Stefan Lundqvist

Continuity and Change in post-Cold War Maritime Security

A Study of the Strategies Pursued by the US, Sweden and Finland 1991–2016
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Born 1968 in Örnsköldsvik, Sweden

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Vaasa, Finland, 2017
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Vaasa 6 September 2017

*Stefan Lundqvist*
List of original publications


The contribution of this author to the co-authored original publications

I have co-authored Articles 3 and 4 of this thesis with my assistant supervisor at the Swedish Defence University, Professor J.J. Widen. The below account of the division of labour between us in the authoring process is verifiable by our e-mail conversations retained by this author.

Article 3
I am the first author of Article 3. Widen contributed to this article by jointly formulating the first version of the aim, scope and research questions of the study, and by preparing and conducting the interviews. He drafted the first versions of the chapter on the Swedish-Finnish defence cooperation and the conclusion. Widen also took charge of our e-mail communication with the editor of the journal. Following receipt of the referee reports, I made the requested major revisions of the entire manuscript. Hence, I authored new introduction and conclusion chapters. I also updated and revised the two empirical chapters by including new empirical material and implementing more rigid, theory-driven analyses. Here, Widen assisted me by providing written comments on my revisions of the manuscript. I individually made the proofreading and other work related to the copy-editing of the manuscript.

Article 4
I am the first author also of Article 4. I individually drafted the manuscript. As with Article 3, Widen assumed responsibility for our e-mail communication with the editor of the journal. I made the bulk of the editing work, based on the content of the referee reports. Widen contributed to this article by making a final editing of the manuscript. I individually made the proofreading and other work related to the copy-editing of the manuscript.
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access Area Denial</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABNL</td>
<td>Admiral Benelux</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADIZ</td>
<td>Air Defence Identification Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>Airborne Surveillance Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTRON</td>
<td>The Baltic Naval Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTOPS</td>
<td>Baltic Operations (US-led exercise series)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENESAM</td>
<td>Belgisch-Nederlandse Samenwerking (Belgian-Netherlands Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>Belgian Naval Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFTA-DR</td>
<td>Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Continental Ballistic Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDCOE</td>
<td>Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Crisis Response Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS21</td>
<td>A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Container Security Initiative</td>
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<td>CTF</td>
<td>Combined Task Force</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoC</td>
<td>Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economic (instruments of power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOI</td>
<td>Declaration of Intent</td>
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<td>DOPS</td>
<td>Directorate of Operations (ABNL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP&amp;C</td>
<td>Directorate of Planning and Control (ABNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMIO</td>
<td>Expanded Maritime Interdiction Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENSECCOE</td>
<td>Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-PINE</td>
<td>Enhanced Partnership for Northern Europe (US framework)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCMA</td>
<td>Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FON</td>
<td>Freedom of Navigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPB</td>
<td>Fast Patrol Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight (intergovernmental political forum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of Twenty (intergovernmental political forum)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</td>
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GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GWOT  Global War on Terrorism
HELCOM  The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (the Helsinki Commission)
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
IMB  International Maritime Bureau
IMO  International Maritime Organization
IR  International Relations (political science theory)
ISA  International Seabed Authority (international body under UNCLOS)
ISPS  International Ship and Port Facility Security (amendment to SOLAS convention)
ISS  International Security Studies
ITLOS  International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (judicial body on UNCLOS)
IUU  Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (fishing)
JEF  Joint Expeditionary Force (UK-led NATO initiative)
LCS  Littoral Combat Ship (US)
LEA  Law Enforcement Agencies
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas
LRIT  Long-Range Identification and Tracking (of ships)
MARSUR  Maritime Surveillance project (EU)
MCM  Mine Countermeasures
MCMV  Mine Countermeasures Vessel
MDA  Maritime Domain Awareness
MEND  Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MEP  Member of the European Parliament
MIO  Maritime Interdiction Operations
MLE  Maritime Law Enforcement
MoD  Ministry of Defence
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSC Maritime Situation Centre
MSOs Maritime Security Operations
M/V Motor Vessel
MWC Maritime Warfare Centre (ABNL)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NB6 Nordic-Baltic Six (The Nordic Council)
NB8 Nordic-Baltic Eight (The Nordic Council)
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
NLBMARFOR Netherlands-Belgium Maritime Forces (ABNL)
NORDAC Nordic Armaments Cooperation
NORDCAPS Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support
NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation
NRF NATO Response Force
NSMS National Security Maritime Strategy (US)
NSS National Security Strategy (US)
NSWMD National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (US)
OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAC Patriot Advanced Capability (US-manufactured Surface-to-Air Missile system)
PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
PLA People’s Liberation Army (PRC)
PMESII Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Private Security Company
PSI Proliferation Security Initiative (US)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Soviet Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VHJTF</td>
<td>Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WW2</td>
<td>The Second World War</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1. The contribution of the thesis

What explains continuity and change in post-Cold War maritime security strategies? What lessons can we learn from the employment of such comprehensive grand strategies in maritime regions where traditional and non-traditional threats converge? While a range of scholars employ rationalist or reflectivist theories in studies aimed at explaining or understanding particular maritime security problems, such as piracy, this author joins the few who engage themselves in the study of the conceptual development of maritime security strategies in this thesis.

This thesis suggests that structural realism provides convincing explanations to the continuity and the most important changes in the maritime security strategies of Finland, Sweden and the US over the past three decades. It thus contributes to filling a gap in the conceptual maritime security literature by employing an analytical framework derived from structural realism in an aggregated analysis of the findings presented in its empirical chapters. These comprise five articles examining the logic of the maritime security strategies employed by the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) member states Finland and Sweden as components of their respective grand strategies. It concludes that while their maritime security concept remains broad, the recent increase in security pressure involves a renewed priority of the military sector of security. Accordingly, navies are re-using the bi- and multinational measures implemented with naval support by a broad set of civil agencies and the shipping industry to improve maritime security, to support the level of maritime domain awareness required for establishing regional sea control and project power from the sea.

The US use of military and political instruments of power to promote its national economic interests is no longer unequivocal. Instead, the US increasingly uses economic means to achieve its national military and political ends, while balance of power considerations induce weaker states to cluster around the rivalling great powers. For Finland and Sweden, converging security interests and a common external security threat have induced processes of security policy transformation, characterised by rapprochement with the US and NATO and by deepened bilateral defence cooperation. This development is spearheaded by their navies.
1.2. The aim of the thesis

The aim of this thesis, that employs a structural realism framework in its analyses, is twofold. First, it aims to explain continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region, in which Russia has declined and then re-emerged as a regional power, with a focus on non-aligned Finland and Sweden whose security policies are in a state of transformation. Given that these small states lack the economic and military power required to pursue independent maritime security strategies, we must duly consider the role of wider security frameworks composed of the EU, NATO and the US. This thesis key assumption that the post-Cold War conceptual maritime security developments of the US – the Cold War victor and the world’s sole superpower – has influenced states worldwide leads us to its second aim. It involves explaining continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security concept by examining its maritime security strategy development.

To fulfil the second aim, we must also examine the influence of the maritime security developments in the dynamic region comprising the East and South China Seas. This is simply because China represents the rising regional power that has the potential to become “a true global peer” of the US in decades to come (Brooks and Wohlforth 2016). The two aims are mutually supportive. We will examine, draw conclusions on and compare the logic of the US employment of its maritime security strategy in two regions in which it confronts a challenger state. Thereto, we will expound on the lessons learned from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in two distinct regions where traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats converge. This will give us a more comprehensive understanding.

Baldwin (1997: 24–25) defined “security as a policy objective distinguishable from others”. This thesis follows him by defining maritime security as a national security policy objective while leaving the “means most appropriate for its pursuit (...) open to empirical inquiry”. It defines conceptual continuity as the continued Cold War focus on military control of the maritime domain for the purpose of territorial defence, naval access, power projection and maritime trade. Conversely, change represents the incorporation of wider, multi-sectoral, definitions of security, focussed on fostering good order at sea to the benefit of many by employing civilian and military resources in coalition operations to counter crime and terrorism in the maritime domain. Somewhat surprisingly, maritime security remains an insufficiently researched issue-area of national security despite that much effort has been devoted to the study of particular maritime security problems. By examining the maritime security
strategies pursued by the US, Finland and Sweden, this thesis contributes to “clarifying the meaning” (Baldwin 1997: 6) of the maritime security concept while explicating on the logic of their selection of means for its pursuit.

In 1991, maritime security was a rarely used term. When used, it was integral of maritime\(^1\) strategies, referring to naval control of sea lanes for power projection and strategic supply – and the provision of national merchant shipping capacity for these ends. Between 2013–2015, maritime powers France (FR PM 2015), India (IN MoD 2015), Spain (ES PoG 2013), the UK (UK Gov 2014) and the US (US DoD 2015) published cross-sectoral national maritime security strategies; intrinsically linked to their national security and maritime strategies. In 2014, the EU Council (2014) published a maritime security strategy, the scope of which was global, and an action plan for its implementation. Although the definitions of maritime security vary in these documents (see section 1.3), they all outline comprehensive visions of managing threats, risks and opportunities, as well as protecting and advancing national interests such as trade and resource exploitation on regional or global scales. This adoption of broad maritime security strategies – complementary to national security and maritime strategies – is a conceptual change central to the research problem addressed in this thesis. However, the recent return of geopolitical rivalries to centre stage of international relations (Mead 2014) influence what national interests states’ give priority in the maritime domain. This suggests, after all, that continuity may be prevailing.

Following Stolberg (2012: 41), this thesis defines policy as the formulation of “what to do about something” or “what is to be done”, i.e. stating the common “ends” of policy and strategy while “[t]he implementing strategy provides the how to do it” (italics in original). Accordingly, policy directs strategy while “there must be policy approval for each component of the supporting strategy” (italics in original), i.e. approval by leaders of the policy-making actor on the “ways” and “means” outlined in the strategy. This thesis thus understands formulation of strategy by rational actors as “a constant process of adaptation [and response] to shifting conditions and circumstances” in a complex and uncertain world (Murray and Grimsley 1996[1994]: 1). Hence, it recognises that policy and higher (i.e. grand) strategy are interwoven.

\(^1\) Here, we make a distinction between the narrow term naval, a single-service approach that places emphasis on establishing/maintaining naval capabilities and employing force at sea, and the wider term maritime, which includes the full range of activities and interests in maritime domain and their interactions with other domains.
Policy-implementing strategies constitute a hierarchy. Different levels of decision-making develop its strategy documents for distinct purposes and with varying degree of generalisation. National security strategies are grand strategies, i.e. strategies coordinated at the highest levels of the state that expand on the use of a full suite of hard and soft power available to a state or an alliance under states of peace, crises and war. In military strategy, these are often abstracted as the application of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of power to reach comprehensive political end-states and manage the desired and undesired effects on the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) dimensions of a complex “engagement space” (see NATO 2013: 1-8 – 1-11, 3-30 – 3-36). Figure 1 illustrates this thesis understanding of how maritime security and maritime strategies fit into this hierarchy. N.B. the actual outline of the hierarchy and the titles of the strategy documents adopted by individual nation states – as well as their scope and content – differ.

Figure 1: This thesis generic understanding of how recent maritime security strategies and traditional maritime strategies fit into the hierarchy of national policy-implementing strategies. Source: Author.
Gray (1999: 17) provides an essentially military definition of strategy, i.e. “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the end of policy” (italics in original). It serves us in establishing the necessary distinction between maritime strategy and maritime security strategy. Both types of strategies incorporate the full range of activities and interests in the maritime domain, their interactions with other domains and their geographical scope are regional or global. However, a maritime security strategy is a comprehensive grand strategy for the maritime domain outlining the “purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community” (Gray 2008[2007]: 283). A maritime strategy, for its part, represents a comprehensive military strategy focussing on the application of naval power. It prescribes a variety of “considerations for navies” in: i) peacetime; ii) “naval operations short of open warfare”; iii) “the non-war functions of naval power that continue even during wartime”; and iv) their wartime functions in concert with other armed services (Hattendorf 2013: 8). This thesis will examine both types of strategies, relevant to gain a comprehensive understanding.

In his study of the Byzantine Empire – a state actor lacking a formal written statement of national security and never used the word strategy – Luttwak (2009: 409) concluded that “[a]ll states have a grand strategy, whether they know it or not. That is inevitable because grand strategy is simply the level at which knowledge and persuasion, or in modern terms intelligence and diplomacy, interact with military strength to determine outcomes in a world of other states with their own ‘grand strategies’” (italics in original). His position is equally valid for maritime security strategies, since they constitute grand strategies for the maritime domain.

This study follows Luttwak (2009: 415–418) by opting to identify “operational codes” in state actors’ maritime strategic policy behaviour. Accordingly, it highlights the logic of states’ maritime security strategies as components of their grand strategies. This is particularly relevant when studying small states, whose limited national capabilities may not justify the adoption of national maritime strategies. Given the linkages between national

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2 Booth (2014[1977]: 15–16) specified three strategic roles for a navy: the policing; the diplomatic; and the military.

3 N.B. national maritime strategies prepared by e.g. ministries of industry or fisheries often omit the military dimension and typically focus on blue growth and maritime management (see MoI Sweden 2015).

4 Although Luttwak focusses on the military dimension of state interaction in his analysis, his statement is valid for the full range of instruments of power available to a state.
security strategies, maritime security strategies and maritime strategies, we must study a wide range of strategy documents adopted by the actors examined. Since we will compare the logic of the maritime security strategies pursued by small and major powers – equally aimed at protecting and promoting national interests – the obvious asymmetries regarding the available empirical material are manageable.

Concerning security strategies adopted by international bodies such as the EU, Tanner et al. (2009: 45) have noted that a “high degree of [interstate] consensus” on common aims is required, which must be “decoupled by the interests and priorities of individual states”. As a result, this necessitates “the use of a broader canvas”. Of relevance to this study, they concluded that although progress to these ends may be smooth in times of peace and stability, it “can easily be halted by unforeseen events that bring instability and fear back into the equation”.

To fulfil the second aim of this thesis, we engage ourselves in a qualitative study of the US maritime strategy developments. Clearly, its maritime security strategy has not developed in a context of geopolitical isolation. Instead, we can expect that a variety of factors and actors on a global scale have influenced it. We must therefore examine the US maritime security strategy developments in geographically separated, influential, maritime contexts.

Given that this thesis understands the post-Cold War concept of maritime security as being in continuous development, its aim is process oriented. To understand the nuances of this process, we must expound on the lessons that we can learn from the employment of maritime security strategies in regions where traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats converge. Here, we can learn a lot from engaging in qualitative analyses at state, international sub-system and system levels. In the last decades, the East and South China Seas have become the scene of escalating territorial disputes, traditional military great power competition, but also a variety of non-traditional maritime security threats such as piracy, terrorism and human smuggling.

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5 In this thesis, traditional security issues refer to conventional interstate threats and/or the use of military force. Non-traditional security issues, for their part, are complex and often transnational “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources” such as natural disasters, irregular migration, people and drug smuggling, trafficking and transnational crime (RSIS 2007).
More recently, the Baltic Sea region has transformed from a “sea of peace” (The Nordic Council 1992: 34) to an arena where national, regional and great power dynamics interact. Here, piracy and terrorism are rare problems while “smuggling of drugs and weapons and human trafficking” are being reported (Fransas et al. 2013: 20). As in the East and South China Seas, a regional power wields various instruments of power to promote its national interests in domains including the maritime. Thereto, the Baltic Sea is also one of the world’s busiest seas, which very slow exchange of water makes it sensitive to pollution caused by shipping accidents (HELCOM 2011). However, in contrast to the East and South China Seas, the maritime security of the Baltic Sea has to date received scant scholarly attention. This justifies the priority assigned to this region in this thesis.

To fulfil the twofold aim of this thesis the following research questions are posed, of which the first and the third addresses the strategies adopted and employed by the state actors examined, while the second and the fourth addresses the consequences thereof – and the lessons to be learnt – in each of the two regions of study:

1. What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategy of the US?
2. What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the East and South China Seas?
3. What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategy of Sweden and Finland in light of the recent resurgence of regional military threats?
4. What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the Baltic Sea region?

Answering the first and the second research questions contributes to fulfilling the second aim of this thesis, i.e. explaining continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security concept by examining the development of its maritime security strategy. Answering the third and fourth research questions contributes to fulfilling the first aim of this thesis, i.e. explaining continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region with a focus on non-aligned Finland and Sweden. Finally, answering all research questions will allow us to compare not only the logic of the US – the preponderant power, external to both regions –
interactions with coastal states in each of the regions, but also the resulting regional security dynamics with a focus on the maritime domain.

1.3. The setting

The 1991 break-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the USSR) – more commonly referred to as the Soviet Union – marked the end to a policy of confrontation between two power-blocs and the entry into a new era in international relations. Arguably, it resulted from a host of interacting domestic and international factors, of which the failure of the weak Soviet economic system to respond to changes in a globalising economy was instrumental (Wallander 2003: 137; Kramer 2003: 183). At the time, Western states maritime security conceptions were shaped by Cold War requirements, referring to “the maritime component of international conflict” (Scott 2011: 77). The continuous importance assigned by states to the maritime domain for satisfying their needs for transport, trade, power projection and defence (Till 2009: 286) renders maritime security a relevant field of study in its own right. Arguably, the value of the maritime domain has increased in the post-Cold War period.

There has been a gradual shift in focus towards the maritime domain not only by states, but also by non-state actors. Non-governmental organisations have frequently called for attention to the intrinsic values of the marine environment, while direct-action groups such as the Sea Shepard have been accused of pursuing maritime eco-extremism (Mills and Ernst 2012). Post-Cold War reductions in naval funding have coincided with the emergence of maritime private security actors, challenging the traditional role of states as maritime security providers (Carafano 2012). India, for example, has repeatedly opposed this challenge of their monopoly of force by setting crewmembers operating vessels of such state or non-state actors on trial for their actions, causing bilateral disputes with the need for international arbitration (PCA 2015; Shettar 2015).

Maritime security management is often coalesced with issues of ocean governance (see Wirth 2012), mainly due to the fact that the sea is an ever increasing source of food and raw materials\(^6\) essential for national wealth and prosperity. Accordingly, the EU defines maritime security as: “a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are

\[^6\] I.e. oil, gas and minerals, including rare earth elements (see Ting and Seaman 2015: 122–123).
enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected” (EU Council 2014: 3). France defines it as “preventing and fighting all intentional activities which are hostile to our interests” (FR PM 2015: 2). For the UK, maritime security is the “advancement and protection of national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK’s prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world” (UK Gov 2014: 15). To the US Sea Services, maritime security is about protecting its “sovereignty and maritime resources, support[ing] free and open seaborne commerce, and counter[ing] weapons proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, illegal exploitation of the maritime environment, and unlawful seaborne immigration” (U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard 2015: 26). Accordingly, the maritime strategies of Western states’ navies have widened in recent decades and now include a broad array of security issues (see Till 2013; Scott 2011; Rahman 2009c). Sea power, however, remains an integral part.

The emphasis on promoting national interests in the maritime security strategies put forth by the UK and the US reverberates in the more generally phrased strategy of the EU. As Germond (2015: 191–193) suggests, economic reasons underlie the EU’s quest to secure the maritime domain and protect the rights and interests of its member states. After all, maritime security deficiencies limit the prospects for sustainable blue growth as they complicate marine exploitation and discourage investors. The comprehensive, intersectoral, approach to the maritime domain of the EU gained momentum by its 2007 launch of an Integrated Maritime Policy (EC 2007).

A corresponding development is evident in South Africa, whose Defence Minister in 2011 declared maritime security “an increasingly pressing priority” and “a critical element of collective human security” linked to regional “development and economic prosperity” (Sisulu 2012). Accordingly, maritime security was included among South Africa’s top ten strategic priorities in 2012. In contrast, earlier documents such as its 2006 maritime doctrine and 1996 Defence White Paper emphasised traditional sea-power concepts and

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7 The EU’s Blue Growth Strategy focus areas are: i) blue energy; ii) aquaculture; iii) maritime, coastal and cruise tourism; and iv) blue biotechnology (European Commission 2012: 7–13).

8 Among the priorities were also to consolidate the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Maritime Security Strategy (RSA DoD 2012: 2, 7, 12).
assigned secondary roles to naval diplomacy and policing (RSA DoD 2006: 8, 48–50; RSA DoD 1996, Ch. 5, para. 27–30).

Much effort has been devoted to studying the developments of the issue areas embraced by today’s broad maritime security concept, i.e. maritime terrorism; maritime piracy; the smuggling of drugs and humans in the maritime domain; and the genesis of private security companies as providers of maritime security services. Scholars applying various approaches to their study of legal or policy problems in these issue areas have created a body of research.

Accordingly, scholars have pointed out maritime security as an emerging sub-discipline within Security Studies, in turn a sub-field of International Relations (IR) theory (Bruns 2014). However, to Bueger (2015: 159, 163) the term is a “buzzword” of international relations with “no definite meaning,” increasingly used in “maritime policy, ocean governance and international security.” This is partly due to the limited amount of scholarly effort dedicated to date to explaining the resulting changes in states’ maritime security conceptions, i.e. why these changes have occurred. Few authors (see Bueger 2015; Till 2013; Yetkin 2013; Scott 2011; Rahman 2009c) have engaged themselves in theory-driven analyses of the conceptual post-Cold War development of maritime security. This limitation in previous results – of relevance to explain contemporary policymaking – represents the research gap addressed by this thesis.

1.4. Positioning the thesis in the academic literature

The array of scholarly work on various issue-areas of maritime security that the following chapter will address indicates the nested character of Western states’ maritime security strategies. In fact, these strategies represent the aggregated result from states’ adoption of various sub-strategies in different sectors of security, each of which outlines a distinct approach to problem solving and promoting civil and military national interests pertaining to, or relating to, the maritime domain. This thesis draws on the fact that the priority of such sub-strategies to comprehensive maritime security strategies tends to change over time. Given the dominance of the military sector in states’ early

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9 N.B. maritime security is an issue area in itself. Following Vertzberger (1990: 71), I break it down further into these categories based on their information content and the primary actors.

10 Struett and Nance (2013: 8), as well as McGahan and Lee (2013: 162), arrive at a similar conclusion regarding the literature on maritime piracy.
post-Cold War maritime security strategies, a residual effect of the Cold War, its priority in subsequent strategies would imply conceptual continuity while emphasis placed on issues in any other sector of security indicates change.

By engaging in a theory-driven conceptual analysis, this thesis contributes to explain the continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of Finland, Sweden and the US over the past three decades. It duly considers the influence of the sole superpower on the maritime security strategies of the two former by its key assumption that the post-Cold War conceptual maritime security developments has influenced states worldwide. This is in consonance with the claim of structural realism that great powers “dominate and shape international politics”, while recognising the fact that realism and liberalism constitute the dominant competing paradigms of IR theory (Mearsheimer 2001: 14–17; Ikenberry 2009: 203–206). The latter state of affairs is acknowledged also by critical theorists, who often point to the scholarly dominance of the social science discipline by US researchers, reminding us that even the idea of conceptualising international relations as a science with a dominant positivistic methodology is entirely American (see Crawford 2000: 15–17, 88–90; Wæver 1998: 696–724).11

Following Waltz (2004: 5), it must be noted that constructivism in the tradition of Wendt (1999) firmly entered the American discipline of IR since the millennium. As opposed to the “critical constructivism” firmly established in European Journals, this approach is complementary to realism and liberalism since it endorses “a scientific approach to social inquiry”, conceding “important points to materialist and individualist perspectives.” It challenges realism and liberalism by focussing on “the role of shared ideas and norms in shaping state behaviour” (Ikenberry 1999), arguing that the anarchic nature of the international system – which rules according to Wendt are socially constructed – may be overcome by states’ identity and interest formation (Wendt 1992). Notwithstanding, this thesis draws on the explanatory power of structural realism.

Augmented by supporting analytical frameworks derived from Till (2013) and Knudsen (1988; 1996) in Article 2 and in the concluding chapter, the structural realism framework presented in Chapter 3 is the main lens through

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which the empirical material will be analysed. However, it may rightly be argued that Finland’s and Sweden’s integration into the common foreign and security policy of the EU have influenced their choice of entering into a bilateral naval cooperation. To provide a more comprehensive understanding of their complex incentives, it employs a competing theoretical framework based on the neofunctionalism strand of liberalism in Article 3. N.B. this analytical siding contributes to enabling us to assess the explanatory power of structural realism, which we will discuss in Articles 2 and 3 as well as in the concluding chapter.

Examining the change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy through a structural realism lens is worthwhile in two respects. First, it has empirical merit by clarifying the influence on its maritime security conception of: i) maritime terrorism; ii) maritime piracy and criminality; and iii) the territorialisation of the sea by coastal states the following interlinked issues areas. However, we must not study the influence of these issue-areas in isolation. Instead, the post-Cold War context must be taken into due consideration. This context centres on a shift in superpower competition from the political-ideological to the economic sphere and involves a complex nexus of geoeconomic and geopolitical concerns (Dent 2010: 243; Raphael and Stokes 2010: 391). Second, this thesis has theoretical merits by assessing strengths and weaknesses of structural realism in explaining the naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden, involving regional and global security dynamics. In addition, its reflections on the conditions enabling small states to influence the conditions for cooperating with a great power have theoretical relevance.

We can more thoroughly assess the explanations provided by structural realism by contrasting and challenging them. Here, various strands of liberalism have offered competing perspectives to those of the realism tradition since the end of the First World War. While neoliberalism represents the main competitor of structural realism, neofunctionalism – a thread of the sociological liberalism strand – is a theoretical framework designed to explain European integration. Finland and Sweden are small Nordic states deeply

12 See Figure 6 for a flowchart outlining the logic of how this thesis understands the responses of state actors to threats to typical referent objects in key maritime security sectors.
13 In a forward-looking article, Buzan (1991b: 432–433) characterised the Cold War security agenda as dominated by political/military concerns due to the real danger of war stemming from intense US/USSR rivalry, transmitted into regions that were more peripheral by their arms transfers. Inversely, he expected a rise in ranks of economic, societal and environmental issues on the international security agenda.
embedded in the common foreign and security policy of the EU. The ever stronger perception among its member states of "common security and defence challenges", requiring resources beyond what they individually possess, have made them agree upon "the vision of a stronger Europe" and a global strategy outlining strengthened "EU cooperation on external security and defence" (EU 2016; EC 2016c). Their coordinated efforts to develop strategic defence capabilities for this common end, justify the use of neofunctionalism as a competing theoretical framework – i.e. we expound on the force of spillover effects – in Article 3. Here, we employ a slightly modified version of neofunctionalism to contrast and challenge structural realism's explanations on the bilateral naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden. This approach is novel but not unique. Ojanen (2006), Parrein (2011), Sauer (2015) and Westberg (2015) have employed neofunctionalism to explain the process leading up to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), international defence cooperation within the EU as well as within the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).

The rise of authoritarian regional powers Russia and China, accompanied by expectations on the international community to accept their perceived need for expanded spheres of influence\(^\text{14}\) and their ambition "to become more formidable powers on the international stage" (Kagan 2015), must be duly considered. Given their challenge of the US hegemony in the last decade – or, as regards China the last decades – we can expect them to influence the character of the maritime security concerns of the coastal states in two distinct regions. Such friction is prominent in the East and South China Seas as well as in the Baltic Sea. Since the rise of China has preceded that of Russia, we use the influence of the developments in the region of the East and South China Seas to draw out the implications for the US conceptual maritime security developments, which we use as a reference when we examine the maritime security developments of the Baltic Sea region.

To understand the regional implications of the maritime security developments, we must study also the foreign policies of less powerful states in key regions and their interaction with the US. Examining their foreign policies will contrast the traditional focus on great powers in the structural realist literature, adhering to the traditional wisdom that the role of small states in the construction and maintenance of international security orders has

\(^{14}\) Such a sphere involves “the [political] claim by a state to exclusive or predominant control over a foreign area or territory (…) which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact” (Dudney 2016).
always been marginal (Wivel et al. 2014: 3). Thereby, this thesis will be linked to the growing body of IR-literature on how small states may act strategically to promote their own security by influencing larger and more powerful states (see Steinmetz and Wivel 2010: 3–11; Mosser 2001: 64–65).

Notably, there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a small state. Rather, smallness – regardless of its definition as an absolute or a relative term – draws on the concept of power.\footnote{For an elaborate discussion on the concepts of power and influence, see Zimmerling (2005: 15–31).} A small state is thus a weak state relative to more powerful ones. The issue at hand making the small states literature differ from structural realist studies is its questioning of whether a certain degree of power – measured in absolute and relative terms – equivalents influence. In plain words, this thesis will reflect on whether certain small states can punch above their weight and if so, how they go about and under what conditions they can do so?

Before we engage more deeply with the theoretical frameworks employed in this thesis, we will review and structure the research previously undertaken in the field of maritime security.
2. Previous research on maritime security

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more detailed account of the current research status of maritime security and its issue-areas. Accordingly, it identifies limitations of existing research and the theoretical approaches employed in the studies of these issue areas. Finally, this chapter specifies key explanatory factors of relevance for this study and positions it in the research field.

As noted in the introduction, the global rise of new maritime security challenges following the Cold War termination has received much scholarly attention. As shown in Figure 2 below, the publication rate on maritime security literature has grown since the turn of the millennium.

![Figure 2: The number of books, book chapters, articles and dissertations that included the words “maritime security” in their title, presented by year of publication 1990–2015 (OCLC 2016).](image)

Notwithstanding, maritime security remains a concept suffering from a lack of comprehensive analysis, since the research efforts have predominantly been directed towards its specific issue areas but also towards the consequences of such local, regional or global problem remedy. From a policy perspective, these issue-areas are often interrelated and sometimes even interconnected. Scholars are increasingly addressing this conceptual lacuna, whereof the most ambitious studies take legal approaches. Below, an overview of maritime security research relevant to this study is presented, structured by the conceptual literature and by issue-area.
2.1. Conceptual maritime security literature

Some scholars have engaged in conceptual approaches. First, in a volume edited by Rothwell et al. (2011), eleven scholars applied legal or policy approaches on Australia’s and New Zealand’s maritime security developments through fourteen essays. Their common effort to conceptualise maritime security from a regional perspective is a benchmark contribution. Three of them – Bateman, Klein and Rahman – have authored a range of books, book chapters and articles of interest to this study.16 Although not explicitly employing International Relations (IR) or International Security Studies (ISS) theories, they combine national/international strategic and legal perspectives with a wide interpretation of security. They exemplify those scholars who elaborate on maritime security as the absence of certain threats to state interests in the maritime domain, i.e. a “negative” definition of the term.

Second, Sloggett (2013: 3, 23–24, 36–46, 152–153, 183–190, 223–236) has portrayed contemporary maritime security through a seven-dimensional framework17 aimed at raising awareness among policymakers. We will not consider his examination of the US concept any further, since it is uncritical and widely reproduces the thoughts of US Admiral Gary Roughead.18

Third, Till (2013) has provided a key conceptual text of scholarly value on the changing role of sea power.19 By taking a historical point of departure, he defines a spectrum of contemporary nation-state behaviour of which “modern” and “postmodern” paradigms – both acknowledging the role of sea power – are the two extremes (Till 2013: 32–43).20 The “modern” paradigm – arguably incorporating a set of traditional realist assumptions – correlates with

16 I.e.: Bateman (2010a; 2010b; 2012); Bateman and Bergin (2009; 2010; 2011; 2012); Bateman, Bergin and Channer (2013); Bateman et al. (2011); Bateman and Emmers (2009); Bateman and Ho (2010); Bateman et al. (2009); Bergin et al. (2002); Herbert-Burns et al. (2009); Ho and Bateman (2012); Klein (2006a; 2006b; 2011; 2012); McCaffrie and Rahman (2010); Rahman (2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2009c); Rahman and Tsamenyi (2010).
17 I.e.: state-on-state confrontation; trade protection; resource management; smuggling; terrorism; disasters; and oceanography.
18 Sloggett appears dazzled by the 1,000-ship Navy concept, widely echoing the thoughts expressed by US Admiral Roughead in his “testimony to US Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations on Defence”.
19 Also Esterhuyse (2010) noted the scholarly value of Till’s holistic approach to analysing “the role of navies in a globalised world” in his review essay of the 2009 edition of this “standard text book” for teachers of naval strategy.
20 Till determines states’ positions on the spectrum by their “doctrine and policy declarations”, capabilities and “the nature of their operations”.
“continuity” in maritime security, as defined in this study, outlining naval behaviour and capabilities in terms of defence of the nation state and promotion of its national interests. Conversely, the “post-modern” paradigm explains states’ use of their navies for maintaining international rather than national security. This more liberally oriented paradigm arguably draws on the ideas advanced by Buzan (1991a) that national security has transformed into international security, which multi-sectoral issue agenda has security communities rather than nation-states as referent objects. It correlates with “change” in maritime security, as defined in this study, involving a broad set of naval missions. Both paradigms are associated with distinct capability developments.

Till (2013: 5–23, 282–304) provides conceptual insights of relevance to this study. A good starting point is his conceptualisation of the sea as a resource and a medium of: i) transportation and exchange; ii) for information and the spread of ideas; and iii) of dominion. Till also notes that the ambiguities of the terms “maritime security” and “maritime security operations” (MSO), which span “everything from ‘hard’ national defence concerns to issues of marine safety”. International collaborative perspectives thus mix with competitive national ones when states’ defend “good order at sea”. Till provides a “positive” definition of maritime security, i.e. implying the establishment of a safe and secure domain. Moreover, he points to changes in the attributes of the sea’s contribution to human development which are closely linked to contemporary maritime security developments, i.e. that the sea is developing from a source of power and dominion into an area of sovereignty and that increasing attention is given to the marine environment’s intrinsic values. Finally, Till notes that maritime sovereignty involves “instrumental” and “expressive” dimensions, the former deriving benefits to the state while the latter symbolises its values and power. He rightly argues that states need legal tools and naval capacity to assert, control and defend sovereignty over maritime areas for any of these reasons.

Fourth, Yetkin (2013) has employed Till’s concept of “modern” and “postmodern” naval paradigms as a supporting framework in an article on

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21 For early theoretical works on post-modernism, linked to post-structuralism, focussing on the role of agency instead of system in societies, see Bauman (1992) and Shaw (2000: 18).

22 Till defines five missions for post-modern navies: i) sea control; ii) expeditionary operations; iii) stability operations/humanitarian assistance; iv) inclusive good order at sea; and v) cooperative naval diplomacy.
conceptual change in maritime security. With some success, he combines it with an operationalisation of Michael Porter’s analytical framework comprising “five forces”\(^{23}\) for evaluating viable strategies for new firms entering existing business markets. He concludes that the maritime security environment has become more “sophisticated” by the effects of globalisation. States must thus not only consider potential naval adversaries when drafting their maritime strategies, but also apply a comprehensive “industrial analysis” approach to assess a “complicated and constantly evolving maritime security environment”. In the view of Yetkin, the change of navies into postmodern character represents a response to paradigmatic changes in supplier and threat environments. His study points to the effects of private actors’ involvement in maritime security governance, which arguably result from neoliberal thought among state governments (Leander and van Munster 2007: 202–204).

Fifth, to Bueger (2015: 159–163), the above elaborations on the content of maritime security centre on an insufficient “laundry list” of threats, which absence define maritime security. Herein he includes a criticism by rhetorically asking *whose* security is provided by employing such a “buzzword” definition, and *whom* the beneficiaries are of the related measures being implemented by individual states and the international community. To Bueger, such rationalist interpretations of maritime security serve to “mask political interests (...) and underlying ideologies”. Instead, he suggests a constructivist interpretation of the concept by a three-pillar framework: i) mapping the relations between maritime security and other concepts; ii) studying securitisations in the maritime domain by employing the Copenhagen School theoretical framework\(^{24}\) – a pre-packed set of assumptions and research methods outlining security as the result of an intersubjective securitisation process (i.e. security practice theory); and iii) examining what actions are undertaken “in the name of maritime security”. Of relevance to this study is Bueger’s observation that “blue growth”, human security\(^{25}\), marine safety and sea power represent established concepts interrelated with – or concepts that even have become subsumed by – the contemporary concept of maritime security. In

\(^{23}\) I.e. rivalry among existing competitors (navies) influenced by the: i) power of suppliers (defence industry, human capital); ii) power of buyers (governments, ship owners, the public); iii) threat of new entrance (other navies); and iv) threat of substitutes (maritime private security companies, other military services or civilian instruments).

\(^{24}\) See the founding works of Buzan et al. (1998), as well as Buzan and Wæver (2003).

\(^{25}\) A concept launched in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme aimed at reconceptualising the understanding of security by focussing on individual, instead of national, security (Schäfer 2013: 7).
addition, his elaboration on maritime security communities, drawing on a concept conceived by integration theorist Karl Deutsch in the 1960s, deserves consideration in this study’s examination of the Baltic Sea region.

Beyond these conceptual elaborations on maritime security, the controversies and practical challenges associated with the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (UN 2013) provide the sources of a rich body of legal literature. The intrinsic tension between UNCLOS granting maritime powers’ their much desired freedom of the seas while assigning coastal states legal rights to vast Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), has been addressed by Kraska. In a monograph attributable to Till’s “modern” paradigm, Kraska (2011a: 1–27, 157–230, 379, 397–403) suggests that international peace and security hinges on the ability of maritime powers, such as the US, to maintain the global liberal order. He laments what he interprets as a restraining trend on US access to littoral seas – “the epicenter of world politics” – by coastal states’ excessive territorial claims in their EEZs. In response, Kraska argues for the implementation of a more assertive US Freedom of Navigation Program to be followed by its allies. What he actually requests here is leveraged influence of US grand strategies on international legal norms.

Liberal-oriented scholars have contrasted the ominous view of Kraska. The volume edited by Erickson et al. (2010), in which twenty authors identified prospects for increased US-China cooperation – and even maritime partnership – by applying perspectives attributable to Till’s “postmodern” paradigm is a good example. While noting that Taiwan remained a major impediment to expanded military and maritime cooperation, Erickson (2010: 429–458) as well as Erickson and Goldstein (2010: ix–xxi) pointed to: i) China’s “cautiously positive reaction to the new [2007] U.S. Maritime Strategy”; ii) the US-China maritime commercial partnership; and iii) the potential for expanding cooperation on maritime search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, marine environmental issues and military education.

Jianzhong (2010: 8–9) stressed the coastal character of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy build-up and the fact that China and the US

26 For two accounts taking different stands on whether and how sovereignty, threats to maritime security and overlapping maritime claims provided for by the UNCLOS contribute to the South China Sea dispute, see Hong (2012) and He (2011). For an edited volume comprising 20 essays evaluating UNCLOS, see Freestone (2013).

27 He places emphasis on what he considers illiberal oceans policies pursued by Brazil, China, India and Iran, which most likely will inspire followers in their respective regions.
shared: i) the aim of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region; and ii) an interest in development and prosperity. Collins (2010: 14–34), for his part, suggested that: i) China was equally dependent on the global maritime commons as the US; ii) commercial maritime interests pushed China’s naval developments; and that iii) China was dependent on secure sea lines of communications for its trade and energy security. Smith (2010: 101–119) elaborated on whether China’s terrorism encounters in the wake of its growing political and military status would foster US-China cooperation on countering such transnational security threats, but concluded that it presupposed a reduction in their geopolitical antagonism.

This literature represents scholarly works of relevance to this thesis study of the US.

Yet another volume edited by Potgieter and Pommerin (2009) has addressed the challenges and responses to Southern Africa’s maritime security. In essence, the authors focussed on its insecurity by arguing that the African states’ defiance of their fundamental obligation to exercise their sovereignty had jeopardised their trade, maritime resource extraction, economic development, and created humanitarian misery (Potgieter 2009: 5–22; Roux 2009: 23–30; Yotamo 2009: 63–68; Allais 2009: 69–76; Fouche 2009: 77–87; Hugo 2009: 103–111; Purves 2009: 113–130). Regional cooperation and collective security were promoted to address piracy, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, human trafficking, maritime terrorism and smuggling. One author took a stand for involving maritime private security companies in protecting maritime resource extraction off West Africa (Vreıy 2009: 89–102). This volume, firmly positioned in Till’s postmodern paradigm, contributes to set the context for this study.

Global, regional and bilateral policy initiatives and agreements are interwoven with international and domestic law arrangements in all maritime security issue areas. Here, scholars have employed competing realist and liberal perspectives in their analyses of the legal developments.

Klein (2011: 2–3, 304–307) has compared the legal improvements made to maritime security with the legal structures provided by the UNCLOS, arguably reflecting traditional security interests. She notes that coastal states’ promotions of exclusive security interests threaten the fundamental freedom of the sea principle. Klein argues that states’ threaten the inclusive interests shared by the international community by asserting "sovereignty and/or jurisdiction in adjacent waters beyond the rights they strictly enjoy under the
law of the sea”. Based on a comprehensive examination of the international legal developments in response to an expanding array of maritime security threats, she concludes that: i) responses to piracy and armed robbery remained a matter for affected coastal states; ii) an extensive body of law is available for states responding to miscellaneous maritime interests – including shipping and offshore installations – threatened by terrorism; and iii) smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is subject to similar legal avenues as maritime terrorism.

Coastal states, Klein (2011: 2–3, 304–307) argues, remain the authority to counter: i) drug smuggling on their territorial waters, but bi- and multilateral agreements can authorise contracting states to interdict; ii) people smuggling on their territorial waters, but bilateral and regional agreements between source, transit and receiving states can authorise contracting states to intervene; iii) IUU fishing on their territorial waters, but recent legal improvements allow for responses by regional fisheries management organisations in certain high sea areas. Finally, she notes that port/coastal states have been granted greater legal powers to respond to intentional environmental harm to maritime areas, suggesting that maritime security would be best served if states emphasised their common interest. She thereby signals her normative commitment to conceptualising maritime security as common security.

The in-depth account on the evolution of maritime security law provided by Kraska and Pedrozo (2013), viewed from a US maritime strategic policy perspective and firmly positioned in Till’s “modern” paradigm, contrasts the “postmodern” perspective of Klein.

Lastly, the monograph of Germond (2015) examines whether or not the EU is a global maritime actor, departing from the notion of Till (2013: 25) that sea power has input (the sum of material assets broadly defined) as well as output (“capacity to influence”) dimensions. After engaging in an eclectic theoretical discussion spanning the realism, liberal, post-structuralism and Marxist schools of thought, Germond (2015: 5–17, 91, 191–192) proposes a new framework for analysis made up of: i) projection of military security; ii) non-military security; iii) environmental security; and iv) securitisations and representations. After degrading his original framework to the status of a “conceptual background”, he applies a more austere framework composed of two distinct categories constituting sea power28 – i.e. material and ideational

28 N.B. backed by relevant institutional structures.
elements – to his study of the EU. Germond concludes that economic interests and the securitisation of non-military threats have shaped the EU's maritime policies. However, he also notes that the power of the EU remains at the discretion of its member states. Therefore, the EU policy documents – despite their vigorous rhetoric – only serve to delineate the "boundaries of what the EU can or shall do".

The monograph of Germond (2015), of relevance for this study's examination of the Baltic Sea region, highlights the challenges associated with employing a (too) wide analytical framework.

2.2. Piracy and terrorism in the maritime domain

Maritime terrorism and piracy represent issue-areas that are prominent topics of the maritime security literature. Studies of the threats and their consequences, the effectiveness and unintended effects of international responses to thwart them, and last but not least their legal dimensions are the most common approaches. Some scholars have stressed the risk of a nexus between terrorism and piracy. Here, I will draw on texts authored by a few influential authors, being keen to admit that the amount of research on this topic is substantially larger.

Liss (2010) and Raymond (2005; 2007; 2009) exemplify the range of authors who have sought to explain the root causes of regional piracy. Liss (2007; 2011; 2012), for her part, has authored texts on the implications on energy security by piracy and maritime terrorism, as well as the use of Maritime Private Security Companies. In their analyses of Southeast Asian piracy, both Liss and Raymond have taken historical points of departure, using adequate statistics to support their framings of the problems before engaging with them, thus outlining the conditions creating and influencing them. Finally, they have analysed and discussed the national and international responses and their effectiveness. Field-studies and interviews have been key sources in their explanations of piracy as both a symptom and a result of socio-economic and security concerns (see Liss 2010: 360). Although the analyses of Liss and Raymond are not explicitly driven by theory, Raymond has highlighted the effects of piracy being securitised by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore following the 11 September 2001 events (Raymond 2007: 63–64).

In a volume edited by Struett et al. (2013) use maritime piracy to expose incongruities in common understandings of global governance. The authors employ constructivist approaches in their efforts to understand various
international actors’ responses to maritime piracy. Gould (2013: 23–46), Heinze (2013: 47–70) and Dutton (2013: 71–95) address contemporary discourses on piracy in terms of its legal construction in international law by states, the shipping industry and international bodies. Bueger and Stockbruegger (2013: 99–120) – noting that piracy has developed from a neglected issue at the millennium into an international problem engaging a host of security actors – suggest that a global security governance arrangement is under construction. McGahan and Lee (2013: 150–162) point to alternative problem framings, suggesting that neoliberal approaches contrast approaches which frame piracy as a threat to human rights. They stress the role of such framings since activists and policymakers use them to shape policies, inferring that normative arguments can motivate costly actions when resonating with prevailing value frames.

The much cited monograph of Murphy (2009: 28–45, 123–125, 161, 177, 380–381) on contemporary maritime piracy and maritime terrorism is a rationalist account of these phenomena contrasting these constructivist approaches. Here, he outlines a framework of conditions which he argues have encouraged piracy throughout history, i.e.: i) legal and jurisdictional opportunities; ii) favourable geography; iii) conflict and disorder; iv) underfunded law enforcement/ineffective security; v) permissive political environments; vi) cultural acceptability/maritime tradition; and vii) the promise of rewards. He highlights weaknesses in statistics and contested definitions, seeking to address each issue from multiple viewpoints. To Murphy, piracy represents local problems created by criminal entrepreneurs or insurgent groups raising money for their struggle, occurring on a global scale with local or regional effects. He provides a comprehensive account also on the development of maritime terrorism – taking multiple references in the works of Peter Chalk, addressed below – while rejecting any concrete links to piracy.

Murphy (2011: 1–2, 135–136) applies this framework in a much acclaimed, but also criticised, case study on the Somali piracy in 1991–2006. Hardly surprising, he finds it applicable to explain the rise in piracy by Somalia’s clan-

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30 See Samatar (2013), whose critique focused on Murphy’s: i) extensive use of secondary sources and the lack of field-studies; ii) downplaying of the triggering role of illegal Western fishing fleets off Somalia; and iii) allegedly inept portrayal of Somalis as uncivilized and tribal natives.
based society and “the rise to power of elites that countenanced predatory behaviour”. Murphy concludes that they simply relocated their land-based kidnapping and extortion activities to a more lucrative maritime environment. While rejecting the choice of costly naval campaigns to thwart a problem originating from ashore, he calls on trading states to address the issues of weak states in the world’s littorals.\(^{31}\)

The monograph on piracy by Kraska (2011b), for its part, focusses on the legal developments, assigning prominence to US policy and strategy perspectives on the subject matter. Here, Kraska (2011b: xv, 1–100) takes a historical point of departure aimed at providing a pedigree of international piracy and an account of historic legal approaches to deal with these crimes. He then enters a path previously trodden by Murphy, elaborating on the contemporary developments of Southeast Asian piracy before approaching East Africa, the main region of study. Before we elaborate on Western naval strategy and policy concerning East African piracy, we will benefit from a brief account on the responses by the shipping industry in general and the coordinating work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in particular. N.B. the works of Murphy and Kraska highlight the need to examine the role of weak states – but also that of the IMO in managing piracy – to explain the conceptual development of US maritime security.

Chalk (1998; 2000; 2001; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2012), see also Chalk and Ungerer (2008), has examined global terrorism and organised crime through a range of studies. Chalk (2008: 19–21) argues that these threats have evolved through a series of attempted and successful terrorist attacks by al Qaeda affiliates since the turn of the millennium, although the number of terrorist attacks on maritime targets has been low since 1976. These incidents have instilled fear among Western powers for a determined expansion of Islamist operations to the maritime domain. This fear was accentuated in the US, Chalk suggests, explaining why the US assumed the lead role in strengthening global maritime security control systems since 11 September 2001.

Chalk (2006: 129) has employed the Copenhagen School for studying securitisations associated with the spread of new and re-emerging diseases in the Asia-Pacific, linking this issue to the threats of biological terrorism perceived among Asia-Pacific states including Australia. Aradau and van

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\(^{31}\) Murphy boldly states that the Somali piracy has “exposed the futility as ever of deploying military power, in this case naval force, against even seemingly insignificant opponents in the absence of clear political objectives.”
Munster (2012: 228–236) outline a suggestive mechanism for explaining collective responses to terrorist events. By drawing on psychological research on people who experienced the 11 September 2001 events, they argue that those involved in a traumatic event had to act in order to understand it. “Sociodrama”, i.e. fostering of cooperative potential and cohesion in a group, may thus explain securitisation processes as a mechanism through which decision-makers govern traumatic terrorist events or threats.32

The possible nexus of piracy and Islamic terrorism is a part of the scholarly discussion. Concerning Asia, scholars have pointed to the former kidnapping for ransom activities perpetrated by the Indonesian separatist group Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM).33 Concerning Somalia, Lehr (2009: 28–29), Reid (2011: 13–15) and Chalk (2012: 164–165) have noted potential links between piracy groups and the al-Shabaab militia. Although not entirely dismissing a future nexus, most scholars have pointed to the inhibitory effect of the different motives of pirates and terrorists (see Chalk 2008: 31–33; Chalk 2012: 164–165; Reid 2011: 12).34

This overview shows that scholars using rationalist and reflectivist approaches have examined the issue-areas of piracy and terrorism. Among the approaches, the Copenhagen School theoretical framework stands out as a framework frequently applied by scholars who critically analyse and discuss the effects of certain security policy practices or phenomena.

32 Here, they call for an interpretation of securitisation processes wider than that of the Copenhagen School.
33 GAM has been described both as a separatist or guerrilla movement and an al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organisation, engaged in criminal activities to raise money for their political struggle (see Raymond 2007: 69–72; Banlaoi 2009: 256; Hansen 2009: 81).
34 For a conceptual discussion on terrorism and criminality, see Hoffman (2006: 17–18, 36–41).
2.3. The smuggling of drugs and humans in the maritime domain

Human and drug smuggling are maritime security issue-areas thoroughly analysed through theory-driven studies. Emmers (2004) employed the Copenhagen School theory in his study of non-traditional security threats in the Asia-Pacific through case studies of Thailand, Singapore and Australia. He concluded that Thailand had securitised drug trafficking, Singapore had securitised piracy and maritime terrorism, while Australia had securitised human smuggling. In an essay on the Asia-Pacific human trafficking problem, Emmers et al. (2008: 77) promoted national securitisation of what they regarded as “one of the [region's] worst transnational criminal offences”. Yet another conceptual perspective of relevance to this study is the volume edited by Bateman and Emmers (2009), contrasting the strategic dimension and the rise of non-traditional transnational threats in the South China Sea region. Notably, they found that these dimensions were converging.

Mallia (2010: 1, 7-8, 18, 27-34) stresses the need for international cooperation and coordinated approaches on transnational people smuggling. She notes a link between US perceptions on migrant smuggling by sea – held as the fastest growing transnational crime – and the risk of undetected entry of terrorists via smuggling networks. Accordingly, Mallia suggests that the US framed migrant smuggling as a threat to US national security in the wake of the 11 September events, while the response measures introduced by the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code were preventive in their character. Its focus on port and container security – and its surveillance and monitoring provisions – were aspects of a desire for control, she argues, aimed at pushing the US border measures abroad. This is important concerning this thesis study of the US.

Mallia (2010: 43-99, 111-160, 163-224) also contrasts the UNCLOS framework available to coastal states when interdicting suspected vessels in their maritime zones with the constraining humanitarian obligations incumbent upon all states. After elaborating on its limitations, she presents the treaty modifications adopted through the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its supplementing (Human) Smuggling Protocol. Based on case studies of Australian, EU and US practices on human smuggling, she concludes that finding solutions to the problems require the addressing of their root causes.
Allen (2012) provides a Caribbean perspective on human smuggling, supplementing the more common US perspectives. It frames the global problem from a perspective of the sending countries, i.e. Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Cuba. Having narrowed his focus to Jamaica, Allen (2012: 34–48) notes a recently established adequate legislative framework. He concludes, however, that domestic legislative provisions – and aggressive information campaigns to deter perilous migration attempts – are needed to make it work.

Guilfoyle (2011) has provided a much-noted volume on the possibilities and constraints of the UNCLOS and shipping interdiction. Guilfoyle (2011: 4–6) approaches maritime security simply as a matter of enforcing peacetime jurisdiction, outlined as a two-step process: first, conducting boarding, inspection and search of suspected ships at sea; second, arresting the vessel and its crew or seizing its cargo if legal violations are substantiated. His volume is structured in three sections. The first outlines the general principles of flag state jurisdiction and maritime zones. The second elaborates on an array of regimes for conducting maritime interdiction and policing of piracy, drug smuggling, migrant smuggling, human trafficking and fisheries, with a focus on the US, the UK and Australia. The third is dedicated to deduce internationally accepted principles for maritime interdiction, drawing from the range of such practices and maritime law previously examined. His book adds to the range of substantiated legal analyses of relevance to this study.

The surge in migrants passing the Mediterranean Sea in their often-fatal efforts to reach Europe in 2014 and 2015 has spawned an expanding body of scholarly work.35 Miltner (2015) applies a legal perspective on the maritime aspects of the European response to what has been referred to as “the Mediterranean migration crisis” since April 2015. This ongoing crisis highlights the complex global phenomenon of maritime “mixed migration”, referring to flows of various categories of migrants with differing motivation and need for protection who use the same migration routes and transport means while relying on the same smuggling networks, which policy implications are scrutinised by Roman (2015). Hammond (2015: 3) and Miltner (2015: 215) highlight the role of the Mediterranean Sea as a “connective tissue” for irregular migration from Northern Africa and the Middle East to Europe. They also discuss Italy’s ambitious Naval Search and Rescue operation *Mare Nostrum*,

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35 The recent volume edited by Ambrosetti et al. (2016) exemplifies the scholarly literature on socio-economic perspectives of this crisis, which is not within the scope of this study.
launched in 2013 and replaced in 2014 by the EU’s leaner Joint Border Surveillance operation Triton.\textsuperscript{36}

This maritime mass migration involves multidimensional challenges for EU member states. As noted by Miltner (2015: 213–232), the legal context of the maritime domain is replete with unresolved conflicts between the duties of states to protect human rights and their legal power to control immigration by interception. UNCLOS include mandatory provisions to rescue individuals in distress at sea, while the \textit{European Convention on Human Rights} provides substantial rights to individuals coming under jurisdiction or control of EU member states.

Scholars have pointed to the links of this crisis – having forged a deep divide in the EU over immigration and induced several member states\textsuperscript{37} to re-impose partial national border controls within the Schengen area (Traynor and Watt 2016) – to traditional military considerations. In February 2016, NATO (2016b) announced the deployment of its Standing NATO Maritime Group Two to “conduct reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings in the Aegean Sea” in close coordination with the EU to “stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration”. As noted by Chapsos (2016), NATO’s deployment in the territorial waters of Turkey and Greece instead appears to have a military purpose, since Russia’s main supply route for sustaining their campaign in Syria\textsuperscript{38} from the Black Sea traverses the Aegean Sea. The scope of the refugee crisis is mainly due to the breakdown of order in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria.\textsuperscript{39} The roles of Russia and Turkey in the latter have increased the stakes (see Oliphant and Weise 2016).

