military force, economic development, foreign technological support, and regime type, and place greater emphasis on the ability of proliferators to prevent or withstand the pressure of coercive nonproliferation measures." (2018, p.59). In their analysis they do not analyse coercive non-proliferation measures, they merely hint that such an undertaking may prove fruitful and that the scientific community should place greater emphasis on it. This seems like as good a place as any to begin our search for an overlooked theory.

3.0 Question I

Can we find a theory that may have been overlooked, in regard to Miller & Narang's work that can be plausible in explaining how North Korea managed to continue to develop its nuclear programme?

3.1 Question I Overlooked theories

Coercive non-proliferation measures, what is it? James D. Fry writes about the concept in *Dionysian Disarmament: Security Council WMD Coercive Disarmament Measures and Their Legal Implication* in the Michigan Journal of International Law (2008). There Fry reviews the definitions of what coercion is in theory, and in practice regarding international law. Fry admits that coercion is a difficult concept and often results in different interpretations, but for Fry "Coercion is defined as a means beyond persuasion that agents (coercers) can use to get other agents (coercee's) to do or not do something, or is a reason for why coercee's sometimes do or refrain from doing something, where the coercee's freedom has been somewhat diminished." (p.202). Coercion is therefore involuntariness without necessarily involving the use of force. Fry notes though that when discussing coercion from the Security Council the ability to authorize the use of force must be present primarily due to its unique ability and broad discretion to authorize and legitimately threaten the authorization of collective security measures (2008, p.203).

An example of coercion could be the Security Council (coercer) threatening a state (coercee) with peacekeepers or sanctions since they have the ability to back their threats, and the states leadership in question does not want a certain development but the development is forced due to the amount of pressure put on the state. The unfavoured development from the coercee's angle could be a change in behaviour towards a certain actor, passing legislation for example including human rights or regime change. The possibilities are almost endless, the unfavoured development is therefore not necessarily one law or one action but more often a combination of unfavoured developments that culminate into an unfavoured state in which the state's leadership or regime does not want to be in, but is forced into due to the coercion placed upon it. An example of something that is not coercion in a single actor let's say Vanuatu wants to change Indian leadership. Vanuatu lacks the means to put pressure on India in the military, economic and political sector. Therefore in this case Vanuatu cannot coerce India into changing its leadership (unless it uses the Security Council in which case the Security Council coerces and not Vanuatu itself).

What forms of coercion are there examples of in the international community? One example of coercion that Fry (2008) lists is that of François Rigaux (Rigaux 1998, as cited in Fry, 2008 p.203). Rigaux points out that followers of certain religions may face the coercive sanctions of excommunication for failing to adhere to ecclesiastical law. Another of Rigaux examples includes withdrawal of memberships in international organisations. There are also the more common coercive economical measures of for example sanctions. Fry notes the argument of Max Weber (Roth, Wittich 1968 cited in Fry, 2008, p.204) in that the form of coercion is somewhat irrelevant as long as sufficient amounts of pressure is applied to the target state that it can be perceived as coercion. There is also what is called "pure coercion", "Where negotiations are impossible with a target state in trying to convince them to abide by such norms, then the application of what is known as "pure coercion" might be necessary. Pure coercion is the use of military force to

physically remove the threat. This is the type of coercion that the Security Council used in disarming Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War and beyond.”(Fry 2008, p.204).

What does this mean for us as researchers or analysts? Well in layman terms it means that as long as the coercer puts enough pressure on the coercee in order that it may be perceived as coercion, coercion does exist. Why use Fry’s version of coercion compared to others? The reason for this is that the author of this thesis argues that it goes well in hand with Miller & Narang’s conclusion that a shift from the military force, technological support and economical development into the “soft” power of coercion may yield interesting results. This is an example of widening the field in which theories regarding (non)proliferation traditionally takes place, the same could be argued for Fry’s version of coercive non-proliferation measures, it is holistic and therefore can be quite difficult to make effective quantitative measurements. By choosing a more holistic and qualitative approach on coercion this author hopes to stride in the direction offered by Miller & Narang (2018). This is also in line with Bell’s argument discussed earlier in how in the theoretical field of (non)proliferation quantitative correlates are made popular but not necessarily accurate (Bell 2015 cited in Miller, Narang 2018, p.73).

Our theory in short is then that 1: If a state shows resilience against coercive non-proliferation measures it probably has a much higher chance of being able to proliferate. In this theory there is then causality in that resilience against coercive non-proliferation correlates to a state’s ability to proliferate.

