Abstract

This paper sets out to answer the research question “Has the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ changed the way in which the EU approaches military cooperation, despite the unwillingness of member states to cooperate on the matter and to surrender national sovereignty over the military? If so, how?” in order to test the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism in the setting of counterterrorist military centralisation and cooperation within the EU. Constructivist institutionalism predicts the drive towards institutional communitarisation by member-states, in terms of discourse, norms, ideas, and practices. In order to test this, the case of the United Kingdom is chosen, as the least likely case of a drive towards military communitarisation. In particular, the British discourse, norms, ideas, and practices following the 2005 London Bombings and 2015 Paris attacks are examined. However, the progress towards communitarisation is not observed in these cases, as there is no mention of EU military cooperation. These results are not what the theory predicts, and indeed, EU military communitarisation is currently taking place, at least discursively. This reveals a shortcoming of the theory, as it assumes the underlying institutionalist norms of itself to be shared by any member-states as well. The conclusion arrived upon is that whilst constructivist institutionalism is a thorough and holistic theory, it must be further developed in order to be usable in the analysis of not only institutions, but also their member-states and their behaviour.

*Keywords: constructivist institutionalism, European integration, United Kingdom, communitarisation, counterterrorism, theory testing*
Introduction

Since its inception as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, what has since 1993 been officially known as the European Union has been an experimental prototype for inter-and even supra-national institutions (EU: The History of the European Union). The prosperity and trade policies that followed the Second World War in western Europe created the ideal environment for a new kind of institution to be constructed: one that since the beginning of the 21st century has come to represent the very concept of norms and cooperation within a neo-liberal paradigm trumping the nation-state as the most significant regional actor. Within the civilian sector, EU member-states cooperate in not only issues of trade, foreign policy, policing, justice and border control, but also in terms of culture, education, and the environment. In many ways, and in many sectors, the EU itself has become an actor in its own right, acting sometimes with authority above that of its member-states.

As the EU has become an increasingly closely knit organisation however, threats and challenges have arisen that concern not only the individual member-states, but the entirety of the institution. As the EU expands, it demands more and more energy in order to maintain its industry, trade, and societal order. This challenge is coupled with an ongoing economic crisis in many of the member-states of the periphery, which in turn have lead to societal crises. Furthermore, due to ongoing wars in Western Asia and Northern and Central Africa, such as the Syrian civil war, or the ongoing conflict in Libya, as well as hunger, unemployment, and persecution in many surrounding countries, the EU has become the goal for many refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants. This has put pressure on the societal and political status quo in most, if not all, EU member-states (BBC(a), 2016: Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts).

A major component of the EU cooperation is countering threats to the entirety of the union. One threat that has since the turn of the 21st century overshadowed all others within the public and prevailing political discourse of the EU has been the threat of terrorism. Following the attacks by Al-Qaeda against the United States on the 11th of September, 2001, the West became aware that
religiously motivated terrorism could have dramatic effects, and that Western nations were not invulnerable to it. This attack was followed, and continues to be followed, by repeated instances of fundamentalism-motivated terrorist attacks against nations both in the European space at large, such as Russia and Turkey, but also against EU member-states, such as the July 7th bombings in London, as well as attacks in Madrid, Paris, Nice, Brussels, Berlin, Stockholm and most recently, Manchester. However, whilst the attacks have taken place on EU soil, the organisations responsible of orchestrating the strikes have originated and primarily operate in Western Asia/the Middle East, as well as Northern Africa. The recent surge of conflicts and instability in these areas have also created space for these organisations to consolidate their power.

This threat of terrorism has not gone unnoticed by the authorities, both on the EU level, and the member-state level. In line with the EU’s self-image as a soft-power superpower, the focus of its counter-terrorist efforts have been within the civilian sector (European Council, EU fight against terrorism). Efforts have been made to institute controls on who enters the EU, to increase cooperation between police and intelligence forces, and to counter recruitment by terrorist organisations. At the same time, the political and civil leadership of both the EU and of the individual member states have strengthened the normative and discursive drive against religious fundamentalism and terrorism. However, whilst the US and its allies have been very active in the US-led ‘war on terror’, the EU as an institution would appear to have been less militaristic in its approach to countering terrorism. It is perhaps because of this that whilst much has been written within institutionalist academia about EU institutionalisation and cooperation on the civilian field, little research has been carried out to examine the military aspects of the EU’s institutional cooperation.

