Civil Security and Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Region:
The 1999 Strömsborg Workshop in Stockholm and the 2000 Tallinn Conference
Revised Edition
Edited by Anna Fornstedt
Table of Contents

Foreword · 5
Professor Bengt Sundelius, Uppsala University and
The Swedish National Defence College · 5

Part 1 · 7

Report from the CBSS Workshop on Civil Security and Crisis Management, Stockholm,
March 18–19, 1999 · 9

Welcoming remarks
Mr. Jacek Starosciak, Director of the Secretariat of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS · 11

Welcoming remarks
Mr. Bo Riddarström, Deputy Director, Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, ÖCB · 13

Regional Crisis Management Research and Preparedness Initiative
Mr. Bo Richard Lundgren, Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, ÖCB, and
Professor Bengt Sundelius,
Uppsala University, Sweden · 15

List of Participants · 21

Part 2 · 23

Civil Security and Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Region, Tallinn, October 22–24, 2000 · 25

Welcome
Tarmo Loodus, Minister of Internal Affairs, Estonia · 27

CBSS and Civil Security
Dr. Hans Jürgen Heimsoeth, Ambassador at Large, Berlin,
Chairman of the CSO of the CBSS · 28
Address to the International Conference on Civil Security and Crisis Management
Ms Yvonne Gustavsson, State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence in Sweden · 34

Address, ‘From National Experiences to Regional Preparedness’
Professor Bengt Sundelius, Uppsala University and Swedish National Defence College · 38

Comparing Institutional Models for Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Area
Professor Boris Porfiriev, Russian Academy of Sciences · 46

Information Management and Media Relations
Mr. Björn Körlof, Director General, Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence · 61

Simulation Exercise
A summary by Dr. Eric Stern and Jesper Grönvall, CRISMART, Swedish National Defence College · 65

Plenary address, ‘Crisis Leadership’
Professor Margaret G. Hermann, Syracuse University, USA · 71

Crisis Leadership: Experiences of coping with individual and organisational stress
Solveig Thorvaldsdottir, Director, National Civil Defence, Iceland · 79

List of participants · 82

PART 3 · 87

Findings, Principles, Proposals and The Way Ahead · 89

Summary Reflections of the 2000 Tallinn conference
Professor Bengt Sundelius, Swedish National Defence College · 95
Foreword

It is a pleasure to present the final report from two regional meetings on civil Security and Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Area organized in cooperation with the Secretariat of the Council for Baltic Sea States (CBSS) and the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning (ÖCB).

The first workshop was held on March 18–19, 1999, at the premises of the CBSS in Stockholm. The findings of that workshop were also presented and discussed at the CSO-meeting in Reykjavik, April 29–30, 1999, and at the International Conference on State Border and Civil Security in Palanga, Lithuania, May 11–13, 1999. A mandate was given to proceed with the suggested plans for research and training in crisis management and in support of civil security.

The second meeting reported here was convened in Tallinn, Estonia on October 22–24, 2000. Over one hundred researchers and practitioners in the Crisis management field attended this Conference. It was hosted by the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs and also cosponsored by the CBSS and the ÖCB. The purpose of this larger meeting was to foster a multilateral approach to civil security in the Baltic Sea Area.

This report ends with the agenda for continued work in this field that was set up at the 1999 workshop. The agenda was presented to and was approved by the Conference participants. It has since been reported to the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials. This body in turn has mandated CRISMA to proceed with this important work. The whole report ends with the summary reflections from the 2000 Conference. These reflections confirm that many of the ambitions of the 1999 agenda have already been implemented. The Conference conclusions also confirm the wide interest among scholars and practitioners in the ongoing work with crisis management in the Baltic Sea region.

It is my conviction that the CBSS countries together must find innovative ways of further improving the civil security conditions in our region. A Partnership of Research and Training for an enhanced regional crisis management capacity can be one important contribution toward this shared objective.

Bengt Sundelius
Head, CRISMA
Part 1
Report from the CBSS Workshop on Civil Security and Crisis Management, Stockholm, March 18–19, 1999
MR. JACEK STAROSCIAK,
Director of the Secretariat of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS

WELCOMING REMARKS

Dear Guests, Distinguished participants of the Workshop on Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Region. It is my pleasure and honour to welcome you at the seat of the permanent international secretariat of the Council of the Baltic Sea States on the island of Strömsborg in Stockholm.

At the beginning let me say a few words about the CBSS and its Secretariat that I am responsible for. As most of you here certainly know, the annual conferences of Foreign Ministers are the supreme decision-making body of the CBSS. The last such meeting took place in Nyborg, Denmark on 22–23 June 1998, where the rotating Chairmanship of the Council passed from Denmark to Lithuania. The Ministers of 11 member States and a Member of the European Commission adopted a number of important decisions, including one which pertains directly to my presence here before you today—the formal agreement on establishing a permanent international Secretariat of the CBSS in Stockholm, which crowned a year of intense negotiations on the mandate, structure, financing and status of this body.

The Secretariat started its operations in mid-August and was officially inaugurated on 20 October 1998. The mandate of the Secretariat includes:

• providing technical and organizational support to the Chairman of the CBSS and the working bodies and structures of the Council (Committee of Senior Officials and the three Working Groups)
• ensuring smooth continuity and contributing to enhanced co-ordination of CBSS activities,
• carrying out the Information/Public relations strategy of the CBSS,
• maintaining contacts with other organizations operating in and around the Baltic Sea region, national authorities of the Member States and the media community.

This workshop may be regarded as a reflection of the special importance attached today in all Member States of the CBSS to enhanced co-operation in the field of Civil Security in general and Crisis Management in particular. Your work in the next two days will therefore fall in the context of the decisions adopted at the 1998 Baltic Sea Conference in Aarhus (Denmark) and Visby (Sweden). The results of this workshop will be communicated.
to the CBSS Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) as well as presented at the next regional conference on Civil Security matters, which will be held in Palanga, Lithuania on 11–13 May this year.

Thus, having put your expert work in the overall political context of the Baltic Sea co-operation, I would like to wish you all very interesting and productive discussion.

Thank you.
Mr. Bo Riddarström,
 Deputy Director, Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, ÖCB

Welcoming remarks

Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning and welcome to this workshop. My name is Bo Riddarström and I am representing the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, ÖCB. It is a pleasure to meet so many representatives from all the Baltic Sea states here in Stockholm. I would also like to express my gratitude to the CBSS who has helped us in arranging this workshop. The CBSS has also let us use their premises for this special occasion. Thank you very much.

ÖCB is the state agency responsible for the overall co-ordination of activities aimed at strengthening society’s capacity to deal with emergencies, in peacetime situations and during war. We are located in Stockholm and employ about 160 people. ÖCB also carries out international peace-promoting and humanitarian assignments. A sound basis for decision-making, and the ability to interpret signals correctly, are required in order to act in time. Therefore, ÖCB puts effort in analysing the surrounding world. This work has become increasingly important in all aspects of civil emergency planning.

ÖCB is responsible for creating a robust and efficient command and control system. Successful crisis management requires that all parts of the civilian defence system are able to communicate at all times during a crisis. Crisis management is very much a question of having a well-developed and experienced chain of command and pattern of co-operation. It is also important that responsible and involved individuals obtain a good understanding of what crisis management is. Most important is that there are clear routines and a clear division of authority and liability for handling crises that can arise in this country, or in the neighbouring Baltic Sea area.

Within its general task to co-ordinate civil emergency planning activities, ÖCB has as one of its objectives the co-ordination of research and the initiation of research projects in areas where knowledge generated from research can enhance the development of civil emergency planning. ÖCB engages universities and independent research organizations in different projects, which are funded by ÖCB. A large number of studies and reports, covering all sides of society have been carried out.

This project, The Baltic Sea Crisis Management Research Project, of which this workshop is a part, is funded within ÖCBs research budget.

With clear trends toward increased interdependence across national boundaries and between sector areas, turbulence in any part of Europe, or
around the Baltic Sea, will tend to generate conditions of considerable political concern. It is quite evident that co-ordinated crisis management measures, in all forms and at all times, is being recognized and considered.

Why do we arrange this workshop and why do we do this in co-operation with the CBSS? Perhaps you remember that the Baltic Sea Crisis Management Research Project was presented at the CBSS-conference on Civil Security in Visby last September. An invitation to join this effort was also given to the participating member countries in connection with the Visby meeting.

At the Visby meeting the CBSS member countries were urged by Mr. Sture Ericson, the Director General of ÖCB, to participate actively in turning this vision into a truly multilateral enterprise. Now, it is time to take another step forward towards this goal.

I am pleased, and proud, to open this workshop. I sincerely hope or, I would rather say; I am convinced, that our common work now will transform the present ÖCB research project into a Multilateral Research Initiative, involving practitioners and researchers, within or near, the Baltic Sea region.

I wish you all warm welcome to this workshop.

Thank you and good luck in your work!
Ladies and Gentlemen!

At their summit meeting in 1998 in Riga, the leaders of the CBSS countries called our attention to the imperative of improving international cooperation in the area of civil security, a call which has already resulted in follow up meetings held in Aarhus and Visby last year.

As you may know the Baltic Sea Crisis Management Research project was presented at the CBSS-conference on Civil Security in Visby last September. An invitation to join in this effort was also given to the participating member countries in connection with the Visby-meeting. This workshop is a result of this invitation.

Developments during the last decade have transformed the character of the European security setting from one of relative political stability to a condition of considerable turbulence within its several regions. With clear trends toward increased interdependence across national boundaries and between sector areas, turbulence in any part of Europe will tend to generate conditions of considerable political concern also for governments in the rest of the continent. This pattern certainly holds for the Baltic Sea area too. The strong impact of modern, transnational media coverage accentuates and widens the impact of such crisis-generating events nationally and internationally. As a topic for regional collaboration, national and international crisis managements are therefore becoming increasingly important.

Recent experience within the region, and further afield, suggests that our societies will continue to be challenged by “extraordinary” in fact extraordinarily dangerous, contingencies.

It is also increasingly obvious that many of the most pressing threats and risks on our individual and collective agendas do not respect national boundaries. Terrorism—in both conventional and cyber-varieties-, organized crime, epidemics, natural and technical disasters are just a few examples of threats which cross borders with impunity. Effective measures to
avert and mitigate such threats will require effective international cooperation, hopefully even more effective international cooperation than has been demonstrated in the part. The Oder floodings 1997, proximate in time and geography, was an example of a complex disaster crossing several borders and where international co-operation was needed. The M.S. Estonia tragedy three years earlier, was another, even sadder example.

Crisis affecting fundamental national values often originate from “elsewhere”, involve parties across national or administrative boundaries, and increasingly require multi-national coordination efforts for prevention, acute response and effective resolution. The need for coordinated measures is evident.

The expression “civil security”, is generally used as a means to describe the state of protection of a society’s normal functioning from all threats other than military ones. When it comes to civil security, it is useful to envision a spectrum of threat intensity stretching from normalcy to crisis. In “normal” situations threats are perceived as diffuse and remote in time and space. In crisis, the most acute form of security contingency, threats are seen as immediate and pressing. In fact, crisis are often defined in the literature as situations in which decisionmakers perceive urgency, uncertainty (in terms of vital aspects of the problem confronting them) and threats to basic societal values.

Democracy is one such societal value, which may be tested in crisis situations. Governments may perceive a need to curtail the civil liberties of citizens during a crisis. For example, rescue leaders may wish to order compulsory evacuations in a natural or technical disaster. In some states emergency powers are constitutionally regulated, in others they may be taken in more ad hoc fashion. From the perspective of democratic legitimacy, it is imperative that government power be exercised in a manner perceived as both legally appropriate and effective in coping with the threat at hand. Crises seen by the public and the media as well managed strengthen governmental and democratic legitimacy. Crises mishandled erode legitimacy.

For these and many other reasons, improving crisis management capacity in the new democracies around the Baltic Sea is an urgent matter. Improving regional crisis management capacity will require developing and sharing knowledge. It will require collaboration across national boundaries and across the gap, which all too often divides academics from those who practice the art of governing.
Project CM-Baltic and the proposed multilateral initiative

The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, ÖCB, launched a research project in 1997 aimed at increasing the knowledge base necessary for handling crises and emergencies in the Baltic Sea region. The project started on a small scale and has during 1997 and 1998 initiated important studies and research in the area of crisis management.

The idea of the project is to map possible national profiles of decision-making during crises among the countries of the Baltic Sea region, and in other countries near and beyond the Baltic Sea, as well as gathering in depth experience of previous historic episodes.

The overall objective of the project is to strengthen the common crisis management capacity in the region. It is based on the belief that an underdeveloped capacity in one country can be a danger to all countries in the neighborhood, and that many crises need common and coordinated measures, or actions to be considered, between the countries.

Another purpose of the research project is to produce new knowledge and to create better understanding and conditions for crisis management and civil emergency planning in all states surrounding the Baltic Sea region. It is also a way to create confidence between the countries and enhance good neighborly relations in the region. It serves to strengthen civil security among the nations. So far, in this project, Swedish, Estonian, Latvian, Polish and Icelandic researchers have started research and studies. Cases involving those countries as well as: Finland, Russia, Denmark, Norway, France, Spain, Peru, Canada and New Zealand have been studied.

In order to further strengthen the joint capacity among the Baltic Sea States a Crisis Management Co-operation Project was presented as a Swedish initiative at the CBSS Conference on civil security in Visby, September 8–9, 1998.

At the Visby summit the CBSS member countries were urged, by Mr. Sture Ericson, the director general of the ÖCB, to participate actively in turning this vision into a truly multilateral enterprise. Now it is time to take another step forward toward this goal.

The director general outlined in his presentation how the initiative best can be developed in three successive stages—each building on the one before.

First, we need to establish a common frame of reference for civil crisis management. We need to decide how best we can gather, share and use the experience gained from previous crises. It is necessary for us to set up and maintain a joint “case bank” documenting a wide range of national and
transnational experiences—and to which all involved partners will have free access. This is the first step of the project.

This step is already in progress. However, we believe that much more can and should be done. When this first step has been established it will form a firm knowledge base on which to build. Then, we can proceed to the second step.

The second step is a stage, which translates research-based knowledge into experienced-based knowledge and practice. This will involve setting up joint training seminars and exercises. Some of these activities are already proceeding, as, for example, regarding joint rescue operations, but we can go further by preparing the central governments to co-operate in complex crisis management situations where several different agencies are involved.

Common approaches can be developed to facilitate training and exercises. We can jointly develop the “art of scenario-making”, the use of computer-aided simulation and improved evaluation methods. Contingencies from the case-bank can also provide real life cases, which can be studied and analyzed from various perspectives and various purposes. Objectives can be how to communicate across borders, how to cope with mass media and how to use military resources.

On the basis of careful analysis of historical and contemporary experience—as well as the result of joint training and dialogue—lessons can be drawn. This will facilitate the joint planning which is the third step of the initiative.

For example, the initiative could include the exchange of mutual information about the different types of crisis organizations that we have created in our various countries. It might involve developing a common computer-aided communication network from which we can obtain the type of information urgently needed in a crisis with cross-border impacts or implications. Such a system can also be designed to contain information about available resources in the participating countries.