3.2 Question I Overlooked Theories Operationalization

How do we measure coercion? There is no easy answer to this question and in order to stay true to Fry’s (2008) argument that as long as it can be perceived as coercion, it is coercion. No quantitative analysis will be made, this also in line with Bell’s argument as mentioned before. Therefore we will first try to find out what different forms of coercion North Korea faces (our coercee), we will then try to find out how North Korea deals with different forms of coercion since the hint from Miller & Narang (2018) was a proliferator’s ability to resist coercive non-proliferation measures. Since coercion is a very nebulous term we do not limit our idea of coercion into sanctions or economical coercion but rather try to find multiple avenues in which North Korea is subjected to coercion and responds to the coercion, either explicit or implicit, this in line with this author’s aforementioned holistic argument.

3.3 Question I Overlooked Theories Analysis

Who then coerces North Korea and what form does this coercion take?

Anna Fifield in an article in the Washington Post (2016) lists the current economical sanctions in place. Some notable coercers include The United States, The United Nations, South Korea, Japan and the European Union. China also agreed to some economical sanctions against North Korea primarily in following the Security Council’s resolution 2375 and 2397 (ACA 2018). Although there is speculation that China does not enforce border control against North Korea and allows

more economical activity between the two countries than the Security Council resolutions allow (SCMP 2017). A state facing multiple coercers both regional and global, some who at least Fry would argue are some of the more powerful coercers available both when it comes to enforcing peace or legitimizing action in the form of The Security Council, and The United States when faced with economical sanctions. How then does North Korea handle the sanctions it faces?

Nikolay Anguelov in *Economic Sanctions VS Soft Power Lessons from North Korea, Myanmar, and the Middle East* (2015) has done extensive research into coercion on an international level. In the chapter labelled *Absorb and Control: How North Korea Responds to Economic Sanctions* Nikolay Anguelov & Bradley J. Hornback delve deeper into the internal and external factors that contribute to economical growth in North Korea despite sanctions from the United Nations and United States. Anguelov & Hornback (2015) also explores how the North Korean government faces and responds to the sanctions placed upon it not only in an economical perspective but in a cultural/ideological perspective as well.

Some interesting conclusions in Anguelov & Hornback's (2015) work was that North Korea has not suffered either regime change, something that is often thought of as the goal of sanctions. North Korea has not altered its behaviour or attitude regarding the United States or its neighbours in the last 25 years, also a sought out goal. And the North Korean economy did not fall into decline but instead actually grew and has continued to grow since the famine in the 1990's, even if North Korea did agree to the Agreed Framework, they did indeed have a secret enrichment program during this period and did not change its goal of proliferation (2015, pp.59-60).

How did the North Korean regime manage to counter the sanctions and continue its nuclear programme relatively unhindered? Have sanctions worked against North Korea? Anguelov & Hornback (2015) cites several authors on the subject of North Korea and sanctions. Chang & Kim (2007) argue that the three most important sanctions that were imposed on North Korea were: 1, the revocation of most favoured nation as a trade status in 1951, 2 the inclusion of North Korea in the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1988, 3 the private financial sanctions targeting Banco Delta Asia in 2005 (Chang, Kim 2007 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, p.61). These types of targeted sanctions according to Cho & Woo (2007) forced North Korea to make slight changes (Cho, Woo 2007 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, p.61), One example of one such change is provided by Chang & Kim (2007), they argue that the 1990's diplomatic talks between the Clinton administration and North Korea, when North Korea agreed to cease nuclear development and the United States removed some of the sanctions it had imposed were a result of the targeted sanctions (Chang, Kim 2007 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, pp.61-62). What has changed? Why do the sanctions no longer apply the intended pressure?

One of the possible reasons is presented by Henriksen (2001). Henriksen argues that since the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the regime has been able to preach the idea of "Juche" (self reliance) and "Songun" (military first). These ideas were adopted from Korean culture and traditional virtues into the communist regime and have allowed the regime to endure hardships while still keeping its citizens under state control (Henriksen 2001 cited in Anguelov & Hornback 2016, p.62). In this argument Henriksen also gains support from Jin (2003), Frank (2005), Kimura (1999) and McKay (2005). These authors all agree that the North

Korean regime has used sanctions to reinforce its platform of “Juche” and “Songun” amongst the population due to being able to blame the evil and uncaring outside world for its hardships (Jin 2003, Frank 2005, Kimura 1999 cited in Anguelov & Hornback 2016, pp.62-63).

Another possible reason is the argument of Dingli (2008). Dingli argues that the sanctions have not been severe enough, nor have they had the amount of support required for them to be successful (Dingli 2008 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, p.63). In this Dingli receives support from Noland (2004) who argues that for the sanctions to be effective and reach their goals North Korea needs to be under a true international embargo where North Korea truly is cut off. This however is not the case, even South Korea has distanced itself from supporting sanctions and increased trade with North Korea becoming North Korea’s second largest trading partner. China which also borders North Korea and is its primary trading partner are the main source for the resources North Korea has to import in large quantities (Noland 2004 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, p.63). Lee (2007) estimates that as much as 90% of North Korea’s oil is believed to be imported from China (Lee 2007 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, p.63). Noland (2004) & Wrobel (2007) argue that neither South Korea nor China desires a system collapse in North Korea which would send large amounts of refugees into its respective areas and thus continue to engage North Korea in economic partnerships (Noland 2004, Wrobel 2007 cited in Anguelov & Hornback 2016, p.63).