In the eyes of many, the military aspect of this ‘European integration’ has not corresponded to the degree of integration in other institutional aspects, such as in terms of foreign policy, policing, the judiciary sector, or trade policy. This thesis aims to answer the question: Has the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ changed the way in which the EU approaches military
cooperation, despite the unwillingness of member states to cooperate on the matter and to surrender national sovereignty over the military? If so, how? Of particular interest to this study will be the UK. This is due to its unique position of being a militarily active member-state, and a reluctant participant in EU centralisation. As such, if it were the case that the UK has pushed and propagated for closer military cooperation within the context of the EU, it could be argued that there has indeed been a call or even actual steps made towards closer institutionalisation of the military sphere on an EU level. Answering this research question would aid in understanding how the external ‘war on terror’ has allowed the EU to mature as a multi-faceted inter- and supra-state organisation (acting both as an institution bringing states together, and at times as one with more authority that the member-states), in addition to having paved the way for today’s attempts at military cooperation.

In order to answer the above question, constructivist institutionalism will be employed theoretically to better support a process-tracing method that examines primary sources on the public record originating from EU and UK authorities, following the September 11 attacks, and focusing on EU-centric military cooperation and counterterrorism. This theoretical framework has been chosen, as in its understanding of the duality of interaction and mutual influence between institutions and member-states, on a discursive, normative, ideational, and practical level.

The focus on the military aspect of the hypothesised drive for closer co-operation is due to the lack of literature approaching this particular aspect of counter-terrorism within the EU context. Much has been written examining the civilian, that is, political, police, and judicial cooperation against terrorism within the EU. However, institutionalist literature, and literature concerned with the EU in general, seems to shy away from elaborating on the military aspects, if any, and their form, of institutional cooperation within the EU. This especially the case considering the recent publicly outspoken political support for closer military cooperation; with some senior EU technocrats even calling for the creation of an EU Army. It is important to study if and how such attempts have been made in the past. This study aims to complement institutionalist theory
through the study of institutional centralisation on the field of military cooperation in the EU. As a singular study, it is not viable to aim to revise the theory to completion, but rather, to contribute as a step in the way to develop a holistic institutionalist understanding of all aspects of EU centralisation and integration, and to test whether current institutionalist thinking can explain the military aspect of the EU.

The issue of the institutional military counterterrorist centralisation of the EU is central to the field of war studies. Whilst not a subject that touches upon themes of military strategy, history, or the role of the military in society, this study’s focus on military centralisation, from a discursive, normative, ideational, and practical point of view makes it compatible with the field of war studies. The goal is to examine if and how the structure of civil-military relations is changing within the EU, towards a centralisation unlike any other form of intra-state military cooperation (like NATO or the former Warsaw Pact). Furthermore, this paper seeks to aid in understanding the preconditions of military cooperation within a political-economic institution, and the possibilities of military communitarisation on an inter- and supra-national level. It seeks to examine the trajectory of the use of force and military organisation in the EU. If the case is that there is indeed a discursive, normative, ideational, or practical drive for military centralisation for the goal of counterterrorism, it would signal the further development of the EU from an intra-state institution to a supra-state one.

**Choice of Case:**
The EU member state chosen as the case for this study, that is, the UK, has certain unique characteristics that make it suitable for testing institutionalist theory in the context of military cooperation within the EU, and EU level. Within popular discourse, and indeed, as the ‘Brexit’ referendum demonstrated, within popular understanding too, the UK is perceived as being distanced from the EU proper, and the discourse towards the EU demonstrates an attitude that from a cost-benefit point of view, the UK is better off acting independently. Therefore, if it were to be demonstrated that the UK, the least likely case, has driven for, or spoken in support of, a closer military cooperation against terrorism, within the context of the EU, this paper will have
succeeded in demonstrating the theory applicable, and the hypothesis reasonably plausible, from a scientific point of view.

However, first and foremost, the difference between military cooperation in an EU context and military cooperation within the EU, as a space, must be defined. Military cooperation within an EU context is military cooperation between at least two EU member-states, which has been facilitated by, promoted by, or undertaken under the leadership, auspices, or legitimising agency of, the EU. This does not include bilateral military cooperation outside of EU influence, cooperation within NATO, or cooperation between EU member-states and nations or institutional entities outside of the EU. Nonetheless, cooperation between the EU as a whole and external nations or institutions is included, as that pre-supposes internal cooperation within the EU, which then in turn cooperates with external entities.