Then, at the end of the effort we can try to determine if it is possible to institute common “standing operational procedures” and take other measures to increase the interoperability of our national capacities.

The hoped for result of this initiative will be to strengthen the joint crisis management capacity of national governments and involved national authorities within and around the Baltic Sea States area. It is one important element of building civil security in the region.
Research approach

Documenting and studying national crisis experiences, in effect creating a regional case bank, is a cornerstone of our project. How do we go about developing a case-bank?

We have, similar to the successive stages just mentioned, developed a basic three-step approach in order to structure our analysis.

First of all, and not the least important step, is to describe the crisis episode in great detail. Day by day, hour by hour, the events are described to give the best possible narrative of what actually happened. It is a laborious, very research intensive task. Even the crisis managers themselves only have some pieces of the puzzle, only part of the overall picture. We pull together, from various public sources, documents, interviews and informal meetings with crisis managers, trying to get a comprehensive picture across the various action arenas of the crisis episode.

After we have as good a picture as possible of the events and the processes of a crisis, we turn to step two: dissecting the crisis into critical decision points. In reality, there is no such thing as a crisis. Rather, from the perspective of the involved decision-makers (the crisis managers) there are a series of acute problems: What is happening now? What do we do now?

We find a series of critical decision points. This too is a demanding task, to reconstruct the crisis episode from the perspective of the key players. This requires even more details and in-depth interviews to be able to capture the flow of the case. Then we have a post-mortem, a case dissected, slice by slice by slice.

The third step is to analyze the particular case, on its own terms and in relation to other cases. Specifically, we study how and by whom the key decisions were taken, communication within the government, with the media, and with the citizenry at large. Was the crisis decisionmaking and communication efficient and effective, or did pathologies of information processing, coordination and/or communication occur?

Comparison with other cases in the same and other countries facilitates the identification of best, and not quite as good, practices. Common pitfalls, which have plagued practitioners in the past, may be pointed out.

Once documented and analyzed using state of the art methods developed in dialogue with leading international experts in the area, this knowledge base can become a point of departure for developing joint training tools and exercises as well as common planning concepts designed to improve regional crisis management and civil security.

To assess the reaction to the project proposal among the Baltic Sea States, we have arranged this workshop at the CBSS premises in Stock-
holm. Two representatives from each country one academic and one practitioner have been invited.

The workshop is a step towards transforming the present Swedish-based bilateral crisis management project into a multilateral project linking all interested nations of the CBSS. The results from this workshop will be reported and discussed at the Conference on civil security in Lithuania in May 1999.

Our agenda covers national presentations on ongoing work in the field and responses to the proposed project, as well as presentations of crisis management research cases and methodology.

ÖCB is very happy that the workshop is held in co-operation with the CBSS secretariat in Stockholm.

Thank you very much, Ladies and Gentlemen.
List of Participants

DELEGATES


Øistein Aarnes Norway
Asthildur E Bernhardsdottir Iceland
Daina Bleire Latvia
Piotr Chmielewski Poland
Jørn Devantier Denmark
Erik Johan Hjelm Sweden
Saulius Jaskelevicius Lithuania
Roman Jastrzebski Poland
Victoria Larina Russia
Raimo Lintonen Finland
Piret Mürk Estonia
Veikko Peltonen Finland
Birutė Petraitiene Lithuania
Boris Pofiriev Russia
Bo Riddarström Sweden
Eric Stern Sweden
Bengt Sundelius Sweden
Lina Svedin Sweden
Jaan Tross Estonia
Dainis Turlais Latvia
Daniel Vaarik Estonia
Alexander Vialyschev Russia
Gro Øien Norway

Observers

Åke Sundin Ministry of Defence, Sweden
Bo Henriksson Prime Minister’s Office, Sweden
Bo Richard Lundgren The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning
Thomas Palme Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Jascek Starosciak Council of the Baltic Sea States
### Organisers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serguei Sokolov</td>
<td>Council of the Baltic Sea States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anna Nylander</td>
<td>Council of the Baltic Sea States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annika Brändström</td>
<td>The Swedish Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesper Grönvall</td>
<td>The Swedish Institute of International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Görel Hamilton</td>
<td>The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattias Jennerholm</td>
<td>The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janet Jeppson</td>
<td>The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maria Sanden</td>
<td>The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harald Törner</td>
<td>The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning</td>
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Part 2
Civil Security and Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Region,
Tallinn, October 22–24, 2000
Good morning everybody. I hope you have been able to have a rest after yesterday evening and that everybody has a fresh head and is in a good mood.

Three times already this morning, I gave interviews to the Estonian press explaining what is going to happen during these two days here and everybody has been interested in one issue, that whether a crisis will be simulated in Estonia tomorrow. I try to calm them down and say that maybe you do not have to play it and maybe we will never have to do it in reality. On the other hand it shows that the Estonians as a society places interest in crisis management and crisis regulating. Maybe one reason is also that our parliament is conducting readings on the law of crisis regulation and maybe another reason for that interest is that the Russians have their nuclear power plant near St Petersburg. Maybe one reason is also the fact that immense amount of oil is travelling through Estonia that from east to west.

I think that both our press and our people are aware of the fact that crisis is such a phenomenon, which can occur, be the reason some natural causes or people themselves. And that is why I am happy to welcome you here in Estonia and I hope that during these two days you will draw more attention to crisis and that we will be capable of managing it better and we will become better ourselves.

Our task is to foresee crisis and if the crises actually occur, we have to manage the crises with as little casualties as possible. And when it comes to the States of the Baltic Sea Region one very important issue is our cooperation. I would like to extend my thanks for organising this conference to the Swedish Ministry of Foreign affairs, the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning and the Swedish Embassy, and I hope that everything that has been planned will actually be implemented during these two days. I wish you success.

Thank you.
Dr. Hans Jürgen Heimsoeth,  
Ambassador at Large, Berlin, Chairman of the CSO of the CBSS,  

CBSS and Civil Security

Minister,  
Distinguished participants,  
Ladies and gentlemen,  

As chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials, the “governing body” of the Council of Baltic Sea States, I accepted with great pleasure the invitation of the organisers to address you today. This conference has brought together distinguished researchers and practitioners to help identify means of, and models for, enhancing national and international collaborative capacity in the field of civil security in the region.

Most of the specific topics included in the agenda of this conference were first brought into focus of attention of various structures of the Council of the Baltic Sea States several years ago. They have remained near the top of the CBSS priority list ever since. I would therefore try to present you a short overview of regional cooperation efforts in the field of Civil Security, in order to put your discussion today and tomorrow in a historical and political perspective.

The concept of “soft” or, as it is now referred to, civil security has been evolving along with the expansion of real and potential threats facing Baltic Sea countries and societies. These risks now range from natural or man-made disasters to illegal migration to organised criminal activities to crisis management. CBSS Member States have long agreed on a need for joint, transnational cooperation in this field, considering it to be a goal in itself. However, there is also a growing recognition of the potential “hard” security implications of “soft” security problems: if not handled properly, the latter may escalate, endangering regional and even international stability in its traditional interpretation.

A combination of these factors formed the logic behind the introduction of a number of Civil Security issues into the agenda of the first meeting of Heads of Government of Baltic Sea States in Visby in May 1996. The common approach towards handling these problems was further consolidated at the Council Ministerial session in Kalmar the same year, and was given another major boost during the second Baltic Sea summit meeting, held in Riga in January 1998. During the 7th Ministerial Session of
the CBSS in Nyborg on 22–23 June 1998, Foreign Ministers of the Member States reiterated the priority of cooperation in the field of Civil Security and called on their relevant national authorities to actively engage in joint activities in a number of specific areas.

Following the decisions agreed upon by the Prime Ministers in Riga, two conferences were convened last year for an in-depth discussion of issues related to regional cooperation in the field of Civil Security.

The first took place in Aarhus, Denmark, on 8–9 June 1998. It focused on such matters as rescue at sea, sea environment and fighting pollution, movements of hazardous materials, training of personnel, mutual assistance in case of disasters, nuclear safety. The conference underlined that an extension of existing cooperation agreements between countries of the region to cover all CBSS Member States was a good means to build up joint structures and develop equipment in the field of early warning systems and search-and-rescue (SAR) operations. In particular, it was suggested that the existing Nordic Agreement on Sea Rescue Operations might be broadened to cover all types of SAR and all countries in the region.

Another conference focused on promoting regional cooperation in this area took place in Visby, Sweden, on 8–9 September 1998. The following concrete cooperation projects in the field of Civil Security were positively received by the participants:

- creation of a regional network of search and rescue (SAR) agreements;
- development of new technologies;
- evaluation of new technologies from the point of view of their applicability in search-and-rescue (SAR) and other Civil Security operations;
- creation of a working party with the aim of establishing a co-ordination centre on Gotland for joint disaster and relief operations in the region;
- strengthened cooperation in the field of prevention and planning with regard to emergencies of trans-border character;
- regional interaction in tackling the Year 2000 Transition (‘Millennium Bug”) problem.

In the Chairman’s Conclusions from the Baltic Sea States Summit held in Kolding, Denmark, 12–13 April 2000, the Heads of Government recommend steps to continue to support the cooperation between the competent civil security authorities and specialists. The aim is to promote co-ordinated action in the fields of disaster prevention and surveillance, as well as search-and-rescue operations and joint disaster relief oriented crisis management. On this occasion, the Prime Minister of Poland proposed that a group of experts should begin working on the harmonisation of technical rescue facilities in the Baltic Sea region.
At the CSO Meeting in Oslo 19 January 2000, the organisation of work on civil security in the Baltic Sea region was discussed on the basis of a work plan proposed by Sweden as lead country in this cooperation field.

The workshop on “Civil Security and Crisis Management” in Stockholm in March 1999 urged states to develop national networks or centres for crisis management studies and training. Sweden and Estonia were charged with facilitating this task. Since then, bilateral links have been established between crisis researchers in Sweden and many CBSS member nations.

At the Stockholm workshop, it was also proposed to establish a joint regional research project regarding hazardous materials and radioactive pollution at sea. HELCOM has carried out extensive work in the field of dumped chemical munitions in the Baltic Sea Area.

Denmark has confirmed its readiness to assume a leading role in the CSO regarding work with hazardous materials at land and, as far as dumped chemical munitions in the Baltic Sea Area are concerned, also at sea, based on its role as lead country within this particular field in HELCOM.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Sea transport in the Baltic Sea is extremely dense and daily getting more important. It is as important in volume as sea transport in the whole Mediterranean. The German CBSS presidency therefore attaches especial importance to all action related to surveillance of the sea environment, development of new technologies, Port State Control and other steps to increase civil security in this field.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has decided that from 1 July 2002 all ships with capacity exceeding 300 tons shall gradually be equipped with transponders. In the Baltic Sea Area, land-based equipment for detecting automatic transponder signals for surveillance is being rapidly developed and built up.

At their meeting in January 2000, CSO members were asked to encourage their competent authorities to promote compatibility between the surveillance systems under discussion in the Baltic Sea region.

The Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation Conference (BSR-BCCC) is for example developing a system for computerised communication based on the INTERPOL/BALTCOM system and another BSRBCCC working group is studying the possibilities for common real-time presentations of the situation in the Baltic Sea region based on present national maritime surveillance systems.

Following up on the already mentioned international conferences on Civil Security in Aarhus and Visby in 1998 and in Palanga in 1999, St. Petersburg has launched the initiative of hosting Annual International fora
dedicated to problems of emergency awareness and mitigation of the con-
sequences of natural and man-made disasters in North-western Russia and
the Baltic Sea region. The first such international forum, “EXTREME
-2000” took place in St. Petersburg in May 2000. In conjunction with this
event, representatives of EMERCOM made a proposal aiming at the es-
establishment of a formal framework consisting of heads of national Civil
Security agencies in the Baltic Sea region that would set up priorities and
guidelines for cooperation projects. The framework would be assisted by a
Civil Security Co-ordination Centre and examples of areas of cooperation
could be the establishment of a database of geophysical risk zones in the
region and the creation of a regional space- and land-based monitoring
structure. A formal version of this proposal from Russia is forthcoming.

In his statement at the recent Baltic Sea States Summit in Kolding, the
Prime Minister of Poland stressed the key role that could be played in pre-
venting threats arising from natural and man-made environmental hazards
and disasters by the creation of an integrated and compatible warning and
information system that would alert people both to threats of or existing
disasters. An urgent task for sea rescue services would be the creation of a
fully integrated system of radio communications that could help to raise
the safety level in the Baltic Sea region. The Prime Minister therefore pro-
posed that a group of experts should begin working on the harmonisation
and standardisation of technical rescue facilities. He also proposed to en-
courage exchange of experts, cooperation in training and the holding of
joint exercises and a continuation of work on creating a legal basis for co-
operation in the field of civil security. The Polish side invited interested
CBSS parties to an open discussion with the aim of defining more closely
priorities for the proposed cooperation. This meeting is tentatively sched-
uled to take place in Warsaw on 18–19 December 2000.

I would now like to turn to the aspect of civil prevention and crisis
management and say some words concerning the German ideas related to
this subject. Civil crisis and conflict management requires an overall politi-
cal strategy, co-ordinated at national and international level and adapted
to the individual situation, which brings together policy instruments, in
particular those relating to foreign, security, development, financial, eco-
nomic, environmental, culture and legal policy. It needs customised solu-
tions and careful co-ordination, between, for instance, military and civil-
ian means as well as Non-state actors (non-governmental organisations,
churches etc.). The German Foreign Ministry has therefore taken the ini-
tiative and is planning in the near future to transform its own Crisis Cen-
ter into a federal civil crisis reaction center that will handle international
crises in the civil field and also deal with the prevention of such events.
With this center, Germany is trying to enhance its capabilities in the field
of civilian participation in conflict management. Our first priority is a national and international co-ordinated civil intervention capability, which reflects the interdisciplinary character of effective crisis prevention. We will pay particular attention to improving training and preparatory capacities for personnel to take part in civilian crisis interventions. All institutions active in this area should be involved as far as possible, not only on the national level but especially the OSCE with its experience of the Kosovo Verification Mission. While soldiers and police already receive sufficient preparation, this has previously often not been the case for civilian forces. Well-trained personnel are however a basic requirement for the success of such missions. Our considerations centre on the establishment of a short, intensive training, to enable targeted preparation for members of civil missions. The long-term goal is the formation of a flexible reserve unit, which the Foreign Office will be able to call on in crisis situations so as to make available qualified personnel for international missions at short notice. In the medium-term we are considering offering training internationally and cooperating with training institutions abroad.