Yet another explanation is provided by Anguelov & Hornback regarding the targeted sanction approach. In order to prevent humanitarian crisis targeted sanctions compared to blanket sanctions became popular for western democracies. Such sanctions were imposed on North Korea that specifically targeted luxury goods. This on the basis that only the elite or those with power in North Korea could afford and be affected by the withdrawal of luxury goods. The idea behind targeted sanctions is that they leave room for trade that could directly benefit the citizens of the targeted state. This according to Anguelov & Hornback is not quite true regarding the North Korean economy, due to the lack of a truly private sector any profits that are made from any trade is therefore accrued to government owned and managed entities. Kimura (1999) delves deep into the North Korean economic system and notes that it is based on a ruling structure which Kimura attributes unique cultural features. Its main attributes are that of a strong collectivist foundation based largely upon a combination of communism, Confucianism, Korean heritage and Asian cultural emphasis on the family together with nationalism born from resistance against Japanese imperialism. “Therefore the previously discussed principles of juche (self-reliance) and songun (military first) define economic activity in whole because they reinforce the virtues of unity.” (Kimura 1999 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, p.65). Anguelov & Hornback therefore argue that no trade or economical engagement occurs in North Korea without the regime rhetoric and propaganda reinforcing the ideological values of “Juche” and “Songun” which in turn allows for the regime to influence and control its citizens by making its citizens active ideological participants. Anguelov & Hornbeck notes that this is a possible reason for the economical development of North Korea despite the sanctions placed upon it (2016, pp.63-67).

Another explanation for continued economic development in North Korea despite the sanctions is that of the free-trade zones. Cha & Kang (2013) explore the dynamics of these free-trade zones and conclude that the economic incentives for both South and North Korea drive this somewhat

silent relationship. The free-trade zones have begun expanding in recent years and now include Chinese participants. The free-trade zones major expansion begun in 2007 but have had setbacks. One example of a setback is when the South Korean government shifted in 2010 when the liberal party was replaced by the conservative party. Then South Korea put a halt to all intra-Korean trade except for the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Kaesong Industrial Complex was in 2012 generating approximate over \$2 US billion. North Korea pursues an increase in the free-trade zones and in 2013 North Korea announced it was creating 14 new “Special Economic Zones” (SEZ) open for foreign investment. There are a lot of international investors and companies involved in these “SEZ”, some examples are Egyptian Orascom Telecom, German DHL, French Lafarge, German Nosotek, and Swedish Noko Jean. The amount of investment and partnerships with North Korea has increased as well. Some examples of this include the Australian partnership in mining and education, the German partnership for the development for utility projects and communications infrastructure and the Russian Trans-Siberian expansion. One of the main reasons Anguelov & Hornbeck lists as an incentive for foreign investment is the report published 2013 which said that the largest deposit of rare earth elements (REE) were located in North Korea, a finding which could make North Korea the largest “REE” exporter. This made a partnership between the North Korean run SRE Minerals and British Virgin Island MNC Pacific Century Rare Earth Minerals Ltd (Chan, Kang 2013 cited in Anguelov, Hornback 2016, pp.67-70). The amount of REE’s that could be mined could according to the 2013 report encompass two thirds of the REE market in the world (Mollman 2017). This trade in REE would boost the North Korea state income considerably and provide incentives for foreign companies to develop relationships with the North Korean regime.

Other examples regarding coercive non-proliferation measures include withdrawal of treaties and other coercive means. Has North Korea been subject to “persona non grata status” or expulsion from cooperation’s, collective trade institutions or various international treaties? One of the more coercive actions against North Korea is the inclusion of the North Korean state into the United States list of state sponsors of terrorism. This has been mentioned before under the sanctions discussion above (2016, s.61). It can be argued that this is not only a strong economical coercion but also a way to put pressure on North Korea and sever some of its diplomatic relations. The speech of George W. Bush comes to mind after the 9/11 attacks. “We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” (Whitehouse Archives, 2001). This statement is a clear marker to the states of the international community that terrorism will not be accepted and sponsors can come to face the wrath of the United States. Even if North Korea did not have anything to do with the 9/11 attacks it is still on the state sponsors of terrorism list, this could lead other states who wish to do trade or private investors looking to invest in a North Korean free-trade zone to think twice before dealing with the enemy of the largest economy in the international community. Even states who wish to do joint ventures with North Korea or diplomatic missions may also be discouraged from doing so. Being an international pariah