This study is not limited to cases wherein the cooperation actually materialised, but will equally look at official pushes or arguments for military cooperation against terrorism within the context of the EU.

**Levels of Analysis:**

The research question can be approached from many different angles, and on many different levels of analysis, both military and civilian. Indeed, the focus of the empirical aspect of this study must be delimited to a certain level of analysis. The most pertinent level of analysis for the examination of the above mentioned research question, and within the confines of institutionalist theory, would be the so-called bureaucrat level, as well as the parliamentary level. This is due to the dual nature of institutional cooperation as per constructivist institutionalism. As constructivist institutionalist theory suggests, there exists a constant interaction between the normative and realist aspects of institutionalism, where the benefit-maximising and cost-minimising realist drive of each member state, as expressed through its bureaucrats and elected parliamentarians, serves to strengthen the norms of the institution (which are in turn represented by the bureaucrats of the institution, some of which may see the institution as a singular actor that acts on a cost-benefit thinking itself) (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 161-162). To this end, this
paper will focus on statements made by elected and government officials of the UK, as well as EU officials, where there is need.

**Hypothesis:**

This study aims to answer the research question, by maintaining the following assumption: It is assumed that, following the influx of terrorism in the first decade of the 21st century, there was a drive, at the very least discursively, to engage in military cooperation within the context of the EU. This is founded upon the theoretical framework of institutionalism. Namely, according to Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, rational choice institutionalist theory suggests that actors seek to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of any action (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 155). This, as it is incorporated into the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism, as it is defined by the authors, which sees an interaction between the rational choices of the individual actors, and the normative milieu created within the institution. According to this theory, the ‘communitarisation’ of the EU’s institutions is a direct result of both the normative developments, and the member states seeing closer cooperation as beneficial (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 161). As such, it is logical to hypothesise, based on this theory, that following the influx of terrorist attacks against the West, EU member-states would seek closer counter-terror cooperation not only on the civilian field, but the military as well. It would be grossly unscientific to claim the ability to prove a hypothesis, as that would imply a de-facto dismissal of alternative explanations and hypotheses, for the benefit of the one presented here. The aim of this theory-testing paper is rather to disprove the null hypothesis that there has been neither a drive nor any political attempts to put to practise an EU-centred military response to terrorism.
Theory

The EU itself has served for a long period, since its conception, as the primary example of institutionalist theory as applied to the real world. Indeed, as institutions become more prevalent in the international political and economic landscape, and as they gain increasing amounts of influence in all spheres of inter-, intra- and national politico-economic environment, with the EU being a prime example of this development, institutionalist theory has developed along several lines of scientific thought, coming to be a microcosm that reflects the full spectrum of political science paradigms. It is therefore prudent, before detailing the theoretical approach this study will take with regards to the research question, “Has the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ changed the way in which the EU approaches military cooperation, despite the unwillingness of member states to cooperate on the matter and to surrender national sovereignty over the military? If so, how?”, to examine the major institutionalist theories.

Literature Review:
Institutionalism has been applied to the case of cooperation, and more specifically, security cooperation, in the EU, in many forms. Authors Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou provide a thorough summary of the different major institutionalist approaches, which are applied to security cooperation in the EU. Furthermore, Raphael Bossong has approached the issue from the rather unique point of view of the ‘multiple streams framework approach’. Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard use institutionalism as a tool to examine the EU’s crisis management capabilities. Marxism and critical theory on the other hand, as applied to institutions, provide critiques, but are not applicable to the minutia of intra-institutional cooperation.