\textsuperscript{36} Led by Italy, but coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex). In addition, Frontex coordinates operation \textit{Poseidon Rapid Intervention}, led by Greece to manage migration flows in the Aegean Sea.

\textsuperscript{37} Including Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia and Sweden.

\textsuperscript{38} At the launch of \textit{The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2016}, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg (2017) described NATO’s naval presence in the Aegean Sea as a success, bringing “together Turkey and Greece, EU and NATO in the region”.

\textsuperscript{39} In the third quarter of 2015, Syrians, Afghans and Iranians predominated among the flow of asylum seekers (Eurostat 2015), giving rise to the controversial March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement aimed at ending the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU (EC 2016a).
2.4 Maritime Private Security Companies

The study of the maritime Private Security Companies (PSCs) issue-area is a niche topic of the maritime security literature. Arguably, it peaked in tandem with the use of PSCs to counter the rise in piracy off Somalia. Typically, it deals with the legal and regulatory problems, economic considerations, and the operational and tactical challenges associated with the use of maritime PSCs, lest to forget the results and the motives behind their emergence. This section introduces some key examples.

The authors of a volume edited by Berube and Cullen (2012) have expounded on the shift in states’ management of maritime security risks from a direct – i.e. using traditional naval means – to an indirect form, i.e. by managing the security behaviour of private sector actors. Cullen (2012: 27–31) concluded that the ulterior motive was a shift in governments’ orientation towards precaution and risk management, thus transferring risks away from themselves by embedding security responsibilities into private industry. Such private initiatives could involve protection of clients against terrorism, he suggested, but more often against crimes. While assessing the probability of maritime terrorism as low (thus offering a small market), Cullen noted that criminality offered a viable market in regions where coastal states had failed to provide adequate maritime security. However, as Berube (2012: 76–78) made clear, the increasingly advanced and costly protection offered by maritime PSCs has been accompanied by a debate on their feasibility and their legal mandate to use lethal force.

Pitney and Levin (2014) have examined the use of maritime PSCs to counter the maritime security threats off East and West Africa in 2008–2013. After reflecting on the 18th and 19th paramilitary practices of the British East India Company off the Horn of Africa, they discuss the emergence of this private sector. In their analysis, they note a range of legal, economic and operational challenges associated with the use of maritime PSCs. Pitney and Levin (2014: 177–229) partly attribute the decline in piracy off Somalia in 2012 and 2013 to the efforts of maritime PSCs, while its sharp increase off West Africa enables them to make cross-case comparisons. They conclude that the demand for maritime PSC services will “remain sensitive to the operational and legal outlook”, the adaptability of PSCs to future threats and the continued willingness of state sponsors. However, given the inability of poor coastal states to fund capable navies and coast guards, Pitney and Levin expect a continued role for PSCs.
2.5. Summary: Taking stock and moving forward

Maritime piracy and human smuggling are the maritime security issue areas that have attracted the greatest academic interest. Here, scholars have employed various critical approaches to create understanding of (as opposed to explaining) the problem dynamics by examining social conditions and uncovering hidden structures. Usually, they have engaged themselves in critique of nation-state behaviours or dominant orders of society. When engaging in legal or policy analyses of these issue areas, these scholars have often aligned themselves with the interests of the migrants, the weak states, or even the often disfavoured individuals who have chosen – or been forced – to engage in piracy activities.

Scholars have frequently employed securitisation theory to identify what issues state elites have successfully constructed as maritime security problems. Here, they have critically scrutinised the consequences for national policies or certain population groups. Typically, these scholars have proposed alternative frameworks for addressing the root causes of the problems securitised by states, which would allegedly thwart the negative outcomes of state practice. This body of work has spanned both policy and legal approaches, and this study benefits from their studies of the links between different issue-areas. As shown in the above review, rationalist approaches engaging in problem-solving policy or legal analyses has contrasted the reflectivist ones. The fact that these critical scholars have mainly been Europeans, while those taking rationalist approaches have essentially been of US or other Anglo-Saxon origin, confirms the division of IR-theory – and its sub-field security studies – as noted in the introduction (see also Wæver and Buzan 2010: 465).

Notwithstanding the relevance of research focussed on each issue-area, the conceptual developments – i.e. the continuity and change in the understanding of maritime security among Western states and its role in their foreign policy – are most important to this study. It therefore builds on the efforts made by those scholars who have engaged themselves in conceptual approaches. Contrary to Bueger (2015: 160), this author considers a state centred conceptual analysis of maritime security a worthwhile endeavour, recognising that the US definition of the term maritime security exerts major influence on those of its partners and allies (and maybe even its adversaries). Here, we can expect diverging and/or converging political interests and/or normative understandings to interact in its regional application, in turn influencing the general conceptual understanding of the US and its partners and allies.
With regards to the aims of this study, the rationalist approach of Till (2013) occupies a unique position in existing research, centred as it is on conceptualising the role of maritime strategy and sea power in states’ foreign and security policies. Although his analyses are not explicitly theory-driven, realism, liberalism and even post-structuralism IR-theories loom in the background. This study addresses this limitation. Till (2013) provides a useful interface between a broad maritime security concept and the body of IR-literature examining US strategy in the maritime East and South China Sea region. His widely used conceptualisation of the sea as a: i) resource; and as a medium: ii) of transportation and exchange; iii) for information and the spread of ideas; and iv) of dominion; is applicable also to this study.

These categories are useful for incorporating the main explanatory factors for the conceptual change in maritime security highlighted in existing research. This change centres on: i) the rise in maritime piracy and the emergence of maritime terrorism in combination with ever-increasing sea-borne trade; ii) states’ territorialisation of the sea; the rise in people and drug smuggling; and iii) states’ shift to an indirect maritime security risk management approach.

This review of previous research shows the applicability of a wide array of theories to explain or understand the concept of maritime security. One could therefore argue that the employment of a comprehensive set of theories, fused into an eclectic theoretical framework, is required to explain the continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of large and small Western states. However, as we noted in Germond (2015), such an approach involves the challenge of maintaining analytical clarity, which this thesis opts to avoid by assigning priority to structural realism. This school of thought offers a sparsely defined theoretical lens centring on the role of the international system, defined by anarchy, and “the distribution of capabilities across states” (Waltz 2004: 2–3).

By engaging in a qualitative study employing structural realism as its main theoretical framework to explain the continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategies and its policy behaviour in this regard, this

40 This factor involves the role of “free market mechanisms such as privatization, contracting out and the formation of agencies”, exposing public service organisations such as armed forces to competition and wider scrutiny (Callaghan et al. 2000: 4–5). It draws on the sociological concept of “risk society”, introduced by Beck (1992) and expounded on in a large body of research. To Shaw (2000: 25), the “common risk society” referred to the international community and the notion that new threats cross political boundaries.
author makes a claim for originality. Given the effort devoted to understand the
nuances of the process oriented research question by expounding on the
lessons we can learn from recent employments of maritime security strategies
in regions where traditional and non-traditional threats converge – with a
justified focus on Finland and Sweden – this claim is both empirical and
analytical. This thesis presents new information on Finland’s and Sweden’s
policy responses of to a changing security environment, while the analytical
framework for comparing the policy responses of the US, Finland and Sweden
in regional contexts – and the analyses made in this regard – involve some
novel features.\textsuperscript{41} By employing supporting analytical frameworks derived from
Till (2013) and Knudsen (1988; 1996), its results are placed within the broader
realist tradition and linked to the conceptual literature on sea power, as well
as the literature on the security of small states.

\textsuperscript{41}In this regard, the challenging of structural realism by an analytical framework based
on neofunctionalism in Article 3 stands out.
3. The theoretical frameworks

This chapter introduces the theoretical frameworks employed in the articles of this thesis, essential for providing a theory-driven analysis of the post-Cold War conceptual development of maritime security and its consequences in key regions. It is structured in three parts. First, a structural realism framework for analysis is formulated by departing from the defining work of Waltz (2010[1979]) and discussing the later elaborations of this research programme, i.e. its defensive and offensive strands. This framework suffices for analysing the US interactions with other great powers, but it also serves as a general framework for analysing the influence of the international system on states regardless of size. Second, the concept of small states is discussed and a complementary framework for analysing small state security made up of four variables and two conditioners is presented. This allows for the analysis of any leveraged influence of certain small states on the workings of the international system in regions subject to great power rivalry. These variables and conditioners are implicitly addressed in the study of Finland and Sweden – and their interactions with NATO and the US – outlined in articles 3 through 5. Thereto, the variables and conditioners are explicitly used for structuring the concluding analysis of the Baltic Sea region’s maritime security environment and to reflect on those of the East and South China Seas. Third, neofunctionalism is introduced as a tool for challenging the explanations of structural realism on the naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden in Article 3.

3.1. Structural realism

Various scholars (see Glaser 2010: 18; Tang 2008: 149) have expounded on the divide in structural realism between Waltz’s original theory and its offensive and defensive strands. Although its strands depart from the same “bedrock assumptions”, they draw differing conclusions on the nature of international politics. Waltz (2004: 6), however, maintains that depending on the situation at hand, a state may choose to adopt offensive or defensive strategies. Sections 3.1.1 to 3.1.3.5 are entirely dedicated to address this divide in structural realism, why the discussions herein are rather separate from the maritime domain. They involve exploring the assumptions and interaction logics of the two strands while comparing them with those put forth by Waltz. In section 3.1.4, the divide in structural realism is tentatively reconciled in order for us to merge the two strands into a single explanatory framework. Here, we will use it to deduce predictions for a state’s foreign policy behaviour and grand strategy priorities, drawing on the role of security pressure. Since a
maritime security strategy is a domain-specific grand strategy, we will deduce also specific predictions for a state’s foreign and security policy for the maritime domain.

3.1.1. The origins of the structural realism research programme

Waltz (2010[1979]) challenged classical realism by outlining a theory focussing on the constraints and opportunities generated by an anarchic international system instead of states’ individual motives and objectives. In so doing, Waltz (2001 [1959]: 231, 238) further elaborated on the causes of war explained by the “third image” – the level of analysis focussing on the “conditioning effects of the state system”, i.e. the structure of the international political system – found to be the “final explanation” preferably supplemented by those of the first (the man) and the second (the state). His seminal 1979 text developed into a research programme whose scholars share a set of bedrock assumptions regarding states. Accordingly, states: i) are the key, unitary, actors in international politics; ii) interact in an anarchic – i.e. lacking a central authority – international environment which defining feature is power; iii) identify threats to their survival as the main system-generated problem; iv) are self-regarding, acting in accordance with the self-help principle; v) assess each other in terms of power and capabilities, not from domestic characteristics; and vi) rationally select strategies whose expected gains exceed anticipated costs (Elman 1996: 18–21, appendix; Glaser 2010: 16–17).

3.1.2. Contrasting and combining the two strands of structural realism

Despite a common core, structural realism’s defensive and offensive strands\(^\text{42}\) have provided additional competing assumptions and paid attention to different logics of interaction, resulting in disparate assessments of the probability for international competition and the prospects for cooperation (Glaser 2010: 18). Walt, Jervis, Van Evera, Snyder and Glaser advocate defensive realism, while Mearsheimer, Layne and Gilpin are offensive realists. To Waltz (2004: 6), “realist theory, properly viewed, is neither offensive nor defensive” why it “is best left without an adjective to adorn it”. Accordingly, their assumptions and interaction logics can be combined. Before we do that, however, the distinctions between the strands will be presented and their positions compared to that of Waltz.

Proponents of both strands concur with the definition of international politics by Waltz (2010[1979]: 126) as a “realm of power, of struggle, and of

\(^{42}\)Mearsheimer (2001: 5) named his theory “offensive realism” while Snyder (1991: 12) first used the terms “aggressive” and “defensive” realism.
accommodation”. Defensive realists emphasise the assumptions of Waltz (1988: 616) that “the ultimate concern for states is not for power but for security” and his view of power as a means of achieving security and not its end. Offensive realists are more inclined to promote Waltz (1986: 336; 1988: 619) claim that states – even without fundamental conflicting interests – will be driven into competitive behaviour by the international system, making international cooperation difficult. This propensity is reinforced by their biased interpretations of each other’s efforts to bolster their security.

Measures undertaken by one state will thus diminish the security of the others, creating what John Hertz termed the “security dilemma” (Waltz 2010[1979]: 126–128, 186–187; Waltz 1988: 619; Waltz 2000: 222). In turn, insecure states tend to resort to balancing behaviour against the powerful state, thus moderating the competitive nature of the international system. As a more risky alternative, a weak state may join its stronger rival in a “bandwagoning” alliance, arguably an option more attractive to minor powers with “greedy” motives (Waltz 2010[1979]: 126; Mearsheimer 2001: 162–163; Glaser 2010: 22; Schweller 1998: 137–139). We may find such dynamics in the East and South China Sea and the Baltic Sea regions because of the rise in power of China and Russia, in turn influencing the maritime security strategies employed by state actors.

Defensive realists disagree with Waltz on the prevalence of this general competitive tendency and claim that states under certain conditions can be highly secure (see Glaser 1996: 123–124, 159–163; Glaser 2010: 20, 24), while offensive realists portray an even more competitive world than Waltz. Mearsheimer (2001: 29–32, 40), outlines an international system in which great powers always seek relative power over their rivals, balancing against each other’s offensive capabilities in their quests to achieve the ultimate aim of hegemony, defining a hegemon as “a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system”.

Offensive realists disagree on the scope of such hegemony. While Gilpin (1981: 49, 135–173) and Layne (2002: 120–164) discuss global balance of power and world hegemony, Mearsheimer (2001: 27–42, 57–60, 83–85) limits the scope of hegemony to regional dimensions for reasons of geography. To him, “the stopping power of water” greatly limits states’ capabilities to project land power. Although Mearsheimer, as opposed to Waltz (2010[1979]: 191), emphasises land power, both define power as material capabilities rather than political outcomes of state interaction. However, based on additional,
interacting, assumptions on the international political system\textsuperscript{43}, he argues that great powers are inclined to think and act offensively against each other.

This disagreement on whether the anarchic international system spurs states to maximise their power or their security represents the first distinction between offensive and defensive realism. Their second disagreement is whether strategies of territorial conquest are rewarding or not.

Defensive realists such as Snyder (1991: 11) and Van Evera (1999: 9) argue that aggressions seldom succeed, as expansive security strategies violate basic principles of international politics and cause balancing behaviour by other states. They are thus counter-productive, undermining the security of states pursuing them. Jervis (1978: 187–194) theory of the “offence-defense balance”, i.e. whether an attacker or a defender has the advantage\textsuperscript{44}, supports assessments of intensities in security dilemmas. It is further specified by Van Evera (1998; 1990/91)\textsuperscript{45} as well as Glaser and Kaufmann (1998)\textsuperscript{46}, stressing that this balance often favours the defender.

Mearsheimer (2001: 39) charges defensive realists with exaggerating the restraining forces of systemic factors and misinterpreting Hertz’s description of the security dilemma. The position of Waltz (2010[1979]: 127–128) on this issue is firmly in line with defensive realism. By linking the imitating and socialising behaviour among states to balance of power, “states will engage in balancing behaviour”, he concludes. Mearsheimer (2001: 166), for his part, emphasises that states do not only imitate successful balancing behaviour but also successful aggression. Schweller (1994: 85–92) points to a status-quo bias in Waltz

\textsuperscript{43} I.e.: i) great powers possessing some offensive military capability are inherently dangerous to each other; ii) since benign intentions can change immediately and malign intentions be misperceived due to deception or misinformation, states cannot be assured by other states; iii) since state autonomy is a prerequisite for achieving all other ends, survival is the foremost aim of all states; and iv) states are rational actors who think strategically in temporal dimensions about how to survive in the international system.

\textsuperscript{44} To Jervis, the main factors determining whether offensive or defensive action is advantageous in actual or potential armed fight over territory are the technical capabilities and geographical positions of the rival states.

\textsuperscript{45} Van Evera added the independent variables “social and political order” and “diplomatic factors” to the theory, creating and testing hypotheses on how real or perceived offensive advantage created incentives for preventive wars and instigated harsh diplomacy styles. He pointed to the danger of “offense dominance” and emphasised the roles of arms control agreements to limit offensive forces and defensive alliances.

\textsuperscript{46} Glaser and Kaufmann added the variables “power”, measured in relative resources, and “military skill” in terms of strategical employment of their military technology to this theory.
balance-of-power reasoning, which ignores the existence of dissatisfied states’ will to join the stronger power’s side in prospects of rewards, relative gains and improved ranking in the international system.

The third disagreement between the two strands thus relates to whether states assume that other states have revisionist intentions or not (i.e. if they expect them to be security-seeking status-quo states). However, their disagreements can be resolved by reflecting on the fact that they are mainly resulting from contradicting assumptions on the level of security pressure.

While acknowledging the importance of relative gains to great powers when international security competition is intensive, Waltz (2010[1979]: 118–122, 166–168, 195, 203) argues that absolute gains rise in importance as it decreases. He does by no means exclude the possibility that states, as a result of domestic political processes, may choose expansive strategies involving the use of force to weaken or destroy other states. Notably, concerning this study’s examination of the Baltic Sea region, Waltz (2000: 24) has pointed to the maintenance and eastward expansion of NATO as a manifestation of how the US has used its unchecked power to extend its geographical sphere of influence. This extension is of key relevance to the current strategic situation in the Baltic Sea region. Waltz emphasises, however, the tendency of other states in the international system to react, uncoordinated, in ways creating balances of power that impose restraints on such power aspirations. The most stable international system is bipolar, he argues, which reduces uncertainty and calculations among the states of the world. In contrast, Waltz (2004: 4) finds unipolarity weakening the structural constraints and enlarging the field of action open to the super power, resulting in “arbitrary and destructive governance”.

Tang (2008: 150–152) offers a useful rephrasing of the above presented theoretical divergences by formulating two typological strategies for achieving security. States pursuing offensive realist strategies seek security by intentionally decreasing the security of other states, he argues, dismissing true international cooperation (except for temporary alliances) due to their genuinely irreconcilable interests and their preparation for inevitable conflict and war. Conversely, states pursuing defensive realist strategies do not threaten each other’s security intentionally and not all of their conflicting interests may be genuinely irreconcilable, Tang suggests. States may therefore overcome the barriers to collaboration posed by anarchy, while conflicting interests need not necessarily lead to actual conflict. His reasoning regarding defensive realism
involves assessments of states' intentions, a notably hard factor to determine. For this purpose, Tang formulates two differentiating criteria, measuring whether states: i) recognise security dilemmas and understand at least parts of their defensive implications; and ii) exercise self-restraint and accept to be constrained by other states (see also Kydd 1997: 141–147).

The outcome has policy implications. According to Tang (2008: 151), rivals guided by offensive realism are best countered by containment policies while cooperative engagement strategies are preferred towards rivals guided by defensive realism, given that one’s own state pursues a defensive realist strategy. Mearsheimer (2001: 402) applied this reasoning when he argued for a change in what he considered a misguided US policy of engagement on a revisionist China, recommending a strategy of containment. Arguably, such interpretation of whether rivaling states have revisionist intentions or not – and subsequent decision on its own strategies – are at heart of the US challenges of dealing with China and Russia. Regardless of the grand strategies chosen by the US to manage these rivaling powers in their home regions, their implementation by this external power necessitate the deployment of *maritime* strategies. Hence, there is a close connection between the US grand strategy and its maritime strategy.

Following Waltz, offensive and defensive realism can be treated as complimentary strands of structural realism. Finding their dynamics interacting, Snyder (2002: 158) notes that the former best explains the security behaviour of revisionist states, while the latter best explains that of status quo powers. While offensive realism assumes that policymakers’ perceptions will lead to policies with concrete effects, Taliaferro (2001: 158–161) concludes, defensive realism assumes that they – acknowledging the security dilemma and adopting moderate policies – also often consider the perceptions of their policies among other states.

In weighing the usefulness of offensive or defensive realism in explaining international politics, Waltz (2004: 6) deems that “[w]hether the best way to provide for one’s security is by adopting offensive or defensive strategies varies as situations change”. Toft (2005: 390), stresses that the disagreement between the strands does not pertain to whether states primarily seek survival or not, but rather about *how* states seek to ensure their survival. Brooks (1997: 447–449, 457–458) notes that offensive realism is characterised by its assumption of high security pressure, predicting that states will act from *possibility* of conflict logics

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47 Offensive realism recognises this challenge, thus predicting that a state cannot be assured by another state.
and worst-case scenarios, while defensive realism assumes lower security pressures and thus predicts that states will act from *probability* of conflict logics.\textsuperscript{48} This thesis takes fully into account the above arguments of Waltz, Toft and Brooks, and applies their reasoning when combining the two strands of structural realism into a single explanatory framework in section 3.1.4 below.

In a great power’s quest to maximise its share of world power, Mearsheimer (2001: 147–155) expects it to opt for reaching the following objectives: i) becoming the world’s sole regional hegemon; ii) maximising its proportion of global wealth; iii) dominating the regional balance of land power; and iv) gain nuclear superiority. Layne (2002: 129), for his part, argues that once a great power becomes a regional hegemon it will seek global hegemony. Mearsheimer presents a range of great powers strategies for gaining power: i) launching costly wars; ii) blackmailing weaker states through coercive threats and intimidation; iii) inducing bait and bleed strategies; or iv) sustaining self-induced protracted conflicts between its rivals, i.e. bloodletting strategies.

A state may use complementary strategies to prevent rivals from gaining power. The rivals can be checked through external or internal balancing strategies and by buck-passing (free riding), involving attempts to cajole another state to balance the aggressor (Mearsheimer 2001: 155–164). Bandwagoning – i.e. conceding power to and joining forces with a stronger opponent – as well as appeasement are non-viable strategies for great powers, he argues, since both violate offensive realism’s core tenet that states seek to maximise relative power. These strategies are useful in this study’s formulation of testable structural realism predictions of state behaviour when security competition is intensive.

While both strands of structural realism derive their main independent variable – the international distribution of power capabilities – from Waltz’s essentially structural theory, they also take into account the effects of intermediary, non-structural, systemic variables. Mearsheimer (2001: 155–159) adds the impact of states geographic location on their policies (i.e. geopolitics), which is supportive when predicting strategies of checking aggression in multipolar systems, i.e. which states will balance or “pass the buck” (se also Toft 2005: 386, 389). Defensive realism acknowledges the importance of geography, but also emphasises the impact of technology and international economic

\textsuperscript{48} Brook’s term “neorealism” – including the writings of Waltz and Mearsheimer – is synonymous to “offensive realism”, while his term “postclassical realism” is synonymous to defensive realism (Taliaferro 2001: 134, note 22).
pressures, so-called “structural modifiers” (Taliaferro 2001: 137; Brooks 1997: 456). We will further elaborate on these factors below.

3.1.3. The foreign policy predictions of structural realism

In this section, general structural realism predictions for a state’s foreign policy behaviour and grand strategy priorities are deduced, but also specific predictions for the maritime domain. However, this task requires that we first expound on its fundamental assumptions. Structural realism’s main independent variable for explaining the foreign policy behaviour of states – i.e. the dependent variable – is their power position in the international system, determined by its share of certain material resources. In turn, the number of poles defines the structure of the anarchic international system. Yet, the strategic context of a state has additional dimensions: i) its geographical environment; ii) its regional and global relationships with other states; and iii) the nature of the international system (Tang 2008: 146). The last dimension involves whether states view each other as being revisionist or status quo and thus the level of security pressure. However, we will begin by discussing the views of the two strands on the fundamental concepts of power, autonomy and influence.

3.1.3.1. The interrelated concepts of power and autonomy

Structural realism defines power in quantifiable terms by material capabilities. It thus represents a concept separated from outcomes of state interaction and politics. Waltz (2010[1979]: 131) measures a state’s power by combining its: “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”. Gilpin (1981: 13), for his part, measures it by combining its “military, economic and technological capabilities”, while Mearsheimer (2001: 55) specifies it as the sum of its military and latent power, the latter referring to its wealth and size of population.

Structural realism understands politics as relational interactions between like units designed to achieve objectives (Lentner 2006: 105; Mearsheimer 2001: 57; Waltz 2010[1979]: 97, 100), while power is a means enabling a state to maintain its security and autonomy. The latter is understood as self-government of its domestic political order (Waltz 2010[1979]: 126, 194; Mearsheimer 2001: 31). It predicts that states will always seek to preserve their security and autonomy, selecting instrumentally and rationally among options in policy areas.

49 I.e. inclined to raise their position in the international system through political, territorial or economic expansion.
which may involve threats to their national security (Grieco 1995: 27; Baumann et al. 2001: 39–40). Given the international system’s anarchic character, states must rely on self-help strategies for which independence (i.e. autonomy) is a prerequisite (Waltz 2010[1979]: 72; Mearsheimer 1995: 11; Grieco 1995: 27).

Autonomy is thus a prerequisite for a state’s power and a strategic objective for which power is an important means. How is this possible? Arguably, this is due to realists’ threefold use of the term power. Power is conceived as “control over resources” when measuring a state’s power (position), which is translated into predictions of “control over actors (...) events and outcomes” through a conversion process (Hart 1976: 289–290, 296). Accordingly, it provides a great power with wider scopes of action and safety margins in dealing with weaker states, a higher degree of independence and ability to exercise influence on more dependent states, and greater capacity to manage the international system (Waltz 2010[1979]: 194–195). Gains in power thus augment a state’s autonomy and elevate its power position, which in turn improve its security. This mechanism may of course be reversed, making it more vulnerable to threats from other states.

Both strands of structural realism predict that states will be averse to relative losses of power (Grieco 1990: 40; Mearsheimer 2001: 22). However, while offensive realism predicts that states will seek as much power as possible, defensive realism suggests that they will restrict themselves to possess only “an appropriate amount” (Waltz 1988: 616; Kydd 1997: 114, 122–123). This consequential disagreement apparently derives from their divergent views on the effectiveness of the balancing dynamic resulting from the “security dilemma” and deviant expectations of security pressure.

The assumption of high security pressure in offensive realism – reducing the security dilemma to an irredeemably condition of anarchy fuelling international security competition – results in favourable assessments of offensive behaviour (Brooks 1997: 447, 450; Mearsheimer 2001: 36, 46; Snyder 2002: 156–157). It also leads to the prediction that states’ will assign low priority to non-security objectives such as the promotion of ideology, national unification or fostering human rights. To Mearsheimer, states might pursue non-security goals as a complement to their “hunt for relative power”, but only if they do not conflict with power and security imperatives.

In contrast, defensive realism’s assumption of lower security pressure and the effectiveness ascribed to the balancing dynamic resulting from the inescapable security dilemma, results in unfavourable assessments of offensive behaviour.
and predictions that states will assign comparably higher priorities to non-security objectives in their policies (Brooks 1997: 455; Snyder 2002: 153, 157; Snyder 1991: 12; Toft 2005: 390). Its assumption of lower security pressure involves an understanding of international politics as less conflictual and competitive than that of offensive realism (Snyder 2002: 153). Although they employ different assumptions on security pressure, both structural realism strands predict that states will seek to preserve or enhance their autonomy—a quest in which they need power.

3.1.3.2. The quest for influence

To be secure, states seek to influence their international environment to preserve their power position and protect their national interests (see Gilpin 1981: 86). This requires power. A state’s ability to influence the behaviour of another state depends on their relative power positions, i.e. their relative distribution of capabilities (Glaser 1996: 133, note 27). This is one of the reasons why states are concerned with relative gains in cooperative affairs and practise “defensive positionality”, especially when security competition is intense (Grieco 1990: 44–45; Waltz 2010[1979]: 195). Accordingly, structural realism predicts that states will seek to influence the actions of states as well as those of international organisations, a process that converts their capabilities into influence (Baumann et al. 2001: 41). Here, there is a link between a state’s desire to influence international organisations and the process of socialisation among states that ”limits and molds” their behaviour (Waltz 2010[1979]: 76). As failure to become socialised to the international system’s prevailing norms may be costly and dangerous (Gilpin 1981: 86), structural realism predicts that states will seek to influence the creation, or change, of these norms to ensure that they will suit their purposes (Baumann et al. 2001: 41).

Since power broadens a state’s strategic options in a competitive international system, offensive realism offers a clear logic when predicting that states will seek to maximise their power. In essence, more power means increased autonomy, stronger influence and improved security. Given that Waltz (1988: 616) and defensive realism are somewhat indeterminate on the amount of power states will aspire for, while their proposal lacks specification (Baumann et al. 2001: 41), the framework of this study uses the proposition of offensive realism. Notwithstanding, structural realism does not expect all states to be driven by expansionist motives, although it remains a possibility which must be vigilantly considered.
Having recognised the key role assigned to power in structural realism and its predictions that states' will seek autonomy as well as influence on their international environment, we will now discuss the divergent assumptions of offensive and defensive realism regarding whether possibility or probability calculations of armed international conflict shape their security strategies.

3.1.3.3. The possibility or probability of armed international conflict

The assumption that high security pressure characterises the anarchic international system, leads offensive realists to conceive of international relations as “a state of relentless security competition” in which “threat or seeming threats to their security abound” among actors who are “usually suspicious and often hostile” (Mearsheimer 1995: 9; Waltz 1988: 619). Uncertainty characterise these relations since “states can never be certain about the intentions of other states” (Mearsheimer 1995: 10). Since interstate aggression has many causes and benign intentions may rapidly change, states are preoccupied with identifying and counteracting dangers of war (Mearsheimer 2001: 31; Waltz 1988: 619). Since they condition themselves by the mere possibility of armed conflict, states always prepare for worst-case scenarios (Mearsheimer 2001: 2; Brooks 1997: 457, 471). The explanatory power of this assumption, combined with that of an anarchic international system, is considerable within offensive realism (Brooks 1997: 448–449). It predicts that geography influences states behaviour in two respects: i) oceans limit their ability of long-range power projection, making their foreign policies regionally focused; and ii) common borders with hostile states increase the propensity to balancing behaviour, while the opposite render them inclined to “buck-passing” if the international system is multipolar (Mearsheimer 2001: 83–84, 271–272).

Defensive realism opposes this view of international relations. By adding three material factors – technology, geography and international economic pressures – to the distribution of capabilities, its proponents expect that the character of the security pressure will vary over time (Brooks 1997: 446, 455, 472). Technology has implications also for what Glaser (1996: 134) defines as the “offense-defence balance”, assigning advantages to defensive forces. Information technology developments increase the interaction capacity of states and strengthen forces of socialisation and competition, which in turn influence the range of regional subsystems and condition the impact of the global system level (Buzan et al. 1993: 70–77).
Already in the 1980s, satellite reconnaissance technologies enabled states to evaluate each other’s military and economic capabilities with unprecedented accuracy (Gaddis 1989[1987]: 232–233). In the 1990s, technological advances enabling networking of sensors, weapons and command, control and communications systems spurred the US adoption of a “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) concept for conventional wars (Dyson 2010: 11–18). The expectations that RMA would cause a recalibration of the global rebalancing of power in its favour brought about a continuous US defence transformation, including using superior information technology as a lever and using conceptual innovation to establish tailored joint operational pictures.

Jervis (1978: 179), suggested that a given territory may, or may not, be of interest to a conqueror, depending on whether it contains exploitable raw material of national interest to the latter. Van Evera (1993[1991]: 200–201), for his part, pointed out that the shift from smokestack-economies to “knowledge-based” production in “post-industrial” economies – dependent on multinational exchanges – had diminished conquerors’ prospects of efficiently extracting economic resources from occupied territories.

To Wohlfarth (1994/1995: 109–111), international economic pressures contributed to explain the Cold War termination, given Soviet’s geopolitical overstretch resulting from its declining economic performance while the economic recovered in the West. The decline in its relative power, he suggested, serve to explain Gorbachev’s far-reaching policy-changes as an attempt to revitalise the competitiveness of the Soviet economy and reduce the security pressure posed by NATO. Wohlfarth’s explanation highlights the potential of influencing states by using economic pressure, used exclusively or combined with the use of military means.

Both strands predict that geography influences the usefulness of military power, i.e. geographically proximate states can more readily threaten each other with military force (Walt 1987: 24; Mearsheimer 2001: 267–272). Thereto, balancing efforts can be impeded if states are geographically arranged in ways enabling an aggressor to prevent other states from assisting a victim by military means (Van Evera 1993[1991]: 222, note 76).

To account for the two strands’ diverging assumptions on the possibility or probability of armed international conflict, we will incorporate the factors provided by offensive as well as defensive realism when formulating the structural realism framework for this study.
3.1.3.4. Whether states adopt short- or long-term perspectives

The diverging assumptions on the level of international security pressure by offensive and defensive realism result in different predictions on states preferences when weighing short-term military security against long-term objectives (Taliaferro 2001: 140). Given that survival is a prerequisite for pursuing all other aims, offensive realism predicts that states will neglect long-term objectives such as economic growth or ideology and give priority to short-term military preparedness when, and if, required (Mearsheimer 1992: 222; Mearsheimer 2001: 31). Defensive realism specifies conditions under which this prediction is valid, of which Taliaferro (2001: 140–141) has proposed the following: i) when geography hampers defence from invasion or blockade of the state; or ii) when states borders relatively strong neighbours. Both are linked to the nature of the international system, i.e. the threat environment resulting from the presence of revisionist or status quo states, while the second also involves relative power and the “offense-defense balance”. Defensive realism argues that war is always a way of resolving conflicts under anarchy, but the probability of aggression depends on factors making conquest more or less cost effective (Brooks 1997: 446–448, 456–457). Accordingly, states may take some risks regarding costly defence preparations when security pressure is low.

To account for the two strands’ predictions on whether states adopt short- or long-term perspectives – based on their diverging assumptions on the possibility or probability of armed international conflict – in the structural realism framework for this study, we note that this theory predicts that when security pressure is high, rational state actors will prioritise short-term military security and subordinate other requirements despite adverse long-term effects. When security pressure is low, it predicts that states will give more equal weight to its short- and long-term requirements, regularly making intertemporal trade-offs.

3.1.3.5. The issue of weighing between military and economic power

Based on its assumptions of intense security competition in the anarchic international system and that states seek to inhibit possible conflicts by self-help measures, offensive realism predicts that states will invariably favour military power to economic power whenever they come in conflict (Mearsheimer 1992: 222). However, it does not expect states to be indifferent to economic wealth – economic power is certainly a prerequisite for building large military forces –

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50 I.e. balancing between relative gains offered at different points in time. The economist Irving Fisher developed the theory of intertemporal choice in his 1930 book Theory of interest (Brooks 1997: 446).
but rather that the superior value of military security will outrank any other end a state may pursue. Defensive realists have charged offensive realism with insensitivity to probabilities and a lack of utility foundations (see Brooks 1997: 454). To offensive realism, states are risk-averse actors seeking to minimise the maximum losses they may suffer, always assigning priority to short-term military security requirements. It incorporates Waltz (2010[1979]: 79, 107) conceptualisation of international politics as a separate domain, strictly outlined in terms of military security (Mearsheimer 1992: 222). Waltz, for his part, expects that states in a self-help system will "subordinate economic gain to political interest" when considering their security.

Defensive realism expects that states will rationally negotiate between economic gains and reductions in military preparedness if "the potential net gains in economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security losses" (Brooks 1997: 447, 462). States will thus be flexible in their efforts to achieve their national interests and may seek to increase their power by military or non-military means. The latter involves a quest to: i) alter international trade patterns; ii) reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their property rights by influencing institutions; iii) secure their supplies of inexpensive raw materials from weaker states by using economic leverage; and iv) reduce their non-productive expenditures and increase the amount of resources available for economic advancement. We will used these predictions below when we formulate structural realism predictions on states’ foreign policies.

3.1.4. Merging the predictions of the two structural realism strands into an explanatory framework of states’ foreign policy behaviour

Given both strands’ prediction that a state’s foreign policy behaviour depends on its power position in the international system and the number of poles in the international system, its use of military or economic power to influence the actions and decisions of other states will invariably conform to its power. A state’s power is determined by its: i) size of population and territory; ii) resource endowment; iii) economic capability; and iv) military strength.

Structural realism predicts that states share a strong interest in autonomy and influence. Since power enables them to pursue policies of autonomy and influence more intensely, they will seek a maximum of it. Autonomy-seeking policies, aimed at maintaining or increasing independence from influence of other states, will thus prevail in relations with stronger states and international
institutions. Thereto, states will pursue such policies more eagerly under intense security competition, when their freedom of action, independence, or even sovereignty is at stake. Accordingly, they will devote less attention to attain influence.

Inversely, states will seek to influence if security competition is limited. Structural realism expects strong states to pursue influence-seeking policies versus weaker counterparts, using their relative power as a lever to achieve dominance and control over their international environment. Weaker states will seek to mitigate or prevent such domination by negotiating collaborative arrangements in inter- or supranational institutions, enabling them to “voice their concerns and interests” and influence their bi- or multilateral interaction processes (Grieco 1995: 34).

Baumann et al. (2001: 49–50) have specified these policies. Autonomy involves the freedom from obligations to: i) consult with – or accept the judgement of – international bodies or to comply with certain duties; ii) refrain from acquiring prohibited goods (weapons); iii) using certain tools (e.g. tariffs); iv) implementing certain modes of behaviour vis-à-vis its own population (e.g. human rights regimes) or other states. It also involves the freedom from restrictions such as: i) asymmetric interdependence to its disadvantage (e.g. markets or imports); ii) imposing economic sanctions or military threats/actions versus other states.

Influence means power to oblige other states to consult or inform themselves, and to accept and implement the decisions of international bodies taken with its participation. It also means power to prohibit them from: i) producing or acquiring certain goods (e.g. weapons); ii) using certain tools or resources (e.g. tariffs/weapons); iii) behaviour vis-à-vis their own populations or other states. Finally, influence means power to restrict other states by: i) asymmetric interdependence to their disadvantage; ii) imposing military threats or action; or iii) imposing economic sanctions.

The results of states pursuit of policies promoting autonomy and influence can be mutually reinforcing or conflicting, Baumann et al. (2001: 52–53) have pointed out, a characteristic phenomenon of their policies towards international institutions. Typically, participation in multilateral actions involves a loss of autonomy but gains in influence, while non-participation involves a gain in autonomy but a loss of influence. Structural realism expects powerful states to: i) seek bilateralisation of its relations with weaker states; ii) weaken supranational institutions; iii) join international bodies whose decisions are
binding also for non-member states; iv) withdraw from international bodies whose decisions apply to member states; v) increase its own share of intra-organisational resources; vi) actively use positive or negative sanctions versus other states; and vii) strengthen international bodies in which it participates. These predictions involve a view on international institutions that are coterminous with that of defensive realism, assigning them the sole role as arenas for states’ efforts to exert influence on each other (see Glaser 1996: 157–159). However, institutions are of minor importance when security pressure is high.

We can now outline a pattern of structural realism predictions. Both strands predict that the international system’s anarchic character forces states to rely on self-help strategies. This will lead them to accumulate power and engage in power politics. Likewise, both strands predict that states will consider factors such as geography, technology and economy in their strategies. Figure 3 (below) illustrates the consequences of the two strands’ diverging assumptions on the level of international security pressure, leading to differing predictions on states’ preferences and behaviour in four foreign policy dimensions, i.e. actor disposition; security pattern; policy priority; and policy behaviour. Offensive realism squarely assumes international security pressure to be high, making state actors dispositioned to engage in possibility calculations, assigning priority to autonomy and military readiness while engaging in peacetime strategic competition and preparing for possible war. Defensive realism assumes that the international security pressure may also be low or moderate, making states dispositioned to engage in probability calculations, assign priority to influencing international bodies, seek security cooperation and evaluate the probability of armed conflict. N.B. the structural realism framework employed in this thesis recognises that the level of international security pressure perceived by a state represents the key factor determining whether it will rationally act as predicted by either offensive or defensive realism.

51 He thus responded to the neoliberalist critique that structural realism disregards the role of institutions.
Figure 3: Structural realism’s pattern of predictions, resulting from diverging assumptions on the level of international security pressure. Source: Author.

Based on the above discussion, we can conclude that a state perceiving high security pressure – e.g. facing a powerful rival who might seek territorial expansion – will pursue an autonomy-seeking policy, subordinate desires for economic wealth to military preparations and prepare for security competition and possibly war. Intervening factors such as geography, technology and international economic pressures will influence the resulting threat to its freedom of action, independence and ultimately its survival. On the contrary, a state perceiving lower security pressures – e.g. bordering only modern, democratic and industrialised states – may allow itself to lower its military guard and seek to maximise its economic prosperity and political influence through bi- and multilateral cooperation in inter- or supranational institutions and bodies.

Structural realism predicts that a state, especially if it is a great power, will:

- seek to maximise its power through military and non-military means
- adjust the amount of power politics in its foreign policy in line with changes in its power
- pursue policies of autonomy and influence, selecting instrumentally and rationally among options in policy areas which are likely to involve threats to its national security
- seek to influence the creation or change of international norms to ensure its interest
- seek to reduce its non-productive expenditures and increase the amount of resources available for economic advancement

A state perceiving high security pressure will:

○ assign priority to autonomy-seeking policy over influence-seeking policy whenever they conflict
invariably favour military power to economic power whenever they conflict and subordinate all other requirements despite adverse long-term effects
assign low priority to non-security objectives such as promoting ideology, national unification or fostering human rights

A state perceiving low security pressure will:
give more equal weight to its short- and long-term requirements, regularly making intertemporal trade-offs
assign priority to influence-seeking policy over autonomy-seeking policy whenever they come in conflict
seek to influence: i) international trade patterns and alter them in their favour; ii) international institutions in order to reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their property rights; iii) weaker states by using economic leverage in order to secure their supplies of inexpensive raw materials

Structural realism is a grand strategic theoretical framework while maritime security strategies are grand strategies for the maritime domain (see Figure 1). Accordingly, it is applicable to explain important aspects of states’ desire to dominate the maritime domain, its trade and its prosperity. Quite obviously, the maritime domain is not a habitat for human beings but an environment in which humans only temporarily reside in for particular purposes. However, as Article 2 will show, temporary and purposeful use of the maritime domain is a characteristic that helps explain its attraction to states in terms of the four attributes we will assign to it.

In the study of the maritime domain through a structural realist lens we can, based on the above reasoning, specifically expect that a state – i.e. a great power – will seek to use its power:

- to maintain or increase its autonomy with regards to its: i) territorial waters; ii) EEZ; and iii) portion of the continental shelf
- to influence international maritime trade patterns and seek to alter them in its favour
- to influence the international standards for interpreting maritime law, assuring its unimpeded access to strategically important waters for power projection purposes
• to influence international maritime institutions in order to reduce its transaction costs and improve the protection of its property rights with regards to maritime trade as well as maritime resource extraction
• to seek strategic control (i.e. dominance) of those aspects of the cyber domain that are interlinked with the maritime domain and serve to check the influence of its rivals

Having contrasted the assumptions and combined the predictions of the two strands of structural realism into unified foreign policy predictions, while deducing general and maritime specific predictions on state behaviour, we will now engage with the concept of small states.

3.2. Small states and international security
3.2.1. The concept of small states and international security

Small states typically lack the power projection capability over distance that is required for having systemic influence. They are therefore not in focus of structural realism scholars (see Waltz 2010[1979]: 72–73). As scholars of other IR-theories of US origin, they tend to analyse great power interaction with small states from the perspective of the interests and concerns of the former (Park 2001: 131). The literature on small states thus became established as a European field of studies in the inter-war period by its growth out of the status of the residual 19th century “small powers” category, marked by ideational credentials (Neumann and Gestöhl 2006: 2–12). Following two decades of little academic interest, the pioneering works of Rothstein and Fox served to turn it into “a genuine school of small state studies” in the 1960s.

Rothstein (1968: 1) established the key proposition that “small powers are something more than or different from Great Powers writ small” in his study on why small states ally with great powers or not. Fox (1959), for her part, examined the diplomacy of neutral Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Turkey during the Second World War. In security studies, the small states literature spans three traditions (Knudsen 1996: 6–7). First, a legal approach focusses on individual neutral states’ policies with concerning international conflict or the implications of their EU membership (see Sundellus 1994). Second, a political approach studies the dominance and submission of small states by great powers. Third, a rational choice approach, to which this thesis contributes, studies the military strategic calculations of small states in crises.

The IR-literature on small states peaked in the 1970s, following the rise in small states by decolonisation. Its decline in the 1980s has been attributed to the
influence of structural realism, degrading small states to the status of a residual category. Keohane (1969: 295–296) – arguably a neoliberal theorist influenced by structural realism – classified states into “system-determining”; “system-influencing”; “system-affecting”; and “system-ineffectual” categories which, he argued, conformed with the traditional usage of “great”, “secondary”, “middle” and “small” states. There is thus a certain tension between the approaches elaborated on in this thesis.

The lack of a universal definition of small states makes the concept of smallness relative rather than absolute. “Small states” is thus rather vague as an analytical concept, why some have considered it useless for analytical purposes (Knudsen 1996: 4). Fox (1969: 751), for her part, compared its conceptual vagueness with that of the international system, arguing that “[t]he small state is as meaningless a category as the international system, which varies through time” (italics in original). Neumann and Gestöhl (2006: 6) note that small states have traditionally been “defined by what they are not”, i.e. not being great or middle powers. In a European context, states whose population size is below that of the Netherlands – a middle power of 16 million inhabitants in 2006 – have traditionally been categorised as small states. With this quantitative yardstick, Finland and Sweden, whose populations in 2015 amounted to 5.5 and 9.7 million people respectively, fall squarely in this category (IISS 2016: 92, 143).

This measure is often augmented by qualifiers such as territory, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and military capability, which, for small states, are limited (see East 1973: 557). Sweden and Finland seem outmatched by Russia by default while they fare better in comparison with e.g. the Netherlands. This illustrates the relativity of the concept and the indistinct definitional borders between categories such as “micro states”, “small states” and “middle powers” (Neumann and Gstöhl 2006: 6). Also Panke (2010: 801), using a qualitative measure consisting of the allocation of votes in the EU Council of Ministers, includes Finland and Sweden among its nineteen members of the small state category. Their bargaining capacity in the Council working groups is thus limited compared to the larger members. In addition, the facts that their financial means and their staff resources are comparably small limit their arguing capacity.

Hence, the concept of small states has a bearing idea of relative weakness assigned to it. Smallness is “viewed as a handicap to state action, and even state survival” (Browning 2006: 669). Some scholars have concluded that the weakness of small states makes them “liable to be continuously threatened by
[even benevolent] greater powers”52 (Fox 1969: 751–762). However, other scholars have pointed to the intriguing ways that “advanced” small states have managed to safeguard their national interests and influence the international system in times of great power competition as well as through international organisations.

3.2.2. The small states of Europe

Finland and Sweden are among the six most active small state members in pursuing strategies aimed at counter-balancing their limited bargaining capacity within the EU (Panke 2010: 802–807). One such strategy is cooperating within the Nordic Council of Ministers, a geopolitical and inter-parliamentary forum established in 1971. N.B. the establishment of NORDEFCO in 2009 was a means to an end of promoting comprehensive defence cooperation. The considerable pay-offs for Sweden of joining the European integration process in the 1990s equalled those of Ireland in the mid-1970s (Sundelius 1994: 179, 193; Hirsch 1976: 113–115). They reaped the economic advantages of access to a common European market and some influence on its rule making, while gaining a better platform of power for promoting their foreign and security policy objectives. In sum, the EU-membership gained by export-oriented Finland and Sweden in 1995 offered potential market diversification and reduced a typical small state vulnerability.

The reduction of the military threat following end of the Cold War increased the possibilities for small European states to pursue independent foreign policies (Wivel et al. 2014: 4). In addition, the effects of globalisation and increased interdependence leveraged the importance of diplomatic and institutional skills in international relations as well as the role of non-state actors. The small states literature duly reflects this rise in liberal influence on international relations and the EU’s gradual development into a security actor. The loose link between non-military skills and capabilities and state power serves to explain their new roles. Thereto, small states has been increasingly requested – and able to – provide military contributions to multilateral crisis management operations, thus gaining influence in international organisations.

3.2.3. The small states literature and structural realism

How, then, does the small states literature correspond with and contrast to structural realism? First, it is not a coherent school of thought. Except for realist approaches, scholars employ liberal and constructivist theories when they

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52 I.e. due to thrust of the resulting “power vacuum”.

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elaborate on the influence of small states on a wide range of military and non-military aspects in international organisations. In the 1960s, Fox (1969: 753) noted, “the rapid growth in international organizations has given the smallest states both life and voice in international affairs”. In this, the end of the Cold War and the adoption of a widened security concept – spanning also issues of economic, societal, environmental security – in the policies of Western states and international organisations has had a far from negligible influence (Wivel et al. 2014: 4).

In contrast to the economic strategies employed by great powers, structural realism predicts that small powers’ domestic political institutions will be shaped by “foreign economic circumstances” (Snyder 1991: 62). Their economic vulnerability influences their foreign policy, which quality “depends largely on the articulation of national capabilities for the pursuit of foreign policy aims” (Hirsch 1976: 113). As noted in the 2000 European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy Paper, long-standing members – as opposed to member candidates – interpreted their EU membership as augmenting their capacity to influence events rather than a loss of sovereignty (EC 2000). The small states literature acknowledges this. Its scholars’ studies of how small states handle the constraints have resulted in an expanding body of literature on the foreign policy of small states and the EU (see Thorhallsson 2000; Miles 2005; Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006; Goetchel 2010).

Unlike structural realist scholars, there is a consensus among small state scholars that domestic politics can influence the foreign policy of small states (see Doeser 2011). They therefore focus on dual levels of analysis, the domestic politics at state level and the international politics at the systems level.53 Structural realist scholars, for their part, argue that the systemic level of analysis is most relevant for explaining alterations in small states’ foreign policies, since changes in their threat perceptions mainly result from power shifts in the anarchic international system while their scope of action is limited (see Snyder 1991: 317–318). They typically conceptualise weak states as more attentive than strong states “to the constraints of the international environment” and threats to their survival, since they “operate on narrow margins” while “[i]nopportune acts,

53 The position on the levels of analysis issue among small state scholars employing realist theories coincides with that of neoclassical realism, introduced by Rose (1998), departing from structural realism’s assumption of systemic constraints but including also unit-level factors. Small state scholars typically use such factors to explain the relationship between the relative distribution of power in the international system – the independent variable of structural realism – and the foreign policies of states – the dependent variable of structural realism.

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flawed policies and mistimed moves may have fatal results” (Waltz 2010[1979]: 194–195; Elman 1995: 175; Jervis 1978: 172–173). Accordingly, small states are less constrained by domestic political processes in their foreign policies than great powers (Doeser 2011: 222–223; Elman 1995: 175). As shown by Schweller (1992: 253, 264–268), a severe external threat may even induce a small democratic state to engage in the launch of a preventive war to safeguard its survival.

Given the assumption that statesmen will acknowledge the constraints of an anarchic international system and respond rationally to threats to their states’ security and survival, a behaviour amplified by the fact that weak states are more vulnerable to external threats than more powerful states (Waltz 2010[1979]: 109, 184–185, 195, Jervis 1978: 172–173). Contrary to Waltz (2010[1979]: 126), some structural realist scholars predict that small states will bandwagon with threatening proximate great powers rather than engaging in balance behaviour (see Walt 1987: 21–31; Walt 1991: 53–55). Walt expects weak states “to balance [only] when threatened by states with equal capabilities”. He illustrates their bandwagoning behaviour with that of Finland during the Second World War while acknowledging that both “balancing and bandwagoning are ideal types, and actual behaviour will only approximate either model”. This was also the conclusion of Fox (1959: 187) on Finland’s and Sweden’s “anti-balance of power” behaviours during the Second World War in her study on how small states – despite their military weakness and with varying success – managed to exercise influence and resist great power coercion by employing “economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods as well as military measures”.

There is a relationship between bipolar great power tension and the influence of small states in the structural realism tradition (Lindell and Persson 1986; Goldmann 1979). Arguably, this is also the implication of Waltz (2010[1979]: 168–169) reasoning on the benefits of bipolarity from a great power perspective. The findings of Fox (1959) supports the neutrality hypothesis, which has been further elaborated on by Goldmann (1979: 120–121) as well as Miller and Kagan (1997: 58–59), suggesting that high great power tension in a region enables its smaller states to exploit their rivalry by playing them out against each other for economic and military aid. Goldmann also elaborates on the deterrent hypothesis, i.e. that rival great powers deter each other from employing force on small states; and the coalition hypothesis, i.e. that high great power tension prevent them from forming coalitions against small states. Both are compatible with Fox (1959).
These findings confirm the scholarly consensus that the influence of the structure of the international system is the dominant— but not the sole— variable explaining the foreign policy of small states. A deviant case suggests that unit- and individual-level variables may cause the opposite behaviour. In a case study on Georgia, Gvalia et al. (2013) conclude that such variables— especially when elite ideas, identities, and preferences influence the formulation of foreign policy— are decisive in explaining its consistent balancing behaviour against Russia since 2003.

3.2.4. A structural realism framework for analysing small state security

This section introduces the further elaborations by Knudsen (1988: 115–120) of the structural realism predictions presented in section 3.1.4. The resulting analytical framework supports this thesis analysis of relations between a small state and a nearby great power engaged in power rivalry with a more distant great power.54 It applies a great power’s perspective on the role of the small state, elaborating on the propensity of the nearby great power to apply pressure or intervene directly against it. The framework comprises three causal variables derived from structural realism, categorising the relations of the rivalling great powers with the small state and the role of the latter in the strategic relationship of the rivalling great powers. Hence, it aims at capturing the influence of diplomatic, political and military great power pressure (Knudsen 1999: 8). The concluding chapter of this thesis uses this framework to structure the analysis of Russia’s— and the US— relationships with Finland and Sweden, as well as to reflect on the regional strategic pattern identified in the study of the US maritime engagement in the East and South China Seas.

The first— main— independent variable is the level of tension between the rivalling great powers (i.e. the security pressure). It directly influences the strategic importance that the great powers assign to the small state. If great power tension is high and the small state is perceived as non-conforming, a proximate great power’s propensity to put pressure on— and seek control of— the small state by “restrictive” and “preventive” measures and minimise its options will be considerable. When security pressure is low, the strategic importance of the small state to the great powers will be more limited.

The second independent variable is “the degree of extroversion” in the foreign policy of the neighbouring great power, in Knudsen’s conceptualisation resulting from a “cycle of power, proceeding from internal growth to external expansion

54 N.B. it is thus not applicable to studying the security policy environment of buffer states (Knudsen 1996: 9).
to overextension and subsequent decline”. The level of great power tension and the pressure on small neighbours will peak in the extrovert phase. Here, Knudsen draws on the works of Modelski (1978) and Gilpin (1981), associated with the realist school of International Political Economy. This study will neither engage with these theories nor seek an in-depth analysis of potential imperialist ideas among the Russian leadership. Instead, it notes that the offensive strand of structural realism predicts that ascending great powers will seek regional domination including territorial expansion, since “hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival” (Mearsheimer 2001: 4). The second variable, which effect becomes visible to the small state by increasing great power pressure, is thus fully compatible also with opportunistic expansionism (Knudsen 1999: 12).

The third independent variable represents the foreign policy orientation of the small state. Knudsen thus acknowledges the role of domestic politics to small states international relations with great powers, as found in most small state literature. The foreign policy orientation of the small state will send diplomatic signals to the proximate great power, confirming or rejecting whether it has succeeded in its attempt to influence the former. Accepting an alliance will pacify their relations. A neutral stance may give rise to “suspicion and vigilance on the part of the proximate great power,” while aligning with the rivalling great power will be seen as a direct threat. A particularly important aspect here is whether the foreign policy orientation of the small state conveys the impression of effective control over its territory to the nearby great power.