seriously limits the states “soft power” options, and therefore can severely limit the states influence internationally and in the region. It can be argued today that North Korea lacks “soft power” and compensates with its military might and nuclear programme to receive status and force negotiations. Jongseok Woo in *Structural Impediments, Domestic Politics, and Nuclear Diplomacy in Post-Kim Il-sung North Korea* (2015) delves into an analysis of how the end of the cold war has shaped North Korea’s domestic political structures and foreign policy strategies. Woo extracts two main policy shifts. The military-policy which shifted power from the workers party of Korea (WPA) to the military with the main objective to safeguard the Kim dynasty and the rule of Kim Jong-il’s regime from political upheaval from below and above in North Korea (2015, pp.65-70). The nuclear programme was the second one. Woo argues that the nuclear programme fills two very important functions for North Korean leadership: 1, it strengthens the power position of the Kim dynasty which ensures regime security. 2, it maximizes the survival of North Korea in a hostile environment providing state security. The nuclear programme does even more than so according to some authors; Woo brings Quinones (2006) argument that the nuclear programme is “all encompassing. It affects national security, domestic political concerns, and pressing economic needs.” (Quinones 2006 cited in Woo 2016, p.71). The nuclear programme therefore serves not only to bolster morale and national pride in North Korea thus providing legitimacy for the ruling Kim, it also provides leverage and a measure of time in the international limelight providing North Korea a platform and ability to get recognition and concessions, both economical and political (2016, pp.70-75). In this argument of “soft” power nuclear weapons are not the first thing to pop into one’s mind, but in the case of North Korea developing and threatening with nuclear weapons appears to be one of the few ways North Korea can gain a platform to push its international agenda. Is this even “soft” power when nuclear weapons are involved? Some authors may say yes others no and this author will not begin that debate here, what is important to note is that without nuclear weapons North Korea would not have gained as much international limelight, and as Phineas T. Barnum supposedly said “There is no such thing as bad publicity.”

In finale, is North Korea immune to coercive non-proliferation measures? No but North Korea has shown a measure of resilience internationally in getting foreign companies to invest in its SEZ, whilst maintaining some diplomatic relations and foreign embassies and not shifting its long-term goals or attitude towards the United States. North Korea has also shown an internal resilience that has allowed the regime to show growth to its citizens and mobilizing support for its cause thus averting regime change or domestic insurrection. Even Fry notes when discussing the active efforts of coercive non-proliferation against North Korea, that “There are many indicators that this soft approach with regard to North Korea has not been working” (Fry 2008, p.205).

Now that we have tried our theory in attempting to explain how North Korea did not fail in its pursuit of the bomb can we find other examples of states that failed due to coercive non-proliferation measures, or succeeded due to resilience against them? This could be important to see if our theory of coercive non-proliferation measures actually can provide a plausible explanation to more states than North Korea that tried but failed as well as succeeded to proliferate.

3.4 Question I Extended Analysis

Has any other author or authors used a concept similar to coercive non-proliferation measures or coercion to explain why a state has been able to proliferate or not?

Debs & Monteiro in *The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation* (2014) explores how and why West-Germany sought to proliferate during the 1950s and 1960s. Germany was defeated in world war two and divided between the east and west. West-Germany was now in the frontline between the two superpowers of the world. In a already threatening environment in July 1956 the Radford plan, which laid out the United States intentions to withdraw 800 000 troops from the continent and rely more on its nuclear arsenal was leaked to the press. This caused great distress in West-Germany prompting the West-German Chancellor to write to the United States Secretary of State “Europe, including Germany, has lost its confidence in the United States reliability.” The Chancellor also declared that “Germany cannot remain a nuclear protectorate.” And vowed to acquire “the most modern weapons for West Germany.” (2014, p.43). Germany entered a secret nuclear programme with France and Italy in 1958, the programme was discovered and highly criticized by the United Kingdom and the United States causing France to dismantle the programme. This did not dissuade Germany from its goals of proliferation and when the United States proposed the creation of a multilateral force (MLF) to centralize the nuclear forces in a single command in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), West-Germany saw it as an opportunity to gain control over nuclear weapons. The West-German Chancellor allegedly said “We must arrange within NATO so that a decision can be taken to use atomic weapons even before the [U.S.] President is heard from.” (p.44). The USSR were not thrilled of this prospect, in 1962 the Soviet representative in a meeting of the UN’s Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament stated that non-proliferation “cannot be discussed in an abstract fashion. It is primarily the question of the spread of nuclear weapons to West Germany.” During the negotiations for the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) a representative of the USSR said “We primarily designed the whole treaty to close all doors and windows on the possibility of the Federal Republic of Germany having nuclear weapons.” (p.45). The unwillingness from both the USSR and the United States for a nuclear equipped Germany caused the United States to turn away from the MLF and focus on eliminating West-Germany’s ability to proliferate rather than its willingness to proliferate. The United States ambassador to Germany said, if the Federal Republic of Germany attempted to acquire a nuclear capability, the United States would “withdraw our forces and support for Germany first”, the other NATO allies “would disassociate themselves from Germany” and the Soviets would “make such efforts the subject of a pre-emptive attack.” (2014, p.46). When the NPT negotiations were completed in the late 1966 the German Chancellor declared the treaty to be “part of a superpower conspiracy to split and denuclearize Germany forever.” The former German Defence Minister called the treaty “a new Versailles, and one of cosmic dimensions.” (2014, p.46). With this powerful coercion from both its own ally in the United States and its main opponent in the USSR West-Germany was forced to give up its nuclear ambitions (2014, pp.42-47). Debs & Monteiro actually go as far as to call this coercion, and their conclusion is that West-Germany was indeed coerced into giving up their nuclear ambitions and programme by the United States and that “West Germany had the willingness to acquire nuclear weapons. Yet it lacked the opportunity to proliferate, because it was vulnerable to coercive pressure from its U.S. ally.” (2014, p.42).