Whilst, as noted above, the military aspect of EU military counter-terrorist cooperation has been under-researched, the same cannot be said with regards to the general, mostly civilian, EU counter-terrorism efforts. Raphael Bossong for instance, in his book The Evolution of EU Counter-Terrorism provides a holistic summary of these efforts. However, rather than applying classical institutionalism to the case of the EU, Bossong chooses to examine the subject through
the so-called ‘multiple streams framework’, an approach most often used in the analysis of the policies and politics of the US (Bossong, 2014: 18). This approach examines the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream (Bossong, 2014: 20-23). Bossong applies what he calls actor-centred institutionalism, arguing that it is not in fact the aftereffects of terrorist attacks that are the main catalysts of policy change, but rather the interaction of actors on the lowest levels (Bossong, 2014: 23). He argues moreover, through the multiple streams framework approach, that for change to occur, there must be a synchronicity, whereupon issues in the problem stream, proposals available in the policy stream, and dynamics in the political stream, such as public opinion, must be brought together in terms of policy and practice (Bossong, 2014: 23-24). This theoretical framework however, does have its shortcomings that do not allow it to be as holistic a theory as other theoretical frameworks described below. First and foremost, as Bossong himself admits, this framework’s focus on public opinion, as a form of the political stream, has less purchase when applied to the case of the EU, as elections and public opinion have, according to him, a low impact on EU-specific political rhythms (Bossong, 2014:24). Furthermore, this framework, whilst acknowledging the interplay of events, policy, and public opinion, does not examine in detail their causes, or the lead-up to policy changes and initiatives in the thorough way other institutionalist approaches do.

To begin with, in a more traditional approach to institutionalism, according to Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, there is historical institutionalism. This form of the theory focuses on the long-term and short-term effects that institutions have (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 154). As such, historical institutionalism as a theory that determines action sees stability preferable to change, and, as the authors highlight, “does not encompass an explicit ontological choice - especially when it comes to the relative pre-of agency versus structure” (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 155). As such, historical institutionalism usually is incorporated into either the rationalist or the constructivist institutionalist theories. Historical institutionalism however can be understood as a proper field of study, and indeed a broad one. Firstly, it may be used in order to answer questions with regards to grander puzzles, that require a placement within a larger historical and geographical context, such as, why revolutions have happened in
certain places, and at certain times (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 696). Furthermore, historical institutionalism can be a particularly helpful theory in the analysis of long-term historical processes. It is of special interest as a theory that provides the researcher with the theoretical toolbox to theorise about causation in a historical setting (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 697-698). Lastly, historical institutionalism may also be used to analyse institutions in their context, in particular in terms of the balance of resources and power, and the broader context of institutional interaction (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 703-704).

Rational choice institutionalism, or rationalist institutionalism, is the most prominent form of institutionalism within political science. The focal point of the ontology of this approach to institutionalism is the individual actor, who acts rationally, and in accordance to a cost/benefit calculation, whereupon the actor seeks to maximise the benefits reaped whilst minimising the costs. This theory sees the institution in question - in this case the EU - as not significant to the calculation, suggesting that the cost-benefit assessment happens outside of the framework of the institution (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 155). Furthermore, this theory predicts the preferences of actors to be stable in the long term, and can therefore be possibly useful, especially in times of uncertainty, or within the above-defined context of historical institutionalism. Within the historical institutionalist paradigm of rational choice institutionalism, the institution itself is a limiting factor, in terms of the choices an actor can make, and affecting the variables of the calculation (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 155).

Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, in their book “The European Union as Crisis Management” would also appear to take this rational choice approach. Whilst they do not outright specify which aspect of institutionalist theory they apply, as the book is far more descriptive than theoretical, the explanations they do provide with regards to the establishment of mechanisms, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism, which pool EU resources towards a common goal of security from disasters, and crises in general, do point in this direction. It would appear that by and large, member-states supported such developments mostly out of self-interest. For instance, Greece called for genuine resource centralisation and cooperation only following the 2007 forest fires
that devastated the country (Boin et al, 2013: 27). Indeed, whilst such mechanisms became far more institutionalised - and centralised - following the Lisbon Treaty (Boin et al, 2013: 29), it would appear that the drive towards a common mechanism of crisis-management was mainly supported by national self-interest. As such, the research of these authors shows, the way in which cooperation takes place is a product of the particular circumstances on the ground, and there exist few real overarching norms that in practice guide cooperation in the face of crises (Boin et al, 2013: 157).

In contrast to the positivist worldview of rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism approaches institutions through a constructivist ontology (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). This ontological approach understands social entities such as institutions and actors to not be external, de-facto units, but rather, to be socially constructed and as such, easier to change in comparison to the rational choice institutionalist view (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). In this paradigm, institutions are understood to be “...social practices, ideas, and norms” (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). Therefore, the authors write, according to sociological institutionalism, institutions constitute actors which change through perceptions, norms, and discourses. This theoretical approach can be seen as the reverse of the rational choice theory of institutionalism, as it is not a calculation of cost and benefit that guides the actions of an actor, but rather, a paradigm in which the ‘logic of appropriateness’ applies, that is, the actors acting in accordance not to a rationalist analysis but rather in accordance with norms and social structures (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). Within this sociological institutionalism, the authors argue, there exists a significant structural bias. This in turn has lead some researchers in the field to focus on the importance of actors, within socially constructed settings (Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). This relatively new scientific paradigm has been termed constructivist institutionalism (Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156).