As for the European initiatives in this field, I would like to mention that as a result of the conclusions of the European Council in Feira with regard to Civil Protection, the European Commission is working on improving existing structures in this field. An initiative project by the Commission foresees an evaluation of the civil security resources available in the member states, the development of a specific training program, the creation of a co-ordination and crisis evaluation team as well as the setting-up of an emergency communication system. Events such as the current flood catastrophe in Italy and notably last December’s events in France, the winter storm that caused enormous problems in France electricity supply and the sinking of the oil tanker Erika on the French coast have shown once more, that co-ordinated efforts in the sector of civil security are needed. The support provided by partner countries and their civil security providers in such situations is vital for the population touched by natural catastrophes and other disasters and complements the initial measures taken by the national civil security actors.

The purpose of this EU-led cooperation is also to help ensure better action coherence undertaken at international level especially with the candidate Central and Eastern European countries in view of enlargement and with the partners in the Mediterranean region. EU-cooperation on civil protection is currently governed by the Community action programme in the field of civil protection for the years 2000–2004 adopted by the Council on 9 December 1999. The «Pilot Project for the creation of a EURO-MED system of prevention, mitigation and management of natural and man-made disasters» may offer a possible model for closer CBSS co-
operation. This project is jointly led by Italy and Egypt and is co-financed by the European Union (EUROMED programme) and the Italian Government (approximate budget is 2.5 M Euro for two years –1999/2000).

It should be noted that cooperation in management of natural disasters, search-and-rescue operations and border control have been specifically identified as areas, in which larger organisations, such as OSCE, EU and Council of Europe, could interact with sub-regional organisations like CBSS. Information exchange is the first step to encouraging practical synergy between all parties involved in this work.

Ladies and gentlemen,

the interest in the field of civil security and crisis management is growing. CBSS has led the way to a multitude of initiatives and proposals. It will be important, at a later stage and on the basis of last years report on developments in the field of Civil Security to update the evaluation of the achieved and to define which proposals have to be followed up. Why not dress a short list of three of four points for practical implementation starting at a national level? It will also be an important task to link Baltic Sea initiatives with EU and OSCE projects.

Today we are looking at the practical side of this important field of multilateral Cupertino. I believe this conference can play an important role to help identify means of and models for enhancing national and international collaborative capacity in the Baltic Sea region. Having already pointed out the multitude of initiatives, this conference is particularly valuable as it includes conference simulation, a useful tool in moving from theory to practice. In this area additional experience is, without doubt, badly needed. I am looking forward to an interesting discussion on future CBSS cooperation in civil security and wish the conference success.
Ms Yvonne Gustavsson,
State Secretary at the Ministry of Defence in Sweden

Address to the International Conference on Civil Security and Crisis Management

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me to be given the opportunity to speak to you today. I would like to start by thanking the Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the other involved organizers for this excellent arrangement. I would also like to stress that my role here primarily is as responsible in Sweden for civil preparedness issues. In Sweden, as you might know, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for military matters as well as for coordination of civil preparedness.

Today, we meet at the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea. This is a sea, which today is surrounded by democratic and stable nations. Only ten years ago, the picture was different. At that time, we did not know how the next few years would develop—peacefully or through armed conflict. Today we have the answer.

With the exception of the tragic events in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, the change of the political climate progressed quietly and peacefully. The countries surrounding the Baltic Sea today participate in ever-deeper regional cooperation through a number of new institutions and fora. Today in this, the most northern region in Europe, stability reigns and the region is becoming increasingly prosperous. This is an interest to all states of the Euro-Atlantic area and enjoys broad Western support.

From the Swedish side we consider it essential to support further international and regional security cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region. The volume of the practical cooperation within the framework of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, CBSS, and the Barents Council is well developed and underpinned by a formidable network of specialized organizations ensuring a lot of meat on the bones. A special growth sector for the region’s interaction is the decentralized cooperation between provinces, cities and municipalities, which serves as a trigger for trade and development.

Sweden regards Northern Europe and especially the Baltic region as an integrated part of the wider Euro-Atlantic security system. We therefore see as essential a presence in the area not only of the regional states but also of the major states of Europe and of the USA. It is important for us to
contribute to the possibilities for all states in the region to eventually find security arrangements that fulfil their own wishes. I am happy to recognize systematic efforts from all Baltic States governments to further develop your capabilities for national crisis-action.

The EU is a regional cooperation area of fundamental importance as a safeguard of prosperity, sustainable stability and security in Europe. The Economic Community of the Six has become the Union of the Fifteen and enlargement to further include States is under way.

The recent developments in the area of civil crisis management in the EU are an important topic for the Swedish government. To improve the civil capability to handle crises is one of the EU’s most important challenges during the next few years. With only two months left before the start of the Swedish presidency it is also a question that we are very much involved in. Actions must be better coordinated and the efforts must lead to that resources get to the destination much faster.

NATO and its cooperation with partner countries plays a key role for security and crisis management in Europe. Thus, it is crucial to intensify the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace, PfP, and not least important, that Russia continues to participate. The three Baltic republics are endeavouring to join the EU and NATO. Within the Union, Sweden is a strong supporter of EU membership for these countries, which should also benefit Russia.

I must say, today’s research seminars agenda on civil crisis management is very broad. This in itself illustrates something, which I consider to be of basic importance for the creation of a lasting security.

We have to make efforts in a lot of areas related to crisis management to increase cooperation, make agreements on how to handle matters of common interest. Security can never be a matter only of defending against or deterring aggression. Security must in the long term be built on a mutual interest in and benefits from a peaceful and fruitful cooperation. The field of civil crisis management may offer special opportunities in this field.

Crises do not stop at national borders. The 1986 Chernobyl and 1994 Estonia crises and the recent Kursk accident have shown that contemporary crisis management also requires intimate transnational coordination. Recent historical cases, also in Europe, have shown the limitations of existing national arrangements and the lack of shared response experiences. We can and we must do better.

It is important to recognize that crisis management must not only focus on the dramatic response phase. It is a broad concept involving prevention, preparation, coping, recovery and learning. Crises can be dealt
with both by investments in acute crisis response capacity but also in crisis prevention strategies.

A particularly important area of crisis management is training. Especially in a country like Sweden, where major crises have been rare, training is an important substitute for personal experience and collective memory. Pre-crisis training helps to make decision-makers more confident in managing the complexity and uncertainty. It can contribute to build networks of contacts, which may be invaluable in future crisis situations. In my country, such training programs for high level officials have been conducted for several decades by the Swedish National Defence College.

Training programs involving participants from different cultures and nations are important. The trans-boundary character of crises also demands training across borders. I have noted with satisfaction that one important part of this conference is a simulated training experience tomorrow morning. Unfortunately, I am unable to participate myself, but I know from personal experience how enlightening such a stressful exercise can be.

It is, however important to emphasize that an ambition in the field of training programs does not mean building up new structures interfering with now existing systems for handling crises. An example of such a system is HELCOM, when it comes to fighting oil pollution at sea.

With Poland Sweden has increased its security cooperation most notably seen in the Nordic Polish Brigade which acted for a while in Bosnia. Sweden also welcomes the Polish initiative put forward in Kolding earlier this year for an expert-meeting on search and rescue in the CBSS context.

Germany, which is developing its capacity for crisis management, is of course also an important partner. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Germany for their work with the present chairmanship of the CBSS.

With Russia we have already a fairly developed cooperation for example in search and rescue and coast guard activities. Contacts have been established in research and education. The Swedish Government welcomes a further development of this type of contacts with Russia. We regard it as particularly important to have such contacts in neighboring regions, i.e. Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg and Murmansk. Russia is an important link in the chain of cooperation between the countries around the Baltic Sea.

The process of overcoming the divisions of the past is not yet finished. The Baltic area is one of the areas in Europe where the security architecture—as it is usually called—has not been finally settled. This will only be done when the EU has expanded to include the present candidates, when the Baltic states have reached their security goals and when Russia’s ties with the EU and NATO have grown to include much more substance than now.
Regional cooperation of the kind that I have mentioned can be helpful in strengthening security and stability. In this way, we can create the conditions for anchoring the countries of the region in the European and trans-Atlantic security framework. We should make sure to develop this regional cooperation in such a way that it does not lock the countries in a rigid structure that makes their integration more difficult and that can be seen as a regional alternative to the EU, NATO or PfP. Regional cooperation is an instrument to facilitate further integration, not an alternative to it.

In my view, it is now high time to move forward toward a strengthened crisis management capacity for the nations around the Baltic Sea. The spheres of academic knowledge, and of knowledge based on practical experience, must join together to enhance the state of readiness at the pinnacle of governments. This conference represents a modest but vital step in the direction of establishing a new regional Partnership for research on civil security in our corner of the European continent.

It is my firm belief that this region will continue to grow and prosper, and that the impressive political and economic progress of the countries of the Baltic Sea Region clearly demonstrates that this region will soon become one of Europe’s most dynamic areas.
Address, ‘From National Experiences to Regional Preparedness’

The governments of today’s Europe operate in domestic and international political settings which have been profoundly altered by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the significant steps towards European integration which have been taken in the last decade. Many of these changes have been positive in nature and perceptions of military threat have lessened in many—but not all—corners of the continent. Political and economic liberalization and democratization have changed the face of Europe and Churchill’s iron curtain is no more. As old threats have receded, new ones linked to transnational social, economic, political, ecological, and technological processes have emerged and joined old scourges in wreaking havoc. The history of the last ten years is rife with civil crises, which have rocked the countries of Europe. The established as well as the more vulnerable democracies of the region and the new ones alike have faced a variety of intensely challenging contingencies—epidemics, terrorism (e.g. kidnappings, hijackings, and waves of bombings), ethnic conflict, nuclear accidents, aircraft accidents, assassinations, floodings, catastrophic fires, environmental contamination, and political scandals. Many of these crisis contingencies transcend jurisdictional boundaries within and among states and place heavy demand upon politics’ capacity for coordination and cooperation.

These contingencies—while different in many respects—pose similar challenges of decision making and communication to those who act in the name of the state or the European Union. Actors at various levels of national and regional administration are likely to perceive these incidents as characterized by urgency, threat to core values, and uncertainty—in other words as crises which demand an effective response. For those caught in the ‘hot seat’ in such situations, political and bureaucratic survival is on the line by the crisis performance.

In 1997 Dr. Eric Stern and I launched the Crisis Management Europe program in close collaboration with the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning. Together, we agreed upon five closely related goals:
To develop and refine theoretically based analytical tools for studying and learning from crisis experiences.

2. To promote the development of crisis studies (a multi-disciplinary academic field) as a knowledge base for an enhanced crisis management capacity in Sweden (and other countries).

3. To encourage scholars and practitioners from European countries (especially from the new and vulnerable democracies around the Baltic Sea Area) to document, analyze, compare, and share knowledge of their crisis experiences.

4. To promote national and transnational dialog between the scholarly and practitioner crisis management communities in Europe through training workshops and thematic conferences.

5. To promote confidence building and the development of a capacity for political/operational collaboration among the governments and international organizations of the region.

Promoting Crisis Studies at Home

As we began this multi-year program in 1997, relatively little work on crisis management had been done at Swedish universities, especially in political science—our own home discipline. In 1997, our process tracing strategy had been applied to just three cases: the Swedish 1981 “Whiskey on the Rocks” submarine crisis (Stern, 1990; Stern and Sundelius, 1992), the 1986 Chernobyl accident and the 1992 defense of the Crown (Sundelius, Stern and Bynander, 1997). It was clear that if we wished to broaden the scope of the program we needed some help. Therefore, we recruited senior undergraduate and junior graduate students as a pool of potential talent for building our national team. Over a period of several years, we offered the best and brightest students we could find the opportunity to participate in our collaborative research effort. Candidates were asked to prepare case research proposals (under our supervision and following guidelines given to them). The most promising candidates were given the opportunity to participate in a training workshop. Their revised proposals were considered as application for modest ‘stimulation grants’. The recruits conducted their research over a roughly six months period stretching from the end of spring term to the middle of the fall term. During this period the new research team met frequently for seminars and had extensive opportunities to meet with the project leaders for collective and individual advising. At the end of the research cycle, a few of the most talented case writers were offered an opportunity to work on a part time basis for the program as apprentice analysts and trainers.
In addition to its potential in producing scholarly knowledge, the approach has already proven useful as an intellectual basis and empirical resource for training the practitioners who will manage the crises to come. The regional program presented here links academic research to education and training in the hopes of making at least a marginal improvement to policy performance in this crucial area. This approach now forms the foundation for a rapidly growing empirical research program covering nearly a hundred historical cases drawn from the experience of more than a dozen European countries, regional/international organizations, and the European Union. Reports are listed at the end of this essay.

Research and Training

Our approach emphasizes reconstructing crisis decision and communication problems as they appeared to participants. Thus the analytical narratives we produce tend to resonate with practitioners who have grappled with acute problems such as those uncovered in our analyses. Furthermore, the combination of case and problem-based approaches lends itself as a resource for developing active learning tools, such as teaching cases, role play exercises, and full blown crisis simulations. Researchers working within the program have organized a substantial number of training exercises with good result for practitioners at all levels (from top level ministerial officials to city government leaders) and sectors (e.g. Cabinet Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Agriculture etc) of the national government.

Thus a variety of training methodologies have been deployed for CM Europe program activities geared towards training different groups of practitioners and teaching students. While these techniques vary somewhat in their emphasis on historical as opposed to hypothetical situations and the extent to which trainees adopt analytical as opposed to problem solving roles—they share a number of common features. All of these methods tend to place the learner in an active role—and thus are ‘experiential’. Furthermore, they are explicitly linked to and build upon our scientific approach.

The heart of our research approach is the reconstruction of “what do we do now?” occasions for decision faced by crisis decision-makers. Thus our research cases are easily transformed into teaching cases in which actors and contexts are introduced and problematic situations described. Often the real world policy choices and the outcomes of the case under discussion are initially withheld for pedagogical reasons. This allows trainees or students to confront the high stakes dilemmas of uncertainty and com-
plexity under time pressure much in the same fashion as crisis decision-makers do. Their interpretations and proposed lines of action may be usefully compared and contrasted to those of the actual decision-makers.

When developing scenario exercises and simulations, decision occasions drawn from the CM Europe case bank are equally useful. New scenarios can be stitched together by taking episodes or extrapolating from situations documented in the case bank (or in parallel studies documented in the international literature). Essentially, exercise participants are supplied with a flow of information, which creates simulated occasions for decision and communication. They then practice crisis management skills under relatively realistic conditions. Activated learners thus produce a simulated ‘case’, which can be used as a basis for a critical debriefing in which participants and observers analyze a shared ‘virtual’ experience.

Academics or consultants using other means to develop training tools often grapple with the problem that potential trainees find scenarios or hypothetical cases contrived and unrealistic. The case bank based approach we have adopted circumvents this problem. Our training tools ‘feel real’—because they are grounded in and inspired by real contingencies and behavioral patterns identified in our research. Our experience suggests that Swedish and other European practitioners are increasingly receptive to this kind of approach—which can provide them with virtual experience and, perhaps even more importantly, with a point of departure for qualified peer dialog, reflection, and experience sharing.