West-Germany was indeed in quite a pickle, if this was to resonate back to our analysis of North Korea and our theory of coercive non-proliferation measures, then West-Germany did not have enough resilience towards resisting the coercive non-proliferation measures from the United States. Having to rely on the United States for protection and in a security situation which West-Germany without the United States guarantee for safety were left to fend for themselves against a vastly overwhelming opponent in the USSR. In our theory of coercion the coerced (West-Germany) was not resilient enough from the pressure from the coercer (The United States), and therefore failed to continue its proliferation attempts.

Can we also find another example of a state that managed to proliferate due to resilience towards coercive non-proliferation measures?

Debs & Monteiro (2014) also explores how and why Pakistan sought to proliferate. Pakistan initiated its nuclear weapons programme early into the 1970s, acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons in the late 1980s and tested its very first nuclear device in 1998. Since Pakistan gained its independence its foreign policy has been aimed at deterring India. To this aim Pakistan sought to gain security guarantees from the United States together with conventional weapons. In 1959 the leadership of Pakistan were convinced that the West would indeed provide the security needs of the Pakistani state from India, and the threat India posed. From the United States viewpoint Pakistan was seen as a bulwark against the spread of communism whilst also providing a base of intelligence operations against China and the USSR. The goals of the United States were not contingent on Pakistan as a long term valuable ally but rather to prevent the spread of communism. When China invaded India in 1962 the United States offered aid to India this created a “growing sense of uneasiness” (2014, p.32) in Pakistan. In 1965 and 1971 the Indo-Pakistani wars erupted. In 1965 over the region known as Kashmir, this war caused the United States to cease all economic and military aid to both India and Pakistan something that was arguably harder for Pakistan to endure due to its economic and military inferiority. This prompted the Pakistani Foreign Minister to declare that the United States decision “would mean that Pak[istani]-U.S. relations could not be the same again... [T]he decision [was] not an act of an ally and not even that of a neutral.” (2014, p.34). In the conflict in 1971 Pakistan lost control of East Pakistan now known as Bangladesh. This feeling of abandonment and lessening security prompted Pakistan to press ahead with its own independent nuclear programme. In 1976 Pakistan signed an agreement with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant, this deal was cut short in 1978 when the United States pressured France into abandoning the agreement. In 1976 the Glenn-Symington amendment was passed by the United States Congress that prohibited military and economic aid to any country importing unsafeguarded nuclear materials, equipment or technology. In 1977 the United States ceased all of its economic and military aid to Pakistan after the coup which brought General Zia to power. In 1978 the United States Congress passed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, limiting the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology even to allies. At the same time the United States administration of then President Carter overrode the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act to allow for the shipment of nuclear fuel to India. The situation for Pakistan did indeed look grim at this stage. But the turning point came in 1979 when the USSR invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan was now seen as a frontline state in the fight against communism and in 1981 “Pakistan and the United States reached a bilateral agreement whereby they would

cooperate in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, while Washington would turn a blind eye toward the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.” (2014, p.36). In 1981 and 1986 Pakistan also receive United States military aid packages which boosted the conventional forces of Pakistan considerably (2014, pp.33-36).

Pakistan faced two military conventionally and economically superior coercers in the form of India and The United States. India’s desire to use “pure coercion” on Pakistan in its impending attack on its uranium enrichment plant in early 1984 (2014, pp.36-37). India was indeed considering the use of “pure coercion” against Pakistan but refrained from doing so according to Debs & Monteiro “No strikes were ever launched, arguably because of the role played by the United States.” (2014, p.36). The United States also sought to limit Pakistan’s opportunity to proliferate this with its embargos and the coercion against the Pakistani-French agreement for a nuclear reprocessing plant which led to France cancelling the agreement. The primary goal of the United States was to limit the spread of communism and arguably create a “Soviet Vietnam” (2014, p.36). This goal was ranked higher than a denuclearized Pakistan which led to military and economic aid to Pakistan from the former coercer, the United States. Once the war in Afghanistan was over the United States stopped all military and economic aid to Pakistan and at the same time in 1990 President Bush “refused to certify that Pakistan was nonnuclear”. (2014, p.38). Debs & Monteiro conclude that “The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to increased U.S. support and ultimately helped Islamabad to acquire nuclear weapons.” (2014, p.38).