Beyond these, classical, approaches to institutionalism, there are other theories, that whilst not very relevant with the field of war studies in particular, and not very popular as explanatory
theoretical frameworks in EU studies, are still very important. A theory that serves as a counterpoint to most positivist approaches, as well as the approaches that concentrate on norms and discourses rather than material factors, would be Marxism. A Marxist analysis would perhaps shine an interesting light on why institutions form, and how they serve class and economic interests (Linklater, 2013: 137). This theoretical framework however, not only does not posses the tools to analyse complex geopolitical structures and issues such as terrorism (Linklater, 2013: 114), but also does not provide an in-depth understanding of why capitalist nations in their whole do or do not cooperate at different times. Critical theory too, whilst providing much-needed theoretical context for the examination of knowledge itself (Devetak, 2013: 164-165), does not provide the required tools for the examination of particular cases, but is rather aimed at analysing the underlying politicised nature of the process of knowledge-creation and its ontology (Devetak, 2013: 166).

The manner in which the theory approaches the EU’s security cooperation as a whole, and the military aspect thereof, would appear to have focused on the limited amount of peacekeeping missions having been carried out under the banner of the EU. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has backed operations that have been active in areas such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Portela and Ruffa, 2015: 547). The study of European security and the CSDP however has been limited to the intellectual heritage of Duchène, who envisioned the EU as a soft power (Portela and Ruffa, 2015: 547). As Portela and Ruffa explain in their chapter The Politics of Coercion: Assessing the EU’s Use of Military and Economic Instruments, few scientists internationally have approached the issue, and those that do, would appear to focus mainly on the civilian aspect of the CSDP (2015: 547).

As Portela an Ruffa further explain, the understanding of the CSDP, and the EU’s military character, differs between those that study international relations, who in general have a less enthusiastic and nuanced view of the CSDP, and the EU scholars, who tend to be more positive and optimistic (Portela and Ruffa, 2015: 548). It is indeed the case that beyond EU NAVFOR Atalanta in the Indian Ocean, CSDP missions are either exclusively or in majority civilian in
nature (Portela and Ruffa, 2015: 549). It would appear therefore that reality reflects the Duchênian idea of the EU as a soft power. However, this focus on soft power as the exclusive characteristic of the EU has been, academically, to the detriment of the study of the EU as a possible military actor. In order to analyse the military aspects of the EU however, it is not enough to look at the mere practical parts of military centralisation. Indeed, the EU is undoubtedly a normative power (Portela and Ruffa, 2015: 549), and as such, any move to military counterterrorist centralisation and cooperation would be observable not only in practice, but also, first and foremost, in the discourse, norms and ideas put forth. It would therefore appear that constructivist institutionalism, which understands the importance of the interplay between the member-states and the institutions on the fields of discourse, norms, ideas, and practices, is the best choice to analyse the possibility of the EU’s military centralisation and cooperation in counterterrorism.

Constructivist Institutionalism:
The scientific theory of constructivist institutionalism dismisses the uni-directional view of norms, structures, actors, and institutions that is held by sociological institutionalism. In contrast to that theory’s ‘logic of appropriateness’, constructivist institutionalism understands the actors as agents, “who are embedded in a given (institutional) context and are capable of developing strategies that are appropriate to a given setting” (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). In essence, constructivist institutionalism combines the normative, discursive approach of sociological institutionalism, with the actor-centric approach of rational choice institutionalism. However, constructivist institutionalism takes a more nuanced approach to the way in which institutions, and actors within them, function, behave, interact, and develop.

First and foremost, this theoretical approach dismisses the implied assumption of rational choice theory, that actors will act rationally, enacting in their decision-making process a universally applicable and accepted cost-benefit calculation, whilst remaining largely uninfluenced by institutions, which, according to the rationalist choice paradigm, only serve to limit the options and capacities of actors to act in accordance with these calculations (Ripoll Servant and
Kostakopoulou, 2016: 155-156). Rather, constructivist institutionalism is built on the interaction of actors and institutions (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 157). Actors are active agents within this paradigm, who not only operate in accordance to their own goals, preconceptions, and convictions, whilst making errors, and acting in confusion or irrationally, but also acting as parts of a larger institution (Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156). This contrasts strongly with the assumptions of objective, arithmetic, rationality held by rational choice theory.