We can derive a fourth independent variable from Knudsen (1988), i.e. the geographic location of the small state and its geostrategic significance to each of the rivalling great powers. The issue at hand is whether, and how, distant rivalling great power can strategically exploit the territory of the small state, regardless of the political will and irrelevant reassurances of the small state. A conditioner for the level of trust between the small state and its neighbouring great power can also be identified, i.e. the historical record of their relations. Knudsen (1996: 9–17) expanded his framework to six variables, making explicit this additional variable and defining the conditioner as an independent variable. He added an independent variable, which I define as a conditioner for the third variable, i.e.: “the existence of multilateral frameworks of security cooperation which might be able to stabilise power disparity”. It is worth noting that Knudsen (1999) returned to his 1988 framework when studying new security agendas in the Baltic Sea region.
As stated above, this thesis employs Knudsen’s framework – made up of four variables and two conditioners – to structure the concluding discussion in Chapter 6 on how Finland and Sweden seek to manage the dynamic regional maritime security environment by engaging themselves in bi- and multilateral cooperation. We will also use this framework when we reflect on the security dynamics of the East and South China Seas, thus facilitating cross-regional comparison of the logic of the interactions of the external superpower – the US – with small states and middle powers in this region.

Having introduced the concept of small states and international security and presented a structural realism framework for analysing relations between a small state and a nearby great power engaged in rivalry with a more distant great power, we will now shift focus and introduce neofunctionalism – a rival theory of the liberalism camp. As stated in the introduction, this thesis employs neofunctionalism in Article 3. Here, it is used to contrast and challenge structural realism’s explanations on the bilateral naval cooperation of EU members Finland and Sweden, whose security policies are framed within the context of NORDEFCO and the common security and defence policy of the EU. This siding from the main theoretical framework of this thesis supports a more comprehensive understanding of their incitements for cooperating and our assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the explanations provided by structural realism.

3.3. Neofunctionalism: a theory of regional integration employed as a contrast to structural realism in the study of the Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation

Neofunctionalism is a thread of the sociological strand of liberalism, recently employed to explain various cases of defence cooperation among EU member states. Liberalism, a broad school of thought rooted in the classical texts of inter alia Immanuel Kant, has offered contrasting and competing perspectives to realism since the end of the First World War. While realists of all strands have focussed on the causes of international conflict, liberal scholars – including neofunctionalists – have elaborated on determinants of peace across the levels of analysis conceived by Waltz (2001[1959]) as “images”. We will now position the process-oriented theory of neofunctionalism within the liberal school of thought, introduce its key mechanisms and discuss its role in theorising on regional community building.
3.3.1. The key features of liberalism and its four strands

In contrast to classical realism’s focus of on how the natures of political leaders influence states’ domestic and foreign policy at the individual level of analysis, liberalism have provided explanations on why individual liberty, interdependence, international (free) trade and prosperity contribute to peace (Russett 2013: 95, 101–102; Dunne 2011: 102–103). At the state level of analysis, collective security, democratic governments responsive to public opinion and national self-determination offer competing explanations to realists’ focus on why states’ internal structure and their ideologies foster foreign policies that causes conflict. Finally, liberalists argue that international law and international organisations – empowered to mediate between state contenders and enforce the rule of law and just order – can moderate and transcend the balance of power system at the system level emphasised by structural realism.

Unlike structural realism, liberalism emphasises the role of domestic factors in explaining states’ foreign policies. Ideas originating from the domestic realm – including core liberal values such as individualism and freedom – are applied to the sovereign state, seen to be shaped by an identity guiding its foreign policy behaviour (Dunne 2011: 102–103). What states define as their national interests may therefore differ between “successive governments and different leaders” in “similar geopolitical situations” (Nye 1988: 238–240). Most liberalism strands thus refute structural realism’s approximation of states as rational unitary actors. Also domestic political debates, involving bureaucracies and non-state actors, can boost cooperation and enable states to transcend the influence of anarchy on their foreign policies (Smith 2000: 35–36).

Baldwin (1993: 4) specified four liberalism strands of which commercial liberalism was the first, advocating free trade market as a tool for peace. Second, Baldwin identified republican liberalism, arguing that democracies do not engage in war on each other. Third, he recognised sociological liberalism – a strand of which neofunctionalism is a part – linking transnational relations to international integration, in turn causing “transformation of the state” (see also Cerny 2010: 22–23). Fourth, Baldwin specified neoliberal institutionalism (neoliberalism), emphasising the role of international institutions and regimes

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55 Dunne (2011: 103) points to a rift within liberalism between those advocating interventionist foreign policies and those who promote the principle of “tolerance and non-intervention”. He notes disagreements on whether robust or lean institutions are best suited for promoting liberal values in a multicultural international system and whether liberalism should preserve the right of individuals (and states) to prosper or give priority to international equality.
to global governance. Liberalism acknowledges the anarchic character of the international political system and the constraints of war put forth by structural realism (Russett 2013: 95–106), but claims that additional constraints of war – i.e. democracy, economic interdependence and international organisations – act in parallel to them, which influence is measured on scales (see Figure 4 below). Their power to explain states’ foreign policy are due to the notion that states are “embedded in domestic and international society”, shaping the underlying preferences of their population and leaders, who represent “some subset of domestic social actors” (Moravcsik 1992: 2, 13). These preferences are thus more relevant for explaining states’ foreign policy than their relative power.

Figure 4: “The Kantian triangle”, illustrating how liberalism’s constraints of war are seen to reinforce each other and interact in promoting peace. Source: Russett (2013: 106).

3.3.2. The importance of the EU to sociological liberalism and neofunctionalism

The EU represents an international institution which progressive and far-reaching regional community building has come to assume a special status in liberalist thought and posed a challenge to structural realism (see Collard-Wexler 2006). Sociological liberals such as Deutsch et al. (1957), Rosenau (1992), Rosamond (2003) and Pollack (2004) have all expounded on the idea of transnational relations to explain why its enlargement process has been successful. Burton (1972), for his part, provided a much used “cobweb” model of international relations – centring on the role of individuals’ membership in
overlapping social groups to cooperation – contrasting the antagonistic “billiard ball” model of structural realism (see Figure 5 below).

**Figure 5: The billiard ball\(^{56}\) and the cobweb models. Source: Jackson and Sørensen (2013: 104).**

Neofunctionalism is rooted in the liberal theorising on the political integration in Europe which began by Haas (1958) analysis of the European Coal and Steel Community, who was soon accompanied by Lindberg (1963; 1966) and Schmitter (1970). It aimed to describe, explain and predict how and why states “voluntary mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves”, i.e. subject themselves to regional integration (Haas 1970: 610).

Neofunctionalism charged realism with not understanding the complexity of the state as a concept and not recognising the role of (Bache et al. 2015: 11–12): i) interest groups and bureaucratic actors outside the domestic political arena; iii) non-state actors in international politics; and iv) “spillover” effects to European integration. Haas, Lindberg and Schmitter elaborated on functional spillover, i.e. that successful integration in one issue-area (economic sector) leads to pressure of integrating related issue-areas and technical pressure to satisfy supranational capability to manage the issues. They also expounded on political spillover, i.e. that functional integration would lead to domestic

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\(^{56}\) This metaphor is informed by Waltz (2010[1979]: 74, 101), holding states’ internal properties constant in his theory – i.e. downplaying the role of unit-level variables (i.e. domestic agents and agencies) on their foreign policies – and declaring them “like units” due to the socializing effect of the anarchic international system.
pressure among groups in the states concerned and “a shift in actor expectations and loyalty” (italics in original) to the supranational level (Schmitter 1969: 166). To Haas (1958: xiv), “nationally constituted groups with specific aims, willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears profitable”, were the actors who would drive the incremental “process of community formation”.

Following stagnation and setbacks in the European integration process of the mid-1960s and early 1970s, which Haas (1970: 627) ascribed to the nationalistic oriented French President Charles de Gaulle, “regional integration ought to be subordinated to a general theory of interdependence”, Haas (1976: 179) concluded. This materialised in the work of Keohane and Nye (1977: 24–26), setting forth a theory of “complex interdependence” emphasising the role of transnational actors. Under such conditions – making world politics a “seamless web” of issue areas – states would give priority to managing welfare issues rather than national security. Notwithstanding, neofunctionalism was revived in the 1990s by Sandholtz and Sweet (2012: 18–24), who incorporated elements of theory from Deutsch. Other scholars, such as Tranholm-Mikkelsen (1991: 6) added cultivated spillover to explain the role of the European Commission in fostering integration, while Niemann (2006) added exogenous spillover to explain EU’s enlargement. As noted in the introduction, recent case studies on European defence integration have employed a slightly modified version of neofunctionalism (see Sauer 2015; Westberg 2015; Parrein 2011).

Let us consider alternative integration theories to neofunctionalism. We have already touched upon the pioneering work of Deutch (1957: 3–5) on pluralistic security communities, in which international and transnational groups would be bound by a “sense of community”. In such communities, people (the members) would resolve social problems by “peaceful change”. Its contemporary application centres on the constructivism version of Adler and Barnett (1998), which is incommensurable with the rationalist approach of this thesis. As Oelsner (2015: 181) concludes after having employed this theory in a study on Latin America, “the concept of pluralistic security community has limited explanatory value to analyse security conditions in Latin America as a whole”.57

57 This outcome was due to “geographic, demographic, geopolitical, economic and even ideological structures” preventing the required “rapprochement between societies”. We cannot exclude a similar result within Europe.
A more promising theory would perhaps be “new intergovernmentalism”\textsuperscript{58} expounding on the replacement of the “nation state” by a concept of EU “member states”, promoted as a successor of both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism (see Bickerton et al. 2015). However, it has been criticised for merely constituting a rebranding of traditional intergovernmentalism (see Schimmelfennig 2015). Also multi-level governance theory, conceiving of the EU “as a polity in the making, in which power and influence are exercised at multiple levels of government” (Nugent 2010: 427), could be considered. Notwithstanding, in contrast to these theories and to non-modified neofunctionalism, the twofold aim of this study is to focus but on the logic of the maritime security strategies employed by rational state actors as components of their grand strategies – not on the EU level of analysis. Here, the slightly modified neofunctionalism analytical framework employed in Article 3 – centring on the effects of spillover – offers the precise predictions needed to challenge structural realism’s explanations of the naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden.

Having introduced neofunctionalism – and discussed its diverging theoretical positions to structural realism – as a tool for contrasting and assessing the explanations provided by structural realism on the motives for the bilateral naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden over a period of varying security pressure, we will now move on to discussing the research design of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{58} Elsewhere called "Member State Theory".
4. Research design

This chapter reiterates and elaborates on key aspects of the research problem presented in the introduction and specifies the framework for the qualitative studies outlined in Articles 1 through 5, which enable us to answer the four research questions in the concluding chapter of this thesis:

• What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategy of the US?
• What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the East and South China Seas?
• What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategy of Sweden and Finland in light of the recent resurgence of regional military threats?
• What lessons regarding continuity and change can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the Baltic Sea region?

First, the chapter provides an account of the criteria used for selecting the regions and states for study. Second, it introduces the key maritime regions and the states herein selected for study. Third, the chapter specifies the type of data used in the articles, provides an account of the methods used in the articles and their contribution to answering the research questions.

4.1. Selecting regions and states for study

4.1.1. Selection criteria

Given this thesis’ assumption that the development and employment of the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy has influenced states worldwide, examining the mutual influence of the US security engagements in key maritime regions is very relevant. To Stubbs and Reed (2006: 290–291), regions can be more or less developed along three dimensions. These dimensions represent the extent of which states in a distinct geographic area have: “significant historical experiences in common”; “developed socio-cultural, political and/or economic linkages”; and developed regional institutions for managing their collective affairs. To qualify as a key maritime region in this thesis it must fulfil not only the criteria of being significant developed along these dimensions. In the terminology of Buzan and Wæver (2003: 27–50), it must be a regional security
complex distinguishable from the global level by a significant degree of security interdependence.

A region under study must be of a maritime character, implying that the maritime domain is vital to the prosperity of its states and their interactions. To enable us to study continuity and change in the maritime security strategies employed, its security dynamics must involve traditional and non-traditional security concerns. Finally, it must be a region in which the US use of power to promote its security is constrained by the international environment. A key maritime region thus includes great power security dynamics with implications at international systems level that enable us to assess whether and, if so, how “[s]tructures shape and shove” (Waltz 2010[1979]: 79). This leads us to select for study maritime regions of US interest with transforming security environments, i.e. those hosting a regional power willing and capable to challenge US supremacy.

Phrased in the terminology used by Brooks and Wohlforth (2008: 14) and Taliaferro (2012: 198), we will study the influence on US maritime security strategies from developments in regions transforming from “permissive” security environments, in which the US faces “conditional and weak” constraints, to “restrictive” environments imposing “conditional and relative strong” constraints on the US. Regions fulfilling the above criteria allow for examining developments at distinct national, regional and systemic levels of analysis. Hence, we will select for study key maritime regions in which national, regional and great power dynamics interact, collide or merge.

To fulfil the twofold aim of this thesis, we must study the interactions of the US – and NATO59 – with key partners in the Baltic Sea region. States with strong national maritime interests – i.e. coastal states granted sovereignty (i.e. TTW), or sovereign rights (i.e. EEZ), over a substantial proportion of the region’s maritime domain – are of particular interest. Here, comparing the strategies employed by states of equal power with dissimilar geopolitical situations in the same region are most relevant. This will enable us to isolate the influences of geopolitics and to assess the impact of their geographic locations and facilitate discussions on their maritime strategies, pursued as subsets of their foreign policy. Moreover, we can expect that states characterised by transformative

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59 Arguably, NATO embodies the US permanent commitment to protect Europe, inter alia by its arsenal of nuclear weapons (The Telegraph 2016). Notably, the main purpose of NATO is deterrence, as set out in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty on collective defence, binding the US to defend Europe in case of military aggression.
developments in their foreign policies – i.e. those that are reconsidering their policies of alignment versus the dominant regional power, the external power and/or other states in the region – will provide particularly valuable information to answering the research question.

4.1.2. Introducing the two regions of study: the East and South China Seas and the Baltic Sea

To achieve this thesis aim of explaining the continuity and change in the US maritime security strategies over the past three decades, we must understand its implications in key maritime regions. To achieve this, we need to study also the foreign policies and maritime strategies of small states in key regions and their interaction with the US. For reasons set out below, the regions selected for study in this thesis are the East and South China Seas and the Baltic Sea.

The security context of the region composed of the East and South China Sea is marked by legacies of conflict, manifesting itself in a multitude of territorial disputes and tensions involving small island states, China, Japan, the US and Taiwan. It is host to some of the world’s most busy sea lanes, important to all states of the region but on which China is particularly dependent (see Cole 2006: 114). From a security policy perspective, the dense and asymmetric network of US bilateral alliances known as the *San Francisco System*\(^\text{60}\) distinguishes this region.

There is no regional political institution for the East China Sea region, although its coastal states are members of wider economic forums such as the intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation for states of the Pacific Rim. For those of the South China Sea, the cooperation of the intergovernmental Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) organisation – which ten member states together form the third-largest economy in Asia (The White House 2016) – contrasts the US alliance network. Here, the legacies of conflict and diverging ideas on the principles for regional cooperation, fuelled by the US-China rivalry for regional influence, have created a volatile dynamic in which economic and military security interact. So do the interactions of the two Koreas, China and Japan. In the security context of East and Southeast Asia – a maritime domain subject to a system-transformation process with global implications – the US and China are actors operating at international system level while ASEAN

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\(^{60}\)This system refers to the results of the peace treaty signed by 48 states with Japan (N.B. excluding the People’s Republic of China [PRC], the Republic of China [Taiwan] and the two Korea’s) and the bilateral US-Japan Security Treaty, both signed in San Francisco in September 1951 (Dower 2014: 2–3).
influences the geopolitical situation by “its leadership in establishing new platforms and channels for communication” (Eggerink and van der Putten 2011: 8–9, 45). Despite the frictions between its member states, ASEAN influences the international political process and the security situation in the entire region by its soft power. As argued by Friedberg (2005: 12–14), the US-China economic interdependence (and those of other states in the region) – managed through various international institutions in which the US and China participate – is a structural property creating incitements for peace and stability that to date have served to constrain the actors from engaging in conflict.

The character of the Baltic Sea region differs markedly from that of East and South China Seas. Since all of its coastal states except Russia are EU members, the level of institutional integration is deep. Their interaction with the US differ from those of the ASEAN members partly due to the role of NATO, of which all coastal states except Russia, Finland and Sweden are members. However, the latter two maintain close bilateral relations with the US and are among the five states in NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Programme for deep cooperation, resulting from the Partnership Interoperability Initiative endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit (NATO 2016a).

In contrast to the East and South China Seas, only a few maritime territorial disputes remain between the coastal states61 of the Baltic Sea region, arguably due to the high level of integration into the EU and NATO (see Miniotaité 2001: 28–34). In fact, this region’s maritime boundary system was almost complete already in the mid-1990s (Leanza 1996: 182). Up to 2013, scholars and policymakers often referred to the Baltic Sea region as a zone of cooperation and peace, or even an emerging security community (see Bengtsson 2016: 452; Möller 2007: 12; Stoltenberg 1999: viii). Since 2014, however, it is clear that the revived geopolitical interests of Russia – including the maritime domain – once again poses challenges to regional and global security.

Knutsen (2000: 1–8) rightly identified three actors operating at international systems level in Northern Europe – and thus the Baltic Sea region – influencing its security (of which maritime security is integral) and stability. The first was Russia, determining the role of the US in the European security arrangements and the security polices of the Nordic countries. The second was the US, while an

61 Following its 2005 withdrawal from its signature of border treaties with Estonia, including maritime borders, Russia resigned them in 2015 but has not yet ratified them (Einmann 2016). Latvia has not yet ratified its 1998 maritime boundary treaty with Lithuania, mainly due to concerns over oil exploration rights (Global Security 2016).
integrated EU possessing independent actor capability would represent a third. For this study, it is clear that while NATO is a collective security organisation dominated by the US that maintains the power structure of the Cold War, Russia and a successfully integrated EU are actors that may become capable of causing system transformation. This links the regional liberal integration process of the EU – preferably studied by neofunctionalism – to the concept of international power structure given primacy by structural realism.

The presence of a rising regional power and the importance of the maritime domain for resource extraction and communication (i.e. shipping) are common denominators of the Baltic Sea region and the region comprising the East and South China Seas. To fulfil the twofold aim of this thesis, the common denominators of these two regions and their differing characteristics render them particularly relevant to study.

4.1.3. The logic of this thesis selection of states for study in the two regions

The twofold aim of this thesis involves a focus on the maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region. To engage in in-depth studies of coastal states in the East and South China Sea region would therefore be beyond its scope. Notwithstanding, an overview of key coastal states’ security policy initiatives of importance to maritime security in this region – and their bi- and multilateral relations with the US, China and each other – will be provided. The provision of this overview is not a fortuitous bonus effect. Instead, we need it to be able to draw conclusions on the lessons learned from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the East and South China Seas, thus answering the second research question. However, it is also imperative for answering the first research question. Since this thesis attention to the East and South China Seas is due to its second aim – i.e. to explain the continuity and change in the US post-Cold War concept by examining the development of its maritime security strategy – the asymmetry regarding the depth of the empirical studies in the two regions is acceptable.

With regards to the Baltic Sea, we can expect that small states like Finland and Sweden – located at important geostrategic crossroads – will be able to punch beyond their weight as regional security providers (see Nordenman 2015: 96, 102; Rûse 2015: 53), inter alia in the maritime domain. The transforming security strategies of these two non-aligned states in a region marked by a dynamic maritime security environment – and their leading roles in regional maritime security cooperation as well as their interaction with the US and its
regional contender Russia – render them particularly relevant for in-depth study.

4.1.3.1 The US

Waltz (2010[1979]: 73) is primarily concerned with those states that make the most difference, thus founding his theory on the behaviours of great powers while claiming the theory to be applicable also for lesser states “insulated from the intervention of the great powers of a system”. Danilovic (2002: 28), for her part, has suggested a useful specification of major powers by: i) a power dimension, “reflecting the sheer size” of their capabilities; ii) a spatial dimension, referring to their “geographic scope of interests, actions or projected power”; and iii) a status dimension, indicating the “formal or informal acknowledgement” of their status. Her specification points to the significance of the sometimes-neglected spatial dimension, which serves to distinguish regional powers from globally dominant superpowers.

According to these criteria, it is of paramount importance to examine the US, the sole superpower in the international system whose actions have global reverberation, possessing the world’s largest EEZ. Waltz (2010[1979]: 74–77, 127–128) claims that international politics is a realm in which state actors are strongly influenced by socialisation and competition, which lead less successful states to replicate the behaviour of more successful ones. From a structural realism perspective, we can thus expect that its allies and partners on a global scale have more or less adapted the US conception of maritime security. The notion of socialisation among states – facilitated by international institutions – is central also to neofunctionalism and to the constructivist conception of security communities, although two latter centre on “norm setting and identity building” (Acharya 2009: 2–3) instead of adaptation to successful survival strategies. Accordingly, such a concept transfer is a reasonable assumption also from these perspectives.

The study of the continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategies outlined in Article 2 – which logically must include its bi- and multilateral relations with states in the region of the East and South China Sea – will provide the conceptual cornerstone to which we will contrast the more recent security developments in the Baltic Sea region.

4.1.3.2. Finland and Sweden

Non-aligned Finland and Sweden have been amidst of transformative developments in their foreign and security policies since the end of the Cold War.
While Finland was bound to its Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) agreement with the USSR until 1991 (Långström 2003: 218), strongly influencing its foreign policy, Sweden officially adhered to a policy of “non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war” (Post 2015: 320). Finland and Sweden became members of the supranational European Union in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR, which had evolved from the European Communities by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and adopted a three-pillar structure including a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters.\(^{62}\) The implications on their policies of neutrality by their EU memberships were addressed in the scholarly literature of the 1990s (see Sundelius 1994; Mouritzen 1994). Likewise were the implications of the 1999 launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), both being tools for the CFSP (see Bailes et al. 2006).

As Rieker (2006: 303–312) has noted, the EU is the sole “multilateral framework without a legacy from the cold war period”. Arguably, it adjusted to the prevailing security context by adopting a wide concept of security and an “innovative” comprehensive approach\(^{63}\), combining economic, political and military instruments of power in crisis management. Rieker found that the ESDP influenced Finland’s and Sweden’s national security discourses by placing emphasis on the international dimension and stepped up transformation of their defence forces accordingly. She also noted that the ESS replicated the threats specified in the 2002 US National Security Strategy\(^{64}\), but that the EU’s comprehensive approach centred on employing alternative policy tools for addressing them. While Finland combined national and international security perspectives, Sweden assigned the latter such weight that Till (2013: 43) subsequently defined its navy as “post-modern” due to its prime focus on UN-mandated expeditionary operations.

\(^{62}\) The European Communities became the first pillar, the CSFP the second and Justice and Home Affairs the third.

\(^{63}\) The understanding of the term comprehensive approach varies slightly. To NATO (2016c), it means, “nations, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (...) contribute in a concerted effort” when approaching crises since “military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to our security”. To the EU it means employing “a wide array of policies, tools and instruments at its disposal”, i.e. “diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid” when responding to “conflicts, crises and other security threats outside its borders” (EC 2013: 3).

\(^{64}\) I.e. organised crime, regional conflicts, state failure, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
The maritime security strategies pursued by Finland and Sweden cannot be studied in isolation of those of the EU. Rather, their strategies are layered by those of the EU and – more implicitly – by those of NATO. We must also consider their cooperation within NORDEFCO, a fact highlighting the importance of the Nordic dimension to their security policies. To Wivel (2014: 81, 88–89), the Nordic region is a security community in the sense of Deutsch et al. (1957), integrated in a “European security complex nested in an increasingly globalized international security system” and “a unipolar world order.” Within the EU Council, the three Nordic members of the EU – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – engage in informal “pre-meeting consultations” including the sharing of information and pooling of expertise (Rûse 2015: 53, 64). The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers are institutionalised fora for intra-Nordic consultation and cooperation, while the Nordic-Baltic Six (NB6) and the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) are key fora for their interaction with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (MoFA Latvia 2016). Thereto, the NB8+, building on the 2003 Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE) framework for US-NB8 consultations, have included also the UK and approached regional as well as global issues.

4.2. Data

This thesis uses data from official foreign and security policy documents, i.e. legal documents, white papers, defence reviews, doctrines and other official strategic documents as a basis of state policy in the empirical in-depth studies of selected states. By presenting and discussing qualitative text analyses of a substantial body of secondary sources it builds on existing research. It uses official statistics to highlight, compare and contrast various dimensions of the states examined and for cross-regional comparison. To some extent, in-depth interviews provide supporting and contrasting perspectives, supplementing official political and organisational views.

4.3. Methods used in the articles

Chapter 3 presented structural realism and introduced a supporting framework for studying small states’ security. It also presented the sociological strand of the liberalism school of thought and introduced neofunctionalism as a prescriptive theoretical tool designed to explain European integration. In this endeavour, independent and dependent variables were specified, while constitutive propositions and predictions regarding the foreign policy of powers weak and strong – with a focus on the maritime domain – were deduced for structural realism. Although not explicitly stated in Articles 2 and 3 – the two in-
depth studies of selected states which ambition are explanatory – the congruence method is used in a deductive approach (see Blatter and Haverland 2012: 144–152, 189–191). Accordingly, we use the theories as comprehensive explanatory frameworks. The analysis of the Cuban missile crisis by Allison and Zelikow (1999) represents a classic example of this approach.

Simply put, we will evaluate the congruence of the propositions and predictions derived from structural realism by comparing them with a broad set of empirical observations. In Article 3, we will contrast and compare the result of this evaluation with the congruence of propositions and predictions derived from neofunctionalism. The small-N research design of this thesis allows us to analysis diverse and fine-grained sets of observations of relevance to the maritime security strategy of each examined state. Given that this study covers an extensive time-period, this design helps us manage a large number of observations. Arguably, it also helps us gain control over the multiple factors and variables that influence – and even prompt the behaviour of – small and large states. One could rightly argue that its external validity is limited in comparison to that of a large-N study. However, this qualitative study is not aimed at making probabilistic generalisations to a population from the findings. Instead, it aims “to make logical generalizations to a theoretical understanding of a similar class of phenomena”, as set out by Popay et al. (1998: 348).

To account for the influence of “timing”, “interaction effects” and contexts” in the US conceptual development of maritime security and the progression of the Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation, Article 2 and 4 use elements of what Hall (2003: 384–385; 2006: 27–28) terms “systematic process analysis”, supplementing the congruence method. This method focusses on assessing the processes whereby certain sequences of events result in actors’ responding by taking actions anticipated by the theories, i.e. whether the states examined behave in the way the theories expect them to do. To make clear the logic of the processes in developing their strategies among the actors examined, the narrative structure of each of these articles is linear. This involves presenting their security policy situation (the set-up); highlighting key incidents, events and initiatives; while stepwise examining the resulting policy and strategy responses of actors involved. The linear narrative is particularly prominent in Article 2 and influences its structure.

In Article 1, we engage in both primary, i.e. conducting “new research to answer specific questions”, and secondary, i.e. “discovering information previously researched for other purposes” (Quesenberry 2015: 46), explorative research aimed at providing contextual understanding of the maritime security
concept. This methodological approach involves reviewing scholarly work and official data to identify and gain insight into key maritime security issues/issue areas, create tentative conceptual understanding on maritime security and draw preliminary conclusions on areas of further research. Article 1 uses a mixed methods approach involving inductive as well as deductive reasoning in a “plausibility probe” (George and Bennet 2005: 75) on tentative factors causing conceptual change in maritime security.

The last two studies of this thesis (Articles 4 and 5) aim at analysing current maritime strategic developments and drawing conclusions on viable strategies for providing maritime security. Accordingly, both include prescriptive elements with respect to maritime security strategies of the US, Finland and Sweden in a regional context, but do not employ any explicit theory. However, no qualitative inquiry starts with pure observation. As set forth by Schwandt (1993: 8), “[p]rior conceptual structure composed of theory and method provides the starting point for all observations”, thus initiating and guiding the observations we make as inquirers. Accordingly, Article 4 and 5 make implicit use of the neoliberal and structural realist schools of thought to structure the arguments.
This thesis understands the adoption and employment of maritime security strategies of states as responses to multi-sectoral threats in the maritime domain, posed by the activities of state and non-state actors to referent objects in four security sectors. N.B. since changes in the maritime security strategies pursued by the states studied are expected to logically stem from changes in their perceived maritime security situation (see Figure 6 above), Articles 1 through 5 engage in the study of both. Given the fact that their responses induce adaptations by the actors posing the threats – while the specific security interests of nation states continually develop – the application of their maritime security strategies are further specified in policy documents adopted by those military (i.e. military strategies/doctrines) and civilian agencies that are assigned responsibilities in the maritime domain. One could rightly argue that studies at each of the five levels of analysis are necessary to provide a complete explanation. However, this thesis aims to explain continuity and change in post-Cold War maritime security strategies by employing a structural realism analytical framework that assigns priority to the international system and unit levels of analysis.
Accordingly, it accounts for the influence on their foreign policy of the anarchic international system and the regional sub-systems in which the examined states interact. Here, it addresses the sub-system level of analysis by employing the supporting structural realism framework for analysing small state security provided by Knudsen (1988; 1996) in the concluding analysis of Chapter 6. As an exception, this thesis addresses the sub-unit level of analysis – e.g. transnational firms and domestic organisations (here, armed forces) – when examining the motives and interests underlying the Finnish-Swedish naval defence cooperation in Article 3, where we employ neofunctionalism to contrast the explanations of structural realism. N.B. structural realism treats states like black boxes and does not consider the sub-unit and individual levels of analysis.
5. Articles

This chapter briefly introduces the five articles of this thesis and their role in answering the four research questions and fulfilling the twofold aim of this thesis. Table 1 provides an overview by specifying the main themes of the articles and categorising them by state actor(s) under study; arena; type of study (i.e. purpose) and period of study.

Table 1: An overview of the articles of this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>State Actor(s)</th>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Main Theme</th>
<th>Type of Study</th>
<th>Period of Study</th>
</tr>
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65 Defined in this thesis as aimed at expanding our understanding of the topic by providing additional information and analysis, while including elements of explanation.
Article 1, titled “From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens and National Economies”, provides an answer to why the maritime security concept widened on a global scale in the two decades following the end of the Cold War while elaborating on the consequences. To answer this question, it examines the global change in the referent object for maritime security in 1991–2013 by evaluating the influence of four prominent factors. The first factor is the role of new threat scenarios to nation states, while the second represents the ever-increasing role of shipping to globalised trade and the advent of transnational maritime terrorism. The third factor is the economic and human security effects of the surge in piracy in densely trafficked sea areas, while the role of coastal states’ substantially expanded rights to exploit maritime natural resources by the 1994 entry into force of UNCLOS is the fourth. This explorative article provides the conceptual baseline for this thesis study of the continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of selected regions and states. The research presented in this article contributes to answering the first research question of this thesis. Article 1 was published in Journal of Defence Studies in 2013.

Article 2, titled “Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime security strategy”, represents the logical continuation of the research effort initiated in Article 1. It contrasts the traditional expressions in US maritime security strategies by the incorporation of broader security perspectives. By employing structural realism as comprehensive explanatory framework – while pointing to the limits of its explanatory power by contrasting it with predictions of neoliberalism – it sets out to explain the continuity and change in the US maritime security strategies in the period 1991–2016. The research presented in this article enables us to draw conclusions on how and why the US maritime security strategy has evolved the way it has done (i.e. the process). The research presented in this article enables us to answer the first research question of this thesis – explaining the continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security. Given the nature of the US maritime security strategy developments,
this article focusses on the US economic and security policy engagements with states in the maritime region composed of the East and South China Seas. As a result, the research presented in this article also enables us to answer the second research question of this thesis. Article 2 is not yet published.

In Article 3, titled “Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives, prospects and challenges”, we shift our focus towards the Baltic Sea region in order to present parts of the research required for answering the third and fourth research questions posed in this thesis. In this article, we employ neofunctionalism and structural realism as competing explanatory frameworks to explain the ever-deepening naval cooperation of Finland and Sweden. For comparison, we also examine the longstanding naval cooperation of Belgium and the Netherlands in this article. These are the two navies whose joint command then Swedish Supreme Commander Göranson promoted in 2013 as a role model for how Sweden could contribute to European pooling and sharing ideas (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a: 70). It draws conclusions on patterns of alliance formation and under what conditions each of the employed theoretical frameworks provides explanatory power. Article 3 was published in Defence Studies in 2016.

In Article 4, titled “The New US Maritime Strategy: Implications for the Baltic Sea Region”, we maintain a focus on the Baltic Sea region. However, this article examines how US security interests – and the inclusion of the new pillar “all domain access” in its sea power concept as outlined its 2015 maritime strategy – overlaps with those of the coastal states of this region, including Finland and Sweden. Accordingly, the research presented in this article contributes to answering the fourth research question of this thesis. Article 4 was published in the RUSI Journal in 2015.

Article 5, titled “Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region” represents the final article included in this compilation thesis. It interweaves the various strands of research presented in
Articles 3 and 4 into a geostrategic overview of the Baltic Sea, expounding on the character of the current maritime security environment and the recent responses of Finland, Sweden, the US and NATO. The conclusions drawn in this article on viable strategies to foster maritime security in the Baltic Sea are essential to answering the third and fourth research question of this thesis. Article 5 was published in 2016 as a chapter in the edited volume *Focus on the Baltic Sea: Proceedings from the Kiel Conference 2015.*

From Protection of Shipping to Protection of Citizens and National Economies
Current Changes in Maritime Security

Stefan Lundqvist*

This article analyses the alteration of the referent object for maritime security from protection of shipping and port facilities to protection of citizens and national economies. It presents a tentative answer on the extent and consequences of this alteration applied by states in a global perspective, and focuses on validating four explanatory factors on why the alteration has occurred. The time period of study is between 1991 and 2013. Its results illustrate a transition in states’ security policies from traditional expressions of maritime security to broader security perspectives, and also indicates radically altered maritime strategic perspectives among states.

INTRODUCTION

The maritime domain’s value for states can be described in terms of its natural resources, its importance for transport and trade, power projection and defence, and the marine environment’s inherent value. Consequently, social, economic, law enforcement and security interests converge and interact in this domain. Government and private interests are mixed with varying degrees of governmental, inter- and supra-national regulation and control, whose effectiveness are dependent on the coordination and interaction between the domain’s stakeholders. Maritime policies have

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far-reaching ramifications and maritime security deficiencies tend to propagate into the land domain. In the Gulf of Guinea, for example, maritime insecurity has rendered significant regional loss of revenue, restrictions on investment, and caused crime rates to increase. Conversely, Somalia’s civil war and political decay has entailed lucrative maritime crime developments, involving piracy and illegal fishing, degrading the maritime security of Somalia and its adjacent states.\(^2\)

However, maritime insecurity can also be a driver for cooperation. As witnessed in South-east Asia, the challenges in providing security for the region’s maritime traffic has spurred deepened regional bilateral and multilateral cooperation, despite severe distrust and suspicion in the countries’ mutual relations and certain states’ relation to the US.\(^3\) Collaboration needs have been prompted by the criminality in the Malacca Straits, which funnels sea traffic of great economic importance for Asian states.

Western powers have replaced traditional sea-power perspectives by comprehensive, transnational and global perspectives, as illustrated in Figure 1. Moreover, the referent object for maritime security has altered from shipping and port facilities to citizens and national economies. These changes become apparent by studying the developments of US and Australian maritime doctrines and policy documents, and when comparing them with the 2004 European Council (EC) regulation 725 and the 2010 European Union (EU) Commission definitions of maritime security.\(^4\)

![Figure 1: Altered maritime strategic objectives and means for achieving maritime security in the US and Australia](source: Author)
Why then have these changes occurred and what are their consequences? This article presents a tentative answer to these questions by identifying and examining four factors candidate to explain this strategic change, and why the maritime security’s referent object is altered. The period of study is between 1991 and 2013, and includes key events such as the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991; the coming into force of UNCLOS III in 1994; the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001; the subsequent signing of the ISPS Code regime for international shipping in 2002; the 2005 revision of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention; and a surge in piracy in key ocean areas. It points to radically altered maritime strategic perspectives where the security policies and interests of the states studied have broadened far beyond traditional notions of maritime security. Thereto, it indicates that terrorism and maritime criminality by non-state actors have altered states’ threat scenarios with legal and financial consequences.

**Factor 1: End of Cold War Has Led to New Threat Scenarios**

The global security environment just over 10 years into the new millennium differs significantly when compared to 1991. Accordingly, new maritime strategic challenges have progressively mounted during the more than two decades that have passed since the end of the Cold War. Chris Rahman identifies a revitalising incorporation of non-traditional security threats into national and international strategic thinking. Today’s security policy concepts were not drafted in the maritime environment, he explains, making a case for the necessity of considering maritime security as part of global security policy analysis and debate. Rahman considers the increased attention to human security as being an important trend supplementing nation-state perspectives, responding to states’ altered perceptions of transnational threats. I hold that the domination of the military threat during the Cold War was due to its imminent and existential nature, making states emphasize threats in the political and military security sectors. By inductive reasoning, we can expect states facing such threats today likewise suppressing threats in economical, societal and environmental security sectors.

South Korea is a state perceiving a persistent and existential military threat with nuclear connotations from its northern neighbour, North Korea. Consequently, its security situation has gained much contemporary
attention. We will now challenge Rahman’s theses by briefly examining South Korea’s security policy developments.

As expected, South Korean policy papers prior to 2008 focused on the Korean Peninsula. The 2006 Defence White Paper exclusively discusses threats pertaining to the political and military sectors, focusing on states’ promotion of national interests through strategic coalitions, local conflicts contribution to regional instability, transnational terrorism and WMD proliferation. ‘Non-military’ threats are discussed as secondary matters in a chapter on establishing an ‘Integrated Defence Headquarters’.

The 2008 Defence White Paper conveys strikingly altered security notions. A rapidly altering security environment, with a rise of complicated and multifarious transnational and non-military threats, provides ‘new challenges and opportunities for the Korean military’. It sets the vision for a ‘Global Korea’, requiring global cooperation on economic, cultural and environmental issues. It outlines three objectives: maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; building firmly the foundation for its security and national prosperity; and enhancing its international competence and status. This remarkable policy change is persuasively explained by Scott A. Snyder, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, through South Korea’s new role as a leading world economy, acquired G-20 membership and related needs of financial stability. Snyder notes a new ‘desire to participate in maritime security, peacekeeping, and post-conflict stabilisation missions’, far from the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s growing dependence on global world trade explains its increased ambitions and related naval investments, he concludes. Its 2009 decision to join the US-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 counter-piracy operation was preceded by several piracy incidents involving South Korean ships and citizens off the Somali coast. Key to South Korea’s continuous and substantial involvement has been the new capabilities provided by its destroyer procurement programme.

The 2010 incidents—in which the South Korean corvette ROKS Cheonan was sunk and the island of Yeonpyeong was shelled by North Korean artillery—are echoed in the 2010 Defence White Paper. North Korea’s regime is portrayed as unstable and provocative, marked by a strategic goal to unite the Korean states under its regime. Notwithstanding this serious military threat, transnational and non-military security threats and the risk of inter-state conflicts in the region are emphasized. Piracy, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation supplements military threats in a new global security environment.
Maritime security is denoted a transnational and common security interest, designated status as a cooperation area at the 2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus. The US–South Korea alliance is pronounced in its defensive position on the Korean Peninsula, but also in its commitment to promote global and regional peace and security through maritime security operations.

The volatile East and South China Seas are strategically important to South Korea. More than half of global shipping tonnage transfers through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok en route to and from the South China Sea. Oil shipping is likely to increase in response to Asia’s growing energy demand, and Asian states are investing in regional offshore gas exploration. Certain exploitation areas are contested, for example, the Spratley Islands being claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The East and South China Seas form a maritime regional security complex, the seasoned strategist Rommel C. Banlaoi adduces, in which the states’ security interests must be addressed comprehensively. He sets forth that disputes about energy, fish and overlapping claims on islands, territorial waters and EEZs feed interstate rivalries and form a regional maritime security dilemma involving the coastal states and other major powers. The main source of this dilemma is the economic and military rise of China, Banlaoi concludes, aggravated by the rising piracy threat with potential links to transnational terrorism.

We can thus conclude that: (1) South Korea’s expanded maritime security requirements and naval investments are due to a widened security focus and valorization of non-traditional security threats; (2) regional and global maritime security are now part of South Korea’s national interests; and (3) South Korea’s widened security focus is due to its increased dependence on financial stability and global trade flows, amplified by exacerbated regional piracy. However, 17 years elapsed from the dissolution of the Soviet Union until the South Korean Defence White Papers expressed broadened security notions. Apparently, existential and imminent military threats inhibit valorization of non-traditional threats in non-military security sectors. In contrast, they appear to be leveraged by financial and human security imperatives.

**Factor 2: Transnational Maritime Terrorism Treatens Citizens and National Economies**

It goes without saying that terrorism is a prominent feature of today’s global security environment. Thus, a second factor candidate to explain
the change in maritime security is that transnational and ideologically motivated terrorism in the maritime domain poses a threat to national and global economies, accentuated by states’ increased dependence on maritime trade. These mechanisms are frequently discussed among contemporary scholars. Chris Rahman identifies transnational terrorism as a threat accentuated in US maritime strategy, managed as a dimension of territorial sea control, and by the maritime transport sector’s implementation of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) security regulations.\textsuperscript{17} It is a concept associated with the risk of WMD proliferation, he argues, countered by maritime security operations. Captain (N) Charles Reid stresses the risk of a nexus between piracy and terrorism. In Somalia, increasingly advanced piracy is perpetrated by criminals affiliated with ideologically motivated terrorist groups which, according to Reid, preclude them from being managed as separate problems.\textsuperscript{18} Reid suggests that pirate leaders, with already usurped economic fortunes and attracted by status and political power, could be motivated to commit maritime terrorist attacks in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. In turn, Islamist-influenced young pirates could be persuaded to participate. Understanding the costly consequences for maritime trade by closing this strait gives Reid’s concern a perspective.

This explanatory factor involves three assertions: (1) shipping’s importance to world trade; (2) the presence of maritime terrorist threats; and (3) these threats impact on human security and potency to induce adverse effects on national economies. Let us examine their validity.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) are useful sources for statistics on shipping and trade. The WTO estimates that shipping’s share of the global transport sector’s financial value increased from 36 per cent in 1995 to 43 per cent in 2006.\textsuperscript{19} In an internal report, the WTO Secretariat estimated that shipping’s share of the 2008 corresponding totals had increased significantly.\textsuperscript{20} A frequently used statistical claim, typically rendered without reference, is the maritime transport sector’s share of world trade, amounting to 90 per cent. I find these statistics relating to a 2008 UNCTAD newsletter, referring to volumes of transported goods from 2000 to 2006.\textsuperscript{21} In the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis, 2009 commercial shipping downturn was limited to 4 per cent compared to a 12 per cent decline of the global export volumes.\textsuperscript{22} In contrast, the 2010 global export volumes had a record increase of 14 per cent followed by 5 per cent in 2011.\textsuperscript{23} The volumes of world seaborne trade correspondingly
grew by 7 per cent in 2010 and 4 per cent in 2011.\textsuperscript{24} Commercial shipping’s substantial growth between 1991 and 2011, in tandem with World Merchandise Trade and World Gross Development Product, is confirmed by the UNCTAD report, \textit{Review of Maritime Transport 2012}\textsuperscript{25}. WTO and UNCTAD statistics thus verify shipping’s increased importance to world trade since 1991.

Examining the alleged presence of a maritime terrorist threat reveals interesting facts. Peter Chalk, senior researcher on terrorism with the RAND Corporation, indicates that terrorist attacks on maritime targets only represent 2 per cent of the total number of international incidents reported from 1976 to 2006.\textsuperscript{26} Terrorist organizations have been located far from coastal areas, he explains, lacking the required resources and expertise to operate at and from the sea. The challenges and uncertainty of success has countered maritime terrorism. According to Chalk, the maritime terrorist threat has evolved in the new millennium through a series of attempted and successful terrorist attacks associated with al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{27} These incidents have instilled fear among Western powers for a determined expansion of Islamist operations to the maritime domain. This fear has been accentuated in the US, Chalk asserts, who has taken the leading role in strengthening global maritime security control systems since 11 September 2001.

Helmut Tuerk, a judge of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, points to the UN Security Council’s recognition of a rising terrorist threat through multiple resolutions preceding and succeeding the events of 11 September 2001.\textsuperscript{28} The latter exposed the vulnerability of the global transportation infrastructure to terrorist attacks and its potential to transfer WMD, he explains, whilst the container system development has furthered shipping’s dual role as target and vector for terrorism. The ISPS Code and the revised SUA Convention must be seen in the light of these events, he declares, since the 1988 SUA Convention and Protocol were deemed inadequate to deter suicidal terrorist attacks by the IMO Council. The review process was, therefore, directed towards improving maritime transport security—suppressing and preventing terrorist acts against ships at sea or in port.

Peter Lehr, lecturer in terrorism studies at the University of St. Andrews, claims that the maritime terrorist threat is exaggerated, since it has been sparsely realized and with limited impact.\textsuperscript{29} He points to the difference between the now-deceased Osama bin Laden’s bombastic rhetoric and Jihadist (Al Qaeda) organizations’ inability to perpetrate
mega-size terrorist attacks in the intractable maritime domain. The development of terrorist groups describes a progression, Lehr asserts, in which different groups copy proven experience. A sudden use of ships as WMD vectors would represent a disproportionate increase in the attacks’ complexity, he concludes.

These analyses indicate a common belief that a maritime terrorist threat exists. It is addressed by states and in the international community’s legal programmes to protect citizens and the global trade system—a system in which shipping holds an increasingly important role. Let us continue by examining its impact on human security and national economies.

Chalk highlights three aspects of Islamist maritime terrorism. First, large passenger vessels represent venues of attacks, able to cause mass casualties and inflict fear among large population groups through media.30 Second, attacks on shipping offer a means of causing mass economic destabilization in the West. He recognises shipping’s key role in the advanced global logistics supply systems.31 Disrupting these delicate systems, for example, by forcing the closure of a major port or blocking a maritime bottleneck, would have a global domino effect on world trade. Chalk recognises the challenges in perpetrating such large-scale attacks, but emphasises the financial effects of limited maritime terrorist attacks.32 Third, the voluminous and complex nature of the containerised sea freight system offers a viable environment for terrorist groups’ logistic movement of weapons and personnel.33 According to Chalk, Islamic militants remain intent to engage in maritime terrorism, visualised through the 2010 attack on the M Star and the high-profile maritime plots prevented between 2008 and 2010.34

In line with Chalk, Tuerk asserts that terrorist attacks against shipping in key strategic areas for maritime transport possess the strength to seriously disrupt global trade.35

Lehr, for his part, analyses a range of attacks in which ‘improvised explosive devices’ have been used in different ‘modus operandi’ with varying degrees of success, placed on-board target vessels or carried on small craft in suicide attacks.36 Based on these analyses and case studies of hijacking and hostage-taking on ships, he suggests a focus shift from scenarios with low probability and high impact to scenarios with high probability and low impact.

Countering asymmetric maritime terrorism threats implies challenges for navies worldwide. The British intelligence officer Robert Snoddon highlights that existing organizational cultures and capabilities among
navies are shaped by the traditional task of defeating conventional adversaries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Operation Active Endeavour, commenced in 2001, thus forced contributing navies to alter tactics and adapt to law-enforcement tasks. Notably, he depicts its unforeseen development towards a surveillance operation in international and cross-departmental partnership, promoting national and international interests through a comprehensive approach.

This examination indicates that limited maritime terrorist attacks have proven their potency of causing mass casualties, impacting on maritime trade flows and thereby threatening the global trade system. Consequently, maritime terrorism is firmly linked to the altered referent object of maritime security: the need to protect citizens and national economies.

**Factor 3: Piracy and Organized Maritime Crime Have Grown into Regional Threats to Human and Economic Security**

The most common theme in today’s maritime security literature is undoubtedly piracy and maritime crime. In the light of its increasing prevalence and the extent of international responses, a third explanatory factor can be phrased: The level of organized maritime crime and regional piracy, linked to criminal and ideologically motivated organizations, has grown into levels posing regional threats to human security, shipping, national economies and regional economic systems. This line of thinking is given prominence by Charles Reid, who questions the validity of previous estimates of piracy costs in the waters off Somalia. Piracy poses a significant threat to regional economic security, the effects of which are unequally distributed among states in the region, he argues. Furthermore, Reid claims piracy to be mutually dependent on the global economic development, responding policies and strategies by the international community, and actions by regional and local actors.

This explanatory factor involves four assertions: (1) an increase in regional piracy and maritime crime; (2) its threat to human security and shipping; (3) a link between piracy and criminal and ideologically motivated organizations; and (4) a threat to national economies and regional economic systems by increased maritime criminality. I will now briefly examine these claims and identify their co-variation.

Arguably, the maritime areas suffering heightened criminality levels are maritime choke points in which the coastal states, for various reasons, have failed in providing adequate maritime surveillance and law enforcement. Sea traffic concentration areas represent two categories:
(a) Transit ways, to which alternate maritime routes exist. If one route is blocked, alternate routes can and will be used; here, a disruption will merely delay the traffic. The Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden constitute such transit ways.

(b) Gateways, which must be traversed en route to or from enclosed seas. Closing a gateway prevents traffic along that route. The Strait of Hormuz may be described as such a gateway.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a useful source for statistics on piracy and maritime crime. IMB statistics are based on incidents defined in UNCLOS as piracy and by the IMO as armed robbery.39 In 2012, global piracy reached a five-year low by 297 reported incidents. This is a discernible drop from the 439 incidents reported in 2011, but an upsurge compared to the 107 incidents reported in 1991.40 In 2012, most reports emanated from Indonesia, describing 81 incidents of petty theft; and the waters off Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea saw a marked decrease, reporting 75 incidents compared to 217 in 2011. IMB attributes these reductions to: (1) preventive and disruptive counter-piracy actions undertaken at sea and versus land-based camps; and (2) merchant vessels’ implementation of IMO’s ‘Best Management Practice’ instructions and employment of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP). Although Somali piracy declined in 2012, the perpetrated incidents were violent; killing two, injuring one and taking 250 crewmembers hostage. Fifty-eight incidents were reported from the Gulf of Guinea in 2012, compared to 45 in 2011. As with the Somali piracy, vessels were hi-jacked, guns were usually used and 207 crew members were taken hostage. In 1991, IMB reported no piracy incidents in East or West Africa, Latin America or the Indian Ocean, but 14 in the South China Sea and 88 in the Malacca Straits.

Apparently, the levels of reported piracy and maritime crime have nearly tripled in from 1991 to 2012. This rise could logically be attributed to the setting up in 1992 of an IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Malaysia. On the contrary, IMB claims that it was created in response to an alarming growth in piracy.41

Let us also examine the impact and developments of piracy. IMB reports extensive piracy in the Malacca Straits in 1990–92 and 1999–2006, with a peak at the millennium.42 However, only singular incidents have been reported since 2008.43 This improvement contrasts with the post-1994 rise in piracy in the South China Sea, likewise plaguing Indonesia.
and Malaysia.\textsuperscript{44} Since IMB statistics indicate an end to a sustained period of considerable piracy, the Malacca Straits is a useful case to validate possible links between piracy and organized crime, as well as its impact on coastal states’ economies.\textsuperscript{45}

Jayant Abhyankar, Deputy Director of the IMB, describes the 1990s piracy in the Malacca Straits as ‘Asian’, characterised by armed robbery of ships’ crews at night.\textsuperscript{46} Thereto, he describes the nascence of a violent form of piracy: hijacking and trading of entire vessels with cargo. The researcher Catherine Raymond confirms Abhyankar’s views on the Southeast Asian piracy developments\textsuperscript{47}, portraying a highly violent piracy, often leaving the ships’ crews murdered or drifting in boats. Vessels carrying fuel oil were the 1990s most common victims and their cargoes were easily sold on a thriving black market, she explains. According to Raymond, this activity temporarily ceased in 2003 due to a break-up of certain international crime syndicates and a Chinese crackdown on the black market.

Peter Chalk describes the procedure applied as: hijacking ships at sea, transferring the cargo to other ships, and using the hijacked ships under false names and documentation.\textsuperscript{48} According to Raymond and Chalk, forged shipping documents are not unusual in international shipping, since ships easily can be re-registered under flags of convenience.\textsuperscript{49} Raymond also highlights the 2001 emergence of a third category of piracy in Southeast Asia, including in the Malacca Straits, using an intermediate level of violence: kidnapping for ransom.

Raymond identifies three types of alleged criminal perpetrators in the Malacca Straits. The dominant category was petty criminals, perpetrating opportunistic armed robberies of ships’ crews in port or at anchorage.\textsuperscript{50} Another category was five Malaysia and Indonesia-based criminal syndicates, committing large-scale piracy and kidnappings. The last category was the Indonesian separatist movement Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, financing its struggle for freedom by smuggling and ship hijackings with hostage-taking. The 1997 Asian financial crisis seriously affected Indonesia, Raymond explains. She concludes that its consequences, conjoined with an increased flow of understaffed merchant ships in the Malacca Straits, reinforced the surge in piracy.

Several factors interacted in solving the Malacca Straits piracy problems. Raymond points to the effectiveness of the ISPS Code implementation and Indonesia’s, Singapore’s and Malaysia’s agreement on the “Trilateral Coordinated Patrols”.\textsuperscript{51} In 2005, joint aerial surveillance was initiated and in 2006 the three countries agreed on pursuing pirates in
each other’s territorial waters. Their concern and outrage about the 2004 US proposal of stationing counter-terrorism forces on craft in the straits were essential to their sudden will to cooperate on maritime surveillance of the Malacca Straits, Raymond asserts. Raymond highlights the ‘Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy’ entry into force in 2006, involving the ASEAN states, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Sri Lanka. Notably, Raymond suggests that Indonesia’s earlier reluctance to cooperate was due to its inability of funding adequate marine resources, why piracy partially funded its Navy.

These scholars emphasize the risks of piracy at various levels of analysis. Raymond discusses the shipping industry’s financial risks in terms of lost cargo, lost ships, risk premiums paid to insurance companies and ransoms paid for crew release. She also addresses the risk of pirates’ tactics being used by terrorist groups. Chalk emphasises mariners’ jeopardised security. Thereto, he elaborates on piracy’s risks to coastal states in terms of food security and costs for decontaminating sensitive environments. Nations in piracy prone areas face socio-economic risks from shipping boycott, he argues, addressing it as a current issue for terminals in Bangladesh, Nigeria, Indonesia and the Horn of Africa. Unlike Raymond, Chalk considers piracy’s costs to the shipping industry as manageable weighed against its financial turnover. Instead, he emphasizes its undermining consequences for affected coastal states’ legitimacy by the associated corruption of state government officials, as in Indonesia. Although Chalk considers the risk of partnerships between terrorist and pirate groups, he stresses their strongly divergent objectives.

Piracy is costly and its ramifications are, as we have noted, wide-ranging. Let us examine some aspects of the Somali case. The Somali piracy’s costs to world economy have been estimated to US $7 billion in 2011, mainly relating to protecting ships traversing the Horn of Africa. This protection is mainly provided by navies through the EU’s Operation Atalanta, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and US CTF 151, including Vessel Protection Detachments. Since 2007, however, Private Security Companies (PSCs) offer increasingly advanced and costly protection in the area. Initially PSCs provided unarmed ‘security riders’, offering protection embarked on the commercial vessels by non-lethal methods. Gradually, PCASPs and escort platforms have been introduced, accompanied by a debate on their feasibility and legal mandate to use lethal force. These legal uncertainties, combined with concerns for the training and supervision of mariners and PCASPs, motivated the IMO’s
series of recommendations during 2009 and 2012. Throughout these circulars, the IMO has encouraged self-protection measures aboard ships, but discouraged use of armed security—except under tight control of their flag state and following risk adequate assessments.