In returning to our theory of coercive non-proliferation measures, the war in Afghanistan created indirect resilience for the Pakistani state, due to the United States broader goals in combating communism primarily in Afghanistan at this point in time. This resilience caused by a temporary powerful ally prevented coercive non-proliferation measures in the form of “pure coercion” from India, and prevented economic sanctions from the United States. Pakistan did manage to proliferate unhindered during this window of opportunity, even though Pakistan tested its nuclear device in 1998, there was evidence they had the capability during the 1980s. In 1986 United States intelligence officials suspected Pakistan had a nuclear capability, and in the 1987 the ruling leader of Pakistan General Zia boasted that “Pakistan has the capability of building the Bomb.” (2014, p.37). During a meeting between General Zia and a counsellor at the United States State Department regarding Pakistan’s security concerns towards India and its nuclear programme, Zia allegedly said “[W]e have little choice but to match their [the Indians] capabilities, [W]e understand your country’s sensitivities and we will not embarrass you.”(2014, p.37). Debs & Monteiro conclude that, the United States wished to prevent Pakistan from testing a nuclear weapon, but otherwise would tolerate a Pakistani nuclear weapons program (2014, pp.37-38). The previous public statement from General Zia and the suspected Pakistani capability is something that may have prevented India from attempting “pure coercion” after the war in Afghanistan was over, even though Pakistan did loose guarantees and military aid.

3.5 Question I Discussion /Conclusion

Does this theory adhere to Miller & Narang's criteria (2018, pp.67-68)? Yes, it is a theory available to test on one state or multiple. It is also measurable in the sense that one may study both the different forms of pressure put on a specific entity (coercee) and the entity's response to that pressure from the coercer, this to see if the coercer actually achieves its goals with the coercion. As in the form of "pure coercion" it is somewhat easier to measure, if intelligence suspects that a coercee has only one reprocessing plant and a coercer uses "pure coercion" on the reprocessing plant and destroys it an explicit effect from the coercion can be seen in that the capability to process enriched uranium from the coercee's end is probably reduced. One of the problems with this type of theory especially the implicit side is the lack of transparency regarding international and domestic politics. What is said behind closed doors seldom reach the scientific community and thus important forms of coercion, both informal and formal may escape the researcher and valuable insights may be lost. This is especially true when officeholders and administrations that made controversial/counterproductive decisions still hold their office or power. Not many politicians desire to be scrutinized for their behaviour or decisions, and some backdoor diplomacy can be argued to benefit from not being scrutinized or made public, therefore there may be more information available on North Korea in the time span 2010-2020 on this particular subject in maybe 20-50 years then are available today.

Can this theory of coercive non-proliferation measures alone answer how North Korea managed to continue in its nuclear programme and nuclear pursuit? Yes it can offer an explanation that allows explaining a part of the North Korean conundrum. It offers a somewhat holistic picture of both domestic and international measures from the coercer and coercee. One issue that may arise from this somewhat holistic theory is that almost anything can be perceived as a form of pressure. This makes it important if not critical to set clear bounds in which form of coercion from what coercer or coercers one intends to study and what possible effects can be found from the coercee. One example of this is the domestic ideology viewpoint of North Korea that allowed it to control the internal economy whilst making its citizens ideological participants. This could be interpreted as economics as in much it is a planned economy and thus subject to state planning. But it can also be interpreted as a cultural movement of the North Korean state in order to promote "Juche" or "Songun". When using somewhat holistic theories that dabble in multiple fields it is important to not let one viewpoint overshadow the others. Needless to say it is also critical to not draw to fine a line thus locking out valid theoretical thoughts and conclusions.

Is this truly an overlooked theory? Or is it simply neglected? Miller & Narang (2018) points toward this direction of coercive non-proliferation measures, it is possible that they wanted to prove that many of our current theories to be somewhat less than accurate in many cases. This could be harder to prove if one were to present in that argument that a theory that exists when they did their analysis or at least a field not often thought of could offer an explanation of the North Korean conundrum. One could therefore argue that the field regarding coercive non-proliferation measures were indeed neglected by Miller & Narang. Nevertheless they pointed towards this area in the sense of opportunities regarding future research, one that proved fruitful.