Moreover, the actions of an actor, according to constructivist institutionalism, are influenced by the institution’s norms, and circumstances. They are adaptable, and will alter their behaviour as circumstances change. The preferences of the actor are formed endogenously, that is, within the institution, rather than exogenously, as rational choice institutionalism postulates (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 156).

As a further development of sociological institutionalism, constructivist institutionalism shares many of its basic standpoints. The most significant of these is the importance of norms, discourses, and their part in shaping the behaviour of actors - both the institutions themselves, and the member states thereof. Nonetheless, where sociological institutionalism sees the interaction between normative and discursive elements and actors as uni-directional, constructivist institutionalism is built upon, as mentioned above, the duality of the actor-institution interaction.

This theoretical framework understands institutions and their member-states to be agents with a certain degree of malleability, but which, at the same time, are also active manipulators of one another, through both discourses and practices (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 157). Within this paradigm of institutional operation, legitimacy comes to play a very important role. This is because those actors, both member-states and on the institutional level, who can be seen as possessing a higher degree of perceived institutional, or counter-institutional, legitimacy, are behind the rules, norms, and ideas that in turn serve to shape the discourses and practices, which
are also judged in accordance to their perceived legitimacy in relation to the audience, which could either serve the role of a passive recipient, or, an active agent acting as a source of contestation to the institutional discourses and practises (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 157). It is the very interaction between actors and institutions, and the norms, rules, and ideas produced therein, that through the filtering mechanism of the legitimising process become the outcomes, that is, the discourses and processes produced (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 157). In summary, the theory sees a spiral, or circle, where certain norms, expressed through discourse and ideas, create the framework for action - practices - which in turn changes the context and allows for the norms, discourses and ideas to further develop and influence further practices, and so on (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 157). At the same time, the norms, discourses, ideas, and practices on the institutional level influence the norms, discourses, ideas, and practices of the member-state and vice versa. This interplay legitimises and leads to further institutional change, in the form of communitarisation.

Similarly to sociological institutionalism, constructivist institutionalism seeks to be a holistic theoretical paradigm. Nonetheless, it is also structured as such, ontologically, that it also allows for the researcher to focus on particular actors, agents, time period, location, institution, or a particular angle (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 157).

In terms of security, and in particular in the case of the EU, the aforementioned authors (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou) apply the theoretical paradigm in the analysis of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ). Integration within the AFSJ has taken a rather unique form, as the areas of security and justice remain very sensitive areas with regards to member-states’ normative and ideational positions on national sovereignty, and even the political understanding of democratic representation within the western paradigm of sovereignty. This application of the theory to the area of security within the confines of an international institution focuses, first and foremost, on the gradual communitarisation of the AFSJ, and to what degree the relationships between actors and institutions in the area have become normalised (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 161). Much of the research on the topic has been
carried out on particular member-states as actors, and their influence in developing what the authors call “specific policy rationales” (Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 161). That is to say, these particular member states examined by researchers of the field, have played a pivotal role in shaping discourse, and dictating practices, along with framing the particular issue in a light of their choosing.

As an example, Kostakopoulou observes in her 2015 chapter Citizenship and Integration: Contiguity, Contagion and Evolution that over the period from 2000 to 2015, the framing of migration into the EU had changed, even if attitudes towards migrants had remained rather constant. The discursive framing moved from a purely security-based norm, to a rights- and citizen-based approach. Whilst this did not change the scrutinising norms in place against immigrants from the outside of the EU, the framing and discursive shift put the normative acceptance of the freedom of movement within the EU in the centre of importance, which in turn was caused by the partial communitarisation of Justice and Home Affairs, thus putting this area largely on institutional hands, rather than the hands of the individual member state (Kostakopoulou, 2015: 153-177).