Another outstanding issue is the prosecution of the suspected pirates. Capturing states have been reluctant to prosecute them in their domestic courts, and international law has been interpreted as prohibiting transfer to a third state. Therefore, some states have applied a ‘catch-and-release’ policy, while others have transferred the pirates to third states for prosecution by relying on UNCLOS jurisdiction. Kenyan courts began prosecuting captured Somali pirates in 2006, but alleged corruption and mistreatment of prisoners have plagued the US, UK, and EU transfer programmes since 2009. These problems have initiated cooperation with additional regional partners such as Mauritius, Tanzania and the Seychelles. The UNODC’s Counter Piracy Programme, established in 2009, has provided these states ample assistance by judicial, prosecutorial and police capacity building programmes as well as equipment. Mauritius has adopted various relevant legislative instruments in its preparations, including a noticed anti-piracy law in 2011. Pirates have successfully been convicted in the Seychelles’ courts since 2010, and in January 2013, the first suspected pirates were transferred to Mauritius for prosecution.

This examination indicates that maritime crime and piracy, occasionally linked to ideologically-motivated organizations, have grown into regional threats to citizens, shipping, national economies, and regional economic systems. Obviously, countering piracy will remain a costly and legal challenge for the international community in the foreseeable future. In addition, it will require adequate operational coordination between navies and PSCs taking armed action in the maritime domain.

**Factor 4: UNCLOS III Extension of States’ EEZs Has Increased the Maritime Domain’s Importance**

The extension of coastal states’ rights to exploit maritime natural resources by UNCLOS III is predominantly discussed among legal scholars, but its effects have wider significance. This explanatory factor draws on the effects of coastal states’ extended rights to exploit natural resources up to 200 nautical miles (nm) from their baselines, and up to 350 nm of the continental shelf, enhancing the maritime domain’s influence on their food and economical security.
This explanatory factor is discussed by Chris Rahman, emphasising the needs to protect the increasingly important offshore oil exploration from crimes, terrorism, accidents and environmental disasters. Martin Robson points to the South American economies dependency on maritime natural resources extraction and the need to meet its maritime security requirements. The strategic link between national interests and maritime security is, he asserts, most evident in the case of Brazil’s large-scale offshore oil exploration investments.

Logically reasoning, states lacking adequate naval resources are less likely to take advantage of UNCLOS’s extended rights. Here, we will examine two African cases: the financially and military weak East African Mozambique, having Africa’s third-longest coastline, contrasting with the overall stronger West African Nigeria, whose coast is a quarter of its land border.

The former Portuguese colony of Mozambique, a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), has a 2,470 km coastline bordering the Mozambique Channel. Mozambique ratified UNCLOS III in 1997 and claims a territorial sea of 12 nm and an EEZ of 200 nm. Despite agricultural and mining activities dominating its economy, fishing is important. Between 1991 and 2002, its fish capture production varied between 23,195–41,579 tonnes, increasing to 189,831 tonnes in 2011. Although Mozambique’s domestic fish production grew by 34 per cent in 2004-08, its domestic market’s concurrent 63 per cent increase in demands turned the balance of fish export weight from positive to negative values. However, despite this change and declining unit prices on shrimp in the international market, Mozambique’s 2008 balance of fish export value remained positive and amounted to $23,393. However, fishing is important for Mozambique from additional aspects. The UN agency Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimates 500,000 Mozambicans being directly dependent on fishing for their livelihoods, whereof 80 per cent are artisanal fishermen. FAO emphasises fish importance as a source of animal protein for Mozambique’s population, and fish imports are required since the demand continuously exceeds its national supply. Trade balance is met through exports of valuable fish and shellfish to SADC, EU, and Asian countries, and imports of, for example, low-price Namibian mackerel. According to FAO, fish exports are an important economic growth area contributing to international interest in developing Mozambique’s fisheries management and production,
for example, fish farming. A recent example is the UK’s ‘Aid-for-Trade’ project which assured continued fish exports to the EU.\textsuperscript{72}

Fish stocks, such as the important Sofala Bank located in the centre of Mozambique’s claimed EEZ, are one aspect of the unresolved territorial conflicts between France, Madagascar and the Comoros concerning the islands in the Mozambique Channel.\textsuperscript{73} Overlapping EEZ claims contribute to Mozambique’s problems to settle their EEZ. At a UN-led Law of the Sea Conference in 2011, Mozambique’s Commissioner linked its unresolved territorial dispute to its challenges in providing maritime security in the Mozambique Channel.\textsuperscript{74} Mozambique’s Navy Chief shared this view, but considered the decisive factor being the imbalance between Mozambique’s scarce marine resources and the size of its maritime jurisdiction area.\textsuperscript{75}

Africa’s most populous state, the former British colony of Nigeria, has a coastline of 853 km bordering the resource-rich Gulf of Guinea.\textsuperscript{76} Nigeria is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and ratified UNCLOS III in 1986.\textsuperscript{77} A disputed national legislation from 1978, in which Nigeria claimed a territorial sea of 30 nm, was replaced in 1998 by claims of 12 nm and an EEZ of 200 nm. Overlapping EEZ claims in the Gulf of Guinea have been set by bilateral agreements, including a notable apportionment and collaboration agreement for oil exploration with the island state of Sao Tome e Principe.\textsuperscript{78}

In 2009, Nigeria’s main export products were crude oil and liquefied natural gas, which accounted for 86.3 per cent and 7.5 per cent of the export value.\textsuperscript{79} Its exports value grew from 1990 to 2009, but its proportion of the total export value declined from a peak value of 99.5 per cent in 2000. Nigeria’s economy is thus totally dominated by its oil and natural gas revenues; a condition that has evolved since the 1958 initial export of high quality oil, which was consolidated in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{80} In 2009, Nigeria was the world’s eighth-largest oil producer. Up to the 1990s, oil was mainly extracted from land-based fields. The deteriorating security situation at the land-based oil fields in the 1990s, including repeated sabotage, large-scale oil spills and hostage-taking by rebel groups forced expansion to offshore fields in the Niger Delta. The major deep sea oil fields in Nigeria EEZ are Bonga (2005), Erha (2006), and Agbami (2008), each with a capacity to deliver 210,000–250,000 barrels of oil and 150–450 m\textsuperscript{3} of natural gas per day. In his much noted review, the journalist John Ghazvinian suggests four reasons for the oil
industry’s investments in Nigeria: (1) Nigerian oil quality enables cost effective refining, (2) Nigeria’s membership in OPEC ensures the oil’s market price, (3) the offshore oil-fields offers a geographical distance from land-based conflict areas, and (4) additional oil reserves are expected to be found.\(^8\)

Francois Vreÿ opposes the argument raised by Ghazvinian concerning the value of the offshore oil fields’ geographic distance from land-based conflict areas.\(^8\) Considering the Gulf of Guinea’s geostrategic importance, he questions how long this geographical distance can estrange maritime oil and gas extraction from the ongoing land conflicts. Vreÿ draws on 2008 statistics to illustrate the threat to Nigerian maritime security, emphasizing the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attack on the Bonga oil field and 35 reported attacks on merchant ships. Vreÿ argues that Nigeria, like all West African coastal states, is devoid of marine resources—resulting in the US Navy presence in the Gulf of Guinea, securing their national interests. He concludes that Africa’s coastal states need PSCs to meet their maritime security requirements.

Defence analyst Helmoed Heitmann proclaims that African coastal states’ must increase their maritime attention.\(^8\) He points to shipping’s 90 per cent share of South Africa’s foreign trade in bulk goods and oil imports, and the offshore fields’ contribution to the oil export’s 80–95 per cent share of Nigeria’s, Angola’s, Equatorial Guinea’s, Gabon’s and Congo-Brazzaville’s export incomes. According to Heitmann, fishing represents 7–10 per cent of Namibia’s, Ghana’s and Senegal’s GDP and 50–75 per cent of the populations of Angola’s, Ghana’s and Senegal’s animal protein intake. Africa’s maritime domain is strategically and financially important, he argues, and controlling its resources is such an attractive objective that it eventually will form an operational area for insurgents, terrorists or foreign forces. Heitmann notes a shift of UN-led peace support operations in Africa from inland to coastal states since 1960 and the African states’ lack of real naval capabilities. Africa’s dependency on commercial shipping and few deep-water harbours make the coastal states vulnerable to external intervention, he argues. In an era where emerging great powers flex their muscles and secure raw materials supplies and market shares, Africa is, according to Heitmann, the sole remaining area in the world being both accessible and vulnerable to their involvement. He illustrates this by highlighting the US military training teams deployed to African states and China’s ‘armed police forces’ protecting Chinese-owned oilfields in Sudan.
This examination reveals that UNCLOS provision of extended rights to coastal states regarding exploitation of maritime natural resources has increased the maritime domain’s impact on their food and economic security—with related maritime security requirements. This is also the case in states possessing as weak marine resources as Mozambique.

CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, I will reiterate the cardinal consequences of maritime security’s altered referent object. First, securing the maritime domain from a holistic perspective is a complex task. It involves a magnitude of tasks, stakeholders and often competing interests, requiring a comprehensive approach to be managed. Second, securing the maritime domain from a holistic and cooperative perspective has forced navies to take on a wider range of activities. A new naval operations type—maritime security operations—involving maritime law enforcement has been developed, typically spanning counter-piracy, maritime counter terrorism and maritime interdiction tasks. These operations are principal tasks for today’s navies, often conducted in international and cross-departmental partnership in support of national and international interests. These low-intensity operations present challenges for navies, whose organizational cultures and capabilities are shaped by the traditional task of defeating conventional adversaries. The emergence of private security companies offering armed protection of commercial vessels, on board or as their close escorts, pose operational and legal challenges. Securing the maritime domain by these means is a costly endeavour.

Third, the legal framework for maritime security has been fundamentally revised in the wake of maritime terrorism’s advent at the millennium. New tools have been provided by the international community to prevent maritime terrorism and extensive regulations for port and shipping security have been globally implemented. Compliance with these provisions is costly and burdensome to costal states and the shipping industry, raising questions on the quality of its global application. Fourth, polities’ awareness of the maritime domain’s value and maritime powers strategic interests in Africa’s natural resources raise questions on resource management and states’ independence. These consequences independently pose valid explanations for the rise of contemporary maritime security studies.
NOTES


5. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was signed at the International Maritime Organization headquarters in December 2002 and entered into force in July 2004. The 2005 revision of the SUA Convention added an Article criminalizing intentional transport of any material, equipment, or software intended for use to produce a biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon. Thereto, it criminalized transportation of persons on board ships known to have committed an offence under UN Counter-Terrorism Conventions and modified its boarding protocol. See http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/maritime.pdf, accessed on 15 May 2012.


13. For example, arising from Japan’s disputes with Russia and China.


27. Chalk highlights the attempted attack on the USS Sullivan, the USS Cole attack, the plans to attack US naval vessels at sea outside Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, the pre-empted suicidal attacks on maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea, oil tankers in the Strait of Gibraltar, and a Turkish cruise ships with Israeli tourists. Ibid., p. 20f.


32. The 2002 attack on the oil tanker M/V Limburg implied a short-term collapse of shipping in the Persian Gulf, a 48 per cent increase in crude oil prices, tripled insurance premiums in the Gulf of Aden, and disastrous consequences for its container traffic and the Yemeni economy. Ibid., pp. 23f.
34. The M Star attack was claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades. Ibid., p. 155.
36. This section refers to Lehr, ‘Maritime Terrorism: Locations, Actors and Capabilities’, n. 29, pp. 57–69.
38. This section refers to Reid, ‘Securitisation of Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Are there Implications for Maritime Terrorism?’, n. 18, pp. 6, 9f.
45. According to UNCLOS III’s definition of piracy, the Malacca Straits incidents predominantly relate to maritime crime since they occurred on coastal states’ territorial waters.
49. Raymond, ‘Piracy in the Waters of Southeast Asia’, n. 47, pp. 66f and Chalk,


51. This section refers to Ibid., pp. 72ff.


53. In this case at individual, subunit (for example, corporations) and unit (state) levels. For a thorough explanation on levels of analysis, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 5ff.

54. This section refers to Raymond, ‘Piracy in the Waters of Southeast Asia’, n. 47, pp. 65–68, 74f.


59. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights.


63. This section refers to n. 61.
70. Ibid., pp. 3, 12.
71. This section refers to FAO, *Fishery Country Profile, Mozambique*, n. 68, pp. 6, 8ff, 12.


This section refers to The World Bank, *African Development Indicators 2011*, p. 10.


5.2. Article 2: “Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime security strategy”

This unpublished article is an extended and updated version of my paper presented in the Maritime Security section of the 9th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, arranged by the European International Studies Association (EISA), Sicily, 23–26 September 2015.
Continuity and change in US post-Cold War maritime security strategy

Introduction

This article argues that control of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) for the purposes of power projection and trade has been consistently at heart of the US concept. It notes that the 1994 entry into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) increased the stakes for maritime resource extraction and brought new concerns for US Freedom of Navigation (FON). Thereto, concludes that the advent of terrorism in the late 1990s entailed a substantial broadening of the US maritime security concept, from a strict military focus on SLOCs to one in which law enforcement and governance issues are at centre stage in a vast littoral environment. This change is persistent. However, as the military dimension of China’s rise became increasingly problematic to the US, it used the addressing of security threats at the lower level of the conflict spectrum in the South China Sea region as tools for the US Navy (USN) and the US Marine Corps (USMC) to deploy in theatre and thus counterbalance China.

Pointing to the influence of structural realism theories on post-Cold War debates on US-China, China-India and Europe-Russia relations, Tang (2010: 2–4) has asserted that defensive realism is “an appropriate guide for security strategy in our time”. Departing from this assumption and the fact that maritime security represents an integral part of states’ foreign and security policy, this article examines the extent to which the predictions of structural realism explain continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy. Employed as a comprehensive explanatory framework, it notes a certain correlation between structural realism’s predictions and the US maritime security policy behaviour.

The setting

Maritime security is of contemporary interest while Maritime Security Studies is an emerging sub-discipline within Security Studies (Bruns 2014). The attention is due to several interacting factors, of which the maritime domain’s growing importance to states’ economic prosperity arguably is the most important. It manifests in new cross-sectoral maritime security strategies centring on maritime resource extraction, maritime trade flows and the utility of naval forces in future conflict scenarios. These strategies mix traditional sea
power conceptions with new concepts for managing a plethora of risks and threats, indicating continuity and change. Here, continuity refers to a continued Cold War focus on military control of the maritime domain for the purpose of territorial defence, naval access, power projection and maritime trade. Conversely, change involves incorporation of wider, multi-sectoral, definitions of security, focussed on fostering good order at sea to the benefit of many by employing civilian and military resources in coalition operations to counter crime and terrorism in the maritime domain. Arguably, the role of the US – the sole superpower – is of importance for gaining conceptual understanding of the contemporary maritime security developments worldwide.

The outline of the article

This article is organised into three chronological periods in order to provide the required overview of the massive empirical material and to allow for an aggregated analysis. Each period involves at least one distinct change in strategies adopted at federal government level, i.e. the US grand strategy or maritime security strategy, or in the maritime strategies adopted at military service level. This approach allows us to study the cumulative effect on the US maritime security conception by economic and geostrategic changes as well as those of major crisis and events. Each period provides a selective account of the national strategies, presidential directives, service strategies adopted and various official reports. Existing research is used to contrast and augment the empirical findings, thus placing them in a wider research context. Comments based on the theoretical framework introduced below are continuously provided, while the empirical findings of the first two periods are summed up by short reflections. To fulfil the aim of this article, i.e. to examine the conceptual continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy of the entire period, a concluding analysis is presented at the end.

First, however, we will introduce the theoretical framework and a supporting framework outlining four attributes of the sea. Here, we derive hypotheses from structural realism, which we employed in the subsequent analysis in order to draw attention to the structural context in which states operate. The aim of this article is not to engage in theory testing. However, we will use the congruence method (see Blatter and Haverland 2012: 144–152, 189–191) in a deductive approach to reflect on the explanatory strengths and limitations of structural realism. Following Waltz (1996: 56), we will draw on "all sorts of information, along with a lot of good judgment" since "a theory becomes useful in devising an
explanation of events [only] when combined with information about them” (Waltz 1997: 916).

The predictions of structural realism

Structural realism is firmly rooted in empiricist epistemology. The “offensive” and “defensive” strands of this research programme take reference in an objective conception of security defined in relative material terms, while defensive realism also includes subjective conceptions of threat and perception. The two strands differ in their assumptions regarding the level of security pressure, which explains their differing – yet compatible – strategy preferences (see Figure 1). Structural realism defines theories as instruments from which we can deduce hypotheses, aimed at seeking objective knowledge by testing their ability to explain or predict observable phenomena in a real world separate from the human mind (Waltz 2010[1979]: 1, 7–10, 124). Given Waltz definition of international politics as “a system with a precisely defined structure” (Waltz 1990: 30) characterised by “organized complexity”¹ (Waltz 2010[1979]: 12), structural realism explanations “may well refer to factors that are excluded from the theory on which it draws” (Humphreys 2012: 395–402).

Structural realism uses a narrow conception of security in international politics, marked by power politics and realpolitik. It is based on five interacting assumptions on the international system: i) the international political system is anarchic, i.e. lacking a central authority; ii) great powers possessing some offensive military capability are inherently dangerous to each other; iii) states can never be assured about other states intentions since benign intentions can be changed immediately and malign intentions misperceived through deception or misinformation; iv) survival is the foremost aim of all states, as state autonomy is a prerequisite for achieving all other ends; and v) states are unitary rational actors, thinking strategically in temporal dimensions about how to survive in the international system.

Structural realism predicts that states will always seek to preserve their security and their autonomy, selecting instrumentally and rationally among options in policy areas which are likely to involve threats to their national security (Grieco 1995: 27; Baumann et al. 2001: 39–40). Due to the anarchic

¹ I.e. the structure and its interacting units are mutually affecting, which “involve dealing simultaneously with a sizeable number of factors which are interrelated into an organic whole” (Weaver 1948: 537).
character of the international system’s, states must rely on self-help strategies for which autonomy is a prerequisite (Waltz 2010[1979]: 72; Mearsheimer 1995: 11; Grieco 1995: 27). In this quest, gains in relative power augment their autonomy and elevate their power positions, which in turn improve their security. Hence, structural realism predicts that all states will seek to maximise their power.

Structural realism also predicts that states will seek to influence the actions of states as well as those of international institutions and organisations, a process converting their capabilities into influence. Such ability requires power. By influencing their international environment, states can protect their national interests and preserve their power positions (Gilpin 1981: 86). N.B. structural realism predicts that international organisations represent “arenas for acting out power relationships” between states (Mearsheimer 1995: 13). The process of socialisation among states, however, “limits and molds” their behaviour (Waltz 2010[1979]: 76). As failure to become socialised to the international system’s prevailing norms may be costly and dangerous (Gilpin 1981: 86), structural realism expects that states will seek to influence their creation, or alter those existing, to ensure that they suit their aims and purposes. Great powers will also seek “bilateralisation” of its relations with weaker states, which means gains in both autonomy and influence (Baumann et al. 2001: 52–53).

The main independent variable in structural realism for explaining a state’s foreign policy behaviour, the dependent variable, is its power position in the international system, determined by its share of certain material resources and the number of poles in the international system. Accordingly, the amount of power politics performed by a state, i.e. its use of military and economic power to influence the actions and decisions of other states, will invariably covary with its power. At the heart of structural realism is balance of power theory, predicting that states will avoid being dominated by stronger powers or coalitions by joining defensive alliances (i.e. external balancing) or by increasing their economic growth and military spending (i.e. internal balancing) (Waltz 2010[1979]: 118; Walt 1985: 5).

The alternative is to “bandwagon”, i.e. joining with the stronger party, which involves putting the state’s survival at risk. Although proponents of offensive and defensive realism employ differing additional parameters, both strands rank a state’s power by its: i) size of population and territory; ii) resource endowment; iii) economic capability; iv) military strength; v) political stability; and vi) competence (Waltz 2010[1979]: 131). Given that this concept of power is hard
to quantify and measure in its political sense – and balance of power thus being difficult to operationalise – the assumption that actors are rational is prominent in structural realist modelling of state behaviour (Buzan 1996: 51, 54).

With regards to economic power, which can be used against a target state to change its foreign policy, Krasner (1996: 116) offers a solution. He suggests that opportunity costs – i.e. the value of something that must be given up to acquire or achieve something else – represent a useful way of operationalising economic power. If the cost for altering the economic policies is low for the initiator but high for the target state, the relative opportunity costs are asymmetrical and allow a stronger party in international relations to make credible threats. This author argues that we can take Krasner’s reasoning one step further, as relative opportunity costs can be used also as a positive incitement towards a target state.

As a prescriptive positivist theory, structural realism not only explains and predicts (Waltz 1990: 22) but also instructs on how states – and especially great powers – should go about to be successful in international politics. It prescribes a ladder of strategy for a great power’s interaction with peer competitors (see Figure 1 below). Both strands of structural realism agree that a hegemon such as the US is a "status quo state" that “wants to maintain its dominating positions over potential rivals” (Mearsheimer 2001: 2). Its preferred strategy thus depends on the level of security pressure, i.e. whether a state perceives its competitors as guided by offensive or defensive realism preferences. Accordingly, we can expect to find the US strategy situated among the alternatives in the middle part of the ladder.
Structural realism uses a top-down approach to strategy. It assumes that policy decisions direct a state’s security strategy – and thus its maritime strategy – which in turn determines the composition and use of its sea services. This line
of thought is closely linked to its conceptualisation of states as rational unitary actors, representing a simplification of reality. Waltz (1990: 23, 27) considers such simplifications necessary to construct a theory that deals with complexity. Which then are the attributes that make the maritime domain worth studying in its own right, leading us to expect that it will be susceptible to structural realism explanations? The conceptualisation of the sea by Till (2013: 5–23) as a resource and as a medium: i) of transportation and exchange; iii) of dominion; and iv) for information and the spread of ideas; is a useful starting point. These interconnected attributes of the maritime domain deserve closer examination through a structural realism lens.

Capability to dominate the maritime domain is imperative for projecting power at and from the sea. As suggested by defensive realist Posen (2003: 8–9), command of the sea – analogous to command of the commons – is the key to the US global power position, enabling it “to exploit more fully other sources of power” such as its economic and military might or that of its allies. Also, Ikenberry, Mastanduno and Wohlforth (2009: 10) hold that the US command of the commons has made it the sole state capable of organising “major politico-military action anywhere in the [international] system”. Mearsheimer (2001: 83–84) takes an opposing position when crafting his offensive realism theory, assigning prominence to land power due to his notion of a “stopping power of water” which to him prevents any state from reaching global hegemony. However, the closely related offshore balancing strategy that he promotes relies on “nuclear deterrence, air power and – most important – overwhelming naval power” (Mearsheimer 2011: 31; Layne 1997: 112–113).

Hence, structural realism acknowledges the importance to a state of dominating the maritime domain for: i) employing its economic power; ii) defending itself against military attack; and iii) to project power. Let us expand on the first dimension. A state’s desire for maritime domination is firmly linked to its needs to influence, or even control, maritime trade. When security pressure is high, it is relevant to discuss the conditions associated with the classic term command of the sea – or the related concept control of the sea, concerned with

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2 This strategy envisions insulating the US from future great power wars and maximising its relative power position in the international system – thus becoming an insular “offshore balancer” – by disengaging from its overseas military commitments and terminating its extended nuclear deterrence commitments.

3 This term denotes a relationship of relative strength between two or more navies opposing each other in which one enjoys a significant superiority over the other(s) that enables it freedom of action.
local and temporary naval conditions in peace and wartime (Rubel 2012b). The establishment of either of these conditions will then promote the security of one’s own merchant shipping and that of its allies and partners. In peacetime, the beneficiaries are numerous, virtually all seafarers participating in the global sea-based trade system. In times of conflict and war, these numbers will be substantially lower, while merchant ships of opposing states might be targeted. When security pressure is low, it is essential to influence the terms of international (maritime) trade to impose asymmetrical economic costs on its trade partners, thus consolidating its economic (and military) power position.

For the security providers, direct and indirect benefits in terms of uninterrupted sea freight may reach levels corresponding with their investments in seaborne trade and land-based production or markets. In the long term, peace and stability in the maritime domain promotes the economic prosperity of all trading states, although disproportionally. A state can use its economic prosperity to improve its military (naval) capabilities, which in turn will improve its power. It can use its increased power to influence the terms of the trade and thus reduce its transaction costs and/or transfer costs for its protection to its trading partners. Till (2013: 17, 21) refers to this reversible cyclic mechanism as “the virtuous maritime circle”, emphasising that seafaring and trade produce universal “trading values” (italics in original), see Figure 2 below. Arguably, these values – previously applied by Chinese and Japanese rulers – are organic to the liberal Western states of today.

Figure 2. The virtuous maritime circle. Source: Till (2013).
The need to dominate the maritime domain include also the protection of marine resource exploitation. Arguably, the entry into force of the UNCLOS in 1994 increased the importance of the sea as a resource on a global scale in 1991–2015, but also from the concurrent effects of the technological developments that enable states to harvest the marine resources of the sea and exploit those of the seabed. Crippling fish stocks and ever increasing demands for fish, partly resulting from population growth, have caused a growing resource deficit.

“Blue growth” is a novel term for strategies aimed at boosting economic growth and employment opportunities in the maritime domain, spanning diverse activities as aquaculture, coastal tourism, marine biotechnology, ocean energy and seabed mining. Since the environmental impact of these activities remains to be further clarified, most comprehensive maritime strategies take into account environmental concerns. Scholars (see Till 2013: 7) have referred to this tendency among coastal states to think of the sea as an extension of their land as “territorialisation”. From a structural realist perspective, we can thus expect that states will seek strategic control of their adjacent waters, since access to and control of resources – on land and at sea – constitute essential elements of their power base. Thereto, we can expect that their strategies will lead to international competition over sea areas, fuelled by technological advances that enable exploration and exploitation of deep-sea resources.

The need for controlling the flow of information through the maritime domain is greater than ever. Although the seabed has been used for such purposes since the first transatlantic telegraph cable was laid in 1858 (IET 2015), recent developments are astounding. In 2014, 263 undersea fibre-optic cables4 transferred 99 percent of all transoceanic data traffic – i.e. internet transmissions, phone calls and text messages – exposed to various natural and man-made risks, including acts of intelligence gathering, sabotage or terrorism (Main 2015; Neal 2014). The establishment of this continuously expanding cable network began in 1989 with the UK-France line (Woollaston 2014). The multitude of power-cables and gas pipelines laid on the seabed need protection from physical disruption, while such fibre-optic cables also need protection from cyber-attacks. Such attacks involve information manipulation and injection of malicious software, with potentially severe security consequences for public infrastructure or corporate and economic systems.

4 Another 22 cables were set to be operational by the end of 2015.
Increasingly networked military command and control system architectures involve software vulnerabilities across the electromagnetic spectrum that states can exploit in adversaries but, inversely, also require them to protect their own systems from exploitation. From a structural realist perspective, we can thus expect that states will seek capabilities to dominate over rival states in the cyber domain, including those aspects that are part of or interlinked with the maritime domain. Thereto, we can expect that states’ gradually assign cyber-defence and cyber-attack concepts more prominent roles in naval warfare.

The intrinsic links between the maritime domain, the use of naval forces to dominate it, maritime trade and states’ prosperity represent mechanisms that are at heart of structural realism. Notwithstanding, the maritime domain is not a habitat for human beings but an environment in which they reside only temporarily for particular purposes. Temporary and purposeful use is thus a characteristic of the human use of the maritime domain that helps explain its attraction as discussed above. Thereto, structural realism is a grand strategic rather than a maritime strategic theoretical framework, which has methodological consequences. Studying the security of the maritime domain through the structural realism lens in isolation is therefore futile and counterproductive. Instead, we must consider the grand strategies that states pursue and the subordinate – but essential – role that the maritime domain holds for realising them. We must focus on those features and aspects of the maritime domain that influence states’ grand strategies, and those grand strategic mechanisms that manifests in the maritime domain. For this purpose, the four attributes make up an adequate supporting framework that we will use in the forthcoming analysis.

When studying the maritime domain through a structural realist lens we can, based on the above reasoning, specifically expect that states will seek to maximise their power through military or non-military means and use it to:

- maintain or increase its autonomy with regards to their: i) territorial waters (TTWs); ii) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); and iii) portion of the continental shelf
- influence international maritime trade patterns and alter them in their favour
- influence the international standards for interpreting maritime law, assuring their unimpeded access to strategically important waters for power projection purposes
• influence international maritime institutions in order to reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their property rights with regards to maritime trade as well as maritime resource extraction
• seek strategic control (i.e. dominance) of those aspects of the cyber domain that are interlinked with the maritime domain and serve to check the influence of its rivals

Conceptual continuity and change in the 1990s

The 1991 US maritime security concept was integral of the declassified 1985 The Maritime Strategy: Global Maritime Elements for U.S. National Strategy and the unclassified 1986 The Maritime Strategy (Hattendorf and Swartz 2008). These documents detailed an operational strategy of global scope for the USN and the USMC, covering the entire conflict spectrum and focussing on the military forces of the Soviet Union (USSR). As noted by Haynes (2015: 5), it was essentially naval and included guidelines for resource allocation. The first phase outlined a deterrence and containment strategy, while the following detailed how the USN and the USMC would fight a global, nuclear, war (Hattendorf and Swartz 2008: 246–253, 288–308). At this time, maritime security was cast in terms of ensuring deterrence and secure access by sea for power projection purposes, facilitated by naval missions together with its NATO allies.

The 1991 US National Security Strategy (NSS) proclaimed the start of a new, more hopeful, era while discerning challenges for US leadership in NATO due to the waning security threat in Europe. It stressed the perils of regional instability, the need for US forward presence and enhancement of partners’ abilities to facilitate US deployments through security assistance programmes (Bush 1991: 1, 15, 19–21, 27–31). The NSS pointed to the US challenges of managing the global economic transformation – noting the link between economic and military strength – while declaring a pending 25 percent force size cut. It only made three references to the maritime domain. Notwithstanding, the US was considered a maritime nation for which FON on the high seas was defined as a vital interest, why unimpeded access to air, sea and space had to be ensured through maritime and aerospace superiority. It placed emphasis on the lessons learned from the intensified efforts of the USSR in the 1980s aimed at restricting the access of naval forces in ways contrary to internationally recognized rights.

The US reduced its military forces and domestic bases in the 1990s through the base realignments and closures process (Lockwood and Siehl 2004). The number of USN ships fell from 526 in 1991 to 318 in 2000 and its active
personnel from 570,262 to 373,193 (Hattendorf 2006: 4). USN and USMC overseas bases, however, remained intact or increased to enable forward presence, with the exception of the 1992 closing of the Subic Bay, its then-largest navy base in the Asia-Pacific. The Philippines unilateral decision not to renew the lease based on the 1947 US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement was preceded by strong anti-US sentiment from some domestic groups (Sanger 1991; Shalom 1990). As opposed to this disengagement, the US-Philippines launched the Balikatan exercise in 1991. USN logistic support activities were partly relocated to Singapore, enabled by a 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) granting the USN wider use of its facilities for repairs and training (IISS 2013).

The declassified 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) FY 1994–1999 sheds ample light on the US position. It designated the USSR collapse – allegedly discrediting communist ideology – and the First Gulf War as victories of the US and its allies, while it identified the latter as a defining event in US global leadership (DoD 1992: 1). The “integration of leading democracies into a U.S.-led system of collective security and the creation of a democratic “zone of peace” was considered a less visible success. As suggested by Haynes (2015: 3), the US won this fight between competing systems models mainly because “nearly all the world’s richest states ended up on its side linked by a robust network of trade that was connected and sustained by American sea power”.

It defined four aims to promote US national security interests (DoD 1992: 1–2): i) to deter or defeat attacks against the US, its citizens and forces while honouring its historic and treaty commitments; ii) to extend and strengthen defence arrangements that bind democratic, like-minded, nations together in common defence (i.e. promote collective responses through regional defence strategies); iii) to preclude any hostile power from dominating any region critical to US interests (i.e. Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Latin America) and prevent the re-emergence of a global threat to the interests of the US and its allies; and iv) to reduce sources of regional instability and limit violence should conflict occur by encouraging the spread and consolidation of democratic government and open economic systems, while discouraging the spread of technology such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

As duly noted, these ambitions required a substantial military force and continuous economic growth. Thereto, it stipulated that a future US president would “need to have options that will allow him to lead and, where the international reaction proves sluggish or inadequate, to act to protect our critical interests” (DoD 1992: 7). Such unilateral ideas convey the view of a state
determined to let its national interests prevail by setting the rules of the international game. They are fully compatible with structural realism’s predictions of the behaviour of a state having achieved the level of security that comes with the systemic position of a hegemon, seeking to consolidate its position. The outcome for US defence planning follows from the 1993 *Report on the Bottom-up Review*, in which “capability to fight and win two major regional conflicts” set the bar (Aspin 1993: iii, 30).

The entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994 meant that provisions on ocean borders were introduced that expanded the rights of coastal states. It assigned them exclusive rights to explore and exploit “minerals and other non-living resources” in the subsoil of its continental shelf (Part VI). Moreover, it inter alia established (UN DOALOS 1982): i) EEZs (Part V), granting coastal states exclusive rights to exploit natural resources; ii) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for dispute settlement5 (Part XI); and iv) the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to organise and control exploration and mining activities on the seabed outside states’ TTWs or EEZs (Part XI) through authorisation, while distributing mining royalties.

In order to explain the US maritime security strategies we must consider its position on UNCLOS. In 1983, the US President explained his refusal to sign it by pointing to “several major problems in [its] deep sea mining provisions”, which he deemed contrary to US interests (Reagan 1983: 378–379). Notwithstanding, he backed its navigational provisions reflecting “existing maritime law and practice” and declared a US EEZ. Agents of the Heritage Foundation have expounded on this argument, pointing to the US problem of being only one of 160 stakeholders and lacking veto-power over the decision-making of the ISA (THF 2011). To them, “proceedings at the ISA would be dominated by anti-U.S. interests” just “like the U.N. General Assembly”. By acceding to UNCLOS, the US would have to participate in its mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms for claims made by other members. Such a loss in influence would be incompatible with structural realist expectations, as would accepting its provisions in Article 82 stipulating transfer of royalties to developing states via ISA for resources exploited in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles of the baseline (UN DOALOS 1982: Article 82; Groves 2012: 2). The US debate continues and in 2012 US Secretary of State rejected the above argument and argued for US accession to UNCLOS (Clinton 2012).

5 Parties may also submit disputes to the *International Court of Justice* for settlement.
The US has placed emphasis on the principles of freedom of the seas, the right to innocent passage\textsuperscript{6} of states’ TTWs and passage through international straits for decades (Groves and Cheng 2014: 7–8). It has consistently issued diplomatic protests and used the USN for routine transits in response to coastal states’ alleged excessive maritime claims since the 1950’s, activities operationalised through the 1979 Freedom of Navigation Program. A declassified 1990 national security directive reauthorized the programme, aiming at protecting US “navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under and over the seas” against such claims (Bush 1990). It has thereafter been maintained, while states subject to USN challenges have been recorded in annual US Department of Defense (DoD) reports.

In the 1990s, the US Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) released a series of influential concept documents, spearheaded by the USN and the USMC 1991 The Way Ahead. Key incrementally outlined ideas included a joint (Hattendorf 2006: 4, 9–15, 69, 96, 107, 136, 154, 163, 196, 231, 246): i) focus on supporting the land battle rather than sea battle; ii) emphasis on forward presence and expeditionary littoral operations; and iii) widening of the engagement scope to include humanitarian assistance, nation building, security assistance, peacekeeping, counternarcotic, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and crisis response operations. The 1992 ...From the Sea document introduced the concept of mobile sea bases while the 1994 Forward...From the Sea encouraged systems thinking for measuring operational effectiveness. Although omitting the term maritime security, these documents noted the role of secure SLOCs and FON for global access and trade, and the enduring responsibility of the USN as a provider of both.


Change is emergent in the US maritime security conception of the 1994 NSS, that notes the conducive role of US leadership for the signing of two

\textsuperscript{6} I.e. not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state (UN DOALOS 1982: 31).
counterterrorism treaties: i) *the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation*; and ii) the 1988 *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Attacks Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation* (SUA) that came into force in 1992 (Clinton 1994: 1, 9). Both treaties centred on prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators. Here, we make two observations. First, the 1994 NSS did not define all security risks as military in nature. Instead, it defined terrorism, drugs trafficking, environmental degradation and refugees as *transnational* threats with short and long-term implications for US security policy. Second, it considered US leadership and international engagement necessary to prevent them from festering.

The 1998 NSS, issued after the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, explicitly linked terrorism to maritime security (Clinton 1998: iii, 16, 27). It deemed that perpetrators driven by “hatred for democracy, a fanatical glorification of violence and a horrible distortion of their religion to justify the murder of innocents” were targeting the US for ideological reasons. Considering the 1997 Asian financial crisis, it stressed the need for US leadership in international financial and trade institutions to promote US prosperity, a core objective required for maintaining “an unrivalled military and the attractiveness of our values”.

Structural realism fails to explain this inclusion of transnational threats in the US national security. Notwithstanding, the US administration addressed them by its available diplomatic, information, military and economic tools of power when it had recognised them as such. However, the US efforts to influence relevant international institutions through “leadership” in order to protect their national interests are fully consistent with structural realism predictions.

In contrast to more recent national security strategies, the USN 1997 *Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century* and the 2000 (1999) *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance* maintained a strand of continuity in their maritime security concept. Both documents focussed on the enduring role for USN “forward presence”, while the latter specified the need for “assuring U.S. access abroad and influence ashore in the 21st Century” through a set of prioritised strategic capabilities and “transformation to a network-centric and knowledge-superior force” (Hattendorf 2006: 178–183). The USN employment in “Military Operations Other Than War” manifested its engagement to assure continuous influence across the spectrum of operations, linking its forward presence to the

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7 The expanded, unclassified, 2000 version augmented the classified 1999 version.
1997 NSS objective “being actively involved in the world beyond our borders in an era of globalisation” (Clinton 1997). The USN should remain postured for “the high end of military conflict”, maintaining a forward deployed “capability to dominate the maritime environment to dissuade global naval ambitions by a future regional power” and perform an “enduring role in strategic deterrence”. N.B. this would enable USN support to maritime law enforcement (MLE) agencies in their countering of non-military challenges by default.

These documents conveyed a conceptual novelty. To project power ashore in regions involving emerging “area denial” capabilities, the USN needed not only secure SLOCs but seamless control of the littorals (Hattendorf 2006: 174–176, 182, 196–201). USN forward presence – a “force-in-being” – would provide rapid response capability for emerging contingencies, while entirely foreclosing the options of a future regional power. Without specifying the regions concerned, the documents offered a new framing of the traditional maritime security concept. To manage the rise of a peer competitor in 2020 – and non-state actors – able to challenge US national interests on a regional scale, they specified the need for: i) forward presence in key operating areas of likely crisis or conflict, “routinely collecting intelligence and gaining valuable knowledge”; ii) “ability to achieve a real-time, shared understanding of the battlespace at all levels”; and iii) to develop critical partnerships and enhance interoperability. While achieving this ultimate aim, they envisioned that US forces would serve as “effective [peacetime] instruments for shaping the international environment”.

The widened geographical requirement of sea control to littoral areas thus stemmed from state-based threats. Viewed through a structural realism lens, this change was necessary to allow for US hedging or containment strategies versus potential opponents in Asia and the Middle East. The 2000 (1999) *Navy Strategic Planning Guidance* specified that China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Russia pursued area denial capabilities (Hattendorf 2006: 190–191). Here, the US relations with key Asian states in a truly maritime region help us understand the developments of its maritime security concept.

First, the US-China differences over Taiwan fuelled the tension in US-China relations – a reality since the US prompt suspending of their security cooperation following the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown – throughout the 1990s (Sutter 2015: 127). A major crisis in their relations ensued by China’s series of ballistic-missile tests in July 1995, diverting shipping and commercial flights in the Strait of Taiwan. The US interpreted these provocations as an attempt to influence the December 1995 Taiwanese presidential elections (Elleman 2015: 128–133;
Sutter 1998: 70–73). Large Chinese air and naval exercises in August and November 1995 and another round of missile tests followed them in March 1996, establishing exclusion zones around Taiwan. In response, the USS *Nimitz* transited the strait in December 1995 and two carrier groups from the US 7th Fleet were deployed in the area in March 1996 while maintaining a diplomatic dialogue. These events illustrate the usefulness of maritime force to influence the decision-making of other states, but also the US need for sea control for intervening in ways interpreted as coercive naval diplomacy (Tai 1998). US arms sales also influenced the security calculus, as Taiwan acquired Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-2) guided missiles and associated missile defence units in 1997 (Kan 2014: 16).

Second, Japan – which post-World War II economic development has been described as a miracle, marked by close cooperation between government and business sectors – lost its status as the second economic power in the world to a rising China at the end of the Cold War (Sutter 2015: 167–169, 174–177). Japan experienced economic stagnation and growing regional military security threats in the 1990s – the Taiwan issue posed the risk of drawing Japan into conflict with China – while confidence in its value as a US ally was reduced. Economic development and restructuring of its internal market rules took precedence in the priorities of the Japanese governments. N.B. the US remained its key economic partner despite frictions such as market access barriers to US exports.

The much noted 1995 rape of a schoolgirl by US servicemen, followed by massive protests, brought international attention to the local problems associated with US bases on Okinawa⁹ (Pollack 1995), situated at “China’s only good route to the open ocean beyond the first island chain” and hosting three quarters of the US military installations in Japan (Tiezzi 2015b). A portion of the US 7th Fleet forward-deployed ships was based in Yokosuka¹⁰ and Sasebo¹¹. Despite these frictions, the close US-Japan alliance without which “the U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific would be severely constrained” was maintained (Sutter 2015: 164). Japan’s elevation to a more “equal partner to the U.S in international security matters” in the 1997 *U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines* –

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⁸ In this case, the possible enforcement of the provisions outlined in the *Taiwan Relations Act*, enacted in 1979.

⁹ Including a Marine Expeditionary Force and US Air Force Composite Wing.

¹⁰ Hosting Carrier Strike Group Five.

¹¹ Hosting parts of Expeditionary Strike Group Seven/Task Force 76.
increasing its regional security responsibility and clarifying their wartime roles – strengthened their alliance (Ajemian 1998: 323–325, 342).

Third, the US maintained good relations with the Philippines, a former US colony\(^\text{12}\) and longstanding Southeast Asian ally. The US maintained its economic aid although terminating remuneration for its terminated access to military bases (Tarnoff and Nowels 2001: 13–14). The value of the US-Philippines trade more than quadrupled between 1991 and 1999, while the US remained its main foreign direct investor (Medalla and Balboa 2006: 4–6). The Philippines turned the *Philippine Republic Day* of 4 July (celebrating its independence from the US) into a *Philippine-American Friendship Day* in 1996, while making a presidential visit to the US in 1998 (Delmendo 2004: 132, 192). A *Visiting Forces Agreement* was concluded in 1998, enabling deepened military cooperation under the 1951 *Mutual Defense Treaty* (US DoS 1998) and resumption of the bilateral *Balikatan* military exercise series (Lum 2012: 15).\(^\text{13}\)

Forth, South Korea’s security dependency on the US, including its extended deterrence, harks back to their 1953 *Mutual Defense Treaty* (Manyin et al. 2015: 8–10, 20). The perceived North Korean threat, backed by its ally China, has consistently been the dimensioning strategic concern of the US-South Korean relationship. Since 1994, the US 7\(^\text{th}\) Fleet is assigned responsibility as Commander of Combined Naval Component Command for the defence of South Korea, tasked to conduct air superiority and battlefield interdiction missions and provide air support to the US and South Korean ground forces (Mizokami 2014). Marine units based on Okinawa are a mobile reserve. However, the management of the historically troubled Japan-South Korea relationship and their competing claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands was a challenge to the US. North Korea’s nuclear programme induced a crisis in the US-North Korea relations in the early 1990s, involving US considerations of a pre-emptive military strike on its nuclear facilities (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015a: 4–5). Negotiations led to the 1994 *US-North Korea Agreed Framework* for dismantling its plutonium programme, monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). North Korea’s 1998 launch of a long-range ballistic missile over Japan and the disclosure of a hidden nuclear weapons site prompted new negotiations in 1999, resulting in an agreement on cancelled missile tests (Sutter 2015: 140).

\(^{12}\) 1898-1946.

\(^{13}\) The Philippines cancelled this exercise series in 1995 due to a dispute on the *Visiting Forces Agreement*.
In the 1990s, South Korea emerged as a major US economic partner and the value of their trade more than doubled (Manyin 2002: 52–53, 57, 65–66). Notwithstanding, their interaction was marred by disagreements over trade policies. In the wake of the 1997 financial crisis, however, the US replaced Japan as South Korea's largest supplier of imports while the International Monetary Fund forced South Korea to further open-up its economy and implement far-reaching reforms of its financial and corporate sectors. As the US-South Korean trade and the level of US Foreign Direct Investment grew in 1999 and 2000, so did their economic interdependence. N.B. the US typically used its greater power and South Korea's economic dependency to set the agenda of their trade talks. Moreover, the level of their trade frictions was principally affected by "whether or not political or security issues [were allowed to] override bilateral trade considerations".

In sum, the strategies of the USN and the USMC were marked by continuity in their maritime security conception in the 1990s. The outstanding conceptual change were the widened geographical requirement of sea control to littoral areas, required to facilitate hedging or containment strategies. This change involves operations in an environment far more complex than the open sea, in turn requiring new types of naval capabilities. The pending (February 2002) USN (2015a) initiation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme – a vessel type designed to dominate the coastal battlespace and defeat asymmetric threats such as mines, coastal diesel submarines and fast attack craft operating from ashore – must be seen in this context. In fact, the emerging anti-access capabilities of potential US opponents were based in the coastal rims. USN units had to be capable of approaching the shores and operate within reach of these threats, but the USN deemed indispensable aircraft carriers too valuable to expose them to these inexpensive weapons. The USN and USMC ambition to control the littoral environment did thus not only require new vessel types, it also required regional partnerships for their basing, logistic support and intelligence collection.

The US ambition relates to regarding the sea as a medium of dominion, reverberating with the state-centric threat perception predicted by structural realism. However, the focus of White House and the US Department of Defense strategies were wider, involving also the reduction of sources to regional instability, the encouragement of open economic systems and promotion of maritime trade. These strategies thus also heeded the attribute of the sea as a medium of transportation, regarding it as a prerequisite for US economic growth by mastering globalisation. These aims were secondary to the USN and the USMC, to be solved “en route” if their main task of deterring potential opponents and
projecting power were solved when and where needed. Rather, they regarded them as a task for US MLE agencies.

The entry into force in 1994 of UNCLOS did not alter the US maritime security conception. However, it did raise the stakes for states’ maritime resource extraction, increasing the tensions between US FON requirements and coastal states’ devotion to exercise national jurisdiction. Clearly, it increased the tendency among states to regard the sea as a resource.

From the turn of the millennium

The turn of the millennium was followed by high-profile maritime terrorism incidents associated with al-Qaeda, such as the failed attack on the USS *Sullivans* in January 2000 and the fatal attack on the USS *Cole* in October 2000, both in the Yemeni Port of Aden (Chalk 2008: 20). Plans by the Jema’ah Islamiyah network to attack visiting USN vessels were revealed in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (Percival 2005: 9). The contentious issue of US FON operations and military activities in international airspace flared up in April 2001, when a Chinese fighter-interceptor collided with a USN reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea (Dutton 2009: 703–707).14 Chinese officials requested a halt of such missions over their EEZ, while US officials argued that Chinese intercepts of their aircraft had become “increasingly aggressive”. In the wake of this serious incident, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua published a legal analysis arguing that such flights were national security threats violating the UNCLOS. Accordingly, analysts warned that China would continue challenging the US presence and interests in Asia (Kan et al. 2001: 22).

Authorised by the US Congress to use military force following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US President launched a *Global War on Terrorism* (GWOT) including *Operation Enduring Freedom* in October 2001 (Feickert 2005). The latter involved the successful use of USN carrier strike groups to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but also established the US-led Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 – tasked to monitor and interdict suspect shipping in the Horn of Africa region (Haynes 2015: 151–152; Ho 2009: 506). Following NATO’s invocation of Article 5 on 12 September 2001, *Operation Active Endeavour* provided NATO naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Profound domestic changes were set off in the US administration and legislation

14 The Chinese pilot died while China detained and interrogated the USN crew following their emergency landing on Hainan Island (Rinehart and Elias 2015: 5).
resulting in the implementation of pervasive security programmes. The controversial *USA Patriot Act*, passed in October 2001, provided US law enforcement agencies with tools designed to uncover terrorist cells (Ball 2005: xiii–xxvii, 16–24). From March 2003, the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS)\(^{15}\) – established through the 2002 *Department of Homeland Security Act* – coordinated the implementation of the programmes.

As argued by Waltz (2000: 13–15), a state’s “impulse to protect one’s identity – cultural, political and economic – from encroachment by others is strong”. This corresponds well with the essence of the US perception of being “under attack” in September 2001. His predictions that: i) “States having a surplus of power are tempted to use it”; ii) “the vice to which great powers easily succumb in a (...) unipolar world [is] overextension”; and iii) “intervention, even for worthy ends, often brings more harm than good”, almost seem to have foreboded the protracted and costly US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Among the frantic US activities to address maritime security was the address to the General Assembly of International Maritime Organization (IMO) by the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in November 2001, urging IMO to implement a scheme for port and shipping security (DHS 2003: 60448). His request was heeded and Resolution A.924(22) became adopted, calling for a thorough review of: i) measures and procedures to prevent terrorist acts threatening the security of passengers and crews, and the safety of ships; and ii) “all existing measures already adopted by IMO to combat acts of violence and crime at sea” (IMO 2015). The resulting *International Ship and Port Facility Security* (ISPS) Code and augmentary measures were developed by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee and its Maritime Security Working Group (IMO 2015). The ISPS Code – amending the 1974 *International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea* (SOLAS) – was part of a wider counter terrorism initiative linked to the actions of the Counter Terrorist Committee of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, the International Labour Organization’s 2003 revision of the *Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention*, and various initiatives of the World Customs Organisation (WCO) to improve supply chain security. To assist developing countries’ contributions to the global effort of protecting shipping from terrorist attacks, a major IMO programme was launched in 2002.

\(^{15}\) Incorporating 22 US federal agencies into one organisation.
The USCG continuously submitted comprehensive security proposals to the meetings of the IMO Maritime Security Working Group, based on work it had been coordinating since October 2001 (DHS 2003: 60448). It held meetings with US Federal agencies with security responsibilities, coordinated outreach meetings with the US as well as foreign shipping, labour and port associations, and arranged a workshop in Washington DC for members of the national and international marine community in January 2002. In December 2002, the IMO adopted the ISPS Code with entry into force set to 1 July 2004 (IMO 2015), except for its provisions of an *Automatic Identification System* (AIS) for vessels on international voyages which was set to December 2004 (DHS 2003: 60449). Notably, the USCG thus managed to align the provisions of the ISPS Code with those of the US *Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002*, enacted in November (GPO 2002).

The USCG was also authorised to develop and implement a *Long-Range Identification and Tracking* (LRIT) system for ships in US waters that were equipped with a *Global Maritime Distress and Safety System* (DHS 2007: 56601–56602). In 2002–2006, the US “aggressively” and “energetically” pushed at IMO – through its Maritime Safety Committee and its bodies – for amending the SOLAS convention to authorise flag state, port state and coastal state access to LRIT information, i.e. ship identity and its location. In May 2006, Resolution MSC.202(81) established the legal mechanism requested by the US, binding the contracting governments to implement the LRIT regime. It involved installing required equipment on cargo ships exceeding 300 gross tonnage, passenger ships and mobile offshore drilling units on international voyages, as well as establishing national LRIT data centres or linking themselves to such cooperative centres from 1 January 2009.

As suggested by Enders and Sandler (2012: 28), protecting the lives and property of the state is essential in liberal democracies and imperative for governments who want to stay in office. Accordingly, the US 2003 *National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism* placed emphasis on protecting US citizens and interests from transnational terrorism – linked to WMD (EOP 2003: 9–11, 15). As Enders and Sandler show, there is a “robust and unequivocal” link between liberal democracies and transnational terrorism, the former being vulnerable by the built-in restraints protecting its citizens’ liberties (Enders and Sandler 2012: 9, 16, 29–30). The DHS was swiftly established to coordinate the process of eliminating the US domestic weaknesses. Without a world

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16 I.e. freedom of movement, speech, press and association, and citizens’ right to privacy.
government, the US was forced to engage in multinational cooperation to address the international weaknesses conducive to transnational terrorism, by definition involving some combination of perpetrators, victims, institutions, governments or citizens from more than one state.

Empirical studies have shown that neither liberal democracy per se nor economic globalisation explain the post-1968 rise in transnational terrorism (Enders and Sandler 2012: 9, 37, 49–50). Instead, (wealthy) liberal democracies were targeted by transnational terrorism (originating from poorer states) only if they were: i) involved in foreign policy crises; ii) US allies; or iii) intervening in civil wars in other states. US citizens and property were the main targets, accounting for 38 percent of all transnational terrorist attacks in 1968–2008. Arguably, the US thus benefitted more than other states from a successful, coordinated, effort to fight transnational terrorism. Still, the partial success of the US efforts to “marshal and sustain international coalitions” (EOP 2003: 15) might be explained by the perceived threat being common to all states in a globalised world in which the US is a major trading partner. In structural realism terms, such behaviour – i.e. when states ally themselves with the stronger party in a conflict – represents “bandwagoning for profit” (Schweller 1994).

The 2002 NSS safeguarded against rising powers but was braced against the global terrorist threat, emphasising US leadership in creating a “balance of power” by a coalition of states professing freedom, democracy and free enterprise versus terrorism and its state sponsors (Bush 2002: 1–2). As defensive realist Walt (1985: 9, 26) posits, coalitions and alliances are usually formed against distinct powerful threats while “ideology does play a [subordinate] role in alliance choices”. Also, “states may balance by allying with other strong states, if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons”. Such hopes apparently guided the 2002 NSS, casting transnational state sponsored terrorism as a threat to “freedom-loving people across the globe”, centring on “a struggle of ideas” (Bush 2002: 1, 13, 15, 31). Arguably, it resembled the Cold War threat arrayed against NATO by the USSR, which imminence was considered requiring preventive and even pre-emptive counteraction.

The US influenced the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) counterterrorism approach. It pushed through UNSCR 1373 (2001), establishing a legal framework for international cooperation on terrorism prevention, and UNSCR 1267 (1999) on thwarting the financing of terrorism (Terlingen 2010: 132). By invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNSCR 1373 imposed indefinitely binding obligations on all member states to prevent the financing of
terrorism and freeze terrorists’ assets. However, the term “terrorist act” was not defined, why the counterterrorism efforts have relied on the various definitions of the member state. In 2002 (1986), the US DoD defined terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives” (White 2003: xiii, 12; Schmid and Jongman 1988: 33). This definition involved targeting of combatants and non-combatants, contrasting the distinction of the latter in the definitions of the US Department of State (1983), the US Department of Justice (1984) and the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. For the US DoD, attacks on US military personnel or units deployed in operations may consistently represent terrorism (DoD 2015c: 243).