In the extended analysis chapter West-Germany is one of the examples used in the analysis. Debs & Monteiro (2014) argued that the reason why West-Germany was unable to proliferate was due to its vulnerability to coercion from its ally. Is this thesis redundant then? Does a theory regarding coercive non-proliferation exist in common (non)proliferation literature? Debs & Monteiro form their own theory in *The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation* (2014) and use many states as examples in it, although their theory is not as much based on coercion, “The likelihood of proliferation, we contend, is largely determined by the strategic interaction between a state deciding whether to acquire nuclear weapons and its adversaries. This interaction is shaped by the potential proliferator’s ability to deter a preventive strike on its nuclear program prior to developing the bomb. This ability in turn, hinges on the proliferator’s relative power and whether it benefits from the protection of a powerful ally.” (Debs, Monteiro 2014, p.9). Coercion does exist for Debs & Monteiro but it itself is rather a tool to be used by a powerful ally or an opponent. They do not discuss the abilities to withstand coercion as something important to proliferate, rather if one has an ally that could help or allows the state to proliferate then the state may proliferate successfully. This in the example of Pakistan is also Debs & Monteiro’s argument for Pakistan’s successful proliferation. This phenomenon in our theory of coercion may also make a state more resilient from coercion but is not its centrepiece, if a strong and valuable ally allows the coerced leniency or prevents sanctions or other coercive activities against the state, this ally then helps built resilience from an outside coercer, same can be said about West-Germany, West-Germany could probably have some resilience against coercion from The USSR since it was allied and protected by the United States, but when trusted ally turns coercer, the coerced’s situation may become untenable, as shown with Pakistan’s successful proliferation, where Pakistan did indeed proliferate during its window of opportunity where the goals of the United States were closely linked with keeping Pakistan a valuable ally, in order to fight a proxy war against the USSR in Afghanistan. This goal of the United States is what allowed Pakistan to gain resilience against coercive non-proliferation measures from the United States. Once the war was over the United States did cease its military and economic aid to Pakistan.

One important thing to discuss regarding this case is the United Nations Security Council. As noted in the theory section coercion from the Security Council must be followed by the authority to issue force. This could be interpreted as something of a problem when it comes to North Korea. Since China has been somewhat hesitant towards stronger sanctions and measures against North Korea. Would China block a peacekeeping mission or a peace enforcing or military intervention in North Korea? If that is the case one could argue that the current Security Council approved sanctions against North Korea do not adhere to Fry’s (2008) definition of coercion. The author would though argue that the Security Council can back a military intervention even if unlikely, they do possess the capability although not all of its members are very motivated to do so. The “can” is the important word here, since it implies that the Security Council can legitimize force. By this argument the author hopes to alleviate some of the concerns regarding the Security Council and its implied coercion towards North Korea.

Another important discussion to have is that simply being resilient against coercive non-proliferation measures does not correlate with the technological ability to build nuclear weapons or reach a certain capability or pass the threshold. What a strong resilience allows is for states with goals or objectives that contradict regional/global states/organisations goals and objectives,

such as the example of North Korea, where the goal of a nuclear arsenal goes against the goal of the Security Council which is a denuclearized Korea (ACA 2018), or the goal of West-Germany to gain nuclear arms, and the United States desire not to have a nuclear equipped Germany. Does this theory even fit with our other theories regarding nuclear weapons since it does not grant any ability to build nuclear weapons? Yes, it explains proliferators' abilities to withstand the pressures of de-nuclearization by coercive non-proliferation measures. Therefore the author argues that this theory is indeed valid when discussing a state's ability to proliferate successfully even though the time span to reach the threshold is not explained by the theory.

4.0 Question II

What possible implications for non-proliferation policy does the overlooked theory bring to the table?

4.1 Question II Discussion

When discussing the dynamics of non-proliferation policy a quote of Sico van der Meer (2016) comes to mind "there is a risk of treating the symptoms while ignoring the disease" (p.210). Sanctions is one of the more popular ways to both show externally to the world community that the state does not approve of another states methods, it is also quite popular internally in the state issuing the sanctions if it is against a state of whom the sanctioneer's population disapproves of (Whang 2011). There is then a risk that using coercive non-proliferation measures in the form of economical sanctions, and believing the sanctions would stop the illicit behaviour of a state, without the sanctions actually having measurable change in the rogue state's behaviour. Without any change in the behaviour or methods of the coercee the coercer will not achieve its goals, rendering the sanctions toothless. This is not to say that coercive non-proliferation measures are not effective, they can be very effective if a coercee is susceptible to them, as in our example with West-Germany. They can also be used to garner support from the coercer's domestic population or neighbours in the region who support stronger action against a state or organisation but does not wish to enter a war/military operations. As shown with North Korea during the agreed framework period maybe "carrots can work better than sticks" (Miller & Narang, 2018 pp.63-65) on such a resilient actor. This to actually treat the disease (often portrayed as insecurity), rather than the symptom of trying to acquire nuclear arms. If coercive non-proliferation measures are used by a coercer on a coercee this author argues that an analysis should be done proactively on that state, this in order to view if the sanctions or pressure actually have the intended effect, and if targeted sanctions are used then the analysis may offer guidance in what targets prove to be the most effective in order to achieve the coercer's goal. One example of this could be targeting the "black knight state" (states who ignores the sanctions and trades with the coercee anyway) instead of the actual rouge state one wishes to change the behaviour of. Targeting the weak spots or where the coercion may be the most effective is not only paramount for achieving the coercer's goal but also to prevent believing one actually achieves ones goals and therefore not paying enough attention to a slow but steady progress towards for example proliferation by the coercee.