Within the field of security, constructivist institutionalism, like securitisation theory and political sociology, focuses on the actors - in this case member-states. These actors are, according to the theory, the driving force, the producers, of norms, policy, and discourse, what Ripoll Servent and Kostakopoulou term ‘entrepreneurs’. However, in difference from securitisation theory and political sociology, the constructivist institutionalist theoretical approach does not place the weight of its academic attention at the practices, but rather at the discursive and normative aspects of an actor’s behaviours, whilst, maintaining focus also on the practices, in a holistic approach (Ripoll Servent and Kostakopoulou, 2016: 162).

Concludingly, the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism sees member-state actors and institutions as existing within a state of interactivity, whereupon one influences the other, both with regard to norms, ideas, and discourse, and in terms of practices. As a further
development of the sociological institutionalist paradigm, constructivist institutionalism focuses on the former, and the legitimising process that this interaction goes through in order to lead to an outcome, whilst also placing emphasis on the agency of actors to disseminate norms, ideas, and discourse within institutions. Moreover, the concept of communitarisation plays a pivotal role within this paradigm, which entails that as an institution becomes more prevalent within the evolution of discourse and normative behaviour, it becomes more central in not only producing discourse and norms, but also as an active agent that plays a pivotal role in intra-institutional processes, surpassing the agency of individual member-states. Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou proceed to apply this mode of theoretical analysis on migration and the EU, where they show how norms and discourses changed over the 2000-2015 period, and how in turn this lead to the communitarisation of migration-related institutions within the EU, which then proceed to construct the prevalent institutional norms, ideas, and discourses on the area.

However, this theoretical paradigm has not been applied to the area of military cooperation. As member states view this as perhaps the last refuge of sovereignty, and indeed, as it remains an area that, more so than others, is dominated by a rationalist world-view, wherein the cost-benefit calculation is seen as very important, the application of the constructivist institutionalist theory onto the field of military cooperation will test the theoretical framework of constructivism institutionalism, and communitarisation, and their applicability on areas of hard power and national normative sovereignty. Furthermore, if it is found that the theory of constructivist institutionalism as it stands cannot be used to fully explain the findings of the study, the theory will be examined with the goal of making a step in the development thereof towards a point where the theory can encompass any possible deviations, insofar as they can be explained by an even more holistic theoretical approach by constructivist institutionalism.
Methodology

In order to apply the theoretical paradigm of constructivist institutionalism in the field of military cooperation within the EU, for the purpose of testing the theoretical tenets presented by Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou, a method must be drawn up, focusing, as does the theory, on a specific actor, and the normative, policy, and discursive aspects of the actor’s interaction with the institution in question (in this case the EU). As noted above, in the Choice of Case section of the introductory chapter, the case chosen to apply this theory upon, in order to test it, is the case of the UK, and the institutional area examined is military counter-terror cooperation within an EU context. This study aims to test the generalisability of the constructivist institutionalist theoretical framework by examining whether the UK, which due to its generally cautious approach to EU institutional communitarisation, as well as its significant role in Western military operations and its large arsenal, is a least-likely case scenario, has acted in accordance to how an actor is expected to within the theory, as it is outlined by Ripoll Servant and Kostakopoulou.

According to the theory, the UK would be expected to, first and foremost, adopt a discourse of military institutional communitarisation, in the name of security, or citizen protection, as that would be following the normative development of the institution of the EU. Furthermore, it is also expected that some development of practices would have taken place, as the discourse, ideas, and norms of communitarisation in the field of military counter-terrorism would also be translated into a change in how both the UK as an actor, and the EU as an institution act, in accordance to the normative changes. As such, there is a strong longitudinal character in the comparison of the two instances this study examines, from the early days of the renewed terrorist threat to EU security, to a more recent period in which a multitude of terrorist attacks had taken place..

These changes in practices, named above, in turn, would be expected to influence the normative, institutional aspect of the balance of interaction between the member-state actor and the institution, as prescribed by the theoretical basis of constructivist institutionalism. Therefore, a
scheme of research design must be made, in order to examine the degree to which the UK as a member-state actor exhibits these characteristics, and the development thereof as a part of the evolving EU.