When the UNSC adopted UNSCR 1267 in 1999, it established a Sanctions Committee composed of its fifteen members. It was assisted by an eight-member Monitoring Team tasked to “identify and ensure the freezing of assets of individuals, groups, and corporations associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban anywhere in the world” – i.e. the Consolidated List (Terlingen 2010: 132–133). UNSCR 1373 established a Counter-Terrorism Committee to supervise its implementation. To these interacting resolutions, the US managed to add “some 200 names to the Consolidated List” shortly after the 9/11 events. UNSCR 1540, adopted in 2004 following a US/UK initiative, invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and obliged member states to take action to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, especially by non-state actors (Oosthuizen and Wilmshurst 2004: 2–4). UNSCR 1566 established a working group tasked to impose measures upon individuals, groups or entities of terrorist networks other than the al-Qaeda and the Taliban (UNSC 2004b). N.B. the 2002 ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism – committing the signatories (including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) to cooperate on information sharing, policy and regime development, capacity-building, transportation, as well as border and immigration control (ASEAN 2002) – referred to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.

Concerns that terrorists could use ocean containers for smuggling WMD into the US, led the US to introduce the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism in November 2001 and the Container Security Initiative in January 2002. The former sought to bolster global supply chain security in the private sector in response to the seven million containers arriving annually at US seaports while regulations were deemed lax (GAO 2003:1). The guidelines of the voluntary Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism security programme were
tailored to each segment of the supply chain, which the applicant had to apply and respect (UNCTAD 2004: 4–9). The Container Security Initiative established a partnership programme for managing high-risk containers. Built on bilateral agreements, it allowed US customs to establish security criteria for containers and provided for deployments of its custom officers at foreign ports to control their pre-screening.\(^{17}\) Notably, the costs for screening and detection equipment, screening facilities, personnel and training are borne by the host country. Closely linked was the “24 Hour Rule”, effected by amendments in US customs regulations in October 2002, requiring provision of detailed manifest information for US bound cargo 24 hours before loading at the foreign port. This information enables US customs officers posted in Container Security Initiative host countries to identify high-risk containers prior to loading (Ireland 2009: 343). All maritime containerised cargo bound for the US is thus screened while high-risk cargo is scanned and, if needed, physically inspected.

Again, an intergovernmental organisation apparently echoed the US domestic and bilateral efforts. As noted by Ireland (2009: 341), supply chain security and counter-terrorism were not traditional roles and responsibilities of customs administrations. In response to the June 2002 demand for cooperative action on international transport system security towards terrorism by Group of Eight (G8) leaders (G8IC 2002), the WCO adopted a resolution on “security and facilitation of the international trade supply chain” noting the global concern with acts of international terrorism (WCO 2002). It established a task force that developed a set of customs guidelines on Integrated Supply Chain Management, which core principle was to implement risk management at the national level (WCO 2004a). To consolidate this achievement, a small “High Level Strategic Group” was established in 2004 to “enhance the position of the WCO and Customs administrations on security and facilitation matters”, tasked to prepare a framework on these matters (WCO 2004b). To promote contributions of less developed countries, the WCO Council approved a customs capacity-building strategy in June 2003 and launched regional “capacity building operational programmes” (WCO 2010: 1–3).

This correlates well with structural realism’s prediction that great powers seek bilateralisation of its relations with weaker states and oblige them to accept and implement its decisions.

\(^{17}\) Or vice versa, if the partner would so prefer.
Fear of terrorists’ acquisition and use of WMD typified the 2002 NSS and the 2002 *National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction* (NSWMD). The latter proclaimed a fundamental US policy change through the (EOP 2002: 1–6, 15): i) GWOT; ii) homeland security strategy, iii) new deterrence concept and iii) new WMD approach. The NSWMD comprised three pillars: i) counter-proliferation; ii) strengthened non-proliferation; and iii) consequence management. Capability of deterrence by retaliation was still considered effective versus conventional state actors, while “rough states” and terrorists were deemed to require intelligence-based anticipatory action. Accordingly, the NSWMD concluded that the US had to improve its: i) intelligence gathering on WMD-related facilities and activities; ii) law enforcement and military agency interaction; and iii) intelligence cooperation with partners and allies.

These elements are essential to understand the change in the US maritime security concept.

In response to a perceived gap in the global non-proliferation system, the US launched the *Proliferation Security Initiative* (PSI) in May 2003. It set a vision for active partnership and practical cooperation in the air and maritime domains (Dunne 2013: 2, 5, 21–24, centring on a *Statement of Interdiction Principles* for merchant vessels that acceding states and international bodies were to endorse. The US also sought bilateral ship-boarding agreements with its partners, concluded with key flag-states Liberia, the Marshall Islands and Panama in 2004.\(^{19}\) As noted by Dunne, the PSI positioned itself within the legal boundaries set by future UNSC resolutions, e.g. UNSCR 1540 (UNSC 2004a) obliging all states to establish effective national WMD export and transhipment controls, including laws and regulations. Again, the US used its power to influence the UNSC in order to impose obligations on other states.

Structural realism explains the US great power behaviour in terms of linking terrorism to alleged state sponsors, imposing obligations on the latter, and its efforts to ban their acquisition of WMD. It also explains the stated utility of seizing “the global initiative” in the 2002 NSS, seeking to induce regional powers such as China, India and Russia to cooperate and prevent a “possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition” (Bush 2002: 6, 13–18, 26–30). N.B. it

\(^{18}\) Including: i) offensive strike systems; ii) active and passive defensive systems; and iii) new capabilities; augmented by networked command and control systems and “exquisite intelligence” (DoD 2001).

\(^{19}\) As of August 2015, eleven states had concluded ship-boarding agreements with the US (DoS 2015).
declared that the time had come “to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” to inter alia “dissuade future military competition”. For this purpose, the 2002 NSS maintained a traditional emphasis on forward presence, in turn requiring bases and temporary access arrangements. As noted in the 2002 NSWMD, it also required coordinated multinational intelligence collection.

Again, the case of the Philippines is instructive on US foreign and security policy. It designated the Philippines the status of a major non-NATO ally in 2003, following its: i) acceptance of US military training of its security forces; ii) troop contribution to the war in Iraq; and iii) successful campaign in apprehending members of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Jema’ah Islamiyah (Sutter 2015: 215–216). In return, the Philippines envisaged economic help while recognising that there “may be others who might feel timid or hostile about U.S. leadership in the war against terrorism” (Garamone 2003). Here, China is widely recognised as the state referred. Likewise, Thailand received this status in 2003 as a reward for its troop contribution to the Iraq war and its policy change, offering the US forward sites for military supplies. Singapore reportedly turned down a similar offer, but entered negotiations on the bilateral Strategic Framework Agreement for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security, which was signed in 2005 (IISS 2013). It involved defence-technological collaboration and sharing, a Strategic Policy Dialogue and a Protocol of Amendment to the 1990 MOU, extending the access for US ships and aircraft to Singapore facilities.

As set forth in the 2002 NSS, the enactment of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) was important for promoting US security and prosperity. This tool was made readily available by the U.S. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, assigning the President a five-year authority to negotiate FTAs with other states, while limiting the mandate of Congress to approve or disprove them (Bush 2002: 19; LRC 2012). Prior to the millennium, the US concluded only two FTAs20, while it signed a US-Jordan FTA in 2000 (Aggarwal 2013: 175–178, 194). In contrast, the US signed FTAs with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco and the Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (CAFTA-DR) in 2003–2004. Except for the US-Chile FTA, all FTAs were closely linked to securing or rewarding US allies21, facilitating US balance of power considerations and/or promoting

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20 With Israel (1985) and Canada (1988).
21 The US-Jordan FTA, economically significant to Jordan but of minor importance to the US, is a prime example. The US Senate delayed its ratification until September 2001, when Jordan swiftly supported the GWOT (Press-Barnathan 2009: 78-79).
regional security, while the support of economic reforms was a key US driver for the US-Morocco, the CAFTA-DR and the US-Bahrain FTAs.

The post-millennium developments of US relations with the remaining Asian states approached in the previous section are also instructive. First, Taiwan remained a contentious issue in US-China relations, characterised by the latter’s continuous build-up of forces targeting Taiwan and potentially impeding US assistance in case of a conflict over Taiwan (Sutter 2015: 129). In response, the US continued its arms sales to Taiwan. Following the 2001 US-Taiwan arms sales talks, negotiations on attack and utility helicopters began in 2002 (Kan 2014: 8–20). They signed contracts on US sale of amphibious assault vehicles22, Kidd-class destroyers and a Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) programme in 2003, while Taiwan received its first delivery of Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles.

Second, Japan remained a key US ally in the Asia-Pacific region, seen by the US as a “cornerstone” of its ability to promote its interests in the Asia-Pacific and to advance its security (Sutter 2015: 163, 177). Accordingly, Japan was reassured on the US alliance commitments. The much noted 2002 disclosure that North Korea pursued a covert programme for highly enriched uranium – violating the 1994 framework agreement placing its frozen nuclear weapons programme under IAEA monitoring – and the restart of its production facility while requesting the IAEA inspectors to leave, led to a new crisis (Pritchard 2007: 164). North Korea’s: i) test-firing of a short-range, anti-ship missile and two *Silkworm* ground-to-ship non-ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan; ii) its interception of a US Air Force reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Sea of Japan; iii) the Japanese Coast Guard’s 2001 chase and sinking of sank a North Korean intelligence gathering ships in its EEZ; and iv) 2001 confession that eleven Japanese citizens were abducted in the 1970s and 80s, four of whom were allegedly alive (Nanto 2003: 18–26); added to the Japanese concerns regarding North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (Sutter 2015: 175). At this time, distrust and suspicion between Japan and South Korea impeded the US efforts for a US-Japan-South Korea management of North Korea. In 2003, Japan began to acquire US-developed BMD technologies and interceptors (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015b: 23).

Third, North Korea remained the main concern of the US-South Korea relationship (Manyin et al. 2015: 10). South Korea’s change in attitude from

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22 Under a programme managed by the US Marine Corps.
confrontation to reconciliation towards North Korea\textsuperscript{23} – reflecting the increased confidence in its regional force projection capabilities by its force modernisation programmes – and its trend towards closer alignment with China – replacing the US as South Korea’s largest export market in 2003 – added to uncertainties regarding the US alliance commitment stemming from the significant US troop reductions announced in 2004 (Cha 2004: 139–142). US President George W. Bush labelling of North Korea as being part of the “axis of evil” in 2002 disturbed South Korean opinion and raised doubts on whether the alliance actually served South Korea’s national interests (Snyder 2009). Although frictions over these issues were substantial in 2002–2004, economy and policy realities worked for the alliance. South Korea contributed medical personnel and engineers to the US-led coalitions in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003 (Axe 2010). Following the increasing market shares of China, South Korea began to lose competitiveness against Chinese goods in 2004, while a growing proportion of its firms operating in China perceived losses in their comparative advantage in technology (Snyder 2007). South Korea’s 2001 establishment of a maritime observation facility and helicopter-landing platform on the disputed Ieo-do/Suyan Jiao reef became a source of China-South Korea discord.

The USN 2002 *Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities* envisioned a USN capable of performing “global joint operations against regional and transnational dangers” (Clark 2002). It would deploy in key regions marked by a mix of states “poised for conflict”, “well-funded terrorist and criminal organizations”, and “failed states” producing frequent crises with little warning. The strategy, which made no use of the term maritime security, outlined three concepts for its forward presence and management of a wide array of threats. *Sea Basing* involved sustained and forward deployed naval forces avoiding shore basing, *Sea Shield* outlined their defensive posture – an “extended homeland defense” – while *Sea Strike* centred on capability and capacity to project power ashore. An internal and external information network, the *ForceNet*, would interlink them. The USN response to a “transformed strategic environment” thus focussed on sustaining and projecting sea power, a capability w it enhanced by information technology. The USN elaborated further on this strategy with the USMC, resulting in the 2003 *Naval Operations Concept for Joint Operations*. As Haynes (2015: 165) puts it, its relevance and direction “would be cast into doubt within a year” due to the bleak experiences from the US 2003 invasion of Iraq.

\textsuperscript{23} The June 2000 summit in Pyongyang between the leaders of both Koreas brought this issue to the fore.
In December 2004, the US president Bush (2004: 1–9) declared that the security of a broadly defined Maritime Domain was a global concern. A Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee was established and tasked to produce a comprehensive National Security Maritime Strategy (NSMS) to consolidate the US increasingly extensive policies and strategies. N.B. this committee was about to develop eight supporting plans to the NSMS, which conceptual implications we will elaborate on below.24

In sum, the years after the turn of the millennium was a time of upheaval for the US people. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 ripped away the perception of security among its population, arguably resulting from the background of living on a continent insulated from wars on other continents by wide masses of water. It brought about a massive domestic security programme with global repercussions in many domains, including the maritime. Focus was on fighting the global war on terrorism declared by the US President. It involved the launch of a frenetic, coordinated strategy development at all department levels and the creation of the influential Homeland Security department. Without doubt, it also opened up an opportunity for the USCG to push forward its view of maritime security domestically as well as internationally.

The USCG success in this quest would later contribute to shaping the first US maritime strategy25 in 2007, in which the three Sea Services jointly outlined a strategy with a focus on sustaining the liberal international economic order (see below). However, the US maritime security conception had widened already in 2004 due to its maritime counter-terrorism endeavour that required international collaboration and cooperation. Support to MLE agencies had thus become a major task not only for the USN, but also for navies worldwide. This development was closely linked to emphasising the role of the sea as medium of transportation, one of dominion and – less obvious – for the spread of ideas.

The focus on maritime threats at the lower level of the conflict spectrum – e.g. terrorism, piracy, people and drug smuggling – in various US maritime strategies addressed what was later to be termed Maritime Security Operations (MSOs), did not transform the USN capabilities, which persistently has centred on carrier

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25 I.e. a marked change from previous naval strategies.
strike groups. This context is key to understanding the implications of the USN 2002 launch of its LCS project, representing an additional capability that would eventually prove to be a useful tool also for supporting MLE agencies and improving partner interoperability and capabilities. The USN and USMC capabilities remained structured for the high-end of conflict, or what the Royal Navy – as opposed to MSOs – termed “the real thing” (RN 2010: 33). One could perhaps describe this naval mode of operations as business almost as usual. Despite the emergent widening of the US maritime security conception, the growing military capabilities of certain powers was a worrying concern in US strategies at all levels. Flaring disputes on military intelligence gathering in “the global commons” were worrying signs of pending conflict, related to regarding the sea as a resource and a medium of dominion.

2005 and onwards

The Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee submitted the still valid NSMS in September 2005. In this strategy, the committee linked maritime security to two strategic aims outlined in the 2002 NSS: i) igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; and ii) preventing US enemies from threatening the US, its allies or its friends with WMD (EOP 2005: 2–12). It set three tiered maritime security strategic principles: i) preserving the freedom of the seas; ii) facilitating and defending commerce to ensure an uninterrupted flow of shipping; and iii) facilitating the movement of desirable goods and people across US borders, while screening out dangerous people and material. The committee also derived four maritime security strategic objectives from these principles: i) preventing terrorist attacks and criminal or hostile acts; ii) protecting maritime-related population centres and critical infrastructures; iii) minimising damage and expedite recovery; and iv) safeguarding the ocean and its resources. N.B. the NSMS identified threats from transnational criminals and pirates, environmental degradation and illegal seaborne immigration, adding to the state and terrorist threats specified in the 2002 NSS and the NSWMD. This inclusion of threats traditionally managed by law enforcement and civil contingency agencies entails a substantial conceptual broadening of maritime security.

The NSMS is preferably read in conjunction with the US DoD 2005 National Defense Strategy, framing US security along with that of the international order and its partners (DoD 2005: 1–7, 15). It prescribed international partnerships as the remedy to the US vulnerability to indirect threats resulting from instability
in the international system. While the strategy deemed the lack of “a global peer competitor” to be a US strength, the 2005 *National Defense Strategy* defined the US globally leading position as vulnerability in terms of breeding unease and resistance. Reaffirming the 2002 NSS, it concluded that the US had to attain its role as a protector of the international system by collective action with its partners, whose capabilities in turn required to strengthening. The strategy thus aimed at seizing the opportunity of key partners’ willingness to deepen their integration into a US-led security system, while new ones would join. In this effort, it considered forward deployed forces instrumental.

USN Admirals Morgan and Martoglio (2005) echoed the principles and objectives of the NSMS in an influential article. While assuming a given role for US global leadership, they recognised the US inability to respond unilaterally to an altered international security environment and expounded on an argument centred on the presumed advantage to all states of “promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime commons”. By turning maritime security into an “exportable product”, they argued, US shipbuilding industry would benefit. Drawing on the implications of a globalised trade system, they suggested that global security on the high seas and in the world’s littorals, harbours and ports was a cornerstone of the prosperity of all. Accordingly, they noted that transnational threats mostly occur in the TTWs of less developed, but still sovereign, states with limited naval and MLE capabilities.

These littoral areas were legally out of reach for the US. Accordingly, Morgan and Martoglio (2005) identified a need for cooperative partnerships to ensure MDA and pre-posturing of US assets to enable emergency and crises response. They emphasised the need to overcome “resistance based on sovereignty concerns”, seen as “a delicate issue” due to the influence of allies, peers, or other nearby nations. In a follow-up article, Morgan (2006) expanded the “Navy of Navies” concept into a “Maritime Force” augmented by Coast Guards, citing US CNO Mullen’s set of principles for establishing a Global Maritime Network through multiple Regional Maritime Networks. The 2006 *Navy Strategic Plan* translated the concept into strategic guidance for USN planners and programmers, otherwise promoting the principles of *Sea Power 21* (USN 2006: 3, 20–21). For its part, the 2006 *Naval Operations Concept* launched the *Global Fleet Station* concept of deployed sea-based, adaptive naval force packages in areas of US interest (USN and USMC 2006: 30).

elaborated on its expanding cooperation with the USN. It used a broad concept of maritime security, placing emphasis on collaborative advancement of global maritime governance in terms of safety and security. Here, it pointed out weak coastal states as a major source of threats to the maritime commons and the continuity of global commerce by being “potential havens for terrorists, criminals, and other hostile actors”, engaged in smuggling, piracy, human trafficking, illegal migration, WMD movement and terrorism. In this strategy, the USCG proclaimed “a leadership role in developing international maritime regimes to promote effective and responsible management of the global maritime domain” and appointed itself as the best-suited organisation for the mission. Its bilateral support were to be selective, tailored to improve maritime governance through a risk management approach when and where such activities supported US national security interests. In essence, the strategy outlined an international engagement programme based on maritime strategic calculations.

The idea of a Global Maritime Network, rephrased as a Global Maritime Partnership, was incorporated in the USN, USMC and USCG October (2007) A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS21). As opposed to previous naval and coast guard strategies, it was the first US maritime strategy, balancing between addressing traditional sea power considerations and maritime security threats at the lower level of the conflict spectrum. Centring on the idea of the maritime domain as the “the lifeblood of a global system” in terms of sea borne trade, less emphasis was placed on issues pertaining to state sovereignty and more on protecting and sustaining a peaceful global system’s “interdependent networks of trade, finance, information, law, people and governance”.

As noted by Rubel (2012a), the CS21 was built on systems’ thinking, construing the global system as made up of a wide range of interdependent and interacting elements which whole was greater than the sum of its parts. Accordingly, it sought to integrate US sea power with those of its allies and partners and with other elements26 of its national power (USN, USMC and USCG 2007). Its logic was that no one nation was capable of providing holistic systemic protection, while the effects of each state’s operations would “ripple throughout the system as a whole”, resulting in the security of the system being either enhanced or reduced (Rubel 2012a: 8). This explains its seminal statement that “preventing wars is as important as winning wars” (italics in original), used as the rationale for establishing a cooperative approach to global maritime security.

26 I.e. diplomacy, information and economy.
(USN, USMC and USCG 2007). Such an approach requires trust and confidence, which indeed “cannot be surged”. This emphasis on US policy interdependence with other states in the CS21, resulting from globalisation, has clear liberalism connotations.

Notwithstanding, the CS21 maintains a strand of conceptual continuity readily explained by structural realism. It addresses the need for the US to maintain “regionally concentrated, forward-deployed task forces with the combat power to limit regional conflict, deter major power war [and] win our Nation’s wars as part of a joint or combined campaign” (USN, USMC and USCG 2007). By noting that “we cannot be everywhere”, it makes clear that US maritime forces will be concentrated to regions where “conflict threatens the global system and our national interests”. To structural realism, the global system represents a set of interacting state units while a systemic change involves altering the hierarchic order of its units (Waltz 2010[1979]: 40, 82). Accordingly, the US efforts to protect the global system involved defending its leading position. At this time, the US increasingly cast China as a peer competitor whose rise and military expansion was not necessarily going to be peaceful (Bush 2006: 41). A structural realist interpretation thus focuses on the US assumption that China was defensively oriented and therefore subject to a policy of engagement, while requiring a hedge for an opposite development. Structural realism offer less explanation to why the US set up CTF 151 in 2009 in response to piracy attacks off Somalia.

The CS21 did not specify adversaries, but US maritime forces were to be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean (USN, USMC and USCG 2007). Duly positioned, they would offer readiness to respond alongside other elements of national and multi-national power and provide political leaders “a range of options for deterrence, escalation and de-escalation”. While dissuading “peer competitors”, they would be committed to promoting regional security in close concert with partners and US allies. In conclusion, the CS21 envisioned a dual use of US maritime forces.

The 2008 Maritime Security Partnerships is a study of conceptual importance to US maritime security (NRC 2008: 16–17, 41, 128–129). First, the study committee observed that maritime security for the USN had “evolved from

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27 To Waltz, three elements arrange the structure: the ordering principle (anarchy), the (lack of) functional differentiation of units, and the distribution of capabilities (the polarity).
conventional maritime operations against a peer competitor to dealing with an environment rife with asymmetric threats and supporting law enforcement functions in the maritime domain” (see Figure 3). It noted that the USN’s international involvement had not always been accepted and highlighted the successes of the USCG in promoting various cooperative maritime security initiatives. It made clear that some states had interpreted the US interest in promoting the *Global Maritime Partnership* as an “extension of its intelligence operations” and US homeland defence. In this interpretation, the reduced size of the USN explained the US need for ensuring that naval vessels of other states were made available to patrol the world’s oceans on its behalf. As a remedy to their lack of will, the committee proposed that the US would show real concerns for local problems instead of terrorism and the prevention of WMD proliferation.

**Figure 3. Spectrum of US post-Cold War maritime security activities. Source: NRC (2008).**

Second, the committee set forth information sharing as the unifying concept for the MSP, using the Joint Interagency Task-Force South concept for countering Caribbean drug traffic as a role model (NRC 2008: 5, 8, 18, 47). Third, it recommended that the USN should address its lack of cultural awareness and
language skills that were hampering its partnership efforts by “expanded formal educational and bilateral/multilateral training”. Forth, the committee proposed forward-deployment of USCG cutters to address local maritime security concerns jointly with the USN. Fifth, it suggested a bottom-up approach to build trust and confidence in the US bilateral relationships by addressing local security concerns and progressively expand those to cross-sectorial (i.e. civil-military) groups. Sixth, the committee addressed the need for a more robust funding of the MSP programme.

It is clear that the US proclamation of true benefits to its partners was not a manifestation of a collective US goodwill. Rather, it was a prescription for obtaining success in its quest for continued global leadership. This is apparent when examining the committee’s proposal to tailor US information sharing to: i) (differing) levels of trust; ii) bilateral (more) versus multilateral (less) arrangements; iii) focus on coordinated action at tactical level rather than information sharing; and iv) (uneven) levels of technological maturity and sophistication (NRC 2008: 56, 76–77, 112–113). By implementing differing information security and protection regimes across the maritime security spectrum (see Figure 2), information to and from each participant could be filtered and protected. Through a multilevel information architecture, close allies would share secret information of the entire spectrum, while less trusted partners could gain access to an unclassified “shared information space” and a “user-defined operational picture” suitable for law enforcement agencies.

Let us further elaborate on the US rationale for employing a cooperative approach and posturing of US maritime forces in the Western Pacific. Rubel (2008: 72, 77), in charge of developing strategy options and analyses of the CS21, reveals that China, Iran and North Korea all were considered for inclusion as US security threats. The staff, however, chose not to identify specific threats because such considerations could prove to be self-fulfilling and thus counterproductive to the intention of furthering cooperation and preventing war. Hence, the staff could not convincingly pursue their traditional threat-based planning. As writing team member Ennis (2009) specifies, China was the most controversial and engaging issue of the process. He confirms that the staff sought to phrase the strategy so that China would be invited to maintain the global system rather than fuel Chinese antagonism, while expecting the Chinese to “read themselves into the document” (as a US threat) in relevant places. Ennis refers to positive open-source Chinese reactions to the resulting descriptions of a “multipolar” world, but conveying a sense of foreboding to its cooperation objectives. To a large
extent the CS21 approach corresponds with that of the DoD 2006 *Quadrennial Defence Review* (DoD 2006: vi, 30) which, in contrast, designates China as a "near-peer" US competitor requiring prudent US hedges if the cooperative approach would fail.

At this time, China's economic growth, increasingly assertive international diplomacy, maritime exploitation in the South China Sea and emerging anti-access strategy increasingly worried the US (Dumbaugh 2008). Its improving capabilities in terms of theatre-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, land-based aircraft, naval mines, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, nuclear weapons and high-power microwave devices were particular USN concerns (O'Rourke 2008). However, there was also an economic dimension to China's emerging power. Through its 2002 FTA with ASEAN – institutionalising their economic relations – China aimed at building trust and partnership, promoting its foreign policy objectives and aspirations for a regionally leading role (Cai 2004: 589, 594). Hence, it was a move to exclude the US. Control of ASEAN's raw materials, energy resources and the three quarters of China's energy imports passing the South China Sea were vital to Chinese current and future economic growth (Koo 2013: 97). Following China's lead was, and may still be, prudent for ASEAN state leaders who consider the importance of exports to China in their economic growth and the political legitimacy of their governments.

Following a ten-year period of dialogue and cooperation between China and the ASEAN member states that included the 2002 *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea* (DoC) on peaceful resolutions of their differences became increasingly apparent from 2006 (Fravel 2012: 34–38, 47; Raine and LeMièvre 2013: 32–34, 45–47). This included the extent of China's sovereignty claims over islands and reefs in the South China Sea and its interpretation of international maritime law. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam dispute the territorial claims by China – identical to those of Taiwan – that were laid down in its 2009 submission to "the UN Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf". The US has taken no position on these complex territorial disputes. The US treaty commitment to Japan includes the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, a Japanese territorial claim fiercely disputed by China (The White House 2014). Since the 1990s, China has bolstered the capabilities of its MLE agencies. As China opted out from the ITLOS when ratifying the UNCLOS and rejects "internationalisation" of the disputes (Storey 2012: 58), these agencies de facto enforce Chinese national laws within the Chinese “nine-dashed line” enclosing most of the South China Sea (Holmes 2012: 110).
The increased efforts of ASEAN member states to assert and exercise their competing claims to maritime rights, superimposed by China’s increased enforcement of its national laws, have resulted in numerous incidents and diplomatic tensions (Fravel 2012: 36–38, 44–47). Chinese MLE vessels have regularly escorted and aided Chinese fishing vessels during fishing activities in disputed areas, ready to intervene with vessels of the other claimants. In 2006, Vietnam’s unilateral decision to pursue oil exploration with foreign oil companies in the disputed Phu Khanh basin led to Chinese protests, while its continued efforts prompted China to threaten the US oil company Exxon Mobil in 2008. Vietnamese fishing operations in disputed waters from 2005 involved confrontations with Chinese MLE vessels, who confiscated the catches, confiscated or expelled the vessels while fining and/or detaining the crews. In 2011, Chinese vessels repeatedly interfered with Vietnamese and Filipino seismic survey activities. The dispute on US FON within China’s EEZ in the South China Sea triggered the 2009 incidents, where Chinese vessels harassed the survey ships USNS *Impeccable* and USNS *Victorious*, while China opposed an ocean surveillance operation in the Yellow Sea by the USS *George Washington* in 2010 (O’Rourke 2015: 10–12, 27). In 2001–2010, China interfered with US air- or seaborne intelligence gathering activities at five occasions (Cole 2010: xviii).

US Secretary of State Clinton (2011) duly recognised the geostrategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, its role in global economy and politics, and its maritime character in her statement on the US “pivot” to Asia. She announced an increased US military presence in the region to ensure its allies and partners on the reliability of US commitments and its desire to influence events, including managing US-China bilateral relations. The 2010 NSS also emphasised the US readiness to manage the implications of China’s expected “expansion of its interests within and beyond the region” (Obama 2010: 3, 13). However, as noted by Holmes (2012: 102), USN capacity is dwindling while China’s capacity to discourage actions that it considers “inimical to its interests is growing along with its diplomatic clout” is increasing. N.B. both powers are dependent on an uninterrupted global transportation system, while their economic interdependence may dampen the US eagerness to defy the will of China.

We must see the 2005 US NSMS against this backdrop. On the one hand, the US cannot abandon its national interests in the South China Sea region. On the other, the US must reassure China of its peaceful intentions when it gets increasingly involved in re-establishing itself as the regional leader. This is in accordance with structural realism prescriptions. The dual nature of naval power – which latent warfighting capability can be activated at any time – makes
cooperative missions hard to distinguish from competitive ones (Holmes 2012: 108, 112). Given the US-China mistrust, USN forces deployed to the South China Sea are likely to be seen by China as tools for US attempts of dominion and vice versa. Indeed, one reason that Chinese leaders prefer bilateral over multilateral negotiations with ASEAN states might be the risk that they jointly seek to counterbalance China – by themselves or aided by the US. Trust is thus the essential ingredient, and it takes time and efforts to build. As suggested by Holmes, the choice of instrument matters and coast guards are not as threatening as warships, although China opposes all kinds of US involvement in the region.

The US Southeast Asian maritime security engagement involved deepened military cooperation with the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore through exercise series such as: i) the US/Philippines bilateral\(^{28}\) *Balikatan*; ii) the multilateral US-led *Rim of the Pacific*; iii) the US/Thailand-led multilateral *Cobra Gold*; and iv) the *Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training* involving US bilateral exercises with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Timor Leste (Raine and Le Mière 2013: 155; USN 2015b). The US has thus replaced its traditional “hub-and-spokes” model of alliance operations in Asia by a distributed network with stronger inter-partner military relations. The US non-deployed engagement has thus actively promoted the regional multilateralism that China has sought to prevent. Here, the gradual warm-up of US-Vietnam relations since 2004 stands out. It was due to: i) the establishment of an annual political, security and defence dialogue involving maritime security issues; ii) the 2011 MoU on bilateral defence cooperation; iii) non-combat naval exchange activities including maritime security; and iv) the 2013 *US-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership* resulting in Vietnam being denoted a key US partner (DoD 2014: 17; Thayer 2013).

Taiwan has participated in the *Container Security Initiative* since 2005 and in the *Megaports Initiative*\(^{29}\) since 2006 (Kan and Morrison 2014: 6–17), supporting the US counterterrorism efforts. More important, Taiwan and China resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008, resulting in closer economic engagement, social contacts and reduced political tensions. In 2011, however, US officials noted a large increase in its exports to China and warned Taiwan for “over-reliance” on the Chinese market, urging its leaders to seek a balanced relationship with the US as part of a national security agenda. In 2011, US Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lavoy voiced concerns that Taiwan was

\(^{28}\) The participation of Australia since 2014 has made it multilateral (Fonbuena 2014).

\(^{29}\) Aimed at detecting and interdicting nuclear and other radioactive materials in cargo.
vulnerable to a People’s Liberation Army attack – which would be contrary to China’s pledge of a “peaceful development” of its Taiwan links – entailing the risk of inviting the “aggression U.S. policy seeks to deter” (Kan and Morrison 2014: 11). The US intended sales of submarines, refurbished P3C ASW aircraft and F-16C/Ds fighters failed to materialise, but Taiwan signed a contract for an Early Warning Radar System in 2009 – successfully tracking North Korea’s 2012 long-range missile test – and acquired additional sets of upgraded Patriot batteries and missiles in 2010 (Kan 2014: 11–25). In 2012, Taiwan also signed a contract for upgrading their F-16A/B fighters.

Japan, the world’s third largest economy, deepened its economic and defence cooperation with the US in 2005–2015. Strengthened by domestic political stability since 2012, Japan: i) revised the Japan-US Mutual Defense Guidelines in 2013–2015, introducing a standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and expanding their cooperation to inter alia include the defence of SLOCs; and ii) passed a controversial security legislative package in 2015, enabling Japanese engagement in collective self-defence30 (Chanlett-Avery et al. 2015b: 1–28). Japan also enhanced its security ties with Australia, ASEAN and India – emphasising FON issues in the South China Sea and deterrence of “Chinese aggression on its maritime periphery”. Pushed by the US – requiring US-Japan-South Korea cooperation to manage North Korea’s nuclear threat and China’s rise31 – Japan slightly improved its relations with South Korea by attending US-led summits in 2014 and 2015, and by issuing a World War 2 anniversary statement of remorse in 201532.

The Japan-US bilateral economic relationships gradually improved as they settled their trade disputes through the WTO33, while China rose as a regional economic power. Japan’s joining of the US Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in 2013, key to the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific, was equally essential. Twelve member states34, including Japan but excluding China, signed this trade agreement covering 40 percent of the world economy in February 2016 (Howard

30 It now permits the use of military force to defend another state under attack if the attack threatens Japan.
31 The US envisions an integrated US-Japan-South Korea BMD system as part of the US “extended deterrence” concept, utilising Japan’s second-most potent land/sea based BMD capability in the world.
32 It specifically addressed the contentious issue of South Korean “comfort women”.
33 Thereto, Japan’s economic growth continued to be slow.
34 I.e. Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam.
Yet Japan has also joined Asia-Pacific trade negotiations that exclude the US. Its decision to freeze its nuclear power industry following the 2011 Fukushima accident made Japan the world’s leading liquefied natural gas (LNG) importer. The US LNG exports commencing in 2017 will increase Japan’s dependency on the US for its energy security.

In parallel with South Korea’s gradual transformation into a leading and democratic economic power in the post-Cold War period, the scope of its security interest expanded from an exclusive focus on the Korean peninsula to global perspectives reflecting a much broader conception of security (Lundqvist 2013: 60). This change was salient in the vision of a “Global Korea” outlined in its 2008 Defence White Paper, requiring global cooperation to promote its new role in the world economy and match its position a new G20 member. The US-South Korea alliance relationship thus turned into a more comprehensive and equal partnership based on shared interests and values (Snyder 2009: 2). Although China and Japan surpassed the US as South Korea’s largest and second-largest trading partners, the US remained its prime supplier of Foreign Direct Investment in 2005, as well as its third-largest trading partner and its second largest export market (Manyin 2006: 1–3). In February 2006, South Korea-US launched FTA negotiations. They signed the resulting agreement in June 2007 and it came into force in March 2012 (USTR 2016), solving contentious issues and increasing the US market access. The Office of the United States Trade Representative described it as “the most commercially significant” FTA in almost two decades.

The 2010 incidents then North Korea shelled the island of Yeonpyeong by artillery and sank the Republic of Korea Navy Ship (ROKS) Cheonan, highlighted its role as the dominant strategic concern of the US-South Korea alliance (Lundqvist 2013: 60). In response, the two allies adopted a “proactive deterrence” policy and established the bi-annual Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue bilateral framework (Manyin et al. 2015: 13–19). They introduced: i) B-2 and B-52 strategic bombers in their exercises; ii) South Korean BMD capability development interoperable with US regional systems; iii) a delay in the transfer of wartime operational control of Korean troops to South Korea (recognising its advances in economic and military strength) while conditioning

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35 I.e. a trilateral FTA with China and South Korea, as well as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership involving ASEAN, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India – launched as an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thereto, the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement came into force in 2015.

36 From a US perspective, South Korea was its seventh-largest trading partner.
it by enhanced South Korean C4 capabilities; and iv) South Korean procurement of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and RQ-4 "Global Hawk" unmanned aerial vehicles – involving an upgrade in its status as a US arms purchaser. Thereto, the US consideration of deploying a Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea – capable of monitoring large parts of Chinese airspace – instigated a Chinese protest in 2015.

Alongside knowledge transfer and training, the US began deployment of marines to Australia in 2012 (reaching 2,500 troops in 2017) and LCSs to Singapore (reaching four in 2018), to meet the US needs for access to and security of the South China Sea region (DoD 2014: 4; Bender 2015; Siegel 2012). Thereto, the USCG transferred two decommissioned cutters to the Philippines Navy in 2011 and 2013 (USCG 2011; Panda 2014). One vessel was involved in the 2012 incident in which China seized Scarborough shoal, following a three months standoff with Philippine navy and coast guard units (Nguyen 2012). Following a series of failed negotiations with China concerning their territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided in 2013 to challenge China’s claims by submitting their dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague, under the provisions of UNCLOS. China has consistently refused to join the arbitration case. Instead, it has warned the Philippines that it could damage their bilateral relationship (Wu and Pam 2015). In July 2016, the tribunal ruled that China’s nine-dash line claim – including the features in the Spratly Islands chain – and accompanying claims to historic rights had no validity under international law (Panda 2016). Thereto, it found the physically obstruction of Philippine vessels by Chinese ships unlawful.

China has been willing to cooperate with ASEAN member states. Following increased US engagement, it even signed guidelines for the implementation of the 2002 DoC with ASEAN in 2011 (Raine and Le Mière 2013: 62–63, 127). However, China has sought to control the process by seeking bilateral rather than multilateral agreements through which their national interests are duly considered. Its refusal to join the arbitration case with the Philippines is illustrative on this behaviour. ASEAN is the smallest of possible multilateral forums for China, and – not least important – one in which the US is not represented. Arguably, China has carefully used its economic advantage through a divide and rule strategy to break up the unity of ASEAN on the South China Sea disputes, e.g. by preventing a joint communiqué at the 2012 summit. In contrast to the Philippines, Vietnam has not submitted its territorial disputes with China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Chapman 2016). Although supporting this move of the Philippines – and in contrast to the candid reactions by the
governments of Indonesia and Singapore (AFP 2016; Siow 2016) – it has been very careful in its official comments to the ruling. Vietnam’s economic dependence on its northern neighbour China is suggestive to why.

In 2013, China began intense and extensive land reclamation, dredging and construction activities on seven disputed reefs in the Spratly Islands chain (Dolven et al. 2015: 1–4, 11–15; Tiezzi 2015a). Both ASEAN and the US regarded these activities as part of an assertive Chinese strategy to bolster its sovereignty claims, violating the principles of the 2002 DoC. In spring 2015, China argued that its activities at the Spratly Islands – to which it claims “indisputable sovereignty” – sought to “meet various civilian demands” and satisfy “the need of necessary military defense”. China, for its part, stressed the lawfulness of its activities, while accusing the other claimants37 for illegal construction activities in the South China Sea. The installations are widely expected to increase China’s capability to maintain ship and aircraft operations in the South China Sea and its capacity to enforce a future Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea. Based on domestic laws, China declared such a zone in the East China Sea in November 2013 (Rinehart and Elias 2015), covering a large swath of airspace which overlapped pre-existing ADIZs of Japan, South Korea and Japan, and airspace over disputed islands. The states concerned and the US Chinese issued strong protests, while Japan and the US also interpreted the Chinese measure as a challenge of the status of the Senkaku Islands.

The broad US maritime security concept and the emphasis on threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum are maintained in the 2015 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready (CS21R). The systemic perspective of its predecessor is prominent, while its emphasis on the prospects of addressing threats to mutual maritime security interests through work in formal and informal networks is maintained (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 1–2, 13). The CS21R highlights the USCG role in US TTWs and EEZ as well as in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, where it enhances regional partners’ maritime safety and security capabilities. In line with the recommendation of the 2008 Maritime Security Partnerships study proposed, it directs the US Sea Services to address local rather than global maritime security challenges.

The CS21R includes a new pillar of sea power termed “all domain access”, centred on safeguarding the US offensive capability to defeat opponents’ anti-access systems in contested regions (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 19–21). This

37 I.e. Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.
pillar relates to the classified 2010 USN and USAF *Air-Sea Battle* concept (DoD 2010: 32), renamed *Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons* in 2015 and including also the US Army and the USMC (DoD 2015b). The all domain access capability elevated in the US current maritime strategies is intended to be employed in coordination with sea control and power projection capabilities to facilitate power projection in contested areas. Although not spelled out in the strategy, the concept seems tailored to counter China's military capability to challenge or even hinder a US naval intervention close to China's homeland. However, it is applicable on any maritime region hosting a rival with anti-access area-denial capabilities.

USN carriers and their maritime air power are critical means for projecting power ashore and these high-value vessels must not be crippled or sunk. In brief, by creating all domain access capabilities the US aims at maximising its battlespace awareness before and during operations. Units will minimise signal emission while passively collecting as much signal information as possible, which is processed and disseminated throughout the force. The concept is a version of network-centric warfare envisioned in the strategies of the late 1990s, seeking to thwart the command and control capabilities of an opponent through the US domination of all domains – including space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum – with non-kinetic means, allowing for kinetic strikes against the opponent's command and control nodes rather than its individual weapons.

Notably, all domain access has a peacetime dimension, materialising through routine manoeuvres in contested waters, well exemplified by the much-noted USS *Lassen* FON patrol in October 2015. This Arleigh Burke-class destroyer sailed within 12 nautical miles of five disputed – partly artificial – reefs in the South China Sea, provoking fierce Chinese statements such as that it was "not afraid to fight a war with the U.S. in the region" (Sciutto and Hunt 2015; McKirdy and Hunt 2015). China claims indispensable sovereignty over these reefs of the Spratly Islands chain, including TTWs and EEZs. This incident highlights the influence of the maritime domain on great-power strategy and the significance they assign to dominate it. While the USCG operates solitary in South Pacific regions such as Micronesia and Melanesia, it takes on a joint endeavour with the USN and the USMC in the South China Sea region. The rationale is explicit. When the USN and the USMC foster bi- and multilateral maritime security cooperation among the ASEAN members, they are deployed in-theatre and thus enhance the US warfighting advantages (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 13). Tailored maritime security cooperation in key regions thus serves the triple purpose of providing:
i) access for influence and deterrence, when necessary preceded or augmented by USCG units; ii) MDA; and iii) burden-sharing on managing threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. This approach embodies the statement associated with USN Admiral Mullen, “the implication is a general need to work smarter, not harder, and so achieve more” (Sohn 2009: 47).

Being devoid of permanent bases in the South China Sea until very recently (see below), the US collaborative effort has contributed to building trust and confidence in its regional commitment. After all, maritime security is consistently regarded as “a promising area for expanded cooperation with our allies and partners” (USN, USMC and USCG 2015: 26) since it collectively benefits to all states – including China. Promoting maritime security with credible forces is thus a useful tool also for a US engagement strategy versus China, involving a reassurance element (showing China its benign intentions) and a hedging element (a deterrent). Thereto, if the US extends its multilateral maritime security cooperation offers to include China, they constitute a litmus test of its strategic intentions. Incremental deepening could follow if China chooses to engage in such US-led security cooperation. If China opts out, the US could resolutely step up on structural realism’s ladder of strategies (see Figure 1) and implement a containment strategy (i.e. deterrence without reassurance).

Recognising the growing complexity of the Asia-Pacific maritime domain, the August 2015 US DoD The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy sets three maritime security objectives and four lines of effort to achieve them (DoD 2015a: 1–17). The objectives place emphasis on: i) safeguarding the freedom of the seas (i.e. FON); ii) deterring conflict and coercion; and iii) promoting adherence to international law and standards. The strategy also spells out why they are vital to the US. The US considers FON necessary for global shipping and a “stable economic order”, but also to “ensure access in the event of a crisis”, while regional conflict and coercion threatens to impede the former. Adherence to international law and standards is required for “shared use of maritime waterways and resources” and “safe operations within the maritime domain”. In plain language, the latest strategy focusses on preventing a rising China from asserting and dominating the East China Sea and the South China Sea regions through a traditional threats-based approach in which the military dimension is centre stage. Conceptually, maritime security thus centres on the same dimensions as in 1991, namely US global access to and control of SLOCs to enable power projection versus a peer competitor. The means, however, are adapted to fit the geostrategic and operational realities at hand.
The first line of effort, “strengthening our military capacity to ensure the United States can successfully deter conflict and coercion and respond decisively when needed” (italics in original), involves a comprehensive weapons modernisation programme for power projection, centring on forward presence and contingency management (DoD 2015a: 19–33). Here, continuity manifests and is evident in the renewed US-Philippines negotiations on Subic Bay, reopened as a military base in 2015 in response to China’s maritime ambitions (The Guardian 2015). On 12 January 2016, the Philippines Supreme Court approved the ten-year security accord signed in 2014 – the Enhanced Defense Co-operation Agreement – offering access to eight bases for US rotational deployments of air and sea assets while catering for US assistance in revamping the Philippine military (Hernández and Whaley 2016; the Guardian 2016). In March 2016, the Philippines opened five bases38 to permanent American presence by rotational air force and army deployments (Tilghman 2016). However, the confrontational rhetoric by Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte – elected in May 2016 – aimed at the US has cast doubts about the future prospects of their alliance (Morales, Petty and Perry 2016).

Change is evident in the character of the US contingency management. The need for addressing a broader range of threats has been manifest since the late 1990s, serving as a catalyst for integrating the US Sea Services and developing the LCS vessel. Continuity as well as change is evident also in the second line of effort, “working together with our allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Indian Ocean to build their maritime capacity” (italics in original). Its emphasis on alliances is an enduring feature of US strategy, while their networked architecture and the key role assigned to the USCG are novelties.

In the third line of effort, “leveraging military diplomacy to build greater transparency, reduce the risk of miscalculation or conflict, and promote shared maritime rules of the road” (italics in original), the role of international organisations (e.g. ITLOS) are enhanced as compared to 1991 (DoD 2015a: 20–33). However, the significance of naval diplomacy remains the same while mechanisms such as the 2014 US-China MOU on rules of behaviour for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (US DoD and PRC MoND 2014) resembles that signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. The multilateral approach outlined in the fourth line of effort, “working to strengthen regional security institutions and encourage the development of an open and effective regional security

38 I.e. the Antonio Bautista, Basa, Lumbia and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Bases and the Fort Magsaysay Army Base.
architecture” (italics in original), involves the most prominent change as compared to 1991. Today, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus Experts Working Group on Maritime Security is an essential forum for this cooperative US maritime security approach. When considering its Cold War engagement strategies, however, continuity is apparent in its support of regional collective security institutions such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Concluding analysis

This article set out to explain continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy through a structural realism lens. We will now discuss our findings and compare them with the hypotheses on US maritime policy that we derived from structural realism and the supporting framework composed of the four attributes of the sea.

The above account has shown that the US maritime security concept broadened in 1991–2015, from a strict military focus on deterrence and secure SLOCs for the purposes of power projection and trade, to one in which law enforcement and governance issues took centre stage in a vast littoral environment. After its embedding in balance of power considerations in 1991, the process of incorporating a broader security concept began in the late 1990s. This process increased in intensity by the 2001 launch of the ongoing GWOT\textsuperscript{39}, involving US attempts to secure the entire trade supply chain, centring on maritime transport activities, and expand the range of available international legal tools. Here, the US used its power to influence international bodies such as the UNSC, the IMO and the WCO, prompting them to accept standards drafted by US agencies and compatible with US domestic measures. It also used its power as a major trader to shift costs for cargo security to the exporting countries through bilateral security agreements, pursuing a strategy of “pushing the Homeland Security mission overseas” (DHS 2015). Notably, US national interests were served by the principle that all states obtained absolute gains in security while – in respect of being the world’s top trading nation until 2012, when it was surpassed by China (Bloomberg News 2013) – the US benefitted most by also obtaining relative gains.

\textsuperscript{39} E.g. by Operation Inherent Resolve (the US intervention against Daesh), Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (the US intervention in Afghanistan) and Operation Noble Eagle (US/Canadian military support to homeland security).
This elevation of governance issues in international politics is clearly linked to promoting certain norms at the systemic level. It may seem to contradict structural realism’s focus on military power, as US naval power apparently declined during this period. As discussed in the introductory section on structural realism predictions, however, structural realism acknowledges that societies establish behavioural norms in informal and spontaneous ways, encouraging conformity and reducing variety (Waltz 2010[1979]: 75–76). Indeed, Waltz (1986: 326) even referred to the international system as an international society. Structural realism also acknowledges a process of socialisation in international relations which conditions state behaviour. However, structural realism does not expect that this process will affect their properties. Instead, they are held constant.

According to structural realism, adherence to international rules and norms are optional to strong states. Waltz (2010[1979]: 94) argues that major “states set the scene in which they (...) stage their dramas or carry on their humdrum affairs”. Brute material power simply trumps what we might refer to as powerful ideas in a systemic structure, characterised by the distribution of material capabilities. The absence of a peer US competitor after the Cold War – relieving the US from the dual threat to its state institutions from Soviet Union military forces and ideology – allowed this hegemon to promote a multitude of less vital foreign policy and security interests other than its survival. Although structural realism – preoccupied with how and why states manage their external security interests (i.e. “hard security”) – does not provide guidance on their management of lower level threats in various security sectors, the widening does not contradict the theory. According to Waltz (2000: 29, 30), the unipolar conditions are an anomaly and capriciously wielded “unbalanced power leaves weaker states feeling uneasy” will sooner or later induce a capable country – or a group of countries – to establish a new balance of power.

Dominating the maritime domain has remained a key means in the US continuous endeavour to safeguard against rising powers aspiring to establish such a balance in any region critical to US interests. Capability to establish and maintain peacetime control of the sea in such regions – in turn requiring MDA and regional basing arrangements – is arguably a prerequisite for enabling command of the sea versus an opposing power if conflict arises. This centres on the need for control – and thus security – of SLOCs for the purposes of power projection and trade. Hence, structural realism well explains this continuity in the US maritime security conception in 1991–2015.
However, there is also conceptual change. One is the widening of the geographical scope of sea control from SLOCs to seamless control of the littorals in the USN maritime strategies from 1997 and onwards. The original, and still valid, reason for this essential change was certain emerging powers growing capabilities to pursue what was later to be termed anti-access/area denial strategies, assessed as precluding the air and sea power of US carrier groups from dominating SLOCs by 2020. Structural realism explains this change. However, forces deployed to achieve this aim can also fulfil secondary roles as tools for shaping the international environment. Structural realism provides only a partial explanation of this fact (see below).

The 1994 entry into force of the UNCLOS increased the stakes for maritime resource extraction and involved new and consistent concerns for US FON. The US persistent reluctance to accede to the convention corresponds with structural realism predictions, since it would involve a loss in international influence and thus in power. However, for the purposes of globally enforcing its views on ocean rights and boundaries – and to assert its FON rights – the US recognised it as codification of customary international law. These issues stem from states regarding the sea as a resource. They involve a tension between those states (i.e. China and Russia) that seek to exercise national jurisdiction over the entirety of its EEZ and those (mostly Western) states that asserts the rights to FON codified in UNCLOS.

Indeed, the US was the first to challenge the long established freedom-of-seas doctrine in 1945 by unilaterally extending its jurisdiction to its continental shelf and its natural resources (UN DOALOS 1998). Throughout the period of study and despite being a party to the UNCLOS, however, the US has been the foremost advocate of international maritime law. Arguably, this harks back to its need for global maritime access to project power – i.e. to dominate the maritime domain – but also to sustain the global trade system. Hence, in line with structural realism predictions, the US promoted the acceptance of those international norms and rules that it deemed best served its national interests.

The conception that marine resources are valuable and that the sea constitutes an important medium for transport represent conceptual continuity, while change is apparent in the leverage that UNCLOS exerted on states’ valorisation of these values on a global scale. It simply increased importance of the sea to coastal states, a development reinforced by the technological developments that have made its resources increasingly discoverable and exploitable. As the stakes increased in this competition for maritime territory
and resources, as well as for control of maritime areas, so did their impact on the US concept for maritime security. Here, the growing challenges to the UNCLOS provisions by rising powers such as China and Russia became a foremost US concern. China’s incipient enforcement of its disputed claim for large swaths of the South China Sea prompted the US recent regional maritime security strategy, while Russia’s establishing in law its national jurisdiction over its EEZ became an issue in the Arctic region in 2012 (Depledge 2015).

We can thus conclude that the two hypotheses predicting that the US would seek to influence international maritime institutions in order to: i) improve the protection of their property rights with regards to maritime resource extraction; and ii) maintain or increase its autonomy with regards to its TTWs, EEZ and portion of the continental shelf; have gained support. The US refusal to become a party to the UNCLOS made this manifest. Acceding to UNCLOS would reduce its autonomy and influence, since it would be: i) forced to share some of its revenues from deep-sea mining with developing states via the ISA; ii) lacking veto-power over the ISA’s decision-making; and iii) obliged to participate in the mandatory dispute resolution mechanisms for territorial claims made by other parties to the convention. We can also conclude that the US has strongly enforced the UNCLOS provisions concerning FON in order to assure unimpeded access to strategically important waters for the purpose of power projection. Hence, also the hypothesis that the US would influence the international standards for interpreting maritime law has gained support.

With regard to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea we can conclude that structural realism’s prediction that states regard international organisations as “arenas for acting out power relationships” has gained support. China, as well as the US, has sought to influence ASEAN by linking trade and security. China has sought bilateralisation of its territorial disputes with certain ASEAN states in order to maximise its bargaining position and avoid consulting with them as a collective unit. Inversely, the US has promoted multilateral conflict resolution mechanisms involving ASEAN – urging them to bring their cases to international courts – seeking to oblige China to accept and implement its decisions. Clearly, self-interested strategic considerations motivated the US increased participation in ASEAN activities and the recently established US-ASEAN annual summit. Influence in ASEAN made a difference in the US and Chinese pursuit for greater regional influence. Such influence, in turn, meant gains in relative power versus its competitor. Since economic and security issues of concern in Southeast Asia were intrinsically linked to the maritime domain, its
security became organic parts the US grand strategies. Apparently, China drew the same conclusion.

The cooperative partnership approach set forth in various maritime strategic documents from 2005 and onwards has liberalism connotations. From this perspective – most obvious in the 2007 USCG and the joint CS21 strategies – maritime security was conceptualised as a requirement for sustained globalisation and the establishment of collective ends that went beyond states’ selfish pursuit of their national interests. In an all-out systemic conceptualisation, which these two strategies approximates, maritime security becomes an organic part of the politics of a global, interconnected and interdependent society inhabited by various kinds of transnational actors. It is somewhat telling that the launch of both strategies preceded the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. McGrew (2011: 16–18, 25–28) suggests that when social, political, and economic activities are globalised they are no longer “organized solely according to a territorial logic”. This blurs the traditional distinction between domestic and international affairs. The systemic conceptualisation of maritime security in these strategies clearly draws on what he labels “a global governance complex” composed of states, international institutions, and transnational networks as well as public and private networks. Such an enmeshed world forces states to engage in cooperative maritime security operations and intervene to promote stability and order, rather than preparing for and engaging in interstate conflict. This liberal logic, aiming at a more pacific world order catering for wealth and prosperity, is thus highly applicable to the concept outlined in these US maritime strategies. Notwithstanding, structural realism offers an alternative conceptualisation.