5.0 Conclusion

Question I: Can we find a theory that may have been overlooked, in regard to Miller & Narang's work that can be plausible in explaining how North Korea managed to continue to develop its nuclear programme?

The theory of coercive non-proliferation has been argued in this thesis as plausible in explaining the North Korean Conundrum. By being resilient against coercive non-proliferation North Korea had the opportunity to continue developing its nuclear programme, a programme who even if counting the semi pause during the Agreed Framework period began in January 1994 (Miller, Narang 2018, pp.59-60). In line with Miller & Narang's conclusions 1-3 this author would like to add a fourth: If a state has enough resilience towards coercive non-proliferation measures from a determined coercer either through an opportunity that presents itself or at a specific point in time, a state can use this period to proliferate successfully. This period's time span can be in many years as the example of North Korea, or it can be much shorter as in the example of Pakistan.

Question II: What possible implications for non-proliferation policy does the overlooked theory bring to the table?

The example of recent North Korean proliferation explained by our theory of coercive non-proliferation measures would indicate that states which show resilience towards coercive non-proliferation measures either through "black knights", cultural/ideological factors, domestic conditions or economical/diplomatic conditions such as valuable resources or allies or even a decent mix of them all can better resist outside pressure on its behaviour and in our case of (non)proliferation theories, the pressure of not being allowed to proliferate by a coercer. The example of West-Germany has shown that states who are not resilient towards certain attempts at coercive non-proliferation, in this case the fear of abandonment can indeed be coerced not to proliferate. This theory is therefore not entirely negative and deterministic, global trade and exchange of goods have indeed increased in the latter years and continue to do so (UNCTAD, 2018). With increased trade and globalization it could become harder to withstand a coalition of coercers that control a vast majority of a resource or a finished goods commodity that the coeree needs. There is also a risk that when resources are no longer controlled by the coercer or a coalition of coercers in sufficient amounts to put pressure on the coeree "black knight" states may trade freely and thus increase the economic resilience of a coeree. This could lead to a reevaluation of the targeted sanctions approach, which the intent is to effect the coeree may instead find greater effect in targeting the "black knights" in the international community.

5.1 Opportunities For Further Research

This theory which this author argues is plausible to explain North Korea's and Pakistan's successful nuclearization and the failure of West-Germany to proliferate would indeed benefit from other examples in making it more than simply plausible. Doing a similar study on states who sought to proliferate, in which different forms of coercion and resilience against such coercion by the coeree are in focus could prove fruitful. Another endeavour could be to try to define different examples of resilience generating factors or abilities, this to make it possible to do a quantitative analysis. Also focusing on coercion against certain actors, for example a poor

state with a strong state ideology and cultural resilience, does it have more domestic resilience in compared to a rich country where that country has a more fragmented unity regarding long-term political actions and goals? Yet another interesting field to explore is goals of allies or regional/superpowers as in the example of Pakistan and its successful proliferation due to the United States objectives in Afghanistan, is China's attitude towards North Korea another candidate? As in our analysis chapter we did conclude that China does not want a system collapse in North Korea. Do the fears of system collapse prevent China from stronger sanctions? Is the goal of preventing system collapse stronger than the desire for a denuclearised Korea? Does this reason alone provide a strong resilience against coercive non-proliferation measures?

There is then ample opportunity for further research in many different areas that may prove fruitful, not only for coercive non-proliferation measures but also for the concept of coercion, either if used as a theory of its own as in this thesis, or simply a tool to be used by states with diverging goals. Coercion is nevertheless something this author believes the scientific community should look closer into.

5.2 Divergence

There is a possibility that the results regarding the overlooked theories chapter could be different if another definition of coercion had been picked by the author. This is also something that could be developed upon. Does North Korea perceive coercion if for example the United States perceives it is coercing North Korea? Is coercion defined by the observers or the receiving/giving end? Since it is a nebulous term and can be quite subjective and objective at the same time the author felt it necessary to use one of the broader yet somewhat measureable definitions of coercion that were available at the time.

6.0 Source Material

6.1 Primary Source Material

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