**Research Design:**
As mentioned above, this study aims to demonstrate the development of the UK as an actor within the EU, and most importantly, to test the theory of constructivist institutionalism, as it has been delineated above. To this end, a scheme is to be laid forth, that allows the replicable analysis of the evolution of the norms, discourses, and ideas, as well as the practices, of the British government and institutions, with relation to the possible communitarisation of military counter-terror cooperation within the framework of the institutional confines of the European Union. Whilst the September 11 attacks were the tipping point for Western anti-terror military interventionism, officially marking the beginning of the so-called ‘war on terror’, many attacks followed against Western targets, and continue to do so to this day. This study will focus on two events. The 2005 London bombings, and the November 2015 terrorist attack in Paris, which concentrated on the attack on the Bataclan theatre. For each instance of terrorism, this study analyses the discourse and associated practises by British parliamentarians and by the government, for a six-month period following the attack. Particular interest is placed upon the Conservative party, the Tories, which is the least likely to be positive to EU institutional communitarisation, especially with regards to the military sovereignty of the UK, as well as the Labour party, which ideologically is more likely to embrace EU cooperation. The two instances chosen differ on certain very important factors, as delineated below, and concisely shown in Table A.
As the above table demonstrates, the two instances differ significantly, and as such allow for a thorough testing of the theoretical paradigm of constructivist institutionalism with regards to military counter-terrorist cooperation within the institutional framework of the EU. Not only is there a longitudinal progression in terms of time, but there is also a difference in space, with the first terrorist attack studied having taken place on British soil, whilst the second occurred in Paris. Moreover there are normative differences, with the popular sentiment in the UK being far more eurosceptic in late 2015, than it was in the summer of 2005, with the ‘Brexit’ referendum being but half a year away, and the refugee crisis playing a significant role in the formation of British discourses and practices towards the EU. Furthermore, whilst in 2005 the governing party in the UK was the centrist Labour party, in 2015 the country was governed by the conservative Tory party.

The research design of this paper is structured around the method of text analysis. As such, the textual material collected will be analysed and filtered for discourse, as well as the adoption of norms and positive representation of ideas encouraging the institutional communitarisation of anti-terrorist military activity within the auspices of the EU. Furthermore, the context in which this discourse, norms, and ideas are spoken will be examined, in order to positively demonstrate whether the hypothesis stated above, in the introduction, is valid or not (D’Angelo, 2002: 870).
This includes statements of intent made by politicians, with regards to any possible policy or strategy that would contribute to the goal of the communitarisation of military counter-terrorism within the institutional framework of intra-EU cooperation. The actual adoption and implementation of policy and strategies constitutes practice, and will be considered as such in the analysis of the finding of the study, as constructivist institutionalism, whilst being focused on discourses, norms, and ideas, does not omit to consider the practices of actors, and institutions, and their role in the interplay between norms and practice, and actors and institutions, which through the legitimising process of the discourses leads to specific outcomes.

**Strategy of Data Collection:**

As the theoretical framework upon which this study is built, and indeed, which is tested in this paper - constructivist institutionalism - as well as the method of analysis chosen, that is, text analysis, both require primary sources for their application, as any secondary source may interpret the original discursive, normative, and ideational material, or may omit part thereof, the main source for this research paper will be interviews and statements given by British politicians and party officials to the press, as well as press releases, and other forms of communication to the public. These statement, communiques, interviews, and press releases will be collected for two six-month periods following the two attacks in question (that is to say, the period of 7/7/2005 to mid-January 2006, and 14/11/2015 to mid-May 2016 respectively for each case of terrorist attack). This study will accumulate and present instances of norm perpetuation, discourse, and ideas presented within the formal British political dialogue, focusing in particular onto representatives of the Conservative party, which is expected to be less welcoming of the institutional communitarisation of such a basic sovereign power as the military. Moreover, this study examines speech acts connected to policy and strategy implementation, that is, the ‘practice’ part of the norms and practices dialectic.

The relevant parts of the primary sources, as taken from online media archives will be quoted within the text, along with the analysis thereof. The interviews, statements, and press releases themselves will be referenced to normally, in the Sources Cited.
Source Criticism:
Whilst being primary sources, interviews, statements, and any other directly quoted form of communication relayed through the press must be scrutinized. As this is a study based on the methodological underpinnings of text analysis, the factual accuracy of the original discourse and normative speech acts is not a prerequisite for them to be taken into account. However, the way the original discourse is presented in media - even in the form of direct quotes - may differ due to the specific media outlets’ own biases, and vested normative interests. As such, these biases and vested normative interests of the source media must be explored. Furthermore, in the cases of practices, rather than norms, being examined, the way in which they are reported will be influenced by the political and ideological biases and interests of the outlet reporting on the news.

An attempt has been made to collect data from