Finally, let us underline that the experience-based knowledge of qualified practitioners—while gathered in and communicated in a manner very different from that of scholars—is worthy of our respect. We should be aware that academics have at least as much to learn from as to teach the world of practice. Knowledge transfer is a two-way street. The intuitive notions and implicit vocabulary used by the experienced practitioner is often theoretically insightful. This experience-based understanding offers a tremendous resource for researchers trying to comprehend and conceptualize the world of practice. The rules of thumb and proto-generalizations of practitioners can often be easily translated into hypotheses and propositions, which can subsequently be assessed through systematic empirical research.
Transcending Communities

From the outset, we considered our Swedish activities as a pilot program spearheading a broader regional effort. This ambition was a key part of our collaboration with our governmental counterparts. Essentially, we were charged with establishing a “partnership for research”—the phrase was inspired by NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The idea was to encourage scholars and practitioners from around the region to step up their efforts to systematically document, analyze and share information about their experiences of national crisis management (c.f. Newlove, ed. 1999). It was decided for a variety of reasons that Estonia would be the target of our initial outreach efforts. Both academic and policy-oriented networks were mobilized.

We were in late 1997 able to assemble a research team consisting of nearly a dozen Estonian researchers and practitioners. The group had close ties to the historic Tartu University and included representatives from the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Estonian Television. The collaborative research effort entailed a series of meetings in Tallinn and Stockholm, which discussed various theoretical, methodological, and practical issues related to crisis studies. The first collection of case studies including a preliminary comparative analysis was published in 1999 (Stern and Nohrstedt, 1999).

Building upon the experience from the Estonian effort, similar groups have now been established in Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Russia, Iceland, Finland, and the United States, as well as Sweden. In order to reach out on an even broader basis, the Program has, in collaboration with like-minded scholars and practitioners elsewhere in the region (and particularly in Holland) launched a pan-regional network to promote crisis management studies. The European Crisis Management Academy (EC-MA) held its first biannual conference in The Hague in 1999 and the second full-scale network meeting will be held in Stockholm in November of 2001. Over one hundred members of this European network will participate in the workshops and simulations.

Our modest “Partnership for Research and Training” program provides a useful complement to the official collaboration between NATO and other European countries taking place under the banner of the Partnership for Peace and within the institutional framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the recently established Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center. Through these joint ventures and those of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, a common vocabulary and conceptual outlook for dealing with national and regional crises is slowly developing.
Toward Best Practices

Our program began with a systematic effort to build knowledge through research. The second step has been to draw on this new understanding in various training activities involving practitioners, such as workshops, conferences and simulations. The next step on our agenda is to promote deliberations within this transnational community of scholarship and practice over institutional design questions. As major institutional reforms are underway in many European countries, there is an important role for and some receptivity to scientific participation in the national and regional debates. In many of the transitional democracies of Europe as well as in the more established democracies, there are clear opportunities for scientific knowledge on crisis management to have an impact on policy formation. Furthermore, the rapidly evolving crisis management capacity of the European Union raises important new questions and opportunities for scholars and practitioners alike.

The difficulties posed by complex crisis contingencies transcend the so-called domestic and international levels and tax the coping and collaborative capacities of governments and international institutions to the very limit. We must work together across the theory-practice divide to wring every drop of usable knowledge from the experiences of the past to help prepare our societies better for the threats and risks of the future.
References

CRISMART Publications:


**Volume 3** (1999)—Crisis Management in Estonia: Case Studies and Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Eric Stern and Daniel Nohrstedt.


Comparing Institutional Models for Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Area

Background

This presentation provides systemic overview and the key results of the study of two surveys on the state of crisis management in the Baltic Sea.

The first one was carried out while preparation to the Research and Practice Workshop ‘Civil Security and Crisis Management’ (Strömsborg, Stockholm, Sweden, 18–19 March 1999). This survey used a questionnaire including four sets of questions (see Annex). Its main outcomes were presented in the national delegations’ reports at this meeting of all eleven countries of the Baltic Sea area and published in the Volume 5 of the publications of the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning (ÖCB).

The second survey was organized while preparation to the three State of Art sessions at the International Conference ‘The Future of European Crisis Management’ (the Hague, the Netherlands, 7–9 November 1999) organized by Crisis Research Team (COT) from the Netherlands and ÖCB. This survey used a questionnaire including seven sets of questions with some repeating those from the first questionnaire and some new (see Annex). The filled questionnaires were provided to the organizing committee of that meeting by seven countries of the Baltic Sea area.

Methods and Stages of the Study

The study used a combination of content analysis and contextual mapping and comparative analysis as basic methods of data processing, systematization and exploration, and involved five basic stages.

At the preparatory stage, all 11 sets of questions from the aforementioned two questionnaires were put together into a more detailed integrated questionnaire containing 14 questions (see Annex). At the next stage, we mapped most essential comments and marked key words in the text body of respondents’ written answers to these questions. Then these key words and excerpts from respondents’ comments were put into respective
cells of a matrix, which columns correspond to the questions coded by their numerical numbers (from 1 to 14) and rows denote respondents from each Baltic Sea country in alphabetical order. Using this matrix composed was a set of 11 tables that disclose the key features of crisis management policy as the main outcomes of the study.

**Limitations of the Study**

Before presenting these basic results, worth making would be a few reservations concerning the limitations of the study. One and perhaps most significant of these involves respondents’ statements representing no more than subjective notions of randomly selected individuals. Despite the existing balance between academics and practitioners among them, which is undoubtedly positive, each Baltic Sea state is represented mostly by unique respondent (see Table 1). This makes their answers whatever valuable less representative than one would like to.

Another limitation deals with the coverage of and scrupulousness of the comments on the questionnaire. In general, respondents covered 60.3% of the issues. However, the degree of coverage varies considerably in both specific country and specific issue terms. For instance, respondents representing three or 27.2% of all Baltic Sea countries provided answers to less than 21.4% of the questions, the other two or 18.2% of those replied to a 50.0% of the questions while the last six or 54.6% of those covered more than 71.4% of the questionnaire items. In addition, almost a half (42.8%) of the total number of questions received a bit more or less than 50% answers. Within these, issue coverage ranges from 36.3% for questions 3 and 10 (political priority of crisis issues and input of academic evaluations of crisis policy on future crisis management, respectively) to 54.5% for questions 5, 9 and 11 concerning role of academics in the aforementioned evaluation, coordination with the neighbouring countries and European institutions and learning from experience, respectively. This leaves alone questions #7 (organizations involved in crisis research and crisis management) and #1 (types of crises) that manifest highest coverage of 81.8% and 90.9%, respectively (see Table 2).
To this one should add that some statements on the same issue contradict to each other, for instance that concerning centralization/decentralization trends within the national crisis management policies. The last but no the least reservation involves comprehensiveness of the questionnaire, which is restricted to selected institutional and related issues of crisis research and crisis management policy.

Given these, one should be cautious with interpretation of the study findings and consider the proposed assessments and conclusions as tentative alone. At the same time, we still believe the results worth consideration both from academic and practical perspectives. All these call for further more representative and substantiated comparative research of crisis policy in the European countries, in particular those of the Baltic Sea region.

The Study Outcomes in Brief
The study outcomes concerning institutional models of crisis policy in the countries of the Baltic Sea region in comparative perspective and as perceived by respondents from these countries are summarized in Tables 3–8. To facilitate interpretation these results are subdivided into three groups as follows.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Baltic Sea States</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
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<td>Practitioner community</td>
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Table 2

ISSUE COVERAGE BY RESPONDERS

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (rounded)</td>
<td>91 64 36 55 64 82 45 55 36 55 64 55 82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crisis Research and Crisis Management Political and Crisis Type Priorities

Almost every respondent either explicitly stressed or implied political importance of crisis issues (both in terms of research and management) in their countries. Representatives from Estonia, Germany and Russia believe that the existing status of these issues is high while both them and respondents from the other countries emphasize the increasing political salience of crisis research and crisis management (Table 3).

Table 3

POLITICAL PRIORITY OF CRISIS RESEARCH AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

<table>
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<th>Priority</th>
<th>Kind of statement</th>
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<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Estonia, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasing</td>
<td>Explicit</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implicit</td>
<td>Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The issue not specified in the Danish and Icelandic respondents’ filled questionnaire
We failed to find either a clear-cut statement or implicit notion on this issue in the filled questionnaires of Danish and Icelandic respondents. This provides for hypothesis that so far crisis issues have not become an organic item in the list of the national policy priorities. However, this does not exclude a suggestion of increasing importance of these issues that may soon enter such a list. To corroborate this suggestion, the data on state of crisis legislation was added to those retrieved from the questionnaires. Given that the legislation development serves both a vital component and an essential indicator of respective policy area institutionalization, these data compiled evidence that crisis legislation in the aforementioned two Baltic Sea states is either well established or developing (see Table 4).

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State of legal framework development</th>
<th>Baltic Sea States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developed (Established)</td>
<td>Finland, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing (Extending/Expanding)</td>
<td>Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To sum up, the respondents’ replies prove that whatever are the differences between the Baltic Sea countries crisis issues transfer increasingly into one of the major items of regional and European development policy. In addition, these answers show that available institutional models of crisis management are comprehensive, or “total defense” or “overall defense” in terms of respondents from Denmark, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Norway. This means that national crisis polices handle practically every existing type of crises with all respondents emphasizing the increasing priority of peacetime crises that tends to dominate over those of wartime within the national crisis policies in the Baltic Sea region.

At the same time, the existing differences should not be overlooked in terms of both political salience and specific types or kinds of crises. Conflict and non-conflict crises are the dominant two types from the three basic types of crises mentioned by eight and ten respondents, respectively as management policy priorities. Meanwhile, compound crises, particularly environmental and epidemics were emphasized an addition to the former two crisis types by experts from three Baltic Sea states alone (Germany, Norway and Russia).
Respondents from all countries except Latvia and Lithuania consider political and social crises a vital crisis policy objective while the kinds of such crises as specific policy priorities vary from civil unrest (Finland, Poland, Sweden) to terrorism and ethnic violence (Germany, Russia, Norway). Within non-conflict crises Finnish, Icelandic and Polish respondents are more concerned by natural disasters than technological accidents given that the latter were not mentioned in their filled questionnaires. The Swedish expert believes the contrary while respondents from the other six countries balanced their priorities between these two kinds of non-conflict crises (see Table 5).

Table 5

**Prevailing Types and Kinds of Crises as Management Policy Priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis Types*</th>
<th>Kinds of crises</th>
<th>Baltic Sea States**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CN Political and Social Crises</td>
<td>Germany, Russia, Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Terrorism and ethnic violence</td>
<td>Estonia, Iceland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Hijacking and airport crises</td>
<td>Finland, Poland, Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN Political conflicts, civil unrest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technological Accidents and Disasters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Nuclear accidents</td>
<td>Estonia, Lithuania, Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Electric and energy supply failures</td>
<td>Lithuania, Norway, Russia, Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Oil spills, oil-rig accidents</td>
<td>Lithuania, Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Hazmat and chemical accidents (incl. Transport.)</td>
<td>Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Disasters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Floods</td>
<td>Estonia, Germany, Poland, Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Forest fires</td>
<td>Latvia, Lithuania, Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Earthquakes, volcano eruptions and avalanches</td>
<td>Iceland, Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC Not specified</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Compound Crises</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP Environmental crises, epidemics</td>
<td>Germany, Norway, Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CN – conflict; NC – non-conflict; CP – compound
** The issue not specified in Danish respondent’s filled questionnaire
Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsible/Coordinating Body</th>
<th>Baltic Sea States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>Lithuania, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>Iceland, Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Federal Security Service and EMERCOM</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Institutional Framework and Policy Models of Crisis Management

All respondents accentuated the vital role of the governmental bodies in crisis policy development and implementation. As to wartime crises, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) serves as a unique body responsible for both functions in all Baltic Sea states while in peacetime such a policy is carried out by different parts of the national governments that vary from country to country. Basing on respondents replies data compiled in Table 6 and amended by those from CEP Handbook 1999–2000 four groups of the Baltic region states could be distinguished in terms of the key agency responsible for development and implementation (coordination) of peacetime crisis policy.

The most numerous group includes six countries where the Ministry of Interior (MOI) serves as a leading body or chief coordinator of crisis policy. While in Germany both functions are carried out directly by MOI respondents from the other five countries mentioned specific bodies associated with this ministry or the other parts of national government sharing these with the MOI. For instance, respondents from Poland and Denmark cited MOI Crisis Management and Population Protection Agency and MOI Emergency Management Agency, respectively amended in the Polish case by special Committee for Emergency Management of the Council of Ministers. Respondents from Estonia, the host of this conference, named Governmental Crisis Center and Coordination office of State Chancellery, etc.

The other two sets of the Baltic region states consist of a couple of countries each. In Lithuania and Sweden, respondents cite the MOD or specific bodies associated with this ministry acting as a central crisis management actor at national level, while those from Iceland and Norway...
mentioned such role played by the Ministry of Justice. The last group of the Baltic Sea countries is represented by Russia alone, where crisis management functions are shared by three basic governmental bodies: MOI and Federal Security Service responsible for handling social and political crises, and Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Natural Disasters Response or EMERCOM) which handles natural disasters and major technological accidents.

Whatever the key governmental body, respondents mention this not carrying out national crisis policy on a sole basis. This body serves rather a coordinator, focal point and clearing house working tightly together with the other parts of the federal government and regional and local administrations involved, especially with their police, fire, medical care, transportation services as urgent response units. Almost every respondent underlined both multi-organizational approaches to organization and pivotal importance of urgent response services as crucial characteristics of existing institutional frameworks of the national crisis policies in the region.

In addition, the authorities closely cooperate with the neighboring countries and European institutions. As data compiled in Table 6 illustrate, all respondents emphasized such cooperation as crucial for the national crisis policy in terms of both development (joint crisis research projects) and implementation (joint crisis management activities). At the same time, given political and geographical peculiarities within the Baltic Sea region one could highly be surprised by representatives from different countries mentioning different states and European institutions as their crisis management partners or assigned to those different priorities, as the least.

For instance, EU members or EU-claiming countries particularly stressed the role of this organization while Russia did the same for CIS. NATO members or NATO-claiming states noted this alliance as a salient framework for cooperation in the field of crisis research and crisis management while respondents from “neutral” countries explicably failed to mention this. The pattern of cooperation between Baltic Sea states and those with European institutions in the field of crisis research and crisis management is shown in Table 7, which provides the picture as explicitly stated by respondents.

Crisis policy developed and implemented by the aforementioned parts of the national governments of the Baltic Sea states and their international partners involve different policy models. The questionnaire restricted contemplation of this complex subject by the centralization/decentralization issue alone. Almost every respondent mentioned centralization model dominating wartime crisis decision-making and implementation. As to peacetime crises, most of respondents mentioned decentralization an increasing trend of crisis management development in the region. However,
this generic observation should not mask the conspicuous differences existing between the Baltic Sea countries: the filled questionnaires provide for distinguishing at least three types of crisis management models carried out at the national level (see Table 8).

### Table 7

**Cooperation on Crisis Management Issues with European Institutions and Neighboring Countries***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Baltic Sea States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSS</td>
<td>Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO/PfP</td>
<td>Iceland, Norway, Russia***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia + Lithuania</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Latvia, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Latvia, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Finland, Latvia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only those mentioned explicitly for both practical and academic fields
** Fluctuating (ups and downs)

### Table 8

**Peacetime Crisis Management Policy Models (Centralization/Decentralization)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management policy model</th>
<th>Baltic Sea States*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization</td>
<td>Germany, Iceland, Norway**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced (flexible)</td>
<td>Finland, Norway***, Poland, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>Estonia, Latvia, Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The issue not specified in the Lithuanian respondent’s filled questionnaire
** As mentioned in Aarnes response
*** As mentioned in Weisath response
Respondents from Germany and Iceland clearly pointed to their countries following decentralization policy model. To the contrary, those from Estonia, Latvia and Russia mentioned centralization as characteristic feature of their states' decision-making and implementation in the field of crisis. While stating this, the Latvian respondent labeled such a situation “a paradox” given that local authorities are first to confront against and respond to crises but lack adequate legal basis to take full responsibility for crisis decision-making. The existing law imposes this on the top management level, i.e. respective parts of the national government involved. At the same time, Finnish, Polish and Swedish respondents believed their national governments follow balanced or flexible crisis strategies. The situation in Norway looks somewhat ambiguous as perceived by the two respondents from this country. While Aarnes clearly pointed to decentralized character of the national crisis policy, which complies with specificity of the existing political system in this country, Weisath considered decentralization is increasing but the policy in general being still “more centralized than decentralized” in terms of community preparedness.

**Crisis Management Decision Support**

Almost every respondent stressed crisis knowledge and data bases accumulated by academics and research community as a whole as respectively vital component and actor of crisis management decision support. However, Tables 9–11 reveal that in each country of the region such crisis policy support is provided in its specific way. In terms of crisis knowledge and databanks development level one could distinguish three main groups of the Baltic Sea states. One of these including three countries (Germany, Russia and Sweden) accumulated substantial wealth of information through crisis research and crisis management thus possessing relatively established and increasing knowledge and databases in the field. Those in the other three states making up the second group (Finland, Norway and Poland) could be characterized as extending and expanding. From replies of responders from Estonia and Latvia, which comprise the third group, one could consider the state of crisis knowledge and databases in these two countries as emerging. It is hard to judge on such a level in the rest three countries of the region given that the filled questionnaires of Danish, Icelandic and Lithuanian respondents missed this issue.
Among the dominating types of organizations, which accumulate the knowledge and data mentioned above almost every responder from all countries but Russia who answered respective question (90.9%) emphasized the leading role of universities. These are followed by various governmental institutions active in both crisis research and crisis management areas and mentioned by 45.5% of such respondents from six countries. Private insurance companies, academic research institutions (within the system of the national academy of sciences) and nongovernmental organizations were cited by less than 20% of respondents. However, these institutions are significant actors in both crisis research and crisis management in Germany, Russia and Estonia, Iceland and Latvia, respectively (see Table 10). To interpret these data correctly, it is worth considering that Danish and Lithuanian respondents skipped answering respective question in the questionnaire.

Table 9

| Crisis Management Decision Support: Development Level of Knowledge and Data Banks* |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| State of development | Baltic Sea States** |
| Established | Germany, Russia, Sweden |
| Extending/Expanding | Finland, Norway, Poland |
| Emerging | Estonia, Latvia |

* Only those mentioned explicitly for both practical and academic fields
** The issue not specified in the Danish, Icelandic and Lithuanian respondents’ filled questionnaire

Table 10

| Crisis Management Decision Support: Types of Organizations Accumulating Knowledge and Data on Crises |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| Dominant organization type | Baltic Sea States* |
| Government institutions and universities | Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden |
| Government institutions and academic research institutes (RAS) | Russia |
| Government institutions, private insurance companies and universities | Germany |
| Universities and NGOs | Estonia, Iceland, Latvia |

* The issue not specified in the Danish and Lithuanian respondents’ filled questionnaire
As to research community, both academic fellows and analysts in practical organizations who actually accumulate knowledge, collect, process, analyze and store the data on crises thus providing intellectual grounds to crisis management, this community’s role in such decision support activities also vary from country to country within the region. Using the criteria of academic community’s involvement in crisis management evaluation and its input into future planning, rate of such evaluation of crisis research and crisis management processes as well as academics’ learning from practical experience and developing dialogue with practitioners one could differentiate two main sets of the Baltic Sea states (see Table 11).

In the smaller group of four countries including Germany, Poland, Russia and Sweden academic community has established its role of efficient collective analyst and consultant for practical crisis management. Research institutions were and keep being actively and regularly involved in evaluation of crisis programs and planning, no less regularly communicate with crisis practitioner community and learn from the field experience thus conspicuously contributing to the future crisis planning. Worth special noting is the leading position of research institutions and units of the responsible governmental organizations (ministries, committees, services) in Russia, in particular those of MOD, MOI and EMERCOM. In Sweden (and also in Denmark), this is typical for regular evaluation of existing crisis management programs carried out by ÖCB and EMA analysts, respectively.

Respondents from the larger group of seven countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway) mentioned their academic communities increasingly but thus far not efficiently enough contributing to practical crisis management. Research institutions’ involvement into of crisis programs and planning evaluation is sporadic. Their communication with crisis practitioner community and learning from the field experience are occasional thus providing for relatively insignificant or inadequate, as the least input to the future crisis planning. Within this set of the Baltic Sea states worth particular consideration are the aforementioned regularity of crisis management and planning evaluation by researchers in Denmark, that of learning from practical experience by academics in Estonia and active dialogue between those and practitioners in Latvia.
## Crisis Management Decision Support: Role of Academic Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baltic Sea States</th>
<th>Involvement</th>
<th>Evaluation rate of crisis research and management</th>
<th>Input into future planning</th>
<th>Learning from experience</th>
<th>Dialogue between academics and practitioners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Respondents mention these activities carried out exclusively or mostly by research units of the governmental agencies responsible for crisis management policy

**Legend**

- A – active
- NA – not available
- S - sporadic
- C – conspicuous
- O – occasional
- I – insignificant
- R – regular

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58
ANNEX

Questionnaire # 1 (4Q)

1. To what extent and how is the systematic knowledge of civil crisis management accumulated and shared in your country?
2. Are there any joint activities planned or in progress between the academic and practitioner communities? Is there a potential for enhancing inter-community cooperation between practitioners and scholars in this field?
3. What types of crisis scenarios are prioritized for planning purposes (folds, terrorism, etc.)?
4. How can academics and policymakers in your country contribute to strengthening the proposed Multilateral Crisis Management Cooperation Initiative?

Questionnaire # 2 (7Q)

1. What types of contingencies/crisis attract the most attention in your country?
2. What parts of the government/public sector are most active in crisis planning (plan-making, training, exercises) and crisis response (de facto performance in real events)? How do you estimate the degree of political priority crisis management is currently employing?
3. Is crisis management policy a predominantly national issue or is it decentralized towards sub-national level(s)? In what way is crisis management in your country coordinated with the neighboring countries and the European institutions?
4. To what extent are crisis operations systematically evaluated in your country? Do academics play a role in these assessments? How would you judge the impact of such evaluations on future crisis planning? Are there ‘best-practice’ examples of experiential learning?
5. To what extent and how is the systematic knowledge of civil crisis management (e.g. disaster planning, large-scale public order maintenance, counter-terrorism, etc.) accumulated and disseminated in your country?
6. Is there a dialogue in progress between the academic and the practitioner communities on the topic of crisis management? If so, where (geographically; institutions/actors; local/national) and how (which forms, for a, triggers, incentives)? Who are these bridge builders between theory and practice, can we identify them? Is there a potential
for enhancing cooperation between practitioners and scholars in this field?
7. Could you provide us with addresses and names of institutions, organizations and persons involved in crisis management practice and/or research in your country?

**Integrated Questionnaire (14Q)**

1. What types of contingencies/crisis attract the most attention in your country?
2. What parts of the government/public sector are most active in crisis planning and crisis response (*de facto* performance in real events)?
3. How do you estimate the degree of political priority crisis management is currently employing?
4. Is crisis management policy a predominantly national issue or is it decentralized towards sub-national level(s)?
5. In what way is crisis management in your country coordinated with the neighboring countries and the European institutions?
6. To what extent and how is the systematic knowledge of civil crisis management accumulated and disseminated in your country?
7. Could you specify key institutions and organizations involved in crisis management practice and/or research in your country?
8. To what extent are crisis operations systematically evaluated in your country?
9. Do academics play a role in these assessments?
10. How would you judge the impact of such evaluations on future crisis planning?
11. Comment on learning from experience in crisis management field in your country.
12. Is there a dialogue in progress between the academic and the practitioner communities on the topic of crisis management? If so, where (geographically; institutions/actors; local/national) and how (which forms, for a, triggers, incentives)?
13. Who are these bridge builders between theory and practice, can we identify them?
14. Is there a potential for enhancing cooperation between practitioners and scholars in this field?
Ladies and gentlemen,

The information management and media relations are, according to my view, one of the most important aspects of crisis management. In fact, crisis management is very much the question of handling information. To start with, people have different threat-pictures and it is important to understand this. We do not have similar threat-pictures. They can be varied in one country and they can be varied according to history, culture and personal perceptions. So when you treat information in times of crisis, it is important to understand this.

You have to situate yourself in the position of the receiver of the information. It is also important to understand that in a modern society we have left to anonymous organisations and actors to take care of us. To take two important examples, energy and transportation. The actors there are responsible for important things in our lives. Still a lot of people do not understand who is the person to blame if something goes wrong. We tend to not look upon threats. We have left over to anonymous actors in the society to take care of us.

Most people tend, in peaceful and quiet times, to behave like Linus in Peanuts: “This is not a problem for me. It is something that someone else has to take care of”.

The situation in times of crisis is therefore to most people a question of whom to trust, and the problem of trust is the most important factor in handling crisis. And who shall the public trust, the media, the authorities, or their neighbours? We recommend you to read a book by the British scientist Adam B. Seligman, who has put this problem of trust in the forefront of the discussion on handling different problems in the democratic society. The title is ‘The Problem of Trust’.

How to uphold the trust in democratic society? How to uphold trust in public authorities when many things go wrong? And what do people expect from different authorities? And how was the trust before the crisis

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1 This text is a transcribed version of the speech presented by Mr Körlof.
emerged? The problem of trust is fundamental in all times of crisis management.

When something unusual happens, the media is almost always the first to report and nowadays this effect very often is called the ‘CNN effect’. The ‘CNN effect’ is in fact three different effects. The first is the quickness of the media to set the picture. The second is the discrimination of other events. If the media has started focusing on something, they have a tendency the focus goes on, and they tend to discriminate against other events.

The third effect is the emotional political effect among the public, which causes different public reactions among governments. This cause is what has been called the upscaling effect. The picture of what happened effects people and they want the government, the responsible politicians to act. This goes upwards together with the media. It goes all the way to the Prime Minister, or to the president.

It is important to understand the mission of the media in a democratic society. The mission of the media is to inform. It is also important to scrutinise in a democratic society and also to create debate by picturing different pictures of what is going on. And for the public authorities it is important to understand this and work with the media, not against the media, and to respect this role of the media even in crisis.

It is also important to understand that the media are the actors that most quickly and correctly can give the news to the public. If you work with the media and not against the media, the media are the ones that can give the public the news and the information the quickest way.

But it is also important, of course, to understand that newsevaluation from the point of view of the media is not always the same as the picture that the authorities have. The media are very often commercial companies and their role is also to sell newspapers and, sort of, maximise the listeners and viewers. So they tend to go to news that are most important to their listeners and their viewers.

The pressure against the public authorities in times of crisis can be enormous because of the media. Even quite small accidents or incidents can cause international media to work with this event. And in my opinion, most public authorities always underestimate the pressure of the media when it comes to handling this. So the important thing is to have adequate resources and information preparedness for the media pressure.

The modern information situation in times of crisis is also a very complex and dynamic situation, with many pictures going around. For example the picture coming from the media, the information within the internal system of the public authorities, the picture that different parts of the society or public opinion gets. And all those confront each other in short time and also with high tense.
Very often it is important to understand that people wonder what is true and how can they rely on the different information that is coming out. And for the public authorities it is very important to do the right things in times of crisis and one right thing to do is to give the correct information as soon as you have checked it. Otherwise other people, other kinds of information sources, set the picture.

It is not enough to be right, you have to get it right and in order to get this picture right, you have to work with the picture and this requires resources, people, that understand how to handle information and to intensely work with this all the time, day and night, as the crisis is going on, because nowadays crisis do not rest in the night time.

For a democratic society it is very important not to hide, protect, censor information, but even in Sweden it sometimes happens that authorities work this way. They try to protect what is going on inside the authority. Do not hide and protect! Show openness!

Why is it so important to be proactive very early in times of crisis? Well, this has to do with what I call the information vacuum problem. When something happens and the fire squads or the police forces or rescue teams start working with it, it is all very intense and the resources work very hard during a short time. If the information about this comes late and not together with what is going on, you have an information vacuum coming up between what is in fact going on and the information about what is going on. All vacuums are always filled up with something, and in times of crisis, these vacuums are filled up with rumours, conspiracy theories, myths, etc. So for the public authorities it is very important to start with the information, and hopefully correct information, together with the crisis and be very careful not to create this information vacuum, which you will have a problem with weeks, months or perhaps years after the incident. So the information resources will very often have to work, if they have not succeeded with this problem, for a long period of time after the crisis to set things right.

To gain the trust of the public and to get your message through the media, you have to earn the respective trusts, and trust is built upon, among other things, the following fundamental characteristics. You have to be a competent authority. People will have to get the information that this is an administration, which knows what it is doing. It is important to show very great openness regarding everything that you are doing. Something that you have done within the authority perhaps is bad, but you still have to show openness about it. Fairness between different people, between different parts of the country or between other aspects is very important, so that people do not think that you give more to some and less to others. And it is important to show empathy to those people who suffer.
This information to the public and the media must be formed so that it is very specific, that it is complete with everything that has to do with this problem, and that you keep to facts—checked facts, not speculations.

What the public needs is information that is easy to understand, that it comes quickly, that is distinct and not blurred, and that they can see for themselves, if possible, that the information is correct, with pictures or other things that you can show up.

The organisation of public information is very important. You have to have the information officers very close to the management in the situation. You have to have a good internal information system. If you have a bad internal information system, you give bad external information. You have to handle the media all the time, day and night for a long period of time, and you have to set up information centres in order to react directly to the public, when they start calling, when they are anxious.

This requires information preparedness. It is too late to set up this organisation when something happens. You must have it within your organisation already and you must have the ability to strengthen it when the crisis occurs.

This requires very often technical resources; telephones, computers, faxes, etc. and personal resources, because if this drags out for a long period of time, people need to rest. You have to co-ordinate and co-operate with information between different branches, so that not pictures coming from the police or the medical care present different pictures of what is going on, which causes mistrust in the public authorities.

Short reminder; no information is good until it is heard or seen, understood, accepted and hopefully led to behaviour which is good for the individuals and the society in crisis.