Structural realism does not deny globalisation, but stresses that if rudimentary transnational governance will ever materialise it will be entirely dependent on the distribution of power (Dunne and Schmidt 2011: 97). This is due to the anarchic character of the international self-help system that limits cooperation of functionally like units, who worry that a division of labour may favour others more than themselves (Waltz 2010[1979]: 104–106). They are also concerned that the more they specialise, the more they rely on others “to supply the materials and goods [they] are not producing”. High interdependence thus represents a “mutual vulnerability”, why states – at least strong ones – seek to secure that which they depend on or, otherwise, aim at reducing the extent of their dependency. This counteracts the visions, ideas and ambitions of those transnational movements that promote national specialisation within integrated international structures for efficiency and mutual enrichment. By linking the
globalisation process to the distribution of power, the role of the US becomes clear. As noted by Dunne and Schmidt (2011: 96), “liberalism, capitalism and consumerism” are core US values, but also to proponents of globalism.

Accordingly, structural realism explains the reasons for the US change in its maritime security strategy up to and including the 2007 strategies. The US economic revival in the 1990s – mainly attributed to its increased global economic engagement – defied the doubts raised in the 1980s about its competitiveness and consolidated its position as the global economic leader (Litan 2000). Arguably, the US lead role in the 1995 creation of the WTO, vested with authority and responsibility for reducing trade barriers and settling trade disputes, was part of this quest. The pace of globalisation and the networks of interdependence spanning continents increased dynamically, accompanied by the US efforts to shape the international environment in ways conducive to its interests and values (Lindsay, Greenberg and Daalder 2003). Through means such as the Internet, transmitted globally through sub-sea cables and made available for citizens in less-developed states, globalisation became a political and cultural phenomenon. Since power – although providing strong states with more influence and wider ranges of action (Waltz 2010[1979]: 194) – does not reliably bring control, globalisation brought new perils for the US in such wide terms as financial speculation, transnational terrorism and adverse effects of global climate change.

We can thus understand globalisation as the result of a deliberate process launched by major (Western) powers – whereof the US arguably had the greatest incentive and capacity – to advance their national interests. As Moon (2006: 438-440) has shown, the US applied a dual strategy of removing the trade barriers of other states through multilateral action while unilaterally erecting such barriers to protect American firms competing with import. Thereto, its regional FTAs such as the North America Free Trade Agreement arguably created liberalisation “structured along the lines favored by the American vision”, namely regimes without institutions. Hence, the US bilaterally forced weaker states to accept provisions that opened their markets to foreign investment under highly favourable terms, to avoid exclusion from the lucrative US market. As suggested by Moon, this was “a divide and conquer strategy not available in multilateral global settings”. Here, it could well be that the unequal

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40 This would hardly have gained approval within the WTO, where groups of nations can bargain as one unit.
benefits of globalisation have induced some of the transnational threats that breed maritime insecurity and risk undermining the global economic system.

We can thus conclude that globalisation also has a structural realism conceptualisation, reverberating Waltz’s (2010[1979]: 95) claim that states “are the units whose interactions form the structure of international-political systems”. The US influence on international trade patterns – in which container-based ship freight has a dominating role – clearly had a maritime dimension. This is apparent in the 2005 NSMS’s linkage of maritime security to the strategic aim of “igniting a new era of global growth through free markets and free trade”.

The US combined its enactment of various bilateral FTAs with efforts to ensure an uninterrupted flow of shipping on its terms. It obliged its trade partners to accede to various security initiatives, on their expense, for access to the US market. In order to maintain the US security guarantees Japan and South Korea had to make concessions in terms of opening their domestic markets in trade negotiations. The hypothesis that the US would seek to alter the maritime trade patterns in its favour has thus gained support, illustrating the role of the sea as a medium of transportation. Moreover, its significance to globalisation as a medium for exchange of information and the spread of ideas are apparent by the sub-sea communication cables that provide the means that enable real-time global communications, essential to global finance flows as well as transgovernmental networks. Finally, we can conclude that the hypothesis that the US would seek to influence international maritime institutions in order to reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their property rights concerning maritime trade has gained support.

It has been argued that the liberal international order is weakening due to the changing global power balance as autocratic states increase their military capabilities (Auslin 2014: 140). Here, China stands out as the main challenger, followed by Russia. Given that globalisation is a state driven phenomenon with the US in the lead, the reduction in its power risks slowing or even reversing the globalisation process. This has implications for the US conceptualisation of maritime security. As the military dimension of China’s rise became incrementally problematic to the US, addressing lower level security threats in the South China Sea region became a tool for the USN and the USMC non-deployed presence in theatre to counterbalance and deter China. This was a required step since the region was markedly influenced by Chinese soft and hard power, while some Southeast Asian states – notably Indonesia and Malaysia (Sutter 2003: 214) – were concerned about the US regional security policy. The
US maritime security efforts thus partly aimed at re-building confidence in the US among the ASEAN member states and create incentives for deepened military cooperation.

In tandem with China’s increasingly assertive geostrategic behaviour, the US began more openly to designate it as a threat to regional security and stability, its FON and its global leadership. Accordingly, the US efforts to counterbalance China in situ, and to hedge against its perceived efforts of regional dominance, prompted a renewed emphasis on the military dimension of maritime security. The need to manage threats to good order at sea was not reduced, but became conceptually encapsulated as a specific operations type (i.e. MSOs) by the US effort to achieve its maritime security in a more traditional military sense, centred on countering the threat of a rising China. That a great power assigns priority to such a threat is at the heart of structural realism. In response to the increasing security pressure, the broad US maritime security concept thus gradually re-centred on balance of power considerations.

The US efforts to counter China’s growing military capabilities support the hypothesis that it will seek strategic dominance of those aspects of the cyber domain that are interlinked with the maritime domain and serve to check the influence of its rivals. The increasing China-US tension involves the risk that they will move upwards on the structural realism ladder of strategies (see Figure 1) in their interaction. A critical and problematic aspect of the realist worldview thus takes central stage in the present situation, namely the problem of uncertainty. From a US perspective, one is inclined to pose the question of China’s intentions. Has Chinese established its military installations on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea for the alleged defensive purposes, or is it masking its expansive ambitions until it deems that its power is enough for offensive action? Although cooperating for the purpose of wealth and prosperity, the dominant attribute of states is that they will always be self-regarding. Hence, the US must consider whether China is inclined to apply a defensive or offensive military strategy in the South China Sea region.

Conclusion

Structural realism explains continuity and change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy. The hypotheses derived from the theory all gained support by our examination of the US case. As expected, the US strategies concerning the maritime domain have been far from isolated from those of the land, air and cyber domains. It has therefore not been possible to isolate the
mechanisms driving the US conceptualisation of maritime security to the maritime domain. While some mechanisms stem from its intrinsic characteristics, grand strategic mechanisms are simply applied to it. A blend of mechanisms thus overlaps and interacts in reinforcing or weakening each other.

Throughout the studied period, conceptual continuity has prevailed in terms of a continued emphasis on the military dimension. Here, the US has maintained the capability to dominate the sea for the purpose of defence and power projection. Change has been apparent in terms of shifts in the opponents identified by the US. The vacuum that followed the USSR collapse was not filled until the events of 11 September 2001, when pariah states including those allegedly supporting the al-Qaeda network – jointly labelled the “axis of evil” – took its place. In the final part of the period, China and Russia have become the regional powers that increasingly challenge the still hegemonic superpower.

Conceptual change was apparent also with regard to the effects of globalisation, increasing the role of the maritime transport system and closely interacting with the land components of the increasingly complex international trade system. In the period of study, this system became subject to extensive regulation and intervention to counter a wide array of new and old threats. Here, the considerable increase in the demands for maritime domain awareness stands out as the main feature of conceptual change in maritime security. In fact, a considerable degree of security competition in this regard is visible in the US relations with China and to an increasing extent Russia.

The 1994 entry into force of UNCLOS did not bring about conceptual change. However, it did raise the stakes for dominating the sea, controlling and extracting its vast resources. It also spurred new territorial disputes involving land and sea areas and conflict of interests between FON and the exercise of national jurisdiction. This was of course contrary to the intentions. According to the official records, UNCLOS sought to address “the super-Power rivalry that was spreading to the oceans”, “the conflicting legal claims and their implications for a stable order and (...) the rich potential that lay on the seabed” (UN DOALOS 1998). Here, structural realism’s view of the nature of international politics offers cogent explanation of why the maritime domain remains filled with these types of issues.
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5.3. Article 3: “Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives, prospects and challenges”

Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation in the Baltic Sea: motives, prospects and challenges

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ABSTRACT
Recently, Finland and Sweden decided to substantially deepen their defence cooperation and this project involves creating a bilateral standing Naval Task Group (SFNTG). The present article aims at examining the deepening naval cooperation between Finland and Sweden from a regional integration perspective, focusing on its motives, current challenges and future prospects. Driven by perceptions of common challenges and desires for cost-effectiveness, and strengthened by recent successes on sea surveillance and a combined Amphibious Task Unit, the bilateral project has considerable potential to achieve success. To fulfil its objectives, substantial legal changes in both countries are required to allow the use of force on each other’s territorial waters. To cater for the requirement of not conflicting with EU, NORDEFCO or NATO cooperations, the bilateral Task Group must operate according to NATO standards and by using English as the language in command and control. The costs of adjusting the naval units to NATO’s technical requirements are far from negligible and this issue still remains to be solved. If Finland and Sweden manage to incorporate new policies, common structures and common organisational norms among their navies, an even deeper integration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, are conceivable.

Northern Europe’s security environment has been in flux since the late 1980s. The dynamics following the Soviet disintegration in 1991 – providing independence to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania while assigning them a new role in the security structures of the new world order (c.f. Hanska 2015, p. 13) – have leveraged the importance of the Baltic Sea region to the EU, NATO, and the US. The EU focus policy areas – prosperity, marine environmental sustainability and regional transport, and energy systems connections (c.f. EC 2010) – differ, however, from the security dimension given priority by NATO and the US. This observation does not thwart the fact that it has nurtured the aim of developing a security dimension within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)1 since 1991, in order to gain capability to respond to European or international crises. The 1998 British-French Saint-Malo Summit (EU Council 1998) concluded that the EU required capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible and readily available military forces, while the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) focused on cooperative security on a global scale. Notably, this strategic framework – assigning
priority to transnational threats\(^2\) – was based on the premises that the US was the dominant global military actor and that close relations were maintained with a friendly Russia, seen as “a major factor in [EU’s] security and prosperity” (EC 2003).

Just over ten years later, the European Commission noted that the transformations of the global system were putting the EU’s adaptive capacities to the test and that its bilateral relations regularly suffered from a lack of coherence (EC 2014, pp. 5–7, 38–39). The “turning of the EU into a strategic foreign policy actor” was still in the making, conditioned upon the “willingness of its Member States to invest political capital in a genuine European foreign policy”. While the ongoing EU–US negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership was a unifying effort in the area of trade, the EU still counted on the US “to step in when crisis situations arise”. Given Russia’s more assertive stance following Vladimir Putin’s infamous speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference (The Washington Post 2007), NATO’s importance to European security is thus once again growing. The surge in the number of refugees and migrants passing the Mediterranean Sea in their risky efforts to reach Europe – referred to as “the European refugee crisis” since April 2015 – has strained European cohesion and “shaken [the Schengen system] to its core” (EC 2016, p. 1). Tellingly, NATO took action to assist in mitigating this crisis in February 2016 by launching a naval reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance operation in the Aegean Sea, in response to proposals by Germany, Greece and Turkey (NATO 2016a).

Concerns regarding a Russian strategy to split the cohesion of NATO and the EU have been voiced by German, UK and US government representatives (c.f. Fisher 2015, Foster 2016, Schäuble 2016). According to Philip Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Russia is “deliberately weaponising migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve”. Fear of Russian attempts to sow discord among the European states was jointly expressed by Nordic defence and foreign ministers in 2015, arguing that the deteriorating regional security situation called for solidarity and deepened military cooperation within the frameworks of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the EU and NATO (Eriksen Søreide et al. 2015). Here, the geostrategic significance of the Baltic Sea was duly noted.

Arguably, individual EU member initiatives are increasingly important to peace and stability in the Baltic Sea region. Examining the security policy developments of Finland and Sweden – its top two countries by length of coastline – are therefore of particular relevance to understand the current security dynamics of Northern Europe. Major and von Voss (2016, pp. 1–3) even suggest that this region is a test case for European security, since the Baltic and Nordic states – “exposed to Russian military and non-military intimidation” – can “neither defend nor maintain regional security by themselves”. Conversely, Russia’s regional anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities make the US and NATO dependent on access to Swedish and Finnish territory for fulfilling their security guarantees to the Baltics.

Non-aligned Finland and Sweden are amidst of a transformative development. As shown in the 2015 US BALTOPS exercise, an intervention in response to Russian aggression in the Eastern Baltic will centre on the air, naval, and cyber dimensions (Lundqvist and Widen 2015b, p. 46). Accordingly, their bilateral defence cooperation is spearheaded by the navies. When considering the maritime domain’s importance to regional security in this region, we find ourselves able to narrow the scope of this article and pose the following twofold research question: Why have Finland and Sweden jointly responded to the altering security situation in the Baltic Sea region?; and what are the prospects for success in their naval cooperation?
For comparison, we will use experience from the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation, widely recognised as a successful integration of two NATO navies. In 2013, the former Swedish Supreme Commander Sverker Göranson referred to it as a role model for combining the navies of Finland and Sweden (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a, p. 70).

The article is organised as follows: In the first section, we construct an analytical framework by consulting theories relevant to addressing the research problem. The following two sections provide overviews and analyses of the Belgian–Dutch and the Swedish–Finnish naval cooperations, in which the analytical framework is applied. The final section provides a comparative assessment of the results of the two cases in a wider security policy framework while answering the research questions. It also draws conclusions with regards to the explanatory power of the theories employed in the study.

**Analytical framework**

In creating an analytical framework, relevant theories in international politics and its subfield foreign policy analysis must be consulted. The range of theories is substantial. However, Finland’s and Sweden’s post-cold war policy developments are marked by their deepening EU integration. We therefore expect that neofunctionalism in the tradition of Haas (1958, p. 13, 1964, p. 35) and Lindberg (1963, p. 149) – focusing on the internal dynamics of institutionalised interest politics and regional integration processes – will provide viable explanations. Conversely, Russia’s reappearance as a regional power has raised deep security concerns in Finland and Sweden. The influence of such external changes in the international system on states’ foreign policies are at the centre of structural realism as articulated by Waltz (2010[1979]). Of particular relevance are Walt’s (1987, 1988) refinement of balance of power theory – a core tenet of structural realism – and Baker Fox’s (1959) classical study on the anti-balance-of-power behaviour of weak European powers, including Finland and Sweden, during WW2.

Rival integration theories challenge neofunctionalism. Intergovernmentalism, presented as a counterargument by Hoffmann (1965) and updated by Moravcsik as liberal intergovernmentalism in the 1990s, suggests that states integrate to promote their national interests in an anarchic international system (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Governments participate in and even control regional integration, they argue. Therefore, cooperation will be limited to matters of common interest in “low politics” issue areas, i.e. economics and social affairs, in which domestic interest groups are influential, but will not take place in national security affairs where such interest groups lack influence. Also federalists assign priority to national and international security concerns, i.e. “high politics”, promoting a fully fledged union for reasons of political influence and stability (Andreatta 2011, p. 24). For them, two tiers of government – state and federation – are required, assigned distributed functions of which the federation must control the supranational instruments of power. For neofunctionalists, federations are only one of several possible outcomes of integration.

Finland’s and Sweden’s current security situations resemble those of 1990/1991 when they considered policy shifts towards the European Community. Both were closely linked to the European Community as full members of the European Free Trade Association. Sweden applied for European Community membership in July 1991 while Finland followed suit in March 1992. The Swedish government, however, maintained its traditionally restrictive position to European Community membership until 1990, since it was considered incompatible
with its non-aligned policy aiming at neutrality in wartimes (Sundelius 1994, p. 177). As noted by Mouritzen (1994, pp. 164–174), Finland was prevented from officially considering such membership until the failed coup of August 1991 in Moscow came to an end, bound by its Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance agreement with the Soviet Union. Based on his study on the Nordic reactions to this coup, he suggests that closer geographical proximity to a threatening great power increases a small state’s anti-balance-of-power behaviour. For Walt (1987, pp. 29–30), such “bandwagoning” behaviour is likely if a weak power is threatened by a proximate great power “capable of rapid and effective action” or if allies are unavailable. Today, as in 1991, Russia is the threatening power while the political issue is whether or not Finland and Sweden should apply for membership in an international organisation. This time, the organisation at issue is NATO.

Structural realism predicts that balance-of-power considerations resulting from external threats will explain Finland’s and Sweden’s increased defence cooperation, as they might rationally consider themselves to be better off as allies than as individual actors (Waltz 2010[1979], pp. 19–27, 1987, pp. 18–19). According to Walt, “[r]egional states are more sensitive to local threats, because how they choose to ally make a significant difference”. However, their ever closer defence cooperation cannot be seen in isolation. The role of the US and NATO must also be considered. Based on his study on principal alliances in the Middle East in 1955–1979, Walt (1987, pp. 161–172) concluded that perceived “aggressive intentions [by a state with offensive power] encourage balancing behaviour” among states in a region, will tend to make them regard “one superpower as favourably inclined and the other as hostile.” He notes that “proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions” are determining factors in alliance formation, why states will “ally with the superpower that seems least aggressive.” Accordingly, distant superpowers “are ideal for a regional power that faces a direct military threat from one of its neighbors,” but “states may be forced to choose among partners of equal capability.” It is thus for structural reasons that the US will remain the preferred protector of smaller European states (Jervis 2003, p. 385).

Notwithstanding, historical experiences and differing threat perspectives, vulnerabilities and national interests could – as highlighted by Walt (1987, pp. 172–178) – restrain alliance formation. Although non-aligned, the implications of Finland’s and Sweden’s EU membership and defence collaboration within the NORDEFCO must be duly considered. Baker Fox (1959, pp. 8, 181–183), for her part, pointed to the “variety of circumstances” under which small states were able to punch beyond their weight when confronted with great-power demands, ensuring themselves genuine range of action “within the limits set by inter-great-power relations.” While the great powers’ wider range of interests often limited their attention to individual small powers, the latter could usually concentrate on sole threatening powers.

Neofunctionalism belongs to the liberal school of thought, a complimentary approach to structural realism with regards to explaining how states define national interests and why they sometimes differ between “successive governments and different leaders” in “similar geopolitical situations” (Nye 1988, pp. 238–240). This emphasis on domestic factors is vital. While acknowledging the international system’s anarchic structure, most liberalism theories refute structural realism’s approximation of states as rational unitary actors. A core liberalism assumption is that international institutions and domestic political debates – involving bureaucracies and non-state actors – can boost cooperation and enable states to transcend the influence of anarchy on their foreign policies (Smith 2000, pp. 35–36). Neofunctionalism is also founded on the liberalist premises that states seek absolute gains – rather than relative
gains as assumed by structural realism – making them care more about economics than military security. Its advocacy of institutionalised supranationalism – i.e. pooling of state sovereignty – and commitment to European integration are normative stands, making it a theory and a manual for regional integration (Mutimer 1994, pp. 30–35).

Deutsch et al. (1957) conceptualised the European Community as a “pluralistic security community” characterised by expanding transactions and communications and sharing a common set of values, which members abstained from using war to settle their differences. Haas (1958, p. 4) distinguished his theory from the cybernetic integration theory of Deutsch by premising it on pre-existing “political institutions capable of translating ideologies into law.” Although constructivists (c.f. Adler and Barnett 1998, Laporte 2012) have adopted Deutsch’s concept, neofunctionalism remains the dominant approach to EU integration.

Neofunctionalists argue that integration results from a spontaneous, incremental, process (Haas 1971, p. 23). Its core assumption is that integration – technical or otherwise – in one issue area will create “pressures for integrating contiguous issue areas for which the original area is crucial and which, therefore, can no longer be controlled at the national level” (Andreatt 2011, p. 25). Such “functional” spillover will, in turn, generate “technical” spillover enlarging the supranational level’s capability to manage the issue. Finally, “technical” spillover may generate “political” spillover, shifting political loyalty and attention to the supranational level. As Haas (1971, p. 23) suggests, a “new central authority may emerge as an unintended consequence of incremental earlier steps.” The expected success of actors advocating this transformative process is due to politicians being “incapable of long-range purposive behaviour,” stumbling “from one set of decisions into the next,” unable to “foresee many of the implications and consequences of the earlier decisions.”

Neofunctionalism – temporarily discarded following Haas 1975 declaration that it had become obsolescent – was revived by Sandholtz and Sweet (2012, pp. 18–24) in the 1990s. Following Deutsch, their point of departure in explaining the movement toward supranational governance in the EU were “actors who engage in transactions and communications across national borders within the context of the institutional arrangements established in the Rome Treaty.” Such expanding activities increase the “functional demand for European-level rules and policies and for supranational capacity to supply them,” they argue, why transactors – “firms, interest groups, legislators, courts, and bureaucrats” – “exert pro-integration pressure on their own governments.” Transactors “propel the system forward, sometimes into uncharted areas” by creating, applying, and interpreting “systems of rules,” i.e. institutions. Expanding in scope, they may become “more formal and specific over time, in ways […] not predictable or expected from the ex ante perspective of those who establish them.” Such international cooperation may result in supranationalism involving some loss of national sovereignty.

We can thus expect that, under budgetary pressure, also defence bureaucracies of EU member states within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) institution – fully institutionalised by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon – may become actors engaged in cross-national interaction generating “functional” spillover. As Ojanen (2006, pp. 60–64) suggests, although Haas did not envision the defence sector having spillover potential equal to the social and economic sectors in his original formulation of the theory, the process leading up to the CSDP confirmed that the force of spillover had eventually reached it. In turn, it provided credibility to other fields of integration, notably its CFSP. Following Ojanen, we base this
article on the assumption that the defence sector is “subject to similar transforming processes as any other field,” rendering neofunctionalism applicable to analysing the defence policies of EU member states.

Recent studies apply neofunctionalism as a framework for analysing defence cooperation between EU member states (Sauer 2015), the Nordic states (Westberg 2015) and the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation (Parrein 2011b, Breyne and Parrein 2013). They study the launch of intensified cooperation on defence capabilities – labelled “pooling and sharing” in the EU and “smart defence” in NATO\(^5\) – in response to escalating capability gaps resulting from declining defence spending in Europe. “Pooling” of capabilities refers to the use of nationally owned or multinationally procured military capabilities on a collective basis, while “sharing” means that member states “relinquish some capabilities with the assumption or the guarantee that other states will make them available when necessary” (EDA 2013). Notably, NATO is an intergovernmental alliance absent of supranational institutions. Also NORDEFCO – the vehicle for an unprecedented level of practical defence collaboration – lacks a supranational mandate (NORDEFCO 2013a).\(^6\) Nonetheless, pooling and sharing within NORDEFCO are key to non-aligned Finland’s and Sweden’s EU integration.

Building on the work of Schmitter (1970), Westberg (2015, pp. 99–100) argues that four distinct outcomes of regional defence cooperation projects can be anticipated on the basis of neofunctionalism: (i) **coordinated integration** by successive widening and deepening of the cooperation, increasing national and collective military capabilities;\(^7\) (ii) **retrenchment**, reducing the number of cooperation areas although increasing national and collective military capabilities; (iii) **non-coordinated integration**, extending the cooperation to new sectors without increasing national and collective military capabilities;\(^8\) and (iv) **disintegration** of the cooperation structure or any of its parts – which are renationalised or transferred to other organisations – or by one or more party withdrawing.\(^9\)

We expect to find that neofunctionalism predictions of expanding cross-national interaction by maritime defence establishment representatives have generated functional spillover, creating political dynamics which involve some loss of national sovereignty. For studying the practical aspects, narrower supporting categories are needed. Following Sverre Diesen (2013, pp. 61–65), we will distinguish in this article between three types of coordinated defence integration: (i) **role specialisation**, implying a division of labour between the actors and singular responsibility of certain military capabilities; (ii) **pooling and sharing**, involving joint procurement of weapon systems for use in operations, jointly or at times by single members; and (iii) **joint force generation**, spanning cooperation on education, training, exercises, maintenance, armament development, and international operations (see Table 1).

Given that neofunctionalism avoids rather than explores the influence of anarchy on states’ foreign policy, it is premised on limited security pressures. As previously noted, a benign European security climate and close cooperation with Russia were prerequisites for the global ambitions outlined in EU’s 2003 ESS. Alas, Russia’s increased military power and more assertive stance since 2014 have induced its neighbours to adjust their foreign policies and increase their defence spending. This enables us to examine any potential limitations of neofunctionalism explanations with regards to increasing security pressure. It also enables us to indicate whether Finland and Sweden are engaged in balance-of-power or anti-balance-of-power behaviour, relating this article to the literature on small states’ strategy.
As was the case at the millennium (Schmidt 2000, p. 39), the debate on European integration theory still centres on structural realism and neofunctionalism. Their dividing line on defence cooperation and integration is the underlying motives. While “bottom-up” neofunctionalist integration processes are driven by rational actors promoting organisational interests of cost-efficiency, structural realism suggests that alliances are forged “top-down” through rational state actors’ strategic considerations to preserve national sovereignty in the face of external threats. Stressing the influence of anarchy in the international system, structural realism posits that states will refrain from ceding sovereignty in defence policy due to fear of abandonment or entrapment by their partners – thus limiting the depth and scope of cross-national defence cooperation (Snyder 1984, p. 461). Hoffmann (1965) incorporated this view into intergovernmentalism from the outset, contradicting neofunctionalism scholars’ envisioned prospects of deeper defence cooperation within the EU and NATO today.

Following Westberg (2015, p. 94), an analysis framework for determining possible limitations in the explanatory power of neofunctionalism’s integration processes on defence cooperation can be constructed (see Table 1).

While some research (c.f. Parrein 2011a, Sauer 2015) is available on the Belgian–Dutch case, the Swedish–Finnish case has gained scant scholarly attention. We therefore use official documentation from the Swedish MoD and Armed Forces, supplemented by interviews with senior Swedish and Finnish officials involved in the cooperation. We have also conducted interviews with senior Belgian and Dutch officers, as well as NATO officials, to acquire updated information. Given that our analyses are based on partly novel empirical material on two distinct cases of European naval cooperation, and that our assessments are based on an analytical framework contrasting two competing approaches to international politics, our claim for originality is both empirical and theoretical.

Table 1. A framework for studying multinational defence cooperation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motives and interests</th>
<th>Neofunctionalism</th>
<th>Structural realism/intergovernmentalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budgetary pressures/domestic factors induce</td>
<td>representatives of defence and law enforcement agencies to engage in cross-national cooperation to promote organisational interests</td>
<td>External military security threats to the national interests of contracting states, perceived as unmanageable by their own capabilities, generate the defence cooperation. Power, identity and past experiences influence their strategic calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling and driving factors: Following institutionalisation of the defence cooperation, spillover effects generate new incentives for deepening it</td>
<td>Restraining factors: Opposition from organised nationalistic groups</td>
<td>Restraining factors: Diverging national interests/identities complicate consensus on aims, means and ways of cooperating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics</td>
<td>Coordinated integration</td>
<td>A limited treaty-based intergovernmental cooperation reflecting the distribution of power between the parties, clearly specifying their rights and obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrenchment</td>
<td>Non-coordinated integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration</td>
<td></td>
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The Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation

Background, the actors and their motives and interests

The deep integration of the Belgian Naval Component (BNC) and the Royal Netherlands’ navy (RNLN) – the “crown jewel of international defence cooperation” (Homan 2012, p. 15) – receives attention as aggregate reductions in European states’ defence budgets create concerns (c.f. Biscop 2015, p. 86, Sauer 2015). From a NATO perspective, they centre on the duplication of capabilities and decreasing capacity (de France and Witney 2013, p. 9). The US 2012 announcement of its partial withdrawal from Europe when rebalancing towards Asia – and its decision to limit its funding of NATO’s capability targets to no more than 50% (Mattelaer 2014) – aggravated these problems by shifting more responsibility for providing European security towards NATO’s European members (Biscop 2015, pp. xi–xii). NATO’s adherence to “smart defence” must be seen against this backdrop. The Ukraine crisis, however, redefined Russia as an adversary to the US, an “existential threat […] ahead of all its other concerns” (Joseph Dunford, Chairman of US Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited in Clerm 2016, p. 75). The 2014 Wales Summit highlighted the urgency in rebuilding capability, resulting in a pledge by the member states to restore defence spending to the stipulated 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (NATO 2014b).

The depth and durability of Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation make it, some argue, a role model suitable for application in all military services of the parties and for Europe (Parrein 2011a, Biscop et al. 2013). The parties maintain close international relations, marked by a common history and culture, a common Dutch/Flemish language, extensive inter-communal links, significant trade, a multitude of investment cooperations and largely aligned security interests (NL MoFA 2015). Notwithstanding, certain differences affect their cooperation.

First, the parties’ military capabilities and capacities differ markedly. One way of visualising this is to compare their defence spending. In 2015, the Netherlands’ defence budget more than doubled that of Belgium (IISS 2016, pp. 78, 122). Measured as parts of their GDPs, Belgium allocated 0.9% and the Netherlands 1.2% on defence. This ratio in their defence spending has been stable since 1995, despite progressive cuts (NATO 2014a, Table 1). The Belgian reductions have mainly hit the army, while the BNC has preserved much of its capacity and managed to develop its capabilities. Analysts (Parrein 2011a, Mattelaer 2014) have ascribed this outcome to their naval cooperation. Nonetheless, the BNC was limited to 1500 personnel operating 2 frigates, 5 mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), 2 patrol crafts and 8 support ships in 2015 (IISS 2016, pp. 79, 122–123). In comparison, the RNLN enlisted 9150 personnel manning 6 frigates, 6 MCMVs, 4 tactical submarines, 4 Ocean Patrol Vessels, a Marine Corps brigade, 2 principal amphibious ships and 31 support ships.

Second, their strategic cultures differ. Both parties operate major seaports, the Port of Antwerp in Belgium – important to Germany and France – and the Port of Rotterdam – Europe’s largest seaport – in the Netherlands. This aligns much of their maritime security interests. However, Belgium possesses no overseas territories, a minor part of its territory borders the sea and its limited EEZ amounts to an area of 3453 km² including territorial waters (TTWs) (Sea Around Us Project 2015). The attacks over its eastern land borders and subsequent occupation during both world wars have arguably fostered a strategic culture focusing on the land dimension of security (Sauer 2015, pp. 46–47). This might explain why a single structure was imposed on the Belgian Armed Forces in 2002.

The Netherlands – a seafaring nation for more than five centuries – maintains strong commercial links to the seas through a diverse maritime industry. Its shipbuilding industry,
such as the globally operating Damen Shipyards Group, is a national interest. The “golden triangle” partnership in which TNO,¹¹ Thales Nederland¹² and the RNLN interact in seeking coordinated research and development (R&D) is a feature of a Dutch naval business model (Keyzer 2014). Three Caribbean territories are integrated with the Netherlands as special municipalities, while another three belong to the Kingdom of the Netherlands with autonomy in their internal affairs (NL Gov 2010, CIA 2015). The Netherlands is responsible for the defence and foreign affairs of these overseas territories, requiring large naval vessels for patrolling its sizeable TTWs and EEZ of 144,864 km² (Sea Around Us Project 2015).¹³

According to Parrein (2011b, pp. 5, 48, 142, 159, 189) ideological or normative decisions did not instigate the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation. He concludes that it was due to a bottom-up process creating spillover effects that eventually required top-down coordination. The chiefs of the two navies gave it new impetus in response to decided and foreseen future defence cuts, which would create imminent risks of losing essential military capabilities preventing meaningful future bi- or trilateral political cooperation. Although the navies differ in size, Parrein (2011a, p. 18) finds their partnership “balanced” due to mutual functional dependency: Belgium having lead for MCMVs and the Netherlands for frigates.

Parrein (2011b, pp. 17, 109–110) confirms neofunctionalism’s predictions, concluding that integration established by influential actors within one domain of interest to the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation generated pressure for integration in other domains. While recognising the smallness of the Belgian–Dutch political cooperation structure as compared to the EU, he points to its strategic contribution to the European common defence project and the similarity of their integration dynamics. Parrein distinguishes between four types of institutionalisation established in this naval cooperation (which is consistent with Diesen’s three types of coordinated maritime defence integration as previously described): exogenous cooperation structures; endogenous cooperation structures; job specialisation, i.e. common structures for tasks previously undertaken by both parties; and institutional alignment.

**Institutionalisation and formal structures of the cooperation**

The Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation currently involves an endogenous, binational, permanent cooperation structure composed of an integrated operational staff, the Admiral Benelux (ABNL), a binational admiralty board, three binational schools, binational weapon system management cells, and binational cells within the two naval maintenance centres (Parrein 2011a, pp. 10–13). Since 2012, it is coordinated by an exogenous cooperation structure, the Benelux Sub-Steering Group Naval, established within the likewise permanent Benelux Defence Cooperation structure (Breyne and Parrein 2013, pp. 80–82). As will be discussed below, further steps have been taken with regard to the air domain.

The level of cooperation has fluctuated along an axis of gradual and stepwise deepening. Common platforms have influenced their collaboration on logistic support, education and training (Parrein 2011a, pp. 11–18). Successes in single cooperation areas have built mutual trust and incited collaboration in others. The initial step was the set-up of the first binational school, the EGUERMIN, which was preceded by their decision to procure identical MCMVs and illustrating functional spillover in this regard. Education and training were initial collaborative steps also in the 1990s, when both navies operated Dutch S-type frigates. Here, the allocation of responsibilities reflected their differing power and national interests: the Netherlands assumed responsibility for the operational warfare school in Den Helder, while Belgium set-up a binational catering school in Bruges. While relations at the two schools
located in Belgium were balanced, the Netherlands took a marked lead of the operational warfare school from the outset. Also, the parties have retained their national establishments for strict military education and academic training, pursuing only exchange programmes.

The second step was their 2001 decision to opt for binational modernisation of their MCMVs – effectuated in 2006–2010 – which forged their conceptual development of “leading parties” and assigned Belgium responsibility for logistical, material and maintenance support of both parties’ MCMVs (Parrein 2011a, pp. 13–16, 2011b, pp. 189–191).

The third step was linked to Belgium’s 2005 procurement of two Dutch M-frigates. Parrein (2011a, pp. 13, 17) concludes that functional spillover dynamics from prior successes of deep cooperation in mine warfare explain this Belgian achievement, contingent on the mutual trust established between the parties and its proven efficiency in terms of financial gains. Belgium could thus re-integrate its operational training with the Netherlands, terminated when the RNLN – but not the BNC – decommissioned its S-type frigates. It influenced their 2006 decision to assign the RNLN responsibility for the logistical, material and maintenance support of M-frigates of both parties. Operating identical platforms enabled economy of scale in the fields of equipment replacement and maintenance (A. Warnaar, personal communication, 5 Feb 2015). To facilitate their cooperation, the structure of the BNC was gradually adapted to mirror that of the RNLN.

The fourth step was the 2010 decision to align the curriculums of the technical naval schools of the parties which, however, remain national establishments (Parrein 2011a, p. 11). Their naval cooperation on frigates and MCMVs thus developed stepwise into spanning three domains: operational support; operational steering, work-up and training; and navy education. We agree with Parrein that this progressive development confirms neofunctionalism predictions of coordinated integration through spillover dynamics. The two navies have managed to implement role and task specialisation – arguably the deepest level of defence cooperation – in turn requiring almost identical means.

Parrein (2011a, pp. 17, 21) stresses the functional balance of this cooperation, manifest in each party having lead for the operational support of a certain capability of both parties. Although this is obvious in the domain of operational support and partly in that of navy education, we note that the Netherlands dominates their cooperation in many respects. Parrein correctly suggests that equal partners have more incentives to cooperate. Our previous comparison of defence spending and naval capabilities reveals, however, that they are far from equals. Their differing size and capabilities, approximately a five-to-one ratio, prevent their partnership from being as balanced as Parrein alleges. The multidimensional warfare capabilities of frigates make them tools for pursuing the core function of navies; gaining or disputing sea control. In this respect, MCMVs represent a supporting capability.

This imbalance is well explained by the structural realism/intergovernmentalism prediction that the stronger party will seek to protect its national interests by defining the terms for the defence cooperation. Let us inspect the internal workings of ABNL a bit closer.

The Commander of the RNLN holds the position of ABNL. In this capacity, he commands the binational operational steering and training of those units allocated to the cooperation structure (Parrein 2011a, p. 10). Although their relationship is described as cooperative rather than hierarchic, the Belgian counterpart remains the deputy. According to the Belgian Director Management Support C. Gillis (personal communication, 3 Feb 2015), this could be subject to change, since nothing in the agreement precludes a periodic alternation of this assignment between the two nations. Despite this hope for a change, the ABNL will probably remain Dutch in the foreseeable future. Head of Naval Policy A. Warnaar (personal
communication, 5 February 2015), clarifies the logic of the ABNL having a Dutch commander, since the RNLN brings exclusive national capabilities to it, while a Belgian commander would require a reappraisal of the current cooperation structure.

The inherent conflict between national sovereignty and deep defence cooperation is addressed by the parties retaining the authority to assign their vessels to international operations (A. Warnaar, personal communication, 5 Feb 2015). However, personnel in binational staff positions or logistic support units must make all-out efforts in operations undertaken by any party. When a unit is assigned to the ABNL command for work up and training, the nation delegates Operational Command (OPCOM). Upon completion, OPCOM is returned to the nation for national deployments or retained by ABNL if the unit remains in a training environment. This concept is based on the parties’ “gradual redefinition of the relationship between armed forces and national sovereignty,” Sauer (2015, p. 55) suggests, giving priority to retaining military policy options through cooperation at the expense of exclusive national decision-making power.

**Outcomes and inherent challenges**

The fact that the Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation has been a role model for the tri-service Benelux Defence Cooperation (Breyne and Parrein 2013, pp. 77–80) illustrates the power of functional and technical spillover. Its permanent structure was established through the 2012 Benelux Declaration, designating four cooperation areas: (i) logistics and maintenance; (ii) education and training; (iii) execution of military tasks; and (iv) equipment procurement. Specific projects have included acquisition of the NH-90 helicopter, common air policing and centralised training of paratroopers (Biscop et al. 2013, pp. 1–3). Quick progress was noted in education, training and exercises, while decisions involving losses of nationally owned facilities and capacities have compromised local socioeconomic interests. In Belgium, however, long-term social issues have arisen from long distance movements of the workforce, and language problems are immediate hurdles at lower levels of cooperation.

Common education and training facilities entail that officers assigned as teachers/trainers stay away from home (weekdays) during extended periods of their career, or that their families accede to temporary stationing in the partner state. Such multi-year assignments involve non-negligible social strains. Also language is a hurdle, stemming from those Belgian non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and sailors who only speak French. The BNC manage this challenge, as Dutch is the agreed working language (C. Colonval and A. Warnaar, personal communication, 5 Feb 2015). So far, discrepancies in national health and safety laws and regulations have prevented them from integrating education and training of divers.

Analysts have noted the potential for success of the Benelux Defence Cooperation, but also the need for transferring defence planning and programming to the international level. Biscop et al. (2013, pp. 3–5) conclude that for an effective defence cooperation to be established, increasing dependencies must be accepted also at the political level. This, in turn, requires mutual trust between the parties as well as international parliamentary sessions. Hence, political top-down coordination of bottom-up integration processes comes at a cost and might be hard to implement. This illustrates, in neofunctionalism terms, the challenges inherent in technical spillover.

Such a result was achieved in March 2015, when the Benelux countries signed a defence agreement on shared surveillance and protection of their airspaces from civil aircrafts that might pose a terrorist threat (Maurice 2015). The prime ministers of Belgium and the
Netherlands referred to this achievement as a step forward within the framework of European defence policy. However, the Benelux Defence Cooperation is a top-down coordination mechanism which inner workings have a bottom-up character. Therefore, it needs manning with people having “the right attitudes towards cooperation” (C. Gillis and A. Desfossés\textsuperscript{15} personal communication, 3 Feb 2015).

A key issue for the future of ABNL is the replacement programmes for MCMVs and M-frigates. Notwithstanding the benefits, A. Warnaar (personal communication, 5 Feb 2015) also notes the costs associated with defence cooperations, of which the most important was that “you have to keep in mind the wishes of your partner.” Belgian and Dutch national procurement procedures, and specific national interests such as the Damen Shipyards, had therefore to be coordinated bilaterally. Since their views on desired capabilities and financial strengths were not always in line, additional coordination efforts could result in protracted discussions if not carefully managed. These discussions must preferably result in identical, binational, solutions (i.e. platforms), Warnaar explained, since the key success factor from a binational perspective is the economy of scale resulting from common arrangements. Since the ABNL is a “life-line” not only for preserving Belgium’s frigate capability but “for the Belgian Navy as such,” C. Gillis (personal communication, 3 Feb 2015) expected that a Belgian decision to abolish its frigate capability would adversely affect the Netherlands and the cooperation structure. From this perspective, the parties are mutually dependent on each other. As of May 2016, Belgium’s new strategic plan appears to have remedied their concerns, setting out a future equipment path including BNC acquisition of two new frigates and six MCMVs (Georges Heeren, Commander of the BNC, cited in Toremans\textsuperscript{2016}).

Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn (see Table 2). First, neofunctionalism’s explanatory power is significant with regards to the motivations of the parties to this naval

| Table 2. Outcome of the ABNL case-study (+/− indicate supportive/weakening outcome). |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Motives and interests                         | Neofunctionalism              |
|                                               | + Aggregated defence cuts and fear |
|                                               | of losing critical capabilities  |
|                                               | induced representatives of the two |
|                                               | navies to engage in naval         |
|                                               | cooperation to reach economy of  |
|                                               | scale and cost savings           |
| Dynamics                                      | Structural realism/Intergovernmentalism |
| + Enabling and driving factors:               | + External military security threats have not |
| + Navy representatives used procurement of    | influenced the defence cooperation|
| identical vessels as a lever for functional   | + Strong historical ties, political identities, and |
| spillover to education, training and logistics| favourable experiences of military collaboration |
| + Successful ABNL cooperation                 | facilitated the cooperation      |
| + Decisions involving loss of nationally      | + Differing economic/military power, national  |
| owned facilities have compromised local       | interests and policy priorities influenced their |
| socioeconomic interests                      | strategic calculations           |
| Restraining factors:                         | + No actor refers to a common need for counterbal-
| + Diverging national interests, budgetary     | ancing powerful states           |
| strength, land/sea identities and Belgium’s   | + The Netherlands has managed to define the terms |
| French-speaking community have complicated    | of the cooperation, making the Den Helder Navy |
| consensus on aims, means and ways of         | Base the node of ABNL while assigning Belgium a |
| cooperating                                    | secondary role                   |
| Outcomes                                      | + Coordinated integration       |
| + Despite their deep integration, the parties’ | + Despite their deep integration, the parties’ have |
| have retained much – but not all – of their       | retained much – but not all – of their sovereignty in |
| sovereignty in terms of operational deployments.| terms of operational deployments. The ABNL |
cooperation and the spillover dynamics in the integration process. Its bottom-up character, stepwise deepening and widening to other areas, domains and nations – eventually requiring political top-down coordination – are telling characteristics. Second, a successfully coordinated integration of two navies offer substantial cost savings, but requires consideration of each other’s national interests. Third, international defence cooperation is accompanied by national sovereignty implications, requiring mutual trust and coordinated efforts to be managed. This takes time to establish. Fourth, Belgium and the Netherlands are forced to deal with non-negligible frictions stemming from somewhat differing national interests, of which most are related to dissimilar policy priorities. Fifth, as opposed to Parrein’s argument, these differing national interests are integral to the dynamics of this naval cooperation and have – as predicted by structural realism/intergovernmentalism – a restraining effect on their integration.

Economy of scale and common education, training, maintenance, and logistics, require identical naval platforms. Thereafter, the parties must give up nationally controlled facilities in favour of common solutions. Despite their common language, Belgium’s minority language has proven a hurdle for cooperating at lower management levels. Also, adequate Human Resource support for personnel temporarily stationed in a partner country is essential.

The Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation

**Historical background, the actors and their motives and interests**

During the cold war, Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation was limited. A formal agreement on exchange of military technical information did not materialise until 1989 (SOU 2002:108, p. 649). Finland’s reluctance to sign such agreements emanated from its 1948 “Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty” with the Soviet Union, setting forth “potential military cooperation in crisis and war” (Lindberg 1994, p. 437). Detached from these impediments, naval cooperation was intensified in the 1990s. The 1998–2006 bilateral Loviisa exercise series – involving Fast Patrol Boats (FPBs), submarines and fighter aircraft – aimed at strengthening their ability to cooperate in crisis response operations (CRO) (Embassy of Finland 2004). Sweden’s desire for NATO interoperability and cost-effectiveness eventually made it obsolete (SwAF 2005, Annex 5, p. 42). Thereafter, they joined up in NATO-led exercises series such as the Northern Coast (SwAF 2008, Appendix 4.1, pp. 4, 26).

However, their naval cooperation has involved more than exercises. In 2001, preparations began for organising a combined Swedish Finnish Amphibious Task Unit (SWEFIN ATU) for CROs (SwAF 2003, p. 16). Its continuous development has led to the parties separate assignments of contributions to pools of forces within the EU, NATO and the UN. Finland’s contribution consists of parts of the Nyland Brigade while parts of the 1st Marine Regiment constitutes that of Sweden. In 2001, Finland, Sweden and Norway signed a joint acquisition project for the NH-90 helicopter (SwAF 2003, p. 18). In 2006, the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Finland Sweden (SUCFIS) interface for exchanging target information in the Northern Baltic Sea between their autonomous surveillance systems was declared operational (MoD Swe 2006). Their success resulted from a bilateral cooperation initiated in 2001, aimed at gaining a common maritime picture contributing to maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the Baltic Sea.16
The two parties have commonalities and differences. The 2015 Swedish defence budget almost doubled that of Finland: EUR 4.81 billion compared to EUR 2.69 billion (IISS 2016, pp. 92, 143–144). However, Finland’s 2015 1.3% defence spending as a share of its GDP outmatched Sweden’s 1.1%. Notably, Sweden’s defence budget includes costs for its Coast Guard and civilian emergency agencies, while it operates a costly professional force and allocates significant funds for procurement and R&D.17

Although differences are apparent with regards to staffing and capabilities, when weighted they indicate a cooperation between equal navies. In 2015, the Swedish Navy enlisted 2100 active duty personnel, manning 1 amphibious battalion, 5 submarines, 9 corvettes/FPBs, 7 MCMVs and support vessels (IISS 2016, pp. 93, 143). The Finnish Navy enlisted 350018 personnel, manning 1 amphibious brigade, 8 corvettes/FPBs, 5 minelayers, 7 MCMVs and support vessels. Also, Finland’s conscript system enables its navy to muster a 31,000 personnel reserve. Unlike Finland, Sweden operates tactical submarines. Unlike Sweden, Finland is capable of laying sea mines. The former Chief of the Swedish Navy J. Thörnqvist (personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) deemed these capabilities complementary, while combined operation of their corvettes/FPBs and MCMVs would offer a desired increase in capacity.

Internal and external factors influence this defence cooperation, the emphases of which have changed over time. Already when Vladimir Putin took office as president, Swedish Members of Parliament voiced their concerns of Sweden’s “vigorous disarmament” and risks associated with pending capability losses (Swedish Parliament 2000). Today’s Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation builds on the activities launched within the Nordic framework from 2005. Then, former Swedish Supreme Commander Håkan Syrén (2009a, pp. 62–63) concluded that Sweden had “reached the end of the road […] in its pursuit of maintaining a versatile and modern armed force on a strict national basis,” since its defence budgets had reached such low levels that further reductions would involve “loss of entire functions and capabilities.”

At this time, Norway was Sweden’s preferred partner with whom it shared border, CRO experience, political interests and the vision of establishing a battlegroup. In 2006, Syrén (2009b, pp. 90–91) argued that Norway’s membership of NATO but not of the EU – while Sweden had the opposite affiliation – was “an additional argument for close cooperation” as it could harmonise these organisations’ developments. In 2008, he repeated the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Committee’s position that “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack,” expecting them to act in the same way if Sweden was similarly affected (Syrén 2009c, pp. 142–146). The Norwegian–Swedish defence cooperation had to be seen in wider Nordic, EU, NATO and UN frames, he urged, as Sweden would not respond to emerging regional security threats on its own. Finland, Denmark and Iceland joined the discussions in 2008 – establishing the “Nordic Defence Support” – in close temporal with Russia’s intervention in the Georgian provinces South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In 2009, the Nordic countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) establishing NORDEFCO (2009).

NORDEFCO adopted a vision in 2013, emphasising the parties’ commitment to “enhanced cooperation and coordination in capability development […] activities in international operations and capacity building, […] increase pooling of capabilities” (NORDEFCO 2013b). The May 2014 Action Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation between Sweden and Finland echoed this vision, setting the aim of “increasing effect and efficiency through combined
use of resources, [...] increased interoperability and [...] closer dialogue" while specifying targets at the military and political levels (Mod Fin and MoD Swe 2014). Cooperation was limited to "activities in peacetime" in "supplement [of] other multinational cooperation".

In sum, the Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation was premised up to this point on developing peacetime CRO capability and capacity. Their security was managed within the framework of the EU's CSDP while desires for cost-efficiency and savings influenced their strategic thinking. The May 2014 action plan – to be further addressed below – resulted from a bottom-up process centring on the 2013 vision document between the chiefs of the navies. This illustrates the workings of functional and technical spillover induced by leading naval representatives in their response to top-down demands of cost reductions which – as in the Belgian–Dutch case – were deemed unmanageable on a national basis.

Russia's March 2014 annexation of Crimea brought a sense of urgency to the Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation. Its conduct in Ukraine, intrusions into Swedish and Finnish air space and altered military exercise practices in the Baltic Sea heightened their perceptions of external threat. In the words of the former Chief of the Finnish Navy K. Takanen (personal communication, 18 Mar 2015): "The situation in Ukraine and the Crimea gave the politicians a kick and it was actually the latter that started a process of making the whole cooperation deeper, also looking at the air force [and] the army." Although Russia is omitted in the official joint documents which we refer to, phrases such as "common challenges" and "aim for better security in a regional context" are pointed in its direction (SwAF 2014a). The October 2014 submarine intrusions deep into Swedish TTWs19 recalled cold war experiences and highlighted Sweden's apparent lack of ASW helicopter capability. In December 2015, Sweden received the first of five NH-90 ASW helicopters (Jennings 2015). It will also convert four search and rescue helicopters already delivered to the same ASW-configuration.

Since 2015, Finland and Sweden have sought to use the cooperation as a deterrent – or a vehicle for diplomatic signalling – expecting it to give "a significant signal to the surrounding region" on "both parties' commitment to raise their relationship to a new level" (SwAF 2015a; J. Thörnqvist personal communication, 12 Feb 2015). Strikingly, the initial emphasis on cost-efficiency and cost savings is redefined as a long-term aim, while increased operational effectiveness has become a short-term priority requiring "additional personnel and financial resources." The former Chief of the Finnish Navy K. Takanen (personal communication, 18 Mar 2015) explained that "the basic idea is to cooperate in peacetime, training and exercising together with secure communications networks between the nations which will make it possible also to do something in times of war." As neither Finland nor Sweden are – or currently aspire to become – NATO members, they seek to enhance the operational capabilities of their armed forces by cooperating bilaterally (E. Mikkola, Ministry of Defence of Finland, personal communication, 18 Mar 2015).

Sweden's and Finland regional interests align and they share a concern regarding Russia's behaviour. These non-aligned states are dependent on safe and secure sea routes for their import and export (Lindqvist 2010, MoTC Fin 2014), and their ministers of defence have emphasised their shared history and common set of values (Hultqvist and Haglund 2015). Such commonalities facilitate successful defence integration. While the two navies recognise their common interests and identity, practical differences remain to be addressed (J. Engström, K. Takanen and E. Mikkola, personal communication, 18 Mar 2015).
Institutionalisation and formal structures of the cooperation

The October 2013 “Vision for the Swedish Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) 2023” – signed by the chiefs of the two navies – is a restricted armed forces document including elements of strategy. One unit, the SWEFIN ATU, already fulfilled much of the requirements. Acknowledging the project’s bottom-up character, J. Thörnqvist (personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) clarified that from the outset, the SFNTG was launched as a tangible instrument for focusing the efforts of the navies’ personnel. He explained that it was intended as an operational tool for crisis prevention and crisis management. Given the opaque nature of contemporary conflicts, however, these formal restraints do not prevent a substantial integration of the two navies. By fulfilment of the vision, the two navies expect increased operational effect and cost-effectiveness within the stipulated time frame. Their contributions to the SFNTG are balanced, each party allocating 10 surface combatants (altogether 1 Offshore Patrol Vessel [Carlskrona class], 12 FPBs, 5 corvettes [Visby class] and 2 multi-role minelayers [Hämeenmaa class]).

The May 2014 action plan – outlining areas of bilateral cooperation at the military and political levels – set a time frame for the project in short-, medium- and long-terms (MoD Fin and MoD Swe 2014). Emphasis was placed on the latter. The political level cooperation areas involved facilitating secure communications at various command levels, a video telephone conference link, MoD cross-manning and the launch of joint studies.

The requirement to remain compatible with the NORDEFCO framework – on which MoU this defence cooperation is founded – is essential and requires transparency and interconnectivity. K. Takanen and E. Mikkola (personal communication, 18 Mar 2015) clarified the logic behind their decision to direct their forces to operate according to NATO standards and use of English as command and control language. They placed emphasis on the requirement of interoperability with EU and NATO members, since “interoperability according to the Finnish understanding also means capability to receive help.” Accordingly, J. Thörnqvist (official statement at Marinstridsdagarna, 21 Jan 2015) declared in 2015 that “the way [for Sweden and Finland] to become interoperable is NATO standard and no other standard.” One year later, the chiefs of the two navies declared that they were fully on track (J. Thörnqvist and V. Taipalus, official statements at Marinstridsdagarna, 26 Jan 2016).

The June 2014 implementation plan set the agenda for realising the action plan. Reaffirming the guidance of the 2013 vision document, it stipulated far-reaching naval cooperation on (SwAF 2014a, pp. 3–6, Annex A): (i) exercises; (ii) education and training; (iii) sea surveillance; (iv) common use of base infrastructure; (v) combined units; and (vi) capability of inter-naval transfer of Operational Control. It set a tight timetable for the bilaterally staffed group handling the “Focus Area Navy”, chaired by Sweden. In December 2014, the restricted “Final report for deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden in focus area Navy” was delivered, while policy decisions were presented in February 2015 (SwAF 2015a).

The two navies envisage a two-tiered objective, establishing: (i) a bilateral Naval Task Group (the SFNTG) with initial operational capability to conduct Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations in 2017; and (ii) a standing SFNTG with full operational capability to conduct operations up to and including Protection of Shipping Operation in 2023. The 2017 objective involves continuous surveillance of an assigned area of operations in order to detect and identify violations, illegal activities and other deviations from the recognised
maritime picture. This may involve the handling of violations that include authorisation to use lethal force in accordance with mutually agreed Rules of Engagement (ROE).

The 2023 objective involves protection of activities or objects in order to uphold security and the freedom of movement at sea and in needed land areas. [It supports] military or civilian operations or activities on land. To establish sea control is an implicit means of protection of shipping by denying a counterpart the ability to use the sea. (SwAF 2015a)

At this stage, the SFNTG must be “fully trained, equipped and have promulgated and implemented all necessary plans, orders and [standing operational procedures]” required for this type of operation.

The SFNTG, led by a Task Group Commander with staff, has pursued a dedicated bi- and multilateral exercise programme since 2014 (T. Tiilikainen, personal communication, 25 Apr 2016). It is manned by personnel having trained together in bi- or multilateral settings during the last decade, while NATO’s tactical manuals bridge their national disparities without having to settle whose procedures are the most effective. Also, mutual trust and cultural understanding is being built through exchange of officers and NCOs at all levels of command. As anticipated by former Head of Plans at the Swedish Navy Department, S. Larsson (personal communication, 1 Oct 2014): “In all organisational change, trust and motivation are key success factors which in turn require a stepwise approach.” Given the navies’ commonalities, the two-tiered objective separated by a six-year implementation period meets such an approach. Media attention to events, such as when SFNTG vessels filled up Visby harbour while preparing for Protection of Shipping Operations exercises in the waters off Gotland during the Swedish–Finnish Naval Exercise 2016, contribute to the parties’ domestic and international signalling (SwAF 2016).

In sum, SUCFIS and the SWEFIN ATU are successful parts of the cooperation structure, while the SFNTG is in the making. Institutionalisation thus far consists of a bilateral MoU, joint release of public documents, cross-manning, establishment of a formal navy steering board, binational manning of the SFNTG and execution of a dedicated exercise programme. In February 2015, J. Thörnqvist (personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) noted that: “The rate of progress has been so high that Swedish Armed Forces representatives have requested political guidance on whether further integration of the forces is feasible. So far there has been consensus on the way ahead.” This illustrates the need for top-down coordination, i.e. technical spillover, resulting from functional spillover. Contrary to neofunctionalism predictions, resistance from nationalistic groups has arisen neither in Finland nor Sweden.

**Potential outcomes, practical implementation issues and inherent challenges**

To deepen their understanding of the project’s operational and legal challenges, Sweden hosted a strategic tabletop discussion with broad participation on a fictitious Baltic Sea crisis scenario in November 2014. The findings are illustrative. The After Action Report (AAR) commended their established capacity to share bilaterally RMP and information conducive to MDA – including SECRET information – through the SUCFIS system (SwAF 2014b). It stressed, however, the need to also share Daily Intention Messages and Maritime Tasking and Co-ordination Orders. Moreover, it revealed incoherencies in ROE procedures and contents among the parties, therefore suggesting the initiation of an alignment process.
Notably, both levels of the SFNTG’s two-tiered objective may involve the use of force. This is by no means restricted to wartime scenarios and may be required on each other’s TTWs. In 2014, former Head of Plans at the Swedish Navy Department, S. Larsson (personal communication, 1 Oct 2014) admitted that neither Finland’s nor Sweden’s legislation fully supported these types of operations on each other’s TTWs.

The 2014 Final Report from the Focus Area Navy and the AAR highlighted the need for Finnish legislative challenges, of which some are potential “show-stoppers” (SwAF 2014b, p. 2, Annex E). First, Finland’s Act on the Defence Forces prescribes that although its armed forces may assist another state – or another Finnish authority – in case of major accidents, natural disasters, or terrorist attacks, it may not use military force in providing such assistance. Second, its Territorial Surveillance Act does not allow for territorial surveillance by foreign authorities. Third, Finland’s Conscript Act limits the international use of conscripts to exercises and training, preventing its fulfilment of the EU’s mutual defence clause and the bilateral cooperation from evolving into a tool for wartime scenarios. The drafting of new legislation meeting the requirements of their envisioned “territorial surveillance cooperation and other operative cooperation” – which Finland initiated in November 2014 – has reached white paper stage and will reach the Finnish national parliament in May 2016 (MoFA Fin 2014, pp. 7, 8, SwAF 2014b, Annex E, O’Dwyer 2016a).

The 2014 AAR also identified the need for legislative changes in Sweden, to enable a defence cooperation as envisaged in the 2013 vision document. Here, the Instrument of Government (a constitutional law) and the Ordinance concerning Intervention by the Swedish Armed Forces in the event of Violations of Swedish Territory in Peacetime and in Neutrality (the IKFN Ordinance) prevent sharing the duties of territorial surveillance and maintaining territorial integrity with another state’s armed forces. However, the Swedish Government can decide on Swedish military support to Finland if authorised by a prior decision of the Swedish Parliament (SwAF 2014b, Annex E). In November 2015, the Swedish Government – in consensus with the Swedish Parliamentary Defence Committee – initiated a study on the constitutional conditions for enhanced international defence cooperation, in particular with Finland, to be presented in September 2016 (Government of Sweden 2015).

Two more essential areas of legal clarification and adjustment result from the Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation, viz., the need for: (i) “deeper and wider research” on possible amendment of Finland’s sole duty “to secure and protect the neutrality and integrity of the Åland Islands area”, laid down in the Convention on non-fortification and neutralisation of the islands of Åland; and (ii) Finland to implement legislation related to Article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty on EU member states joint defence responsibility (SwAF 2014b, Annex E).

Capability requirements and implementation of NATO technical standards are major – and perhaps sensitive from political and defence industry perspectives – long-term issues closely related to funding that Finland and Sweden must agree upon. Sweden’s initial adaption to these standards in the 1990s was a far more troubling (i.e. costly) issue than implementing NATO procedures for command and control (SOU 2002:108, p. 740). The AAR highlights the operational challenges associated with intervention operations, as long as the parties lack full command and control compatibility (SwAF 2014b, Annex D, pp. 1, 2). In the words of Finnish Defence Command Staff T. Tiilikainen (personal communication, 18 Mar 2015),

One of the reasons we chose the vision for the SFNTG to reach full operational capability in 2023 was that we already had identified that Sweden was a couple of years behind Finland with regard to a NATO interoperable command and control system.
Our analytical framework specified three types of defence integration: pooling and sharing; role specialisation; and joint force generation. Thus far, Sweden and Finland have opted for joint force generation, signified by joint training, bi- and multilateral exercises, and joint participation in CROs. Informal discussions have dealt with future role-specialisation. Here, Sweden would take the lead for submarines and ASW, while Finland would assume lead for mine warfare and air defence. In 2015, no formal evaluations or directions had been made in this regard (J. Thörnqvist, personal communication, 12 Feb 2015).

As for pooling and sharing, there is a pending need to replace older surface combatants and a joint procurement would certainly bring new impetus to the collaboration. J. Thörnqvist (personal communication, 12 Feb 2015) explained that Swedish *Stockholm* and *Gothenburg* class corvettes will need replacement in the mid-2020s. Although not yet planned or financed, a preliminary conceptual description had been drafted, indicating a Swedish desire for a lean manned, high endurance corvette, capable of performing multidimensional warfare regardless of season. In September 2015, Finnish Minister of Defence J. Niinistö authorised the Finnish Navy to launch the project “Squadron 2020”, aimed at replacing six vessels with four new surface combatants to be built in 2019–2024 (MoD Fin 2015). It remains to be seen whether a bilateral coordination of vessel procurements is possible.

As for the outcomes of the Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation, the early phase of their integration process prevents a definitive assessment. So far, it has landed squarely in the category of “coordinated integration”; successively expanding and creating increased national and collective operational capability, while steps are taken to pool sovereignty (see Table 3). This outcome is due to the presence of multiple enabling factors and, thus far, an absence of restraining factors. The two navies consider role specialisation a valid future

<table>
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<th>Table 3. Outcome of the Swedish-Finnish case-study (+/− indicate supportive/weakening outcome).</th>
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<td><strong>Motives and interests</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td>+ Aggregated defence cuts and fear of losing critical capabilities induced representatives of the two navies to engage in naval cooperation to reach cost-efficiency and cost savings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- No significant impact of differing economic/military power on their defence cooperation and its navy pillar</td>
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| Dynamics | Enabling and driving factors: | Enabling and driving factors: |
|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| + Overarching defence cooperation resulted as an effect of functional and technical spillover from the establishment of promising naval cooperation | + Both parties refer to a common need for counterbalancing a powerful Russia |
| **Restraining factors:** | **Restraining factors:** |
| - No resistance from popular groups detected | - The need for merging differing national standards has been circumvented by the parties using English as command language and NATO tactics, techniques and procedures |

| Outcomes | + Coordinated integration, but the parties are in an early phase of their integration process | - So far, the parties retain their sovereignty, but steps are being taken to pool it |
option, while examining pooling and sharing possibilities. The question of a military alliance is an issue which the present Swedish government has been particularly reluctant to consider. Notwithstanding, the perceived Russian military security threat boosted the Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation and its navy pillar from 2014.

Although their national security interests align, Finland’s 1340 km land border with Russia means higher risks and geostrategic sensitivities than for Sweden. This might induce Russia to step up its pressure on either of the two parties in an attempt to create friction and split.

It is worth noting that Swedish representatives until 2016 refrained from officially considering a defence union with Finland, while Finnish officials raised this issue already in 2014 (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a, p. 65). This outcome is consistent with the structural realist/intergovernmentalist prediction that contracting parties to defence cooperations primarily seek to safeguard their particular national interests from external security threats.

A comparative assessment in a wider framework

We will now engage more deeply with our twofold research question, in light of our analytical framework and by comparing the result of our two case studies: Why have Finland and Sweden jointly responded to the altering security situation in the Baltic Sea region and what are the prospects for success in their naval cooperation?

It is clear that the Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation project stems from a cross-national cooperation initiated by the chiefs of their navies, in turn explicitly inspired by the successful Belgian–Dutch naval cooperation. It is equally clear that these two naval cooperations were launched in response to their fear of losing critical capabilities resulting from aggregated cuts in defence spending, while envisioning substantial cost savings by cooperating. Empirical evidence shows that favourable experiences of previous collaboration facilitated both projects and that they were launched within wider security policy frameworks. For the ABNL, both NATO and the EU were indispensable frameworks within which their cooperation could be pursued. For the SFNTG, the EU was the framework and NORDEFCO the vehicle for managing the practical aspects of establishing.

The two case studies reveal striking similarities regarding motives and interests, dynamics and outcomes, although the level of integration in ABNL is significantly higher than in the Swedish–Finnish naval cooperation, which is still under establishment. We therefore expect that the navies of Finland and Sweden will face similar challenges as those experienced by Belgium and the Netherlands if it evolves into role specialisation and/or pooling and sharing.

With regards to motivations, however, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 turned the table. The fact that its military capabilities were more limited during its south-eastward intervention into Georgia in 2008 might explain why the same level of alarm was not raised. In accordance with balance of threat theory as outlined by Walt (1987, p. 5), Finland’s and Sweden’s geographical proximity to this powerful potential aggressor – and the western direction of its expansion – made the threat appear more severe and acute than for e.g. Belgium and the Netherlands. For the latter two, it sufficed that NATO leaders continuously addressed the crisis in Ukraine from the Wales Summit in September 2014, through measures such as its Readiness Action Plan, the Connected Forces Initiative, and their agreement to reverse the trend of declining budgets among its member states (NATO 2014b).
Trends in defence indicate the perceived urgency of the Russian threat to individual states. The Netherlands’ 2015 defence expenditures corresponded to its 2012 level, while that of Belgium reached an all-time low (NATO 2016b, p. 4). In 2015, Sweden decided to increase its defence budget for 2016–2020 by 1.09 billion EUR (10.2 billion SEK), explicitly motivated by the Ukraine crisis (Government of Sweden 2014, pp. 1, 6). Finland raised its 2016 defence budget by 0.227 billion EUR compared to that of 2015, despite its shrinking GDP (MoD Fin 2016). Also in Finland, government officials referred to the Ukraine crisis as the rationale for allocating extra funds for procurement of new fighter jets and warships (Tiessalo 2015). In conclusion, the determining variable explaining the difference in outcomes of the two cases is the perceived level of external military security threats.

Although deliberately downplayed in public discussions in favour of its economic interests, security considerations loomed in the background of Finland’s 1992 application for European Community membership (Venna 1995). Economic imperatives, i.e. “the prospects of being left outside the united West European market after 1992,” were key domestic issues also for Sweden, while the dominant Social Democratic party was the protector of its policy of credible neutrality (Sundelius 1994, pp. 179–181). Its representatives solved the issue of a supranational European Community – which would limit Sweden’s sovereignty – by declaring that Europe was evolving into “a new peace order,” where “bloc divisions [had] disappeared” (Prime Minister I. Karlsson cited in Sundelius 1994, p. 181). From 2014, this regional order no longer exist and the main players of the old one – Russia and the US – are at centre stage.

Belgium and the Netherlands deal with this change through NATO. Finland’s and Sweden’s pre-1992 dilemma, however, is repeating itself and renewing the relevance of structural realism and weak-power theory. For Mouritzen (1994, pp. 156–161), the impact of balance-of-power – and anti-balance-of power (applicable only to non-aligned states) – theory is preferably studied in connection to “wide ranging and sudden power shifts.” Arguably, the 2014 Ukraine crisis was such a shift. What then are the theoretical implications of our Swedish–Finnish case study?

We note the trend that Finland and Sweden seek to safeguard their core national interests and values in the short-term by merging their military capabilities, but also by committing themselves to what they consider the stronger pole – the US – through various NATO arrangements. Their joint signing of NATO Host Nation Support agreements – and their accepted nomination to NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Programme – during the Wales Summit in September 2014 stand out. Notably, their bilateral cooperation does not prevent any party from applying for NATO membership. As NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations M. Soula (personal communication, 3 Feb 2015) made clear: “Sweden and Finland are most valued partners to NATO who contribute more to NATO then many member states,” “politically wanting more access to NATO in terms of consultation”, whose “bilateral cooperation easily can fit into the wider framework of NATO’s Maritime Strategy.”

In May 2016, Finland and Sweden met with NATO in a “28 + 2” constellation for a “close dialogue on European security” (SvD 2016). Thereto, Sweden has established bilateral defence collaboration with neighbouring NATO members. A framework agreement on deepened defence cooperation was signed with Poland on 14 September 2015 (Government Offices of Sweden 2015), and an MoU on enhanced defence cooperation was signed with Denmark on 14 January 2016 (MoD Den and Swe Gov 2016).
These recent developments – involving the defence ministers of Finland and Sweden officially voicing their considerations of forming a treaty-based defence union (O’Dwyer 2016b) – seem to confirm the predictions of Walt (1987, pp. 161–172) that a distant super-power is ideal for the weak state facing direct military threat from one of its neighbours, as well as that it may be “forced to choose among partners of equal capability.” In contrast to Mouritzen’s (1994) findings on their behaviour in the aftermath of the cold war, Finland and Sweden appear to be engaged in balance-of-power behaviour rather than anti-balance-of-power vis-à-vis Russia. Quite tellingly, Sweden adopted a tougher military strategy doctrine in March 2016 and for its Supreme Commander Micael Bydén, the possibility that Sweden “for some reason would have to stand alone” is the exception under which its armed forces “will fight to the last man or woman” (DN 2016).

Conclusions

Neofunctionalism explains the motives and interests underlying the initiation of Swedish–Finnish defence cooperation, spearheaded by their navies. Aggregated cuts in the defence spending of both parties diminished their military capabilities and capacities. In order to compensate for the losses, representatives of the two navies saw defence cooperation as a viable remedy. Given the low security pressure in Europe from mid-1990s until 2013, they became the main proponents of defence cooperation. Here, focus was on cost savings and cost-efficiency within wider NORDEFCO/EU security frameworks. The developments up to 2013 closely follow those of Belgium and the Netherlands, except for the NATO framework.

When the perceived military threat re-emerged by Russia’s westward expansion in 2014, their lack of military capabilities became a tangible security problem. Structural realism and balance-of-power theory serve to explain their responses vis-à-vis Russia, each other and the US, in which NATO appears to be given a decisive role. Since Finnish and Swedish territory is critically important also for the US in fulfilling its security guarantees vis-à-vis the Baltic States and Poland – and by their joint action – their bargaining position is strong, which enable them to punch beyond their weight in a European security context. Although the final outcomes remain to be seen, their naval cooperation is so far a success.

Notes

2. Specifying five principal threats: (i) terrorism; (ii) proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; (iii) regional conflicts; (iv) state failure; and (v) organised crime.
3. To Hoffmann (1966, p. 882), permanent excesses of losses over gains made integration of “high politics” unlikely.
4. based on a positive feedback loop to a specific institutional arrangement.
5. Introduced in 2012, it involves pooling and sharing of military capabilities, priority setting and procurement coordination among NATO members (Doninovska 2014).
6. Westberg (2015, p. 99) finds neofunctionalism’s spillover process applicable to the study of NORDEFCO’s internal dynamics by limiting its ulterior aim of creating supranational institutions to the advancement of its member states’ national and collective defence capabilities.
7. Requiring “functional”, “technical” and “political” spillover as specified by Haas (1971) and Schmitter (1970).
8. Equating Schmitter’s concepts “spill-around” and “muddle-about”.

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9. Equating Schmitter’s concept “spill-back”.
10. The Netherlands’ 2015 defence budget amounted to EUR 8 billion, while that of Belgium was EUR 3.58 billion. In 1995, the Netherlands spent EUR 6.35 billion and Belgium EUR 3.25 billion on defence.
12. Company producing electronics for defence and security applications.
13. The sum of 63,912 km² (the Netherlands [Europe]), 68,783 km² (the Netherlands Antilles [Leeward]) and 12,169 km² (the Netherlands Antilles [Windward]).
14. Chief of Staff at the Netherlands-Belgian Operational Warfare School.
15. Assistant Chief of Staff of the Policy Branch of the Benelux Steering Group.
17. Sweden allocated EUR 1.77 billion (SEK 16.9 billion) to procurement, maintenance, and R&D, EUR 0.11 billion (SEK 1.04 billion) to its Coast Guard and EUR 0.30 billion (SEK 2.82 billion) to its civil emergency agencies in 2015 (CoF Swe 2014, pp. 9–10).
18. 1600 permanently assigned personnel. 1900 conscripts undertake basic training.
19. Although the perpetrator remains unconfirmed (SwAF 2015b), experts widely assume Russian involvement.
20. Attended also by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

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THE NEW US MARITIME STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALTIC SEA REGION

STEFAN LUNDQVIST AND J J WIDEN

The new US maritime strategy has received praise from many corners of the world. As a manual it is well suited to guide the efforts of its three sea services in navigating a challenging global security environment in the years ahead. The strategy emphasises maritime presence, both where conflict threatens the global system and US national interests, and where allies require reassurance, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. However, Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen argue that the document fails, to some extent, to address Russia’s increasingly challenging conduct and its implications for Northeast Europe and the Baltic Sea region.

In March 2015, the three sea services of the United States (US) – the US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard – released a revised and expanded version of their 2007 maritime strategy, entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready. The predominantly positive reviews thus far have focused on its implications for actors and relationships in the Indo-Pacific region, accentuated by the explicit designation of a rising China as a threat to peace and stability in the region. Others have emphasised the implications of the strategy’s inclusion of a new pillar, ‘all domain access’, in the concept of sea power. Some have, with good reason, pointed to the consequences for maritime security in the Mediterranean of the US rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific. Yet the implications of the 2015 US maritime strategy for maritime security in the Baltic Sea region have not yet been discussed, a gap that this broad analysis seeks to address.

US Maritime Strategy: Strategic Context and Major Changes

The 2015 US maritime strategy retains its predecessor’s long-term focus on protecting the global economic system and its emphasis on international co-operation and partnership. It also continues the effort to clarify the utility of maritime power in maintaining the US’s position of global leadership. Produced in a strategic context in which the US is no longer engaged in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan, it provides a detailed account of how the country intends to deploy and employ its sea services in the different regions of the world. This is a significant clarification of the previous maritime strategy’s general positions on ‘forward presence’ and ‘forging international partnerships’. The Indo-Pacific, marked by a rising China whose naval expansion is deemed to present opportunities and challenges, stands out as the region of prime strategic importance – and thus most deserving of US attention. In this way, the 2015 US maritime strategy adds a strand of traditional geopolitical concern to its predecessor’s almost exclusive systemic focus.

China’s rapidly increasing ability to deny the US access to the South China Sea clearly represents the reason for including ‘all domain access’ as an essential function of US sea power, with an emphasis on addressing challenges and opportunities in cyberspace while acknowledging the need for the US to regain control of the electromagnetic spectrum to create war-fighting advantages. This is arguably the most significant change in the latest US maritime strategy. All domain access is also exercised in peacetime through routine manoeuvres in contested waters. The much noted USS Lassen freedom-of-navigation cruise within 12 nautical miles of five disputed artificial islands in the Spratly Group in October 2015, provoking fierce Chinese reaction, is the most recent example.

Perhaps a less prominent, but still notable, change is the declared impact of persistent US fiscal uncertainties and austerity (not discussed in the previous strategy), requiring the careful prioritisation of US maritime engagements and adequate risk management. These constraints must be considered in combination with the revised strategy’s recognition of ever-growing volatility, instability and complexity in the global security environment. The need to maintain credible US combat power in key regions, the authors of the strategy claim, and ‘to deter conflict, reassure allies and partners, and respond to crises’ is therefore greater than ever, especially in the Asia-Pacific.

It can be argued, however, that China is not the only state actor to pose a major threat to US national interests.
and the global system. A similar threat also comes from Russia and its attempt to re-establish itself as a great power in Europe and on the world stage — something recently asserted by General Philip Breedlove, commander of the US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), who pointed to Russia’s vast nuclear inventory and its explicit threats to use it. The Russian threat turns the Baltic Sea region — particularly vulnerable to Russian aggression — into one of relevance to global, rather than regional, security. Yet this region is notable by its absence from the 2015 US maritime strategy.

Maritime Security Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region

As emphasised in the 2015 US maritime strategy, Russia’s military modernisation, illegal seizure of Crimea and active role in ongoing military aggression in Ukraine threaten European security and stability. The Russian Baltic Fleet, for example, based in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and outside of St Petersburg, will be reinforced with new vessels and weapon upgrades through the ongoing 2020 armament programme. Accordingly, the number of military exercises and levels of intelligence activity in the Baltic Sea will likely continue to rise, alongside the intensity of commercial shipping. This highlights the geostategic importance of the Baltic Sea region. Here, the fact that Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland constitute the northern boundary of the Schengen Area, in which the participating countries have eliminated their internal border controls, is worth noting since they maintain the EU’s common external border with Russia.

The 2015 US maritime strategy also points to the globally skyrocketing demand for energy and resources, underscoring the importance of the free flow of commerce through strategic maritime crossroads. The Baltic Sea is a primary example of the growing centrality of the seas, as both resources and trade routes: its seabed is increasingly exploited for oil extraction, submarine cables, wind-power farms, and pipelines — with Nord Stream, the world’s longest sub-sea pipeline, delivering natural gas from Russia to Germany through the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the region’s coastal states, deserving particular mention in this regard.

Approximately 2,000 vessels travel through the Baltic Sea every day, carrying some 15 per cent of the world’s container shipping, including a large share of Russian trade (see Figure 1). Shipping intensity is, however, not only about numbers and maritime safety. It also involves considerations of maritime security, such as the intentions of the ship masters, the type of cargo, and any associated threats posed to or by the vessels — at sea and in ports — as noted in the 2015 maritime strategy. Following the Baltic States’ decision to put an end to their dependence on Russian gas, Norwegian-supplied liquefied natural gas (LNG) is brought across the Baltic Sea to a recently established terminal in Klaipeda, Lithuania, located only a short distance from Kaliningrad. Conflicting interests on land thus radiate outwards at sea and as tension rises between Russia and its neighbouring states, so does the strategic importance of the Baltic Sea, an important fact absent from the US maritime strategy.

Figure 1: The Shipping Routes in the Baltic Sea.

Source: Region Blekinge.

Post-Cold War Maritime Security Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Region

The security challenges associated with the Baltic Sea region are closely linked to European security and stability which — according to the 2015 maritime strategy — remains a vital US strategic interest, preferably dealt with through NATO. Given the partial withdrawal from Europe by the US, and its rebalancing towards the Indo-Pacific, as well as the country’s decision in 2014 to restrict its funding of NATO’s capability targets to no more than 50 per cent, the reduction by European states of their defence budgets is creating serious concern about retaining military capabilities across NATO as a whole. The coastal states of the Baltic Sea (like many states in continental Europe) put their trust in deepening security co-operation and rely on the use of multilateral mechanisms. They now collaborate on sea surveillance through various exchange mechanisms, so that shared maritime domain awareness (MDA) may be achieved in a cost-effective manner. Among the Baltic Sea states, non-NATO members Finland and Sweden take lead roles in wider Baltic Sea and EU sea-surveillance networking.
projects (known respectively as SUCBAS and MARSUR). The military SUCBAS sea-surveillance system, which became operational in 2010, has gradually been improved and since 2012 has involved Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden. The two countries have also taken a more ambitious approach through a bilateral sea-surveillance system (known as SUCFIS), exchanging information at an advanced level. Furthermore, Sweden and Finland have deepened their defence co-operation by establishing a joint standing naval task group covering surface warfare, mine counter-measures (MCM) and amphibious capabilities. The task group is set to reach an initial operational capability to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations by 2017, and to form a standing task group with full operational capability, ready to protect shipping, by 2023. Besides increasing operational efficiency in an era of constrained defence budgets, the main concern of these two navies – and the key driving force of ever-closer defence co-operation within the Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO) framework in general – is Russia’s current conduct, perceived as ‘challenging’ and ‘aggressive’. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – driven by their sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Russia – have, for their part, actively sought to co-ordinate their defence policies, moulded as they are by geographical proximity, a common cultural and historical context, and considerable security interdependence. Indeed, they have maintained and deepened the trilateral military co-operation they established in the 1990s, centring on the Baltic Battalions, the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON), the Baltic Defence College and the Baltic Air Surveillance Network. BALTRON has since its inception in 1998 focused on MCM activities and search-and-rescue operations. Since 2004, when the three Baltic States joined NATO, the countries’ armed forces have also been incorporated into the NATO security structure and they arguably punch well above their weight inside the Alliance, a status gained through significant troop contributions to its missions (mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan). With regard to the addition of ‘all domain access’ as a pillar of present US maritime strategy, the 2008 establishment of a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia and the latter’s recently created Cyber Defence League reserve force are notable. Also, the 2013 establishment of NATO’s Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSECCOE) in Lithuania is striking in light of Russia’s use of LNG as a strategic tool of power. The peaceful post-Cold War security environment in the Baltic Sea region paved the way for an agenda seeking to establish a Baltic Sea security community involving also the states of its eastern shore. At that time, the main question was whether to initiate a self-reinforcing community-building process using a ‘top-down’ (EU) or ‘bottom-up’ (Nordic) method. It was envisaged that, through political and economic relations, Russia would be bound into a web of commitments and socialised into mutual trust, thus eliminating the need to deter it. However, the hopes of fostering Russian partnership and encouraging its adoption of democracy and liberalism have come to naught. Today, it pursues an agenda of its own. In fact, Russia is the main actor inducing insecurity in the Baltic Sea region, which is also a major reason why maritime security is given a more traditional interpretation among the region’s coastal states. Accordingly, aspects of ‘essential functions’ such as all domain access, deterrence, sea control and power projection outlined in the 2015 US maritime strategy are interlinked with their maritime security efforts. The baseline for maritime security constitutes of (shared) MDA and, quite tellingly, Russia has consistently refused to accept the invitations to participate in the SUCBAS co-operation since its inception. As noted by Gerard O’Dwyer, Poland and Sweden have recently embarked on investment programmes leveraging their naval strike capabilities. Poland is seeking to acquire cruise-missile systems for its new submarine series and has ordered naval strike missiles for an additional shore-based coastal missile-defence squadron. Sweden has launched a modernisation programme for parts of its corvette and submarine fleets, and ordered two A26 submarines. In May 2013, Poland and Germany signed a Declaration of Intent (DOI) on enhanced maritime co-operation, outlining twenty-eight projects covering: operations – for instance, maritime security operations (MSO), MCM and a common submarine operating authority; capabilities (pooling and sharing); education, training and exercises; and logistics. This co-operation at the national level, spanning the full spectrum of conflict, was mirrored by bilateral co-operation between the respective single services. Here, it is clear that the prospect of arms export leads to security co-operation. Accordingly, the Swedish government declared on 7 November 2015 that it will also sign an agreement on enhanced security co-operation between Poland and Sweden, following the DOI on close co-operation between the Swedish company SAAB and the Polish Naval Shipyard when building Polish next-generation naval vessels, including submarines.

‘Being Where it Matters, When it Matters’

Based on a multiregional survey of the diversified global threats from state and non-state actors, US national-security interests, and in an enduring context of constrained resources, the 2015 US maritime strategy assigns strategic priority to the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East, with forward-based naval forces in ‘places like Guam and Japan’, forward-operating forces deploying from Singapore and rotationally deployed forces from US bases of first concern. As a consequence, the 2015 maritime strategy ranks Europe as third in terms of regional importance to the country’s sea services. US and NATO officials have, however, repeatedly stressed that this strategic rebalance to the Indo-Pacific does not imply that the US has lost its interest in European security. Rather, they have stressed that European states remain important economic partners to the US, while the 2015 maritime strategy emphasises the need for maintaining interoperability with its European allies. Hence, the US Navy maintains its forward-based naval forces in Europe (stationed in Rota, Spain).
In accordance with the elements of its title – ‘Cooperative’, ‘Forward’ and ‘Engaged’ – the 2015 US maritime strategy places emphasis on maintaining interoperability with NATO and its European allies and partners, a requirement partly met by those US naval forces still in Europe.33 Indeed, these forces are a key enabler for NATO in the collective defence of the three Baltic States from Russian aggression. This commitment was emphasised by US President Barack Obama during his visit to Estonia in September 2014.40 However, the deployment of the Standing NATO MCM Group One, comprising only five ships, to the Baltic Sea on 22 April 2014,41 did not provide a credible naval deterrent.42 Calls from NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe for more robust reassurance measures thus prompted the US to launch Operation Atlantic Resolve in June 2014 as part of its European Reassurance Initiative.43 Within this programme, the US European Command has undertaken a series of rotational land, air and sea deployments and exercises, mostly as part of NATO. The 2014 Northern Coast and BALTOPS multinational maritime exercises focused on improving interoperability between US, NATO and partner forces.44 The 2015 BALTOPS exercise – involving training for amphibious landings, air lifts, and assaults in Poland, Sweden, Germany and the Baltic Sea – was designed to demonstrate the resolve of NATO and its partners to defend Poland and the Baltic States from any potential attack.45 With these smaller NATO members experiencing mounting security pressure from their eastern neighbour, UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon noted the ‘real and present danger’ of Russia trying to destabilise them, using tactics ‘similar to those it used in Ukraine’.46 A major concern is that the souring of the Russian economy – badly affected by the global drop in oil prices, as well as US and EU trade sanctions – will tempt Russia to seek an escalating regional crisis (possibly involving threats to use nuclear weapons there).47 Finland and Sweden are also highly attuned to the fact that NATO territory in the Baltics is potentially under threat. In spite of their official non-alignment, both countries are embedded in the longstanding US framework Enhanced Partnership for Northern Europe (e-PINE) for co-operating with the eight Nordic and the three Baltic States on, inter alia, security.

Reflecting on the 2015 maritime strategy’s emphasis on the challenge posed by the Chinese pursuit of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability in the Western Pacific, some analysts have noted the Russian desire for creating an A2/AD zone in the Eastern Mediterranean – potentially challenging US and NATO access to the Black Sea and the Suez Canal.48 Alas, this is also the Russian ambition in the Baltic Sea, reflected by its continual development of capabilities (such as improved air defence and Iskander missiles) aimed at, among other things, countering the US traditional approach to power projection.49 Whether or not Russia is capable of mounting such threats to the US and NATO is disputed; however, mere perceptions of its growing capacity breed fear among its neighbours and threaten to undermine confidence in NATO’s collective defence among the member states of its northeastern flank. The recent increase in Russian violations of national airspace, aggressive exercise scenarios, harassment of state vessels in the Baltic Sea, and suspected submarine intrusions into Swedish and Finnish territorial waters, have all caused such sentiments. In this way, there is a risk that a vicious circle of actions and reactions might develop. Its momentum, however, stems from the Russian search for power and influence. Given the scope of the global commitments and challenges facing the three US sea services, the 2015 US maritime strategy appears to assign the Russian problem only a modest priority. Recent developments indicate that this might need to be changed.

Russia’s geopolitical assertiveness has revived the somewhat languid security policy debates in Sweden and Finland, which jointly signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with NATO in September 2014 aimed at sustaining NATO-led forces in, or supported from, their territories as ‘Host Nations’ during operations.50 Both
countries are recognised as small but credible security actors. As Michel Soula, NATO deputy assistant secretary general for operations, aptly puts it: ‘Sweden and Finland are most valued partners to NATO who contribute more to NATO than many member states... politically wanting more access to NATO in terms of consultation'.

At the bilateral level, the multifaceted US–Swedish relationship has likewise been broadened and deepened in the last decade, encapsulated in the visit by US President Barack Obama to Sweden in 2013. The two countries share an interest in developing stronger transatlantic links. With regards to trade, both advocate the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership currently being negotiated between the US and the EU. In terms of defence and security, they maintain their 1987 MoU on defence procurement and industrial collaboration, while meeting for security-policy dialogues in the recently established fora of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the US-Nordic Security Dialogue. At the military-to-military level, they collaborate on training, education and exercises to maintain and enhance force interoperability, while the defence-industrial relationships are remarkably developed. US–Finnish relations are similarly close.

There are real and mutual benefits to strengthening bilateral and multilateral security relations between the US and the coastal states of the Baltic Sea. The existing sea-surveillance co-operation mechanisms meet the basic requirements of a shared MDA, of which the SUCFIS system – operational since 2006 – enables Finland and Sweden to share secret information. It would be preferable, however, for their pursuit of closer co-operation, aimed at enabling combined MSO to prevent and manage regional crises, to be made in strategic partnership with the US and NATO.

Indeed, the naval capabilities of Sweden and Finland, accentuated by their knowledge of – and operational experience in – this littoral environment, can contribute significantly to the US Navy’s forward presence in the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, joint capability and development would help to develop these littoral-warfare capabilities, especially in light of the emerging A2/AD challenge in the Baltic Sea. Developing and utilising the capabilities of the Swedish and Finnish navies through an ‘operationalised partnership’ would leverage these partners’ Host Nation Support Agreements with NATO. Such an arrangement would send a clear diplomatic signal of the US and NATO commitment to defend their allies and partners in the Baltic Sea region, as well as the readiness of NATO’s regional partners to provide military assistance.

In this way, the US Navy’s forward presence could also be extended to an important region given scant attention in the 2015 US maritime strategy, and at limited cost. As the strategy notes, such presence – preferably by naval forces – is needed if allies and partners are to be reassured of the US’s political and military commitment. As BALTOPS 2015 has shown, the Swedish coast offers excellent basing areas for the persistent presence of US and NATO maritime forces, actively shaping the maritime domain and negating the need for a forcible entry into the Baltic Sea.

Given Russia’s ongoing capability development, it is also necessary for the coastal states of the Baltic Sea region to invest in all domain access. Sweden recently decided to allocate a portion of the 11 per cent increase in its defence spending in 2016–20 to enhancing its intelligence capabilities and to developing defensive (passive and active) and offensive cyberspace capabilities. This allows for joint capability development with NATO, which the Swedish government recognises as vital.

Conclusion

The 2015 US maritime strategy is a comprehensive manual, well suited to guide the efforts of its three sea services in navigating a dynamic and challenging global security environment. The strategy’s emphasis on sustaining a maritime presence, both where conflict threatens the global system and US national interests, and where allies require reassurance, is particularly important in relation to the Baltic Sea. However, the document fails to address the impact of this region’s growing maritime insecurity on global security. Given Russia’s increasingly challenging conduct, the US needs to acknowledge the possibility of a serious crisis emerging in Northeast Europe. Instead, the strategy disregards the need for a more permanent US Navy presence in the Baltic Sea to reassure the allies of the eastern flank, which might best be established in strategic and operationalised partnership with non-NATO members Sweden and Finland.

Sweden and Finland have already assumed leading roles in fostering maritime security in the Baltic Sea, and could act in concert with the US and NATO to protect the Baltic States and Poland. Needless to say, this would require their extended involvement in joint capability building, training, exercises and operations. Some aspects of this, such as the US BALTOPS series, NATO’s regional exercise programme (including the Northern Coast), and the 2018 high-visibility exercise Trident Juncture, hosted by Norway, are already in place. Existing bilateral and multilateral sea-surveillance exchange mechanisms further provide a certain level of regional MDA, while Sweden has recently launched cyber-defence programmes enabling all domain access. Perhaps most importantly, a prompt multilateral US engagement in and around the Baltic Sea would send a clear and much-needed diplomatic signal to the states in the region. In this increasingly tense region, US Navy presence matters and it matters right now.

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Notes


5 The Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Europe, Africa, the Arctic and the Antarctic. US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, pp. 9–18.


11 ibid., p. 13.

12 PBS Newsnight, ‘NATO Commander: Russia’s Use of Force in Europe is a Major Threat’, 29 July 2015.


16 These exploitation activities overlap with the legacy of past destructive practices such as the dumping of chemical-warfare agents and the laying of extensive minefields during the First and Second World Wars, unexploded ordinance and munitions that still create risks and hazards. See Stefan Lundqvist and J J Widen, ‘Cultivating Regional Maritime Security: Swedish-Finnish Naval Cooperation in the Baltic Sea’, in Ioannis Chapsos and Cassie Kitchen (eds), Strengthening Maritime Security Through Cooperation (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2015), pp. 63–73.


18 See President of the Republic of Lithuania, speech by President Dalia Grybauskaite at the Klaipėda LNG terminal opening ceremony, 6 February 2015.


22 See David Galbreath, ‘Western European Armed Forces and the Modernisation Agenda: Following or Falling Behind?’, Defence Studies (Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014), pp. 394–413; and Mattelaer, ‘Strategic Insurance’.

23 See the website for SUCBAS, <http: www.sucbas.org>.

24 SUCBAS was launched in 2008 following an initiative by Sweden and Finland. Lundqvist and Widen, ‘Cultivating Regional Maritime Security’, p. 67.


30 Ibid., p. 19.


32 Ibid.


39 Ibid.

40 David Jackson, ‘Obama Pledges to Defend Baltic Allies against Russia’, USA Today, 3 September 2014.


42 Simultaneously, NATO Baltic Air Policing was reinforced, while the US deployed 600 paratroopers to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, fighter jets to Poland and marines to Romania. See Paul Belkin, Derek E Mix and Steven Woehrel, ‘NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe’, Congressional Research Service, Report R43473, 31 July 2014.


44 Ibid.


48 See Altman, ‘Expanding A2/AD’.


51 Author interview with Michel Soulé, 3 February 2015.


57 Ibid., p. 38.
5.5. Article 5: “Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region”

Maritime Security and Sea Power: A Finnish-Swedish Perspective on the Baltic Sea Region
Stefan Lundqvist

Abstract
Recent European and U.S. maritime security strategies are characterised by addressing the multidimensional threats to the maritime domain that result from states’ increased dependency on seaborne trade and maritime resource exploitation. Stefan Lundqvist notes, however, that in the Baltic Sea – as in the Asia-Pacific region – there is a continuing need for navies. This is due to certain regional powers pursuing strategies that include the wielding of sea power in ways that violate international law, heightens the risk of accidents and threatens international security. Given the hybrid character of the threats, he recommends that states in the region opt for a co-operative and comprehensive regional approach to maritime security – like that of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region.

Introduction: The Dual Character of Recent Maritime Security Strategies
The increasing importance of maritime security is highlighted by recent releases of maritime security strategies: the UK National Strategy for Maritime Security in May 2014 (UK Gov 2014); the EU Maritime Strategy in June 2014 (EU Council 2014); and The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment in August 2015 (U.S. DoD 2015). These strategies focus on protecting national interests, maritime trade flows and maritime resource extraction, while securing blue growth opportunities. They all apply a wide conceptual framework for maritime security, resulting in calls for regional and global maritime governance. This concern for maritime management is closely linked to the economic dimension of security. Environmental security is also addressed, bringing into focus the need for clarification of the environmental impact of some activities associated with ‘blue growth’.

Traditional sea power considerations, however, are also at the heart of some of these strategies. Evidently, conflicting geopolitical interests now tend to superimpose low level threats such as Human Smuggling, Drug Smuggling, Piracy and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU). With regards to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region⁴, it is worth noting that the U.S. Coast Guard operates independently to foster maritime security in island states such as Micronesia and Melanesia, while conducting integrated operations with the other Sea Services in bi- and multilateral co-operation in the South China Sea (Lundqvist 2015a: 23; U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard 2015: 13).

Some key aspects of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy deserve to be highlighted. Firstly, promoting maritime governance is closely linked to the U.S. effort to further liberal norms and free trade. In this endeavour, the U.S. Coast Guard has taken on a leading role in the Caribbean, Africa and Southeast Asia, supported by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps (Lundqvist 2015A: 18-25; U.S. DoD 2015: 25-29; U.S. DoD 2014: 17). Addressing local maritime security challenges, rather than global ones, have contrib-

⁴ The U.S. rebalance – launched in 2011 as a ‘pivot’ – to Asia initially focused on military strategic initiatives but broadened in late 2012 to also include the economic and diplomatic dimensions subsequently emphasised by the Obama administration. For the launch of the initiative, see Clinton (2011). For a thorough account on its development, see Sutter (2015: 69-107).
uted to making states such as Indonesia and Malaysia more willing to co-operate politically, economically and militarily with the U.S., but also to making Vietnam a U.S. strategic partner.

Secondly, as widely recognised, China has gradually been assigned the role of a U.S. rival, influencing the direction of U.S. strategy and capability developments (Lundqvist 2015a: 17-25). China uses the assets of its five maritime law enforcement agencies to protect its national interests, such as fishing and maritime oil exploitation. Around disputed artificial islands, to which it claims indisputable sovereignty, China claims territorial waters and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In some cases, Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs) have been declared. Notably, China considers its national jurisdiction applicable in its EEZ. The U.S., for its part, has been enforcing its right to conduct military activities on and above the high seas through its Freedom of Navigation (FON) programme. The sailing of USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of five disputed islands of the Spratly group on 27 October 2015 resulted in fierce Chinese protests (Lundqvist & Widen 2015B: 42).

Although a U.S.-China military confrontation over U.S. FON operations is unlikely, there is a risk that minor incidents could result in military escalation. The worst case scenario could involve Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities being put to the test against U.S. All Domain Access capabilities and its Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. So far, both protagonists trust their own capabilities. Notably, China’s intensified construction activities on disputed reefs and islands, and growing anti-access capabilities – combined with the effects of fiscal restraints on U.S. naval capabilities – make U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea increasingly risky (Denyer 2016; Tiezzi 2015).

Let us apply these insights from the Asia-Pacific region to the Baltic Sea region, where one of the coastal states exhibits striking similarities with China. The Baltic Sea, widely agreed by geographers to be delimited in the west by a line between Drodgen and Lange-land, is one of the world’s largest inland seas with brackish water by surface area (Nationalencyklopedin 2016). Its shallow and narrow connection to the North Sea is particularly sensitive to disturbances. The Drodgen Sill is only 7 metres deep, which limits access to the narrow Øresund strait, while the depth of the Darss Sill in the Belt Sea area amounts to 18 metres. A disruption of shipping here would have far-reaching consequences for the seaborne trade of the region’s coastal states.

We must also consider some key geostrategic areas in the Baltic Sea. The usefulness of the Island of Gotland – located in the centre of the Baltic Sea – is apparent if we consider an intervention in support of the Baltic States (Aranson 2015). The demilitarised Åland archipelago is of particular legal concern with regards to the ever closer naval co-operation between Sweden and Finland (Lundqvist and Widen forthcoming). For Finland and Russia, the Gulf of Finland is of critical strategic importance. The widely varying topography of the Baltic Sea bed influences some of the current maritime security challenges. Its maximum depth of 459 metres is found in Landsortsdjupet, while Gotlandsdjupet, with a depth of 239 metres (Nationalencyklopedin 2016), has been the scene of conflicting interests in the last two years. The Baltic Sea is an important area for Russian submarine trials (c.f. TASS 2015) and Gotlandsdjupet, situated on the high seas, is often used for deep water tests.

A range of factors need to be taken into account when assessing the region’s security policy environment (Lundqvist/Widen 2015A:
Proceedings from the Kiel Conference 2015
Focus on the Baltic Sea

64, 65). Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland represent the coastal states separating the Schengen Area from Russia. Furthermore, Russia’s ongoing remilitarisation of the Kaliningrad oblast, sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania, raises particular security policy concerns. This development contrasts sharply with the special economic status which Russia assigned Kaliningrad in 1996. Notably, this resulted in increased trade with the EU and improved economic growth, which peaked in 2007 (BBC News 2015). Apparently, the hopes for a Russia that would move closer to Europe, at least in terms of tourism and trade, were well justified at this time.

Although Russia’s Northern and Pacific Fleets have priority over its Baltic Fleet, which is based in Russia’s only ice-free European port (Baltiysk) and in Kronstadt, it will be reinforced with new vessels and weapon upgrades through the ongoing 2011-2020 State Armament Programme (Carlsson 2012: 7, 8). Although Russian naval shipbuilding plans have been plagued by delays and cost over-runs, partly as a result of EU sanctions, three additional Steregushchy-class multipurpose stealth corvettes have been commissioned into the Baltic Fleet since 2011 (ONI 2015; Gorenburg 2015).

Uninterrupted commercial sea transport is vital to the coastal states of the region. The sea lanes of the Baltic Sea are trafficked daily by 2000 large vessels\(^5\) carrying some 40 per cent of Swedish goods (Havsmiljöninstitutet 2016) and some 15 per cent of the world’s container traffic. Notably, this shipping also carries almost 70 per cent of Russia’s container throughput, including that transiting via Finland and the Baltic states, giving the Baltic Sea basin a dominant role in Russian container traffic\(^6\) (Lorentzon 2014: 14).

The shallow Baltic Sea – one of the largest bodies of brackish water on earth – is over-stretched. Its marine ecosystem consists of unique flora and fauna which are vulnerable to overuse and pollution (EEA 2015). Shipping, fishing, energy cables and pipelines, tourism and recreation; the Baltic Sea has many uses today and the competition for marine areas continues to become more intense (WWF 2010). Offshore wind farms and oil rigs, gas pipelines, power and communication cables are being laid at many places on the sea floor, while shipping routes, boat traffic, fishing and other human activities already affect the same areas.

This phenomenon is well illustrated by the 48 turbines of the densely configured Lilgrund offshore wind farm opened in 2008, which produces some 330 Gigawatt Hours of electricity per year resulting from the strong, constant winds in the area (Vattenfall 2015). Notably, the Drogden and Flintrännan navigational fairways border the wind farm to the West and Northwest, while the navigational fairway Lilgrundsrännan borders it to the East. To complicate the picture, one of the Baltic Sea’s 174 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), under the Helsinki Convention (HELCOM), borders the area to the south (HELCOM 2013). This area – the Bredgrund – also constitutes a so-called Natura 2000 area, sensitive to pollution resulting from accidents at sea. In addition, the area is considered to be of marine archaeological importance (Carneiro and Nilsson: 72, 73).

Interest in offshore oil exploration is growing in the Baltic Sea region, and exploratory drilling has shown there is more oil to extract.

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\(^5\) i.e. vessels equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS).

\(^6\) In comparison, the share of the Far Eastern Basin was approximately 20 per cent in 2013, while the Black Sea Basin accounted for 10. The twin terminal container port in St Petersburg is the largest in the Baltic Sea Basin.
Currently, there are four oil platforms in the Baltic Sea, all of them located in the southeastern part of the region in the oilfields of Kravtsovskoye and B-3 (WWF 2010). Three of the platforms are Polish and one is Russian. The reserves in these fields are estimated to last until 2030 or longer. Here, we must also bear in mind that large sea areas off the coasts of Poland and Lithuania are MPAs and Natura 2000 areas (HELCOM 2013).

Nord Stream is the world’s longest (1,224 kilometres) sub-sea gas pipeline and has been controversial from political, environmental and strategic perspectives since the outset. Inaugurated in 2011, its capacity is equivalent to about ten per cent of the consumption of natural gas in the EU (Reuters 2015). In June 2015, Gazprom, Shell Oil, the German company E.ON and the Austrian company OMV signed a preliminary agreement to build another twin gas pipeline – Nord Stream 2 – in the Baltic Sea, placed parallel to the existing Nord Stream pipeline (Zhdannikov and Pinchuk 2015). Thus, Russia aims to double its gas deliveries through the Baltic Sea, thereby reducing its exports via Ukraine and Poland. This project is significant for European energy security and has security policy implications because it will increase some of its member states dependence on Russian gas. In November 2015, Gazprom sought to mitigate these concerns by announcing that its stake in the new project will be reduced from 51 to 50 per cent, thus equalising EU-Russian ownership (Nord Stream 2 2015).

The seabed of the Baltic Sea is also being increasingly used for placing cables for high-voltage power transmission. On 6 February 2014, EstLink-2 was handed over to its owners and made available for commercial operations, boosting the existing power transmission capacity between Finland and Estonia (Fingrid 2015). Consequently, a bottleneck in the Baltic region’s power connectivity with the rest of the EU was removed.

These kinds of exploration activities also face risks from previous and current military activities. In the Baltic Sea, the remains of an estimated 170,000 mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), laid since 1855, need to be taken into consideration when planning activities on the seabed. There are also large amounts of chemical warfare munitions dumped in certain areas of the Baltic Sea. Accordingly, the Nord Stream project faced risks posed by the remains of both conventional and chemical munitions in dumpsites east of Bornholm and south-east of Gotland (Nord Stream 2009).

Urgent calls for maritime governance and management in Sweden since the millennium must be seen against this backdrop, a tendency also evident in the U.S. and the EU. As in the U.S. (Lundqvist 2015a: 24), the Swedish demands emerged from the gradual incorporation of broader views in its national security policy, and its increased economic dependence on international sea-borne trade. In this conceptualisation of maritime security, navies only take supporting roles, while law enforcement agencies assume the lead.

The Role of Russia: Inducing Multi-sectoral Maritime Insecurity

The Russian quest for a new security order, announced by Vladimir Putin in his infamous speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007 (The Washington Post 2007), has a territorial dimension. As increased geopolitical tensions lead to intensified naval exercise activity in the Baltic Sea, we can expect continuing conflicts and frictions between Russia’s military interests and neighbouring states civilian interests. If Russia persists in pursuing the hybrid warfare strategy salient in its seizure of Crimea and other

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7 For a summative portrayal of Sweden’s development into a competitive export-oriented state in the wake of the recession of the early 1990s, see Sutherland (2015).
parts of Ukraine, states in the Baltic Sea region will be forced to manage coercion or threats of violence – or the exercise of graduated violence – in a context of strategic peace. The perpetrator might be hidden or use proxy elements to influence various security sectors of other states.\(^8\) As a result, Baltic Sea coastal states must prepare for action within a framework of continuous crisis, the character and intensity of which are set by Russia. In light of Russia’s current behaviour, the need for capable navies returns. It does not, however, entail a return to the Cold War concept. To manage a maritime security environment facing a broad spectrum of threats, where the military security sector has primacy but with complex links to other security sectors, consideration must be given to a co-operative and comprehensive approach where the military is allowed to lead. Managing threats to today’s intense shipping will be a demanding task.

Finland and Sweden perceive the Russian conduct as ‘challenging’ and ‘aggressive’. In fact, Russia is seen as the main – and highly capable – source of maritime insecurity in the Baltic Sea region because of the way it wields its sea power (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a: 63, 64). Therefore, maritime security is given a more traditional interpretation by the region’s coastal states than that presented in the March 2015 U.S. maritime strategy (Lundqvist and Widen 2015b: 44). Here, essential functions such as All Domain Access, Deterrence, Sea Control and Power Projection are interlinked with bilateral efforts to provide maritime security. Finnish and Swedish media frequently report border infringements and ‘harassments’. Finland and Sweden have noted an increase in Russian\(^9\) airspace violations since 2014. The Swedish Supreme Commander has highlighted the risk of collisions with Russian aircraft, following incidents in 2015, when they operated with transponders turned off, and the 2014 incident in which a Russian fighter jet manoeuvred ‘provocatively close’ to a Swedish signal intelligence plane. (Yle 2015, Holmström 2015). In January 2016, two Swedish fighter jets intervened to break off the hot pursuit of a Swedish Airborne Surveillance Control (ASC-890) aircraft by a Russian SU-27 off Bornholm (Gummesson 2016). In August and September 2014 and April 2015, the scheduled activities of the Finnish research vessel M/V Aranda in Gotlandsdjupet were prevented by Russian warships and helicopters, because of alleged interference with unannounced Russian submarine activities (Nygårds 2015). The second of these incidents prompted a response by two Swedish fighter jets.

In October 2014, the Swedish Armed Forces launched a week-long search operation for what was widely assumed to be a Russian submarine in the archipelago off Stockholm (Gummesson 2015a). The final analysis concluded that Swedish internal waters were, ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’, violated by a foreign submarine. This incident drew attention to the apparent lack of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters in the Swedish Armed Forces. On 27 January 2016 this capability shortcoming was set to be remedied, as the first of nine navy version NH 90 helicopters was delivered to the Swedish Armed Forces (DI 2016).

Energy security is increasingly important in the Baltic Sea region, which is why Sweden assigned high priority to completion of the NordBalt sub-sea connection between Sweden and Lithuania as planned (Swedish Grid 2015: 5). The transmission capacity of this

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\(^8\) For a post-structural approach to studying the concept of multi-sectoral security, see Buzan et al. (1998).

\(^9\) N.b. as well as aircraft of other origin.

\(^10\) The Swedish Armed Forces has ordered a total of 18 NH 90 helicopters, which are to be delivered until 2020.
energy link – amounting to 700 Megawatts – enhances the Baltic countries’ supply security and contributes to connecting Nordic and European electricity markets. A Swedish Member of the European Parliament (MEP) dared to describe the December 2015 inauguration of two high-voltage power cables and a fibre-optic telecommunications cable as a ‘victory’ for Swedish security policy, depriving Russia of an instrument of power (Eriksson 2015).

Russian naval vessels interfered with NordBalt cable laying work in spring 2014 and on four occasions in March and April 2015 (Gummesson 2015a). The cable laying vessel M/V Topaz Installer and the surveillance ship M/V Alcedo were either ordered to alter course, or to leave the area for periods up to 10 hours due to alleged Russian naval exercises in the area. The President of the Swedish National Grid, Mikael Odenberg, pointedly commented on the August 2015 NordBalt incidents in the Lithuanian EEZ, stating that: ‘I see this as a demonstration of the Russians behaving in a manner someone might, if they mentally considered it to be their own economic zone, and not Lithuania’s. In identical formal written notes to Russia in April 2015, Sweden and Lithuania expressed their ‘deep concern’ about the repeated interference, disrupting peaceful shipping and economic activity in violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The written protests illustrate the harsh diplomatic tone that currently prevails between Sweden and Russia. In August 2015, Russia expelled a Swedish diplomat from Moscow. Swedish defence attachés in Moscow have reportedly had problems performing their duties, being denied opportunities to visit military units and attend normally open briefings by Russian authorities. The general need to protect submarine communication cables – such as the one laid by the NordBalt project – was highlighted in October 2015. The New York Times then reported on American and Norwegian concerns over the ongoing Russian survey of transatlantic communication cables by submarines and the ocean survey vessel M/V Yantar (Sanger and Schmitt 2015). Admiral Mark Ferguson, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Europe, reportedly considered these operations as part of Russia’s emergent hybrid warfare strategy. Moreover, analysts (c.f. Braw 2015) have highlighted the risk of Russian A2/AD capabilities being imminently established in the Eastern Mediterranean. Such capability development is also discernible in the Baltic Sea Region, through Russia’s investment in improved air defence capabilities, and its deployment of Iskander missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave since 2013.