Thank you for listening!
Simulation Exercise

The purpose of this exercise was to give the participators a challenging interactive simulation exercise, which focused on the difficulties of decision-making during crisis conditions. The exercise aimed at giving an insight into the difficulties of international negotiation and information sharing during a complex regional crisis that if managed poorly could cause severe local, regional and international consequences. The scenario had as its point of departure the difficult problem of managing the predicament of an out-of-control military satellite, which could crash anywhere in the region. The exercise was designed to stimulate reflection and discussion regarding national and regional crisis management.

One of the cornerstones to create an interesting and successful simulation game lies on it being credible; thus the preparation needs to be of top quality. This was done through an exhaustive historical research on the contingency, upon which the simulation based. CRISMART decided to create five fictitious countries coping with the simulated crisis. Contacts were taken with specialized national and international agencies dealing with such matters to obtain the details on how such a problem of this character would be managed in real life. Examples of approached agencies are the Swedish National Space Agency, the Swedish Radiation Protection Agency, the European Space Agency (ESA) and the NATO based Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Center (EADRCC).2

While the exercise was designed to induce participants to struggle with tasks and dilemmas often faced by real world decision-makers, the setting, working situation and information flow was simplified. This was done in order to target general crisis predicaments such as choosing between opposing alternatives with the result of conflicting values, dealing with great uncertainty and severe time pressure.

At the outset the participants were divided into two main groups; one group had a half-day seminar on crisis communication hosted by the Swedish National Board of Psychological Defence (SPF). These participants were given roles as journalists during the final event of the exercise.

2 CRISMART would like to express great appreciation for useful comments and inspiration from officials approached at these agencies.
a full-scale press conference. The other group was assigned to play operating roles during the simulation.

The operative participants were divided into five groups playing a crisis cabinet in one of five fictitious countries, resembling, oddly enough, the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea. All the participants were given a brief context of their own and the neighboring countries, an outline of the situation at hand and a background description on their own role. All the countries were given specific historical, economic, political and social prerequisites. However, the fictitious region was placed in the institutional context of contemporary European and international organizations. For example, some of the states were NATO members, some were EU members etc.

Each of the crisis groups, consisting of seven people, were given specific policymaking roles; Minister of Environment, Deputy Minister of Industry and Technology, Deputy Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a Public Affairs Expert from the State Chancellery. The position of chairperson in every country was different as to observe if the matter would be differently managed depending on what political and organizational interests that the chairperson was representing. Each person in the five countries was given an individual role description with its specific background and traits to create interesting differences of opinion, not know to the others in the group, to create bureau-politics, which is present in everyday (government) life, and heighten group dynamics in the exercise. The participators should deliberate with the other group members and would in addition to that be able to communicate with other country teams. Working together in country teams trying to make collective decisions and communicating with other country teams closely resembled the two-level negotiation game of international politics.

Communication between the countries was encouraged and conducted through written notes that were dispatched with the help of ‘runners’, i.e. by the help of the game command. The participants could of course chose between sending a message with the blessing of the whole group but could as well dispatch notes to their opposite number in another country (or any other actor for that matter). The participants could as well contact outside actors as for example the ESA; these requests were dealt with by game

3 One example of such a role is the one the one for Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tutonia (A fictitious state resembling Germany): You are a typical ‘career diplomat’ with a well-developed sense for negotiations that has made you a strong leader in EU and NATO negotiations. You are a very determined and persuasive person who demands respect and attention of others in the group. You are very pro-NATO and are happy that your neighboring country, Visigrad, has joined the alliance. You developed personal relations to a colleague that now holds the same position as you in Scanmark during a diplomatic mission. You are very concerned about Slavonia’s growing rivalry with NATO. You see this most of all as a communication problem, where information should be shared throughout the region.
command. On several occasions additional information, or stress notes, were distributed to enhance the anxiety levels of the participants.

The groups’ assignment was formulated as follows; firstly, assess the problem and develop a national strategy from the given information under conditions of threat and uncertainty. Secondly, attempt regional and international coordination and policy collaboration under adverse conditions through contacts with other governments. Thirdly, crisis communication to the public and other actors through press releases.

The game command consisting of eight people made sure that the exercise ran smoothly and observed how the course of events developed. In addition, two people were given the specific task to observe the events within the country teams as well as the general events taking place in order to conduct the very important de-briefing part after the simulation exercise had been completed.

**Falling Shadow Scenario:**

The scenario begins with the following information, which was the same for every participator.

It is 8 o’clock in the morning. Two hours ago you were rudely awakened by a telephone call from the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister had received an emergency fax from the ESA, European Space Agency. The fax stated that their satellite tracking systems indicate that there is a major risk that a military satellite can crash on the territory of your country within the next 48 hours. You have informed the relevant agencies reporting to your Ministry. So far, they have little information but have promised to investigate and get back to you as soon as possible. Apparently the media has not yet gotten wind of the problem.

From this introduction one can assume that the participants draw the conclusion that their country stood in front of a serious problem that could have serious consequences. As we had given the various participants different backgrounds, both individually and their respective countries there was an opening for various interpretations in the group and between the different countries on how to manage this problem. However, in general the interpretation in the various country teams was that this situation covered the criteria for being a crisis situation. The reasoning was that several values were threatened (e.g. national security, citizens health, relations with neighboring countries etc.), limited time was available for decision-making (when will the satellite crash) and the circumstances were marked

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4 Coordination and communication with local or regional actors within the countries was not emphasized.
by great uncertainty (when will the satellite crash, were will it crash, will it re-enter the atmosphere unharmed, what can we do to avoid another Chernobyl etc.). Silently, or out loud, one question was asked by the country teams, ‘What do we do now’!

During this first round additional information was given to the country teams. The information was not identical for each country, some countries received information that stated that the satellite was carrying a nuclear charge and that it was coated with special material that would allow the satellite to enter the earth’s atmosphere without turning into flames. Other country teams received information that the satellite did not carry any radioactive material and would probably burn up and should therefore not be regarded as a major problem. All country teams were also given a weather forecast, as that would be a very important factor in determining which countries could be effected by radiation from the crashed satellite. CRISMART of course formulated the forecast so that every country could interpret it as being in the danger zone.

The second briefing contained a bit more information than the first one. An excerpt of such a briefing, specified for one country, reported that:

The European Space Agency experts are now calculating that the satellite will crash somewhere in the heavily populated northeastern quadrant of the region, 12–18 hours from now. According to their latest estimates there is a 30% risk that the satellite will crash in the country. They are monitoring the situation closely, trying to narrow the possible crash zone, and promise to keep us posted.

The Supreme Commander has reported to the Prime Minister that the forces do not have the appropriate means to shoot down the falling satellite. Initial consultations with NATO headquarters in Brussels have been made by phone; thus far NATO has been sympathetic but non-committal.

The radiological protection authorities have now done a risk analysis. The worst case scenario parallels Chernobyl if the satellite falls in a rural area, but could be even more severe if the satellite were to fall in one of our densely populated urban areas.

After having been given additional information together with the contacts with other countries and international organizations the picture was becoming clearer for some of the country teams. For some countries the risk that the satellite crashing in their country might not be that extensive, for others it was the opposite, there was a great risk of a crash. It also became clear that it would be possible to shoot down the satellite, but that capacity did only exist in two countries, one on the NATO side, and one non-NATO. The two countries that were in the risk zone of the crashing satellite began an intense round of communication to try to persuade them
to come to their aid. But that would mean that the intercepting missiles from the ground would have to pass through the airspace of other countries which was politically sensitive. Some of the country teams began to view this crisis not only as a threat but as well as an opportunity. Handled right, the crisis could lead to for example membership in particular international organizations and better bilateral relations with neighboring countries.

Since there was a growing interest for a meeting at a regional level by the countries involved, game command offered them a platform to meet by sending out invitations from the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency. CRISMART used an historical analogy from the Chernobyl accident where the IAEA had a very active role and then offered, as in this case, its services as an information clearing-house and coordination site. Each country team could send one member to the negotiating table. All countries accepted the invitation, even though some countries preferred other fora. During the secluded IAEA sponsored meeting the country representatives could send and receive notes from their respective national delegations.

During the international meeting a third information package was issued. The message notified the country teams, (although not those in the IAEA meeting), that media now ran stories that an impending disaster with great magnitude could soon strike the unprotected citizens. A sample of headlines was given: “Armageddon? Experts state, ‘this could be worse than Chernobyl’, Space mission gone wrong, who is to blame” etc. The story had now hit the headlines all over the world and the task for the participants became one of risk communication. The participants were ordered by their Prime Minister (game command) to prepare a spokesperson selected by the group. That spokesperson should be prepared to answer questions at a joint international press conference.

The final phase of the simulation was the joint press conference, which was held jointly by the five countries where each country had its representative on the podium. As said in the beginning the participants not actively taking part in the simulation exercise, but instead having a half-day seminar about crisis communication, played journalists. The journalists had been briefed on the scenario and the developments in the exercise to be able to ask challenging questions to the country representatives. The questions asked focused on what the risks were, how the citizens could protect themselves, what was going to be done, who was to blame for this, why had the media not been informed earlier etc.
The Debriefing:

Following the press conference, a debriefing was held. This was an opportunity for the participants to reflect upon their experience, engage in dialogue with other participants and the game leadership, and think together about the challenge of preparing for future crises. Since participants (both ‘operational’ and ‘journalistic’) had viewed the events from different vantage points, the debriefing was an opportunity to share information about what had been going on elsewhere.

Participants discussed the processes, which had been taking place inside the country teams—it was clear that the groups varied somewhat in terms of their mode of operation. Some chairpersons had adopted relatively directive leadership styles and established a more hierarchical mode of operation, while others operated in more ‘democratic’ and consensus-oriented mode. Differences in real life knowledge and experience with space, radiological and military issues proved important—as predicted in the literature, some ‘experts’ were able to translate their knowledge into power and influence within the groups. Similarly, verbal (and in some cases language) skills proved important too, as some participants were handicapped by a limited command of English.

The bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations provided much food for thought and discussion. It proved difficult, but not as it turned out, impossible for old enemies to cooperate in order to deal with a common threat. It was striking that willingness to take active measures in coping with the threat varied closely with the latest estimates as to the likelihood of a crash in one’s own country. In the beginning, when all were at risk, roughly parallel levels of concern were visible. However, once a differentiation emerged between the most likely potential ‘victims’ and potential bystanders and aid-givers significant differences in the level of concern developed—which made it difficult to reach a consensus in the simulated IAEA meeting.

There was much discussion (and a substantial measure of critical interchange) regarding the simulated press conference. A number of players felt that their spokespeople had not accurately portrayed the policy process and content, which had developed in their groups. Other commentators felt that the journalists had been too ‘friendly’ and had not succeeded in putting enough pressure on the panel of spokespersons. A number of common mistakes were made during the press conference, some of which were thought to have created serious risks of credibility damage. Many of the participants left with new insights into the challenges of both operative, journalistic, and public affairs roles in crisis situations.
It’s a pleasure to be here. My research has focused on two ends of a continuum of political leadership. Much of what I have written is about national leaders (Heads of Government and their advisors). What they are like influences what they do. I have also done a lot of consulting with not-for-profit CEO’s and leaders of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s). What I want to do today is talk to you about people. We often, when we are thinking about crises, focus on institutions. Today in the simulation we were looking at what governments and what inter-governmental agencies do. What I would like you to think about, for a short period of time, is what the people are like, who are in these situations and settings.

A former mayor of Paris once described leadership under crisis as being on a moving sidewalk, fire at either end, standing in the middle juggling three objects and people at either end throwing things at you. The whole idea of trying to be a leader in such a setting is bringing those forces into co-alignment so that you as the leader can actually get to the end of the moving sidewalk.

That is what I want us to think about today. What are the forces that tend to facilitate and to hinder leaders in moving down the path? I want you to think about more than the cognitive. Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius have what they call a cognitive-institutional approach to crisis decision making. Much of what people do in crises actually comes from the gut, from their fear, from the beliefs and commitments that they have, from the feelings, and emotions and motivations they are experiencing.

If you think about politics, politics is really what you like and desire and want. We only have crises because those things we want and desire are threatened in some way, shape or form. I want you to think about people. Each one of you has good days and bad days. The weather on Sunday was dreadful. The mood kind of pails as the weather gets dreadful. As the weather gets brighter and we are able to go outside and enjoy it, our moods improve.

Many of you in this room are crisis managers. So in effect your moods are influenced by what’s going on around you. It may have nothing to do

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5 This text is a transcribed version of the speech presented by Professor Hermann.
with politics or nothing to do with the substance of the issue. Also think about the personal events. There is a very poignant picture of Menachem Begin after his wife dies. If you look at his behavior once she died, he retreated from government and never played the same kind of role again. It was like he had lost a piece of himself. All of us at some point in time have parents who become ill. We have things that happen to spouses or to children and they too can effect the way we deal with crisis-kind of situations.

We have stereotypic images. We have perceptions. We have things we really truly believe in and we don’t want anyone to disturb them. We have cultural and generational experiences that can often differ. Young people have experienced one kind of world and older people have experienced a very different kind of world. We have to coordinate and interact, but we come from very different perspectives. All of us acting in the crisis terrain want to retain our positions. Most of us are interested in holding onto positions that we have been selected for or that we are actually engaged in.

The former Press Secretary for Madeline Albright who retired three months ago, James Rubin, made a very interesting comment when asked to talk about his experiences. He said that one of the most interesting and intriguing observations that he had during his time in government was that in crisis situations some people that he had observed tended to act as they had always acted. You could predict what they were going to do. Other people tended to rise to the occasion, do things that you would not have predicted them to do in these situations. A third group fell apart in front of him, right before his eyes. He said, “I often could not predict which kind of person was going to fall into each of these three groups, but all three groups were present in most crises that Madeline Albright was dealing with.” People were literally disintegrating, people were trying hard to deal with the situation and other people were treating it as if it were an everyday occurrence.

What I want us to think about is the difference between crisis and stress. To some extent when we are talking about a problem we are talking about a problem facing an organization, an institution, a government or a group. When we are talking about stress, we are talking about what people feel and what they are experiencing. What we know about stress is that it has some good points. Good news and bad news. All of us need some stress to be active and to engage in our official behavior. All of us need some stress to get up in the morning (a cigarette, a cup of coffee). Something that motivates us to get up and become active.

But too much stress can be debilitating and extreme stress can even lead to death. One very intriguing case where extreme stress did actually lead to death is Woodrow Wilson. He had formulated his idea for the League of Nations. He had worked hard to have the Treaty of Versailles
written in a specific way. But when he came back to his own government, Congress refused to ratify it. So instead of compromising or engaging in some type of change or trying to work on the situation, he decided to go directly to the American people. During that trip out and making all of those speeches, he had a heart attack and never fully recovered from it. Part of it was the stress because this was something so important to him and it was so important that it be exactly as he wanted it. He was going to do everything he could, short of death, to make it happen.

Stress is almost like a u-shaped curve. We aren’t motivated to do much if anything, that is the one end in a low-end situation. It is like you preparing for this conference or when I tell my students that we are going to have an exam in six weeks. My students say, “Oh fine, professor. I’ll take the books home. I am not going to worry it.” Then in about three or four weeks, I remind them that the test is coming up and they better start thinking about it and start reading. But it is the night before the exam, they are really going to cram.

The stories of George W Bush during the three recent presidential debates in the US are that he is a crammer. He loves to stay up the night before a situation occurs. That is literally what he did before the debates. But then one can ask how tired you are to begin to try to function and participate effectively the next day. So what you think about is that people differ in where they are on that stress curve. For some people a crisis can be extraordinary stimulating. It can be the best thing that has ever happened to them because they are actually having some influence on policy. For other people it can become debilitating. The issue is of knowing where in the group of people you are looking, which of these stress effects is occurring.

I want to talk to you a little bit about instances when political leaders tend to be more stressed. What are the situations or conditions which lead to more debilitating stress?

One such situation is when the goal that undermines their particular participation and their particular political position is threatened or challenged.

Ehud Barak coming to the Camp David meetings this summer is an example of this. He came when he literally had his government falling apart around him. The Camp David meetings were his one chance to rescue that government. If he could go back with an agreement then there was a chance that the Labor government could continue in office. Without an agreement, he was in a very poor position. Those kinds of situations tend to increase the stress on a political figure and make into a crisis what may not be for the other participants in a negotiation. A challenge to authority and legitimacy.
Hostage-taking events are often highly challenging to countries because they are being forced to recognize an adversary in order to get the hostages released.

The Balkan situation for President Putin raised all kinds of issues about the legitimacy and credibility of the Soviet Union. What kind of position will they take? There is a recent article in the International Herald Tribune that talked about the fact that Putin was not invited to a meeting with all of the other major powers. Isn’t that highly stressful to a leader who firmly believes they have the position and should be included? When the leader feels responsible personally for a particular policy or position (like in the Woodrow Wilson example) and feels they have the capability to implement it. Then the level of stress increases. What can happen? What we see is an increase in what we call negative emotions: feelings of anxiety, uncertainty, tension, frustration.

We talk about the three responses one can have. One can flee, one can fight or one can panic. The flight takes many different forms when you look at how leaders who are experiencing high-stress deal with the stress. Scape-goating is a common reaction to a high-stress situation.

For example, we had the Junta in Argentina who looked at the growing demonstrations in the streets. They think they have a dilemma with Great Britain and the Falkland Islands. If we attack the Falkland Islands we will be able to mobilize the country and people will rally around the flag. Then we will see a diminution in the number of demonstrations and for a period of time we can take a breath. But in fact, they engaged in a violent activity that didn’t turn out to be very successful.

Many argue that George Bush Senior actually had the same strategy with the Gulf War. At the time that Iraq went into to Kuwait there was an enormous debate in the US and in the Congress about the economy and there was very little agreement. Isn’t interesting that the Gulf War took away all of the uneasiness and uncertainty about the budget until the Gulf War was over until the presidential elections started in the spring. So it was a short-term way of avoiding the situation and putting it out of mind. That is the notion of flight. You can deny the problem, and say that it does not exist.

We actually had some of that at the simulation press conference this morning. Some were actually denying that there was a serious problem. You can ‘pass the buck’ and say “Hey it’s not my responsibility, but it’s somebody else’s.” (“It’s the Chinese’s responsibility not Slavonia’s.”) You can bolster your own position. (“It’s not that big of a problem.”) Or you can devalue the experience and say it’s a problem for somebody else. (“I’m not going to worry about it at this point.”)
All of the so defensive maneuvers are ways of avoiding the situation and also not dealing with the kinds of frustration and anxiety you are actually experiencing. You can take the crisis on. I think Slobodan Milosevic and Chairman Yassir Arafat are fantastic examples of taking the problem on in what we call a kind of hyper-vigilant manner. They will try anything in the short term to deal with the situation. If you look at Milosevic’s behavior from 1988 through the fall of 2000, you see a repeated pattern of behavior. Always short-term solutions, but letting the context play itself out. What is my opposition going to do? And always challenging the limits, but never going over them.

You also have panic reaction, and I think Bill Clinton panicked. I think the Monica Lewinsky affair was a panic reaction. If you look at when it began in November. The government was shut down. The Republican Party had taken over. Health care was no longer being considered, and Clinton was at the lowest moment of his political career. He really didn’t know what to do, and along came somebody who took him out of the environment and said, “You’re wonderful”. Who interacted with him in a very positive kind of matter in the way of a confidant or a friend. Began to bring his spirits back. But that was a panic reaction. He had withdrawn from everything and he was looking for some way to escape. Not to deny because he couldn’t deny, but just to escape the situation completely. So different ways of responding to the stress are experienced.

A problem is that the more people you have in a group, the more likely you are to see disruptive effects on the group decision making. It’s not just like my behavior’s going to affect me, but the more people who actually “sliding” and showing very apprehensive behavior, the more likely you are to see disruption and ineffective group decision-making processes. The more likely you are to see the group believe that the adversary out there is in control of the situation “We can’t do anything. They are in control so we can only react. That way we are not responsible. Right? They are responsible for everything that happens.”

A focus on the present rather than on the future. So coming into the present and not thinking about the nature of the consequences for the future. A desire to find a quick fix, and to move on that quick fix. It’s only interesting with people who will support you, so you are not going to look for people who will give you negative or different kinds of advice. And a heightened tendency to see things in the present that are very much like the past. If it’s been successful in the past, we’ll deal with it just like we did in the past then we’ll escape this kind of event.

I think there are some factors that tend to accentuate stress especially for policy makers.
First the focus on the “now” and the “not now” problems. Many policy makers are looking at what is happening now and are not thinking about the nature of the “not now.” They are not planning for what needs to be done when another situation happens. So what if we have two crises at the same time?

One of the more interesting examples is that the Suez Canal crisis happened at the same time as the Hungarian uprise. What if they had been separated? Under stress the leadership tends to focus on that event which is most pivotal to the leader, who has his position on the line. In the United States government we know (we have the data and the documents) that a warning was given to the President that Sadam Hussein had moved his troops onto the border of Kuwait and that an invasion was imminent. But President Bush had an image of Iraq as being a friend. They had worked with us. We had worked with them. We had been allied with them. How could they do such a thing?! The stereotypes you have, the categories you put into the environment, are much more black and white under stress. President Bush didn’t see that information and didn’t deal with it. He was very surprised when the event actually happened.

Secondly we tend to focus on failures rather than successes. In fact, if you think about the terms that we have for negative emotions, we have a whole range of terms that apply when you think about failures. We have a whole range of terms: Fiascoes, shame, blame, guilt. When you start to think about the terms for positive emotions, we have much fewer. We tend to base our experiences on those things that failed. We tend to think about them; we make them the lessons of history that we base things on. Yet we know in crisis situations there tends to be a contraction of authority. So in a crisis situation, there is often the greatest opportunity to engage in change. John Galvin, who was the Director of the US NATO forces, said that we didn’t tend to see crises as opportunities. We weren’t Chinese enough to say that it is both a threat and an opportunity. Those were the times when change was the most possible. If we could somehow reframe the issue, we then could use those times to change things within government or our policy. This we would not be able to do any other time.

I think one of the problems for leaders is that the kind of characteristics that you have tend to be accentuated as stress increases. If you tend to be aggressive and assertive, you will become even more aggressive and assertive. If you tend to be humble, more receptive, and more compromising you will become increasingly more that way.

In the US, we often talk about President Clinton using the artichoke reaction to stress. You peel off one layer at a time and then see what the reaction is and how far you really have to go. Won’t the problem go away? If it doesn’t, then you take off the next layer. But this is characteris-
tic of a person, like Clinton, who is extraordinary strategic and who is really highly attuned to the environment in which he is operating. The political context is extremely important, so he is interacting in order to get that information. Contrast that with Ronald Reagan who said, “Look, we will not negotiate with the Soviets unless the US is a stronger country. We will not negotiate from a position of parity. And I don’t care what you say. That’s our position and we will continue to stick to that. No matter what!” As the stress of the Reykjavik meeting, where the Soviets actually gave in, increased Reagan hung onto that even more tenaciously than he had to start with. A continuation and an accentuation of the traits and characteristics of the individual, so again knowing something about the people becomes very important especially when you think about a negotiating setting, when you are judging people across the table from you, the people you are trying to coordinate with. There are now a series of ways of looking at non-verbal behavior to begin to determine how stressed the individuals are and being able to see how they defend against this stress. Do they try to avoid it? Do they tackle it? Or do you see some panic? Both sides can then begin to think about the kinds of strategies they would develop in response to the stress.

So what do we do? I once made a proposal, which was probably one of the most foolish things I have ever done in my life, to the Mayor of Columbus, Ohio. I said that it might be good to have somebody on staff that has a sense of what that staff is like. Their position would be to learn and to think about when people are under stress. To what degree and can you move them from the setting if they begin to show a lot of stress, can you refigure the group so those people feeling stressed are not in these set of meetings? Are there ways of watching and observing?

The organizational literature is now talking about the notion of a confidant. Every leader at the top needs somebody they can confide in, that they can let their hair down with. That individual will not judge them in any shape or form. Often this is a spouse, but it doesn’t have to be. In the Columbus community we paired non-for-profit CEO’s from very different kinds of agencies, but who had very similar types of problems. We got them to shadow one another. They spent time watching the other person in their job and position in particular when there was a stressful event or a crisis. And they could share information about how each handled that position. We develop a network that can be extraordinary supportive across time because one of the difficulties, and it shows from our discussions of the simulation, is we don’t look at the process. We look at substance.

The US government has a training program where they take people they think will become generals and admirals. They take them for a year and put them in barracks in the middle of Pennsylvania. The program is
intended to get them from thinking hierarchically (they are given an order and will follow it) to thinking more politically (much more laterally). They will learn how to persuade. Also the program has been set up because you are trying to assess the capabilities of these individuals—How well can they do these things? One of the exercises is what we call “leaderless group discussions”. They give to a group of these military personnel a substantive discussion (much like the simulation exercise—a satellite is going to fall what are you going to do?). But around the outside, they have a second group. The purpose of the second group is to look at the processes, not the substance, but to think about whom is playing an informal leader role. What are the formal leaders doing? How is the group structure? Who is having an impact on whom? What kind of destructive group dynamics do you see? Their findings are that it takes 6–8 months to get the people in the second group to look at the process in the first group. All of us want to think about the substance. Several leaders say you never go into a meeting that you do not know the outcome. What that outcome will be. Part of it is thinking about the process, and how people will interact with one another. It is almost as important to think about process as it is about substance. That’s why I think exercises, like the simulation, become very important. But it is also important for all practitioners to have some skills in knowing what’s going on. Many people have them intuitively, but they have never thought about the importance in how these skills could be used.

Thank you.
Crisis Leadership: Experiences of coping with individual and organisational stress

A couple of things that effect stress for a disaster manager are, in random order:

**Issues that increase stress in an individual:**

- **Expectations**—when you are expected to do something in a certain way. Usually you are expected to do well. If somebody comes and says, “I know you will do a great job”, it can actually be very stressful. Or if you normally do a great job and you think “Oh, my God, they all expect me to be doing a great job”, that too can be stressful. Both valid and invalid expectations of others made to an individual, or which you impose on yourself, can create stress.
- **Unknowns and uncertainties**—Not accepting that you do not know everything, meaning that you do not know how things will turn out, that there are unknowns and uncertainties, can be stressful. There will always be unknowns and uncertainties in crisis. That is part of the definition of a disaster. But accepting this fact will help you. If you do not accept it, it will cause stress.
- **Self-doubt**—Obviously if you have doubts about your own capability you will become very stressed when you start managing a disaster.
- **Lack of trust in others**—will create stress. If you don’t have confidence in the team that is working with you, you will not feel that you, or the group as a whole, can do a good job, or even an appropriate job, and this can cause stress.
- **Exercise artificiality**—Exercises are different than real life and they can actually be more stressful than real events. For example, exercises can be stressful for an individual if there is an expectation that you will respond to the problems in the exercise like it was a real setting, but the set up of the exercise does not allow it. For example, for a long time I could not understand why it was so difficult to get doctors to partici-
pate in exercises. We need doctors to work in the field, to work with fire fighters and others and therefore we need doctors to train in the field with them as well. During the exercises we would light fires that the fire fighters put out, we would ask the police to set up road blocks to close roads and we would ask doctors to tend to people who were acting as patients. However, we had difficulties in getting the doctors to participate, and it was not until later that I realised a key factor to their reluctance. The firefighters fought real fires, the police worked with real traffic, however the doctors worked with actors who were not responding like real patients, and their vital signs and symptoms would be quite different. The doctors did not want to put themselves in a position where they were being judged on how they would react to a real situation based on a very unreal situation. They became frustrated and said they were being unfairly judged.

**Issues that decrease stress in an individual:**

- **Training**—knowing the procedures. You can lower stress by training and learning the procedures in your line of work. You must have procedures. First you make a plan, then you learn the plan, then you exercise the plan, and if you prepare yourself in this order, it will help you. You need to have a good understanding of the system that you are working within. For example, during a volcanic eruption we need to get information to farmers. How do we do that? Obviously through the media is one way, but we have a system. We talk to the head veterinarian. The head veterinarian talks to the local veterinarians and the local veterinarians talk to the farmers. We have a system. I know this system and knowing I know the system helps me relax when working in a crisis situation.

- **Knowledge of the phenomenon**—If you have an understanding of what you are doing, all the problems that you are working with, it will help you. Understand risks and consequences. For instance, during the exercise this morning, not knowing anything about satellites, what the consequences would be if it hit the ground, this was very unfamiliar territory for me. But if I am dealing with an earthquake or volcano, I know exactly what to do. With a volcano I have to deal with ashes, volcanic eruptions under glaciers cause flooding, etc., this is something I know and understand. If you have an understanding of the phenomenon that you are dealing with, it will help you.

- **Experience**—obviously experience helps. It gives you confidence but also tells you what to expect. For example for me with a volcano, I know what happened and how we responded last year and the year before that and therefore I have a good understanding of the likely turn of events for the next one. If you know what to expect, you are less stressful.
• Confidence in your people. Knowing you have good people working with you is a great stress reliever.
• Knowing your team—knowing each individual’s strengths and weaknesses and how they work together as a team. Even if there are people on the team that are not very good, just as long as you know and understand how they work, that helps. You can get into a situation where you do not know all the people you are working with, but you are always going to have people around you that you do know, so get to know them well. Preplan and team train.

General

Critical incident stress and critical incident stress debriefing is something that is often talked about. One of the things that I have decided to do in our office is to get everybody to tell us what it is that they want us to do if they get stressed. Maybe some people want to get a hug or they want to be touched or have a conversation, others may want to be left alone for a few minutes. This will help the other people in the office know how they are supposed to respond to that particular person when he or she is stressed. And obviously this is done in an environment where people know each other very well, but if you work with crisis management you will get to know people very well.

You need to remember that people are different, some even seek stressful situations in their sports, like racecar driving and skydiving. Stress is not all bad. It can help an individual take things a little more seriously if he or she thinks they will get stressed during a certain situation and therefore push them to prepare for that situation.

Thank you.
List of participants

CBSS
Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth  Committee of Senior Officials of the
Council of the Baltic Sea States
Serguei Sokolov  Secretariat of the Council of the Baltic Sea States

Denmark
Niels Johan Juhl-Nielsen  Copenhagen Fire Brigade

Estonia
Tönu Ader  Estonian Civil Aviation Authority
Raine Eenma  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Hanna Hinrikus  Ministry of Finance
Taivo Kendla  Rahandusministeerium
Marten Kokk  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Märt Kraft  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Eerik-Niiles Kross
Sven Kruup  Ministry of Social Affairs
Tiiu Kurik  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tarmo Loodus  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Piret Mürk  Eesti Telefon
Andres Nolve  Ministry of Culture
Helmut Näks  Järva Rescue Service
Meelis Poldsam  Estonian Rescue Board
Olev Raidla  Estonian Rescue Board
Mati Rubin  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Eleka Rugam-Rebane  Dr Aleksander Martinson Memorial Foundation
Rein Seljamäe  Ministry of Agriculture, Estonia
Lauri Tabur  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Elle Tanner  Estonian Radiation Protection Centre
Indrek Treufeldt  Eesti Televisioon
Jaan Tross  Bureau of the Prime Minister
Nathan Tönnisson  Estonian Rescue Board
Daniel Vaarik  Ministry of Finance
Riina Valvere  Ministry of Culture

Finland
Esa Ennelin  Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Tuomas Forsberg  Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Christer Pursiainen  Alexander Institute / University of Helsinki
Civil Security and Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Region

Aaro Toivonen  Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Timo Viitanen  Ministry of the Interior
Pekka Visuri  Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Germany
Ekkart Zimmermann  Dresden University of Technology Institute of Sociology

Iceland
Asthildur  University of Iceland
Bernhardsdottir
Solveig Thorvaldsdottir  National Civil Defence of Iceland (Avrik)

Latvia
Eriks Cinkus  Ministry of Defence
Maija Konca  Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ramona Lamberte  State Fire and Rescue Service
Inta Lase  University of Latvia
Andris Maurans  Riga Technical University
Modris Stasuls  Crisis Management Centre
Mārtins Zuteris  Centre of Disaster Medicine Ministry of Welfare

Lithuania
Haroldas Brozaitis  Vilnius University
Edita Dranseikaite  Lithuanian Academy of Law
Edita Miciukeviciute  Vilnius University
Gitana Razaliuniene  Ministry of Internal Affairs
Laimonas Talat-Kelpsa  Office of the President
Vaidotas Ubelis  Ministry of Defence/ Institute of International Relations
Eugenijus Vaicekauskas  Ministry of Defence
Jovita Veėkytė  Ministry of Defence
Ruta Zvinklytė  Vilnius University Lithuanian Business Employers’Confederation

The Netherlands
Arjen Boin  Leiden University
Joop Quint  Hoorweg & Quint, International Consultants for Crisis Management

Norway
Nils Ivar Larsen  The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning
Olav Sønderland  Stavanger Police District
Ole Christian Ulleberg | The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning

Poland
Piotr Chmielewski | Institute of Sociology, Warszawa
Adrian Cybula | University of Silesia
Pawel Koprowski | Protection of People Agency

Russia
Boris Porfiriev | Russian Academy of Sciences

Slovenia
Milena Dobnik Jeraj | Administration for Civil Protection and Disaster Relief
Julij Jeraj | Department of Protection Rescue and Civil Defence of the City of Ljubljana
Marjan Malesic | Faculty for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana
Bojan Pipenbaher | Ministry of Defence

Sweden
Karl-Olof Andersson | Embassy of Sweden, Tallinn
Kerstin Castenfors | National Defence Research Establishment
Birgitta Darrell | The National Board of Psychological Defence
Ann Enander | Swedish National Defence College
Sture Ericson | The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning
Yvonne Gustafsson | Ministry of Defence
Henrik Jacobsson | The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning
Lars Karlberg | Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Björn Körlof | The National Board of Psychological Defence
Karin Lindgren | The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning
Sara Lönberg | Ministry of Defence
Staffan Molin | National Defence Research Establishment
Witold Patoka | Umeå University
Eric Stern | CRISMART, Swedish National Defence College
Dick Sträng | National Defence Research Establishment
Bengt Sundelius | CRISMART, Swedish National Defence College
Christer Widgren | The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning
Civil Security and Crisis Management in the Baltic Sea Region

UK

USA
Margaret G. Hermann Syracuse University

Secretariat
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Estonia
Mairit Kratovits
Natalja Mjalitsina

CRISMART Swedish National Defence College
Annika Brändström
Anna Fornstedt
Jesper Grönvall
Dan Hansén
Lindy Newlove
Daniel Nohrstedt
Eva-Karin Olsson
Britta Ramberg
Lina Svedin

The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning
Petra Ekroth
Görel Hamilton
Bo Richard Lundgren
Harald Törner
Part 3
Findings, Principles, Proposals and The Way Ahead

1. BACKGROUND

The Crisis Management Co-operation Project was presented as a Swedish initiative at the Conference on Civil Security in the Baltic Sea region (Visby, September 8–9, 1998). CBSS member countries were urged to participate actively in turning this project into a multilateral enterprise. A workshop was announced to take place on 18–19 March 1999 at the CBSS Secretariat’s premises in Stockholm to discuss the multilateral crisis research and preparedness initiative. The proposal received positive reactions among the delegates.

The proposal from ÖCB was later endorsed at a meeting of the CBSS Working group on assistance to democratic institutions (WGDI) in Helsinki, January 25–26, 1999.

2. INTRODUCTION

Delegations from 10 of the 11 CBSS countries met in Stockholm on March 18–19, 1999, for a workshop aimed at assessing the current state of crisis management studies, training, and knowledge-sharing in the region. (One country submitted a written response to the workshop questionnaire.) The following summary of the CBSS workshop concludes with proposals for concrete steps toward intensified regional co-operation within civil security and the crisis management area.

3. FINDINGS

The findings summarize the answers to the questionnaire, presentations by national delegations and the discussions during the workshop.

Level of interest

Many delegations reported an increased level of interest in improving preparedness for civil crises. This was in part a response to changes in the European and regional security climate, as well as the result of national experiences in some CBSS countries. Nearly all of the states represented indicated that they had experienced severe civil crises of one kind or another over the last decade. With the exception of a limited number of highly publicized events, delegates tended to know relatively little about the civil crises occurring in other countries in the region. Thus, valuable opportuni-
ties were being missed for learning from each other’s experiences. A mutual need for more intense information exchange was noted.

**National variations**

National presentations by delegations reflected a high degree of variation in the scope and nature of crisis research and training activity within the region. While some states reported relatively well-developed systems for documenting, analyzing, and learning from national experiences, others indicated that such systems were lacking. Similarly, some states reported that strong research communities specializing in crisis management were available. Others reported that few if any researchers had shown a sustained interest in this area or had produced potentially policy-relevant work. However, several of these countries indicated that relevant disciplinary competence existed, but had not yet been exploited for developing crisis studies.

**Scholar—practitioner communication**

National delegation reports suggested that there were also considerable variations in the degree of scholar-practitioner communication with respect to crisis studies. In some countries, little relevant communication was taking place, while in other academics participated primarily as instructors in crisis management and related courses. Several participants reported a relatively high degree of interaction and ongoing scholar-practitioner exchanges.

**Examples from practice and research**

Many countries in the region provided examples of best practices and innovative research and training projects. The Swedish-based co-operation project, CM Baltic, was warmly endorsed by delegates from several countries. Participants frequently expressed appreciation for specific activities taking place in neighboring countries, as well as interest in sharing information about legislative and institutional arrangements developed abroad. Such examples included programs for crisis simulation and training, national crisis committee structures, and data-sharing arrangements between University researchers and national authorities.
Inter-disciplinary approach

It was noted that crisis management studies required an inter-disciplinary approach. Several countries reported an emphasis on risk and hazard management leading to a focus on natural and engineering sciences. Such a focus could contribute to a relative neglect of the potential contribution of the ‘softer’ social and behavioral sciences to crisis management and crises studies. Improved inter-disciplinary communication was needed in most of the countries in the region.

Civil-military synergies

Several delegates noted that the challenges of civil crisis management had much in common with those of military crisis management. Knowledge and training techniques developed for facilitating military crisis management were often relevant for civil crisis management, and vice versa. The existing and potential synergies here should therefore be exploited intensively. Innovative forms of co-operation between civil and military authorities must be tested.

4. CONCLUSIONS OF THE WORKSHOP

A. PRINCIPLES

All states in the region stand to benefit from a regional initiative to develop, exchange, and exploit knowledge about civil crisis management. Furthermore, co-operative research, training, planning, and ultimately joint operations in the Civil Security field tend to build confidence likely to spill over to other domains and contribute to improving good neighborly relations within the region. Joint research and training is a concrete and cost-effective way to begin this process toward building a regional security community in the Baltic Sea area. This important work should build on the following principles:

Comprehensiveness

Regional co-operation for developing, sharing, and using knowledge about crisis management should encompass all Baltic Sea States. Particular efforts should be made to strengthen the knowledge base and improve communication with countries, which have been least active in the past and involve all types of crises, both conflict and non-conflict cases.
Accessibility
Information about national crisis experiences and institutional arrangements as well as research, training and planning methods should be made accessible to academic and practitioner communities in all parts of the region. Information technologies should be exploited actively to facilitate the diffusion of crisis management knowledge.

Integrated Approach
Co-operation should be aimed at promoting knowledge accumulation, diffusion, and use. The latter suggests that effort to promote co-operating training and planning should be prioritized, once the knowledge base has been further developed via joint research.

Regional Emphasis
While crisis management knowledge building and sharing within the larger frameworks, such as the PfP, are useful, much can be gained by a focused Baltic Sea (sub) regional effort. The experiences of neighboring countries are likely to be particularly relevant for planning and training purposes. The states of the region are increasingly interdependent when confronting transnational threats, which require co-ordinated responses to emergency contingencies.

Institutionalization
Ad hoc and short-term efforts to stimulate national and regional knowledge accumulation and sharing are likely to be inadequate. Sustained and systematic efforts seem to be required. A system of national networks or centres for crisis management studies linked by a regional network/centre would be recommended.

Political will
Without top-level determination and support, civil crisis management preparedness work is likely to remain a marginal activity in our societies. Internationally and domestically, the foreseeable future is likely to be turbulent and crisis-ridden. It would require timely and strong political leadership to ensure that the CBSS nations will not be caught unprepared, if and when the next crisis occurs.
B. PROPOSALS

The workshop discussions brought forward the following proposals.

- Encourage the development of national and regional research networks. Funds should be made available for scholarships, fellowships, and research projects, workshops, and conferences in this area. Contacts with well-established centres elsewhere in Europe and North America should be encouraged. The possibility of setting up a network of national crisis management study and training centres, with a regional centre linked to the CBSS co-operative framework, should be seriously considered.

- Develop national case banks in all of CBSS countries, which could be consolidated, into a fully accessible regional case bank. These case banks should be computerized as soon, as is feasible in order to facilitate access. Similarly, national and regional banks of scenarios and hypothetical contingencies (possibly inspired by the broad range of regional experience to be documented in the banks) should be created for training purposes.

- Develop a Regional Crisis Research and Training Group consisting of junior and senior researchers from as many CBSS states as possible. This research team would be the lead group for competence building and sharing and could be deployed to study specific topics relevant to crisis management and civil security in the Baltic Sea Region. The possibility of giving such a multinational team, a ‘rapid response’ capability to monitor on-going events and deliver prompt analyses (“post-mortems”) of regional crises, should be explored.

- Identify a list of high priority substantive topics for joint regional research projects on crisis prevention and mitigation. These issues might include: hazardous materials and radioactive pollution at sea, civil security risks associated with proliferation of organised crime, terrorism, asylum and refugee, flows, and Y2K problems.

- Map out and compare the various national systems for crisis response, including national legislation. This is an important topic for research, and is useful for future projects of institutional design within the region. Similarly, one should continue the process of mapping out national systems for documenting and learning from crisis experiences which was launched at the Stockholm Workshop.

- Develop Crisis Management Libraries and teaching materials. International state-of-the-art literatures should be made easily accessible to scholars and practitioners in all CBSS countries. Texts, which draw upon the examined cases, should be published and whenever possible, translated into languages of the CBSS states.
5. THE WAY AHEAD:

With reference to the proposals listed above, the following three fields of activity were singled out as the most important and relevant for the moment:

1. To start a joint research project on crisis prevention and mitigation with respect to hazardous materials and radioactive pollution at sea. This research focus was proposed by the Russian delegation and received wide attention. It is recommended that Russia and Sweden should take the lead and formulate a project proposal in this area.

2. To develop national networks or centres for crisis management studies and training. This must be organised in accordance with different national conditions. It is recommended that Estonia and Sweden take the necessary steps in this project, with Sweden playing a coordinating role.

3. To develop a Regional Crisis Research and Training Group consisting of junior and senior researchers from as many CBSS states as possible. The possibility of giving such a multinational team a ‘rapid response’ capability to monitor on-going events and deliver prompt analyses should be explored. It is recommended that Norway and Sweden take the necessary steps in order to insure political support from the CBSS to help launch this multilateral task force.
Summary Reflections of the 2000 Tallinn conference

1. This conference took stock of ongoing research and invited new actors in the Baltic Sea region to join this common knowledge-building effort. The multilateral, cross-boundary and multidisciplinary character of the field was recognized.

2. Participation in the conference of practitioners, analysts and academic researchers was innovative and opened a dialogue that should be furthered through the establishment of a new ‘Partnership for Research and Training’.

3. The conference noted an increased interest at all levels (EU, national, OSCE, CBSS, and local) for crisis management cooperation. However, it was also noted that great differences still remain regarding the terminologies and the language codes in use. Conceptual clarification may be valuable.

4. Institutional design issues were examined and further comparative studies were suggested.

5. The conference recognized the vital importance of crisis communication and media relations, and stressed the need for better interaction between researchers, policy makers and the media.

6. The importance of disseminating the findings from research and from experiences to the sphere of practice was noted. One useful technique is by simulated crisis experiences involving potential crisis managers from different nations, sectors and professional cultures.

7. The conference experience indicated that periodical training workshops could help enhance crisis management skills in the region. The conference endorsed the offer by CRISMART to take the lead in developing such a ‘research-into-training’ project involving participants from all of the CBSS nations. This can be pursued based on a recommendation already from the 1999 CBSS workshop and now this is reconfirmed here.

8. Finally, this conference is a good example of the cooperation possibilities—and necessities—across the national crisis management communities around the Baltic Sea. We recognize in particular the generosity and good preparations displayed by our Estonian host: The Ministry of Internal Affairs.