Responses by the U.S., NATO, Finland and Sweden

Current maritime security challenges are being addressed through various regional co-operation initiatives (Lundqvist and Widen 2015b: 43-45). To a large extent, they centre on the security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The U.S. launch of Operation Atlantic Resolve in June 2014 – part of its European Reassurance Initiative, resulting in a series of rotational deployments – is particularly important, augmented by the co-ordinated initiatives of NATO. The fact that NATO territory is potentially threatened in the Baltics is also taken into careful consideration by Finland and Sweden. The 2015 U.S.-led BALTOPS exercise – aimed at demonstrating U.S., NATO’s and partners’ resolve to defend Poland and the Baltic states through training in amphibious landings, airlifts and assaults in Poland, Sweden and Germany – has reinforced the co-operative dimension. The use of U.S. B-52s has also forged a link between the U.S. Strategic Command and regional exercises with NATO.
However, shared maritime domain awareness (MDA) constitutes the baseline for providing maritime security. Accordingly, Sweden and Finland operate the bilateral Sea Surveillance Co-operation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS) interface for exchanging target information in the Northern Baltic Sea between their autonomous maritime surveillance systems (Lundqvist and Widen 2015a: 66, 67). SUCFIS, established in 2006, enables exchange of secret target data. They have also taken on lead roles in the wider, unclassified, Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic States (SUCBAS) and the EU Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) co-operation. Quite tellingly, Russia was invited to join the SUCBAS co-operation, but has consistently refused to participate. Nevertheless, the geographical scope of the SUCBAS co-operation has grown to include the Baltic Sea’s approaches by the UK becoming a fully-fledged member in March 2015 (SUCBAS 2015).

To cope with the current challenges, Finland and Sweden seek to merge their capabilities to create synergies and to send resolute diplomatic signals. Notably, their navies also strive to ensure interoperability at the higher level of the conflict spectrum by operating in full accordance with NATO standards. The ‘flagship project’ of their co-operation — established within the Nordic Defence Co-operation (NORDEFCO) framework — is the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG), composed of task units for surface warfare, mine countermeasures, amphibious operations and logistics (Lundqvist and Widen 2015b: 44). It will be led by a Task Group Commander supported by a bi-national staff. Finland and Sweden are currently implementing their vision document for the SFNTG 2023, outlining a two-tiered objective, to: i) reach Initial Operational Capability to conduct Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations in 2017; and ii) form a standing Task Group with Full Operational Capability to conduct operations including Protection of Shipping Operations in 2023 (Lundqvist and Widen, 2015a: 70). The higher level of ambition will require a high degree of interoperability in their command and communications systems. Mutual trust and cultural understanding is being built through exchanges of officers and non-commissioned officers at all levels of command. So far, the project has been successful and the 2017 objective is well within reach. The parties, however, face legal challenges in achieving the far more complex 2023 objective, centring on the need to use force in each other’s territorial waters under peace conditions to counter the Russian threat.

To achieve these capabilities on time, an ambitious bi- and multilateral exercise programme is scheduled. The multilateral dimension is mainly — although not exclusively — being pursued within a NATO framework (Fin MoD 2015: 58), reflecting the two states’ ever closer defence ties with NATO (O’Dwyer 2015a). Sweden has assigned air force and naval units to the NATO Response Forces Pool (RFP) since 2014, while Finland and Sweden jointly assigned their bilateral Amphibious Task Unit in 2015 (Holmström 2013). Of particular interest to the establishment of the SFNTG is Sweden’s assignment of two Visby-class multi-purpose corvettes and Finland’s assignment of a supply ship to the NATO RFP in 2017 (Larsson and Selling 2015: 147; Fin MoD 2015: 60). The main drivers for the Swedish and Finnish assignments are the opportunity to participate in NATO’s exercise programme — in which the Trident Juncture exercise series stands out — as well as its systematic evaluation and feedback programme aiming at certification of military units.

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11 Member states co-operate at any of the three levels of ambition offered (see: http://sucbas.org/levels/).

12 As early as 2013, Finland assigned the Utti Jaeger Regiment’s Special Operations Unit to the NATO RFP (MoF to NATO 2013).
Notably, Finland and Sweden will be involved in planning certain NATO Response Force (NRF) Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) exercises and will gain access to NATO communication systems during their execution (Larsson and Selling 2015: 147). In essence, participation in the NRF is expected to bolster development of areas of operational effectiveness and interoperability with NATO, which cannot be obtained on a national basis (Fin MoD 2015: 60). The quid pro quo is that the littoral expertise of the Swedish and Finnish navies is envisaged as ‘enhancing the capabilities of the [NRF] to respond to [the] emerging security challenges posed by [inter alia] Russia’ (Larsson and Selling 2015: 147; SHAPE 2015).

Sweden is seeking bilateral co-operation beyond that with Finland. Accordingly, in October 2015 the Swedish Government mandated its Armed Forces to negotiate bilateral agreements with the relevant authorities in Finland and Denmark to allow for the use of each other’s ports for alternative basing of naval units in peacetime (Government Offices of Sweden 2015). Notwithstanding the bilateral dimensions in Swedish security policy initiatives, the ability to act with NATO remains a recurring theme. In October 2015, when summoned by the Swedish Parliament’s Defence Committee following the disclosure of a classified memorandum, Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist clarified that he did not rule out Swedish participation in the UK-led NATO Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) (Gummesson 2015b).

Reportedly, talks with ‘Northern Group’ – i.e. Germany, the Netherlands and the UK – government representatives had taken place, but no formal process was established. In 2017, the JEF will constitute NATO’s VJTF, with readiness to intervene in the Baltic States within 48 hours. As highlighted by the BALTOPS 2015 exercise, Sweden’s participation in such an enterprise might prove decisive, given its key geostrategic position.

Discussion

Maritime Security is increasingly important to the coastal states in the Baltic Sea region, which is why Sweden and Finland have taken leading roles in multinational co-operation on a range of issues, including sea surveillance. Here, considerations such as navigational safety, marine environmental protection and maritime spatial planning are complicated by Russia’s challenging and aggressive military conduct. Notwithstanding the real threat that Russia poses to the three Baltic States – vulnerable to the kind of hybrid warfare that Russia is using in Ukraine – incidents involving Russian air or naval craft could well escalate into military violence. This concern was raised by NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, during the Nordic Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Stockholm 10-11 November 2015 (SvD 2015).

Although they are non-aligned, Finland and Sweden could preferably act in concert with NATO to protect the Baltic States and Poland. Needless to say, this would require their extended involvement in joint capability building, training and exercises. NATO’s regional exercise programme, including the Northern Coast series, the 2018 Trident Juncture High Visibility Exercise hosted by Norway, and the U.S. BALTOPS series are already in place.

The Finnish-Swedish defence co-operation – spearheaded by their navies and founded on NATO standards and procedures – should not be seen as a political process isolated from the EU and NATO. Instead, their regionally focussed capability development is being pursued in tandem with those of the EU, NATO. James J. Townsend, U.S Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, stressed in February 2016 that the US Department of Defense refers to Sweden as a ‘building block in the wall’ to deter
Russia (Holmström 2016). Furthermore, Benjamin Hodges, Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, declared that the U.S. wants to practice the deployment of key military equipment – such as Patriot missiles – from its bases in Europe to Sweden by air and sea (Stenquist 2016).

Conclusion
Fostering maritime security in the Baltic Sea region, with Russia’s emerging hybrid warfare strategy, will require co-operative and comprehensive efforts, in which navies are assigned leading roles. Therefore, besides their multinational regional security engagement, Finland and Sweden have launched domestic programmes to improve the co-ordination of civilian and military agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain. This involves legal challenges and the need for flexibility among their organisations. In order to reach a common and comprehensive end-state for the Baltic Sea region founded on the rule of law, states in the region must deepen their co-operation not only between navies but also between maritime law enforcement agencies. Stimulating challenges in terms of creating a dialogue to align disparate – and occasionally conflicting – civilian and military interests surely await military decision-makers, if policymakers task them with leading a comprehensive planning process aimed at securing the maritime domain.  

13 For an argument on the educational and practical challenges inherent in implementing a truly comprehensive approach, using the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), see Lundqvist (2015B).

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6. Concluding discussion

- What is maritime security? I posed this research question when I first approached the concept by authoring a literature review for the Swedish Armed Forces (Lundqvist 2011). It proved to be the start of a complex and stimulating research project. The significance of the maritime domain to national prosperity, international politics and trade as well as environmental sustainability soon became clear. I noted that the deficit of maritime security in key regions resulted from multifaceted non-traditional threats, while the concept of maritime security was in transformation towards a more comprehensive definition – drawing on concepts of cooperative and common security.

It spurred me to author Article 1 of this thesis, exploring key factors candidate to explain this change through the study of official documents, statistics and scholarly works. Comments on this article provided by a senior US naval strategist made me realise the need for considering also the influence of traditional maritime strategy objectives given priority by the US Navy and the US Marine Corps, materialising in the US Navy force structure. His key point was that certain objectives stated in US maritime security strategy documents would remain nothing but words – or peacetime activities for its expensive navy awaiting kinetic missions – if adequate resources did not support them. Clearly, the US Navy has maintained a focus on carrier strike groups through the entire period of study. These type of platforms are not optimal for operations at the lower level of the conflict spectrum, such as maritime security operations. These insights made me orient this thesis towards the study of continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed by rational state actors, and examine them through the main lens of structural realism.

The works of Buzan (1991a), Buzan et al. (1998) and Buzan and Waever (2003) – expounding on and employing the analytical concepts of regional security complex theory and multi-sectoral security – convinced me to heed the regional dimensions of maritime security. This implied a focus on the interactions of weak and strong states in regions where traditional and non-traditional security concerns interact in shaping their maritime security strategies. The five articles have presented the empirical, but also certain theoretical, results of this endeavour. Based on these findings, this concluding chapter discusses the answers to the four research questions through the theoretical lenses and frameworks set forth in Chapter 1 and draws aggregated conclusions:
• What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategy of the US?
• What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the East and South China Seas?
• What explains continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategy of Sweden and Finland?
• What lessons can we learn from the post-Cold War employment of maritime security strategies in the Baltic Sea region?

6.1. The continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of the US, Finland and Sweden

This concluding section combines the findings of the empirical studies to provide a theory-driven explanation of the continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of the US, Finland and Sweden, while reflecting on factors relevant to explain the differences. Some key events characterised the initial period of study, including the break-up of the USSR in 1991 and the entry into force of the UNCLOS in 1994. In the mid-period, the 11 September attacks had a pivotal effect on their conceptual maritime security developments. As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis departed from the key assumption that the US post-Cold War conceptual maritime security developments of the US had influenced states worldwide. This assumption gained some empirical support in the findings of Article 1 and more solid backing in Article 2. We will discuss the results below.

6.1.1. The US

The results outlined in Article 2 show that throughout the period of study, the maritime security concept expressed in US national strategies sometimes differed from those expressed in its service strategies. At the outset of the period studied, the US maritime security concept was consistently cast in terms of ensuring deterrence and secure access by sea for power projection purposes, facilitated by naval missions together with its NATO allies. The strategies of the US Navy and the US Marine Corps maintained this traditional conceptual understanding until it eventually changed by the 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, representing the first joint service strategy including the US Coast Guard.

This traditional concept, firmly embedded in US balance of power considerations relative the USSR, is well explained by structural realism and its expectations that states perceiving high security pressure will favour military
power to economic power. The robust network of global maritime trade—sustained by US sea power and linking the world’s richest states—was seen as instrumental in winning the Cold War by making them end up on its side. Here, the subsidy *Maritime Security Program* for US flag oceangoing ship owners and operators, making their ships and crews available to the US Department of Defense for sealift operations in times of war or national emergencies, is instructive on the continuity of traditional security considerations in the US post-Cold War maritime security concept.

This concept was integral also to the US aim to consolidate its position as the sole superpower in the 1990s, seeking to preclude any hostile power from dominating any region critical to US interests while preventing the re-emergence of a global threat to its interests or those of its allies. It correlates with structural realism’s predictions on the behaviour of a state having achieved the level of security that comes with the systemic position of a hegemon. In this period, it is clear that the US maritime security concept centred on the role of the maritime domain as a medium of dominion and transportation.

Accordingly, the US duly considered the need for maritime access to project power ashore in the UNCLOS negotiations. They catered for this by enforcing what would be its provisions on the principles of freedom of the seas, the right to innocent passage of states’ territorial waters and the right to passage through international straits. Thereto, the US relaunched its *Freedom of Navigation Program* in 1990, aimed at protecting US navigation, overflight and interests over, under and on the seas. The 1994 entry into force of UNCLOS did not alter the US traditional maritime security conception. However, it raised the stakes for states’ maritime resource extraction and increased the tension between the US Freedom of Navigation (FON) requirements and other coastal states’ desire to exercise their national jurisdiction. It also increased the tendency among states on a global scale to regard the sea as a resource, a factor explaining much of the conceptual maritime security developments of the 1990s.

In accordance with structural realism predictions, the military needs for including also littoral areas among the areas that must be dominated to establish sea control well explain the geographical widening in the altered maritime security concept of the US. The change was due to the military area denial capabilities of potential adversaries’ in Asia and the Middle East, required to allow for US hedging or containment strategies. It also explains the US continuous capability needs for establishing sea control to reassure US allies such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. Here, China and an
increasingly threatening North Korea – engaged in acquiring ballistic nuclear weapons capabilities – represented their common concerns. Structural realism accounts for the reaction of the sole superpower to the 11 September 2001 attacks – launched in a context of low international security pressure – by engaging in a “war on terrorism” to fend off the sudden and harsh attack on its cultural, political and economic identity. Notably, most of the US post-millennium legal, commercial and diplomatic initiatives taken to secure the maritime domain have been directly linked to this war. One could thus rightly argue that the US benefitted more than other states from a successful, coordinated, effort to fight transnational terrorism.

As shown in Article 2, it is clear that the US throughout the period of study used its power and economic leverage to influence its allies and trading partners – bilaterally as well as by influencing international institutions – to accept, implement and even bear most of the costs for those measures identified by US authorities as required to prevent any unauthorised entry of people or prohibited goods into the US via shipping. This empirical finding supports the structural realist prediction that a great power will seek to influence: i) international trade patterns and alter them in their favour; ii) international institutions in order to reduce their transaction costs and improve the protection of their property rights. It is also clear that the domestic Homeland Security measures introduced in the US were the ones that the US with apparent success exported to its allies and trading partners. Structural realism’s idea of “bandwagoning for profit” is instructive to why they volunteered to implement costly US arrangements such as the Container Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism.

The perceived threat of maritime terrorism – framed by the US as common to all states in a globalised world centred on itself as the leading trader – serves to explain the partial success of the US efforts to create and sustain the navy contributions to the “war on terrorism”, e.g. by the multilateral Global Maritime Partnership initiative. Given that the maritime transport sector’s share of world trade had consistently amounted to 90 percent, providing an adequate level of maritime security was indispensable to the US. Although the number of maritime terrorist attacks was low, the effects of those carried out had proven

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66 I.e. illegal migrants and terrorists.
67 I.e. WMD-related items/substances, weapons and drugs.
68 Introduced by USN Admiral Mullen in 2005 as “the 1,000-ship Navy” initiative to foster global maritime security.
their adverse influence on regional and global trade. The progressive emphasis in US national and maritime strategies on providing systemic stability is striking. Since 2005, an emphasis on the US role as the guarantor of the international system – called upon to lead its allies and partners in a cooperative effort to this end – pervaded its national and service strategies. This, in turn, required a systemic and collective understanding of US security – and thus its maritime security. The 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* was the pivotal maritime strategy, clearly influenced by a broader concept of security. N.B. the priority assigned by the US to its long-term economic gains was premised on limited international security pressure. At this time, both China and the US recognised the need for maritime security in the East and South China Seas to promote their maritime-related economies, while they played out their competition mainly in the political-economic domain.

One could argue that neoliberalism is best suited to explain the assignment of the international system as a referent object to US security by drawing on the role of interdependence, international free trade and state prosperity to peace. Structural realism, however, offers convincing explanations. Notably, security pressure was low in the first two decades of the period of study. As shown in Articles 1 and 2, the post-Cold War era was marked by intense global economic competition, and it is striking that the US placed emphasis on protecting international maritime security in order to protect the international trade system and the liberal order while actively competing with inter alia China to secure preferential trade agreements. Based on these findings, we can conclude that the US made intertemporal trade-offs between its short- (i.e. economic power) and long-term (i.e. military power) requirements while continuously seeking relative gains. Accordingly, the low international security pressure gave way to a focus on economic power in a globalised world, which sea-borne trade faced increasing threats from the activities of certain non-state actors. This explains why the US chose to engage in multi-sectoral international maritime security cooperation, i.e. assigning priority to non-military dimensions of maritime security and promoting collective security.

We can also conclude that – in accordance with structural realism predictions – the US assigned key roles to international organisations such as the IMO, the World Customs Organization (WCO), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to foster international maritime security in the wake of the 11 September 2001 events. The reason for influencing these institutions was their utility as tools for promoting US national interests, and the global support was served by the
principle that by implementing security measures all states obtained absolute gains. The US, however, also obtained relative gains. In respect of being the world’s top trading nation until 2012, when China took over this position, the US gained more than the rest of improved global maritime security.

We can draw two conclusions from the implications on the type of activities performed under the maritime security banner by the transformation of the US maritime security concept, visualised below in Figure 7. First, the US Coast Guard played a decisive role in the successful transfer of US Homeland Security initiatives to US allies and trade partners through internal staff work in key international organisations. It also played a decisive role in convincing small Southeast Asian states that resuming security cooperation with the US would bring mutual benefits. Given that China in 2007 was increasingly cast as a peer competitor to the US by its economic and military rise, fuelled by its deepening economic and political interactions with the ASEAN as a body and its member states, the widespread regional scepticism towards its Global Maritime Partnership initiative posed a US concern.

Eventually, the US Coast Guard bilateral cooperation initiatives with ASEAN members and China’s increasing diplomatic assertiveness, including China’s use of the fleets of its Maritime Law Enforcement agencies to promote its marine resource extraction, paved the way for an increased US maritime security engagement in Southeast Asia including naval cooperation. In 2008, the focus of US maritime security activities had hence shifted towards the low end of the conflict spectrum, i.e. maritime security operations where the US Navy provided support to its law enforcement agencies. The US Coast Guard concept for Southeast Asia was not new. Instead, it was a concept proven through years of engagements to counter drugs- and people smuggling in the Caribbean. Gradually, the US managed to include the military dimension of maritime security cooperation with most Southeast Asian states through a range of exercise series. Politically, the US declared its “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region, emphasising its maritime character and recognising its role to global economy and politics.
Second, we can conclude that the US maritime security activities in Southeast Asia have had a dual character. On the one hand, throughout the period of study China and the US have been dependent on an uninterrupted global transportation system to prosper, while their relations have been – and still are – marked by a significant level of economic interdependence. Accordingly, various maritime strategic documents from 2005 to 2008 conceptualised maritime security as a requirement for sustained globalisation and the establishment of collective ends that went beyond states’ selfish pursuit of their national interests. Here, maritime security operations addressing common threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum served to build trust and cultural understanding, especially when performed by law enforcement agencies. This mechanism – readily explained by structural realism as the strategy of a responsible superpower that is consolidating a world order in accordance with its political ideology and national preferences – is duly

Figure 7: The altered focus of US activities on the maritime security spectrum 1991–2015. Source: Adapted from NRC (2008: 129).
On the other hand, structural realism’s predictions that great powers will seek to maximise its power and adjust the amount of power politics in its foreign policy accordingly – e.g. through influencing the creation or change of international norms in line with its interest – are confirmed by the US appreciation of and response to China since 2007. This has profound implications for the US maritime security concept, involving a renewed emphasis on traditional security concerns (see Figure 7 above). It is not a return to its 1991 concept. Instead, US maritime security has become a comprehensive concept in which the military sector takes a dominant position while permeating the management of other sectors of security.

As shown in Article 2, the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy fleshes out the US appreciation of the growing maritime security complexity of the Asia-Pacific. This document also illustrates the dual character of the concept. As opposed to the collective ends expressed in the 2015 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready, the traditional maritime security objectives set by this Department of Defense strategy focus on safeguarding the freedom of the seas, deterrence and promoting adherence to international law – while explaining why they represent US national interests. It designates China as the actor inducing regional maritime insecurity through incremental steps aimed at gaining control over disputed islands; i.e. engaging in land reclamation, constructing advanced military installations, coercing its rivals and performing unsafe manoeuvres by ships and aircraft.

In tandem with the increasing security pressure in the East and South China Seas, the US has moved upwards on the realist ladder of strategies. It is clear though, that the US still pursues an engagement strategy combing hedging by deterrence with elements of reassurance (see Figure 8 below).
Figure 8: The US current position vis-à-vis China on structural realism’s ladder of strategies. Source: Adapted from Tang (2010: 104).
The US altered maritime strategy versus China conforms to structural realism’s expectations of a state experiencing a heightened level of security pressure (see Figure 3). This involves a tendency towards perceiving a situation of strategic rivalry vis-à-vis its peer competitor inducing possibility rather than probability calculations of conflict, and assigning priority to military readiness although in this case it may compromise its trade with China. N.B. this important change in the US 2015 maritime strategy document – adopted at military service level – is clearly reflected in the US subsequent 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, a component of its grand strategy.

6.1.2. Finland and Sweden

In 1991, Finland and Sweden did not embrace the concept of maritime security in their national or service strategies. Notwithstanding, typical maritime security tasks were included in the still highly valid operations type “protection of shipping” in tactical doctrines. The maritime security concept was introduced by the measures they were bound to implement due to IMO’s adoption of the ISPS Code. Their gradual implementation of the concept has followed the path of the EU rather than national ones. Seen through a structural realism lens, it follows from their limited power to influence neither the maritime strategies of the EU, in which they are members since 1995, nor those of the US. Until 2013, there was no need for them to develop national strategies on this issue-area marked by global credentials. This was simply because the Baltic Sea was a sea of peace and cooperation, which maritime challenges centred on issues of sea safety and environmental sustainability. Accordingly, Finland and Sweden have willingly contributed navy and coast guard resources to promote maritime security in the EU-led military crisis management operation European Union Naval Force Operation (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta in the waters off Somalia.

In respect of possessing the longest coastlines Finland and Sweden have, as shown in Articles 3 through 5, shouldered much responsibility for establishing bi- and multilaterally shared maritime domain awareness in the Baltic Sea. Thereto, their leading roles in the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission (the Helsinki Commission [HELCOM]) and the EU Natura 2000 network, establishing vast nature protection areas, illustrate their efforts to contribute to the environmental management of the Baltic Sea.\(^{69}\) Here, the EU’s

comprehensive 2014 Maritime Security Strategy represents a capstone document outlining the maritime dimension of EU’s maritime policy, in turn being the partial result of a process aimed at turning the EU into a strategic foreign policy actor.

In conclusion, Finland and Sweden have refrained from developing national concepts of maritime security but incorporated that of the EU, in turn influenced by that of the US. These two EU member states have placed emphasis on maritime governance, blue growth opportunities and marine environmental protection. Since 2014, however, traditional military concerns superimpose their maritime security calculus, with an emphasis on defence and deterrence. Accordingly, changing circumstances related to a more assertive Russia – the regional power that has dimensioned their defence capabilities in much of modern history – have forced them to react. As shown in Articles 3 through 5, they have responded by deepening their bilateral naval cooperation, including far from insignificant elements of maritime security strategy in their vision document for the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG). Notably, the 2023 objective for the SFNTG represents a joint re-establishment of their national Cold War protection of shipping capabilities, but spanning a wider range of civilian maritime activities. Finland and Sweden have identified the need for a regional maritime security strategy that, as shown in Article 3, centres on managing the effects of great power competition and interaction.

6.2. Lessons learned from recent employments of maritime security strategies in regions where traditional and non-traditional security threats converge

Despite the differing geopolitical characteristics of the two regions subject to study in this thesis, certain aspects of the maritime security problems addressed by their coastal states and those of the external great power US are common. Such a common denominator is the fact that traditional and non-traditional security threats converge in shaping the character of their maritime security challenges. Another is that the traditional threats stem from the rise of regional powers challenging the current hegemon – external to both regions, but allied with several coastal states in each of the regions that perceive themselves increasingly threatened by the regional challenger – potentially capable of

70 Following Cohen (2003: 12), this thesis understands geopolitics as “the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other, political processes”.

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inducing a change in the order of the international anarchic system. In order to suggest viable strategies for preserving peace and stability in the Baltic Sea region, we can learn certain lessons from the developments in the East and South China Sea region.

6.2.1. The East and South China Seas

Arguably, the maritime security of the East and South China Sea region are subsets of that of the larger Asia-Pacific region. Here, maritime powers Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan interact with each other and the US, but so do also the rising power India, which maritime security interests – as part of a more vigorous Indian foreign policy – now extends beyond the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea into the Western Pacific (see Collin 2016).

As shown in Article 2 of this thesis, the coastal states of the East and South China Sea region have been particularly active in promoting national interests and economic growth through bi- and multilateral cooperation initiatives and trade agreements, but also of linking them to security. While the level of distrust and rivalry between many of them has thwarted bi- and multilateral defence-industrial cooperation, the ASEAN has taken on lead roles in fostering dialogues on trade and managing threats at the low end of the conflict spectrum, such as the region’s widespread piracy and the smuggling of drugs and arms. The high level of irregular migration in the region – which links to security have been thoroughly addressed in the constructivist literature (see Chapter 2) – stands out as a major challenge. The activities of Islamic groups have been troubling phenomena in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines throughout the period of study. In addition to criminal groups, there are numerous examples on their engagement in armed robbery at sea, maritime piracy, ship hijacking, as well as terrorist plots and attacks on cruise ships and military vessels in the period of study.

As shown in Article 2, the main and intractable traditional security problems of the East and South China Seas that include a maritime security dimension and directly involve the US through its security guarantees are: i) the military (nuclear) threat posed by North Korea, directed primarily towards South Korea and Japan; ii) the China-Taiwan conflict; iii) the Chinese build-up of its Maritime Law Enforcement agency capacity, anti-access area denial, submarine and blue water naval capabilities, territorial assertiveness and appetite for marine resources in the South China Sea and its biased interpretation of international maritime law; and iv) the build-up of naval capabilities among the other coastal states of the region. We can add to this list the uncertainty of the India-China and
India-US relations, which may prove stabilising or destabilising for the security of this maritime region.

In conclusion, patterns of economic and maritime security cooperation on managing non-traditional threats superimpose patterns of national rivalry over resources, territory and influence as well as naval power in the East and South China Sea region. Thereto, as shown in Article 2, it is apparent that – in line with structural realism predictions – the amount of power politics in the foreign policy of China increases in tandem with the increase in its military power. As a result, the notable – although not always successful – role of the intergovernmental ASEAN in issues of low politics such as economics, trade, social affairs and the management of non-traditional security issues in the last decades. However, its role in managing issues of high politics – i.e. issues of traditional military security – has been marginal, a fact apparent in the territorial disputes and the increasing security pressure affecting its member states.

In reflection on Till’s conceptualisation of the sea (see Section 2.1), the roles of the East and South China Seas have consistently served as a resource and a medium: i) of transportation and exchange; ii) for information and the spread of ideas; and iv) of dominion.

In accordance with structural realism’s prediction that states will assign low priority to non-security objectives in times of high security pressure, small and medium powers in this region have sought to maintain their economic relationships with China while deepening their security relationships with the US, regardless of ideology. Among them, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam – signing a US strategic partnership in 2013 – stands out. So do the ongoing process of changing the Japanese post-WW2 pacifist constitution (McCurry 2016) and the US-Philippines 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, leading up to the Philippines’ March 2016 decision to once again allow for permanent US military presence by rotational deployments. To the south, as shown in Article 2, Australia’s post-2012 enhanced security ties with the US including US military deployments – which stands in bright contrast to its close economic ties with China – are due to fears of the latter becoming a regional hegemon.

Given this trend, it is likely that states in this region will continue to conform to structural realism predictions and give priority to autonomy seeking over influence seeking policies if the level of security pressure increases further. Accordingly, many will disregard ideology and national sentiments that may disfavour the presence of US military personnel on their territories in their
subordination of other requirements to military power. As a result, we can expect that the role of ASEAN will be further diminished and that the states of the wider Asia-Pacific region will more or less continue the process of aligning with either the US or China. The lack of reference to the recent ruling of the international tribunal on the China-Phillippines territorial dispute in the final statement of the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits of September 2016, following intense Chinese diplomacy, is indicative on this (Crowe 2016).

Here, the conceptual framework for structuring the analysing the relations between small states and a nearby great power engaged in power rivalry with a more distant great power (see Section 3.2.4) is useful. As shown in Article 2, structural realism’s prediction that a regional power will put pressure on weaker states in the region and minimise their options when security pressure is high is confirmed by China’s use of its economic leverage through a divide and rule strategy to break up ASEAN's unity on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The case of the Philippines’ loss of control over disputed territory to China following the Scarborough Shoal standoff is illustrative on the way China uses the capabilities of its maritime law enforcement agencies in combination with those of its navy. The Philippines – openly promoted by the US and Vietnam – did not redraw its submission the territorial disputes with China from the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which ruled in its favour in July 2016.

As shown in Article 2, the case of Vietnam is indicative on the effect of the Chinese pressure and perhaps an attempt to performance a balancing act between China and the US, since it has not followed suit with the Philippines and submitted its territorial disputes with China to this court. Its careful official comments to the ruling, contrasting those of geographically more distant Indonesia and Singapore, are instructive on its efforts to manage the Chinese pressure and avoid confrontation. This points to the influence of the geographic location of the small state relative the regional great power, as set forth by the framework, and the influence of their historical record of bilateral relations. The China-Vietnam relations have been turbulent throughout history, well-illustrated by their 1974 naval engagement resulting in China gaining control over the Paracel Islands (Fravel 2011: 298). However, China was a strategic ally of North Vietnam in the US-Vietnam War while the former US colony Philippines is a long-standing US ally. We must also bear in mind that China shares a 1,450 km border with Vietnam (VBN 2016). Accordingly, we can expect that China is considering the possibility that the US would use Vietnam’s territory for its purposes unacceptable, while it finds the US use of that of the Philippines undesired.
A key lesson learned from the East and South China Seas is that to overcome “the stopping power of water” emphasised by Mearsheimer (2001: 114), the US has sought to employ a well-crafted comprehensive maritime strategy embracing civilian as well as military agencies. As noted in Article 2, the 2007 *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* served to reassure China by the emphasis placed on the cooperative dimensions of maritime security. This concept provided not so obvious benefits to an external great power in the backyard of a rival regional great power. Through its increasingly ambitious maritime security activities the US became capable not only to assist its allies and partners in policing the seas, but also gained a military foothold in a region in which China was establishing the capability to prevent regional access by the US Navy and the US Marine Corps. Here, the employment of US Coast Guard capabilities in the South China Sea as a part of the US “pivot” paved the way for military deployments, initially providing support to its law enforcement agencies but gradually expanding their scope to include also naval dimensions.

Another lesson learned is that to manage the complex maritime security challenges of the East and South China Seas, US allies and partners agreed to contribute to establish shared maritime domain awareness, each to a level of information sharing which satisfied their needs and their command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems capabilities. As noted in Article 2, close allies share secret information of the entire spectrum through the implemented multilevel information architecture, while less trusted partners only have access to an unclassified “shared information space” and a “user-defined operational picture” suitable for law enforcement agencies. By implementing such differing information security regimes across the maritime security spectrum, the US has managed to obtain *all* information while it controls that of each participant. Since superior maritime domain awareness is a prerequisite for the US establishment of “command of the seas” and the projection of naval and air power ashore, the layered information management concept implemented in the region under the banner of “maritime security partnership” serves well its maritime strategy. The concept leverages the US information superiority, why it has become a prescription for obtaining success in other maritime regions of importance, serving its quest for continued global leadership.

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71 Arguably, these military capabilities shape the modern battlefield.
6.2.2. The Baltic Sea

As noted in Articles 3 through 5, the Baltic Sea is a distinct region in which the interaction of its coastal states – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden – shape its maritime security. All of them, except Russia, are members of the EU while the Baltic States, Denmark, Germany and Poland are members of NATO. The Baltic States, Finland and Poland forms the Eastern boundary of the Schengen Area in which internal border controls has been eliminated since 1995, but of which Sweden has temporary reintroduced them since November 2015 to manage the migration crisis (EC 2016b). In contrast to the East and South China Seas, access to the Baltic Sea is limited to the single shallow gateway made up of the narrow Øresund and the Great and Little Belt straits.

As shown in Articles 3 through 5, Finland and Sweden have been particularly active in promoting bi- and multilateral cooperation on sea surveillance. Until 2014, regional maritime security management centred on navigational safety, resource exploitation and protecting the vulnerable eco-system of the Baltic Sea, i.e. maritime governance. Since 2005, it is designated a “particularly sensitive sea area” by the International Maritime Organization and thus subject to particular measures, i.e. routing and traffic monitoring of shipping and pollution control (IMO 2016). The Baltic Sea is distinguished for the absence of piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorist attacks. However, Sweden has had to deal with cases of illegal migration by sea since 2015, while Finnish and Swedish police have suspected that representatives of human trafficking networks of the Mediterranean operate in their countries (Ekstrand 2015; TT 2016a). In conclusion, these non-traditional security concerns have been the focus areas of their maritime security policies throughout the period of study.

Given the multinational – and partly transnational – characters of these threats to sustainable maritime governance and exploitation of marine resources, it is apparent that Finland and Sweden have considered their national interests best promoted by engagement in wider Baltic Sea and EU frameworks. One could rightly argue that this provides support to typical neoliberalism predictions that international institutions and regimes to constrain state behaviour and manage state interaction, that ideological preferences prevail in states’ foreign policy, and that states seek absolute gains while focussing on economics and other non-military issues. It also points to the importance assigned by them to the rule of law. Notwithstanding, also structural realism predicts that weaker states will seek to mitigate or prevent domination by
stronger powers by negotiating collaborative arrangements in inter- or supranational institutions. In this quest, the EU was the given arena for Finland and Sweden.

As shown in Article 3, neofunctionalism explains the motives and interests that led to the 2013 launch of a process by the two chiefs of their navies aimed at integrating the navies of Finland and Sweden within the framework of the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group. This need for bilateral military cooperation within the NORDEFCO framework was not due to external threats. Instead, the need to become more cost-efficient and maintain critical capabilities in response to aggregated and foreseen defence cuts was the main motive. Neofunctionalism’s idea of functional and technical spillover effects between different issue-areas explains the dynamics at the time they launched the cooperation. Notably, the wider framework of the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy was a prerequisite for this process. Both this policy – adopted in 1991 and thus coinciding with the Cold War termination – and the subsequent 2003 European Security Strategy – focussing on cooperative security on a global scale – were premised on a benign security environment in Europe and the continued global military dominance of the US.

The post-2013 developments contrast these collaborative views on maritime security in the Baltic Sea region. They suggest that while its role as a resource and a medium of transport and trade persist, the Baltic Sea is increasingly seen as a medium that must be controlled and dominated.

As shown in Articles 3 through 5, the US pivot to the Asia-Pacific was being effectuated in 2014 and its military presence in Europe was already reduced. Within NATO, member states spent much effort on discussing who would pay for the defence capabilities of Europe. In this context, Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea was a “game-changer” altering the security calculus of the EU and NATO, while restoring US interest in European security. Russia’s demonstrated capability to effectuate its will by force made earlier statements by President Putin on a new security order – e.g. that of the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007 – credible and the European security landscape swiftly embraced geopolitical dimensions. Russia’s build-up of anti-access area denial capabilities and modernised nuclear weapons, e.g. in the Kaliningrad exclave, now posed a tangible threat to NATO-members on its Eastern flank. Russia’s much noted deployment of Iskander-M missile systems from the Saint Petersburg region to Kaliningrad on 7–8 October 2016 illustrates the role of the maritime domain to the security of the Baltic Sea region. Russia
used the M/V Ambal to deploy the missile systems, escorting it by SU-27 fighter aircraft of which some repeatedly violated Estonian and Finnish airspace (Holmström 2016c).

As shown in Articles 4 and 5, Russia’s military modernisation and renewed assertiveness in the Baltic Sea region has become a regional, as well as a global, security problem. The weak national defence capabilities of the Baltic States and their: i) limited territorial size; ii) common borders with Russia; and iii) Russian minorities; render them particularly vulnerable to Russian conventional and hybrid warfare. Withal, given the security guarantees NATO and the US have granted them, their survival is crucial to the credibility of the former. We must also consider the vulnerability of Poland, a NATO-member bordering the Kaliningrad exclave that has taken a series of measures to improve its defence capabilities. NATO and the US have launched multiple initiatives to improve deterrence, e.g. the 2014 US Operation Atlantic Resolve (part of its European Reassurance Initiative), the setup of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the raised ambitions of various exercise series.

The defence of these NATO-members has obvious maritime implications. While a maritime logistics chain has the advantages that come with the load capacity of ships, amphibious landings may be required in a scenario at the high-end of the conflict spectrum to deploy reinforcements or to retake occupied territory. Depending on the level of threat, command of the sea in the region may be required to provide adequate force protection and reach acceptable levels of risk to own forces when executing any such operation. Accordingly, Russia’s emerging anti-access area denial capacity poses a risk to allied naval forces, while an opposed entry through the narrow and shallow gateway to the Baltic Sea would be particularly risky.

Notwithstanding the obvious challenges associated with crisis scenarios at the high-end of the conflict spectrum, Russia has induced multi-sectoral peacetime maritime insecurity in the Baltic Sea since 2013. As shown in Articles 3 through 5, it has involved harassments of civilian shipping, intrusions of Finnish and Swedish territorial waters and airspace, as well as deliberate close encounters by military aircraft and naval vessels. Developments in 2016 include Russia being accused of distributed denial-of-service attacks on Swedish media (Kudo 2016), Swedish civilian air traffic control systems and the Finnish Parliament (Fagerström 2016), the spread of disinformation (Holmström 2016a) as well as espionage (TT 2016b). In response, NATO has raised the stakes regarding military deployments and by engaging in increasingly advanced
exercises in the Baltic Sea region (as in the rest of Northern Europe), aimed at deterring Russia. While Finland and Sweden have actively participated in these exercises, Finland joined the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia in June 2016 and Sweden decided to follow suit in September 2016 (NATO 2016d; TT 2016c).

The conceptual framework for structuring the analysis of relations between a small state and a nearby great power engaged in power rivalry with a more distant great power (see section 3.2.4) is useful also to explain the security dynamics of the Baltic Sea region. Concerning the first independent variable, Russia’s growing power corresponds with its increasingly assertive foreign policy – as predicted by structural realism. This has induced geopolitical tensions with its rival external great power (the US), which influence it would like to reduce in the regional “sphere of interest” in which Russia apparently seeks to acquire a level of economic, military, political and to some extent even cultural exclusivity. Recently, analysts (see Ma 2016) have pointed to the gap between Russia’s military and economic power, of which the latter is far from impressive. Notwithstanding, a recent US Office of Naval Intelligence (2015) report concludes that although being plagued by production problems, Russia’s build-up of a multi-purpose naval force continues at a steady pace.

Concerning the second independent variable, it is clear that Russia uses its economic and military power as a lever to influence the foreign policies of its neighbours. Here, as shown in Article 3, Finland’s 1,340 km common land border with Russia means higher risks and sensitivities than for Sweden. Given recent developments, we can conclude that if stakes get higher this factor will be more pronounced, which contributes to explain why Finland are more keen on seeking a formalised alliance with Sweden than vice versa.

As concerns the third independent variable, Articles 3 through 5 show that both Finland and Sweden have transformed their foreign and security policies in the time period of study, from one of non-alignment aiming at neutrality in times of war to one of non-aligned EU-members engaged in deep partnerships with NATO. An explicit aim of their bilateral naval cooperation has been to send diplomatic signals on their resolve to protect their sovereignty and their national interests. This is evident by the facts that both states: i) have ensured that their navies fully operate according to NATO standards within the framework of the SFNTG; ii) host and deeply engage in high-profile NATO exercises, which objectives are associated with deterrence and the high-end of the conflict spectrum; and iii) carefully cultivate their bilateral relations with the US.
Notably, as shown in Article 5, Swedish Defence and Foreign Ministers have refrained from opposing statements by US military officials such as that Sweden represents a “building block in the wall” to deter Russia.

To Russia, the impending probability that an external rivalling great power may use Finnish and Swedish territories must be apparent. In turn, this probability entails an underlying motive for Russia to influence their foreign policies and convince them to heed the risks associated with deepening their relations – not to mention aligning – with the US. This contributes to explain why Russia has engaged itself in multi-sectoral, peacetime, assertiveness and psychological operations in the Baltic Sea region since 2013.

Concerning the fourth independent variable, it is clear that throughout modern history, the location of the Baltic Sea between Russia and the Atlantic Ocean have conditioned the geopolitics of the region. The conflicting views have centred on whether it should be a “mare liberum” open to external powers or a “mare clausum” strategically controlled by its littoral powers, i.e. Russia and until 1991 the USSR (Miljan 1974). As shown in Articles 4 and 5, the Baltic Sea is vital for Russia’s oil and gas exports, its export of naval vessels including submarines and the use of container ships in its trade. A complicating factor for its maritime resource extraction is its very limited EEZ rights in the Baltic Sea, why its needs for influencing or controlling the policies of smaller coastal states are apparent. Withal, control over its sea lines of communication and military exercise areas are core Russian interests.

As noted in a recent study on the effects of Finland’s possible NATO membership, “Finland and Sweden constitute a common strategic space” (MFA FI 2016: 6). From a geopolitical perspective, both states hold important strategic spaces in the Baltic Sea region, including the demilitarised Åland archipelago in the Northern Baltic Sea. As noted in Articles 3 and 4, the southern coast of Sweden is particularly useful for staging a military intervention in support of the Baltic States. The placement of modern air defence systems on the island of Gotland would effectively contribute to the military control of the Baltic Sea. From a Russian perspective, control of this territory would impede such a NATO intervention. These facts help explain the Swedish Armed Forces September 2016 deployment of a mechanised infantry company to the island, reportedly motivated by a “significant deterioration” of the international security situation (SvD 2016). Here, the conditioner for the level of trust between Russia vis-à-vis Finland and Sweden, made up of their historical record relations, work against Russia. The relationship between these Western democracies and Russia have
been nothing but adversarial throughout modern history. During the Cold War, Finland was compelled to pursue a cautious policy towards the West since Russia “never truly accepted Finnish neutrality” (MFA FI 2016: 9–10).

As noted in Articles 4 and 5, non-aligned Sweden and Finland have become deeply integrated with NATO and bilaterally linked to the US. From a Russian perspective, NATO membership applications by these states would therefore simply confirm the negative implications of their aggregated foreign and security policy choices. Finland’s and Sweden’s joint signing and implementation of Host Nation Support agreements with NATO have clearly fuelled the Russian concern that they would allow NATO – and thus the US – to use their territories in a crisis. Prior to Sweden’s May 2016 parliamentary decision on its implementation, Russian agents were particularly active in spreading systematic disinformation aimed at postponing the decision (Holmström 2016b). In July 2016, the Russian President hinted on how Russia’s would react if Finland joined NATO, i.e. that it would “move its troops closer to the Finnish-Russian border” to balance “NATO’s military infrastructure, which overnight would be at the borders of the Russian Federation” (Dyomkin and Forsell 2016).

We noted in Articles 4 and 5 that access to Swedish and Finnish territory is critical to NATO and the US for establishing staging areas in case of a military intervention in the Baltic States. If so, NATO and the US highly desire access to information from their interconnected sea surveillance systems for establishing an adequate level of MDA in the Baltic Sea. Thereto, we must not disregard the value to NATO and the US of being able to make use of the naval niche capabilities of Finland and Sweden – interoperable with NATO forces – for their operations in these confined and shallow waters. Their far-reaching partnership arrangements with NATO and their deepened bilateral security cooperation with the US confirm the expectation set out in the introduction of this thesis that these small states – for the reasons above – are able to punch beyond their weight as regional security providers. The implications of this fact are particularly prominent in the maritime domain due to the importance of the Baltic Sea to transport and communication within the region. In conclusion, the security policy choices of Finland and Sweden centre on whether they will choose to openly challenge Russia by entering processes of accession to NATO, which risk creating an atmosphere of tense antagonism, or continue their “middle way” of close cooperation with NATO while putting their hope in a lowering of the regional security pressure.
Regardless of choice they must, as argued in Articles 3 through 5, protect their lawful maritime interest on a daily basis in peace-time scenarios. To mitigate the risk of being accused by Russia for escalating various types of incidents where civilian and military interests collide, Finland and Sweden need to implement a comprehensive approach. If existing maritime law enforcement units – ships and maritime patrol aircraft cross-manned by liaison officers – would be equipped with military command and control systems and weapons as appropriate, they would be well suited to act as first responders on incidents at the low end of the conflict spectrum. Of course this would involve widening the scope of their maritime patrols as well as an increase in their intensity. Seamlessly, as done by China, naval vessels and aircraft could then be called upon to support if situations escalate. Here, active strategic communication – preferably coordinated bilaterally and with NATO as feasible – could counteract any attempts to spread misinformation.

To establish a comprehensive and collaborative maritime security effort in the Baltic Sea, aimed at managing the lower end of the conflict spectrum, further legal amendments are required in Finland and Sweden but also on a regional scale among members of the EU and NATO. The ability of maritime law enforcement and military personnel of the region's coastal states to use of force on each other's territorial waters would significantly leverage the effectiveness of existing capabilities. However, as suggested in Article 5, implementing a comprehensive approach among civilian and military agencies on a national and/or multinational scale is a daunting legal and cultural challenge. In the view of this author, as concluded in Article 5, it may require transformational learning processes among the personnel of all services.

6.3. Aggregated conclusions

This section serves to present the aggregated conclusions drawn from answering the research questions, divided into empirical and theoretical conclusions respectively.

6.3.1. Aggregated empirical conclusions

In this thesis, we have noted close relation between the US 1991 concept of maritime security and that of sea power. Arguably, it was as a naval approach to manage national security problems. It draws back to the idea that “he who commandeth the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will”, coined in 1625 by the English philosopher and statesman Francis Bacon (cited in Friedman 2001: 4). N.B. it implies the utility of naval forces to
project power in distant regions of the world or use it as a defensive barrier off its own shores. As commonly known, the prominent maritime strategists USN Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan and British historian Sir Julian S. Corbett elaborated further on this thinking in their works. The fundamental role traditionally assigned to naval power in US strategic thought explains much of the continuity, but also much of the change, in its maritime security concept. Its employment may involve direct and/or indirect approaches with different strategic implications. While the direct approach centres on various types of kinetic action, the indirect approach involves more subtle dimensions such as naval presence, reassurance of allies as well as counter-piracy, embargo and FON operations. These types of activities shape the maritime domain, most often in peacetime.

We can conclude that the use of sea power is at heart of the US maritime security concept, representing a thread of continuity. Change is due to shifts in focus regarding the domains for the US peacetime strategic competition with other major powers, in turn conditioned by the influence of altering economic and transforming security contexts. The absence of peer US military rivals in the 1990s gave way for strategies aimed at reaping the benefits of the global trade system – dominated by merchant shipping while being increasingly threatened by various non-state actors perpetrating maritime crimes or terrorism for reasons of economic gain or political influence – by shaping it in its favour. Following the plots and attacks on USN vessels and the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US used terrorism as a lever to implement Homeland Security initiatives among its allies and trading partners on a global scale through bilateral agreements (often linked to preferential trade agreements) and by influencing relevant international institutions. The rise of China and Russia in the 2000s made them peer US competitors (and Russia a named adversary), whose shore and sea-based anti-access area denial capabilities posed increasingly severe threats to US naval access to the East and South China Seas and the Baltic Sea. Advanced shore-based coastal defence capabilities and non-traditional security threats necessitated the geographical widening of the sea areas in which maritime security were required. We can thus conclude that the return of geopolitics and military threats to world politics explains both the continuity and the most recent change in the US post-Cold War maritime security strategy.

To promote its interests from the array of traditional and non-traditional maritime security threats in these regions, the US was dependent on cooperation with its regional allies and partners, large and small. Those who possessed geographic areas critical to promoting US national interests, while being willing
to offer basing areas, share information contributing to maritime domain awareness, engage in training and exercises while preferably also being subject to US free trade agreements were the ones who could punch beyond their weight in the regional security calculus. Their non-proportional influence on US employment of regional maritime strategies was clearly conditioned by an increase in the level of great power rivalry and their fear of the regional great power – resulting in willingness to side with the external great power by facilitating US peace-time access and intelligence information, and for partners to deepen their US/NATO partnership. Concerning partner countries Finland and Sweden, they also offered niche capabilities – of great value to the US – to respond by submarine and anti-submarine warfare in confined and shallow brackish waters. Finally, it is worth reflecting on the fact that the Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation has rendered them a stronger partner in their often joint dialogues with the US and NATO. Article 2 of this thesis noted the power of joint small states action, as small states’ dominance of UN General Assembly influenced the US decision not to ratify the UNCLOS.

6.3.2. Aggregated theoretical conclusions

Given that structural realism is the main theoretical framework of this thesis, it is reasonable to pose the question: How can we know that its explanations are convincing? Article 3 showed that neofunctionalism provides credible explanations of the motives and processes underpinning the launch of the Finnish-Swedish naval cooperation. However, the distinction between high and low politics given primacy in neofunctionalism is outright dismissed by Waltz (2010[1979]: 94), since states “use military and political means for the achievement of economic interests” and vice versa. The causal direction of this mechanism is thus reversible, making it “misplaced” to explain state behaviour. To structural realism, states’ priorities are determined by the level of international security pressure, which was low in the Baltic Sea region in 1991–2013.

Neofunctionalism is an IR-theory designed to explain – and even instruct on – EU-integration. Hence, neoliberalism represents a more adequate competing theoretical framework for examining the US developments. Although this IR-theory has not been employed in this thesis, we can expect that neoliberalism would offer complementary or competing explanations on the role of international bodies such as the IMO, the UN and the ASEAN, especially concerning the priority given to the political and economic sectors of security in the first two decades of the study. In particular, it would explain the
conceptualisation of maritime security as a requirement for sustained globalisation and the establishment of collective ends beyond states’ selfish pursuit of their national interests expressed in various maritime strategic documents from 2005 to 2008. N.B. security pressure was low also in the Asia-Pacific region at this time. Although this perspective remains an important part of the US current maritime security concept, the most recent strategy documents place emphasis on traditional security considerations.

It is equally clear that structural realism fares better than neofunctionalism in explaining the deepening of the Swedish-Finnish bilateral naval cooperation, resulting from a common external threat and influenced by Russia-US rivalry. The gradual emphasis of the naval dimension in their maritime security strategies, entailing revisions of legal frameworks including constitutional laws and intensified rapprochement to the US and NATO, have not been due to concerns of cost-efficiency but of sovereignty and to deter Russia. Structural realism readily explains the continuity in Finnish post-Cold War maritime security strategy as compared to Sweden by its common border with Russia and their historical record of conflict and submission.

Concerning the South China Sea, we noted the weak response of intergovernmental ASEAN in dealing with individual member states’ territorial disputes with China in Article 2. The apparent limits of this regional organisation – characterised by socialisation processes and the norm of non-interference – to promote the interests of its members in face of a rising and increasingly assertive China is well illustrated by its vague response to the ruling of the International Tribunal in Hague on the China-Philippines case.72

Regional organisations premised on liberal principles appear to be frail in times of high security pressure, weakening the explanations of liberalism theories and strengthening those of structural realism. Given the congruence between the predictions of structural realism and the empirical findings of this study, we can conclude that this framework provides convincing explanations to the most important aspects of continuity and change in the maritime security strategies of the US and EU member states Finland and Sweden. This despite the fact that its explanations are somewhat “indeterminate” on the role of domestic and systemic factors (see Waltz 1986: 343).

72 Although the ruling favoured the Philippines, its September 2016 Summit only gave a vague statement of on the concerns expressed by some member states on the Chinese assertion of its territorial claims (Crowe 2016).
6.4. Limitations and future studies

In this qualitative study, as in all research, we have chosen and applied a methodology. Certain limitations in its results are thus unavoidable. This thesis employed the broad structural realism school of thought in its study of the sole superpower and two small states in two distinct regions subject to comprehensive maritime security challenges. It aimed at providing explanations not only to continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region with a focus on non-aligned Finland and Sweden, but also to that of the US post-Cold War maritime security concept by examining its maritime security strategy developments. The degree of transferability of the empirical results depends on the nature and character of the maritime security problems in the two regions at hand. Given that much of the detailed findings are context dependent, we can expect them to differ widely.

It is however clear that the influence of global trade has resulted in significant interdependence, which serves to explain why the US conceptual understanding of maritime security has influenced most states of the world. Thereto, the influence of a varying level of security pressure on the explanatory power of structural realism and neoliberalism has a certain level of generalisability. It is likely that the structural realism claim that when states face military threats to their sovereignty and survival, they will subordinate their economic and ideological interests has merit. In this regard, the agony shown by the current Swedish government when forced to deal with traditional security threats in its own region, centring on the role of NATO and collective defence, instead of focussing on contributing to EU-led global crisis management and state reconstruction activities is illustrative. As shown in Article 3, cross-case comparisons of neofunctionalism explanations on defence cooperation are possible within the EU. Since the origin of this theory coincides with European integration, comparisons are likely to be limited to this regional context.

The comparison of the findings in the two distinct regions highlights the similarities of the constraints on the foreign policy of Finland and Vietnam in their relations to a regional great power. Moreover, certain aspects of the Philippines more daring behaviour in the face of the same regional power – which can be traced backed to its lack of common border with China and its alliance with the US – to some extent resembles the wider leeway Sweden enjoys in comparison to its Eastern neighbour Finland. In both cases, the states concerned are members of regional international bodies – i.e. ASEAN and the EU respectively. Here, further study on the interactions of Vietnam and the
Philippines and the continued role of ASEAN and their respective bilateral relations with the US seems like a promising project.

For the Baltic Sea region, a longitudinal case study on the Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation, employing the theoretical framework used in Article 3, would provide answers to the prospects and challenges inherent in European defence cooperation. Concerning the far-flung plans on marine exploitation of the Baltic Sea including sea-based wind power parks, fish farming, offshore oil and gas extraction – well captured by the concept of Maritime Spatial Planning – a study on how the region’s coastal state approach the entanglement of civilian interests and military activities seems like a worthwhile endeavour. Here, one might pose the following research question: what are the viable national strategies that enable blue growth in contested marine environments subject to the forces and interactions that follow from global interdependence?

Finally, the foreign and security policy of the EU – an economic and political union subject to what some have described as an existential crisis (see Menéndez 2013) – represents a fascinating object of study in its own respect. Here, we could employ a variety of theoretical perspectives to explain the current challenges and expound on its future prospects. As an extension of this study, a case study on the US conceptual influence on the 2014 European Union Maritime Security Strategy – and the shaping efforts made by individual member states including Finland and Sweden in the drafting process – would be most relevant.
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What explains continuity and change in post-Cold War maritime security strategies? What lessons can we learn from the employment of such comprehensive grand strategies in maritime regions where traditional and non-traditional threats converge? While many scholars have addressed particular maritime security issues, this author joins the few who engage themselves in the study of the conceptual development of maritime security.

Through the lens of structural realism, this thesis examines the logic of the maritime security strategies employed in two distinguished regions by the US and EU member states Finland and Sweden. It concludes that while their maritime security concept remains broad, the recent increase in security pressure has renewed the priority assigned to the military sector of security. Navies are thus re-using the measures implemented by a broad set of civil agencies and the shipping industry to improve maritime security, to gain the level of maritime domain awareness required for establishing regional sea control and project power from the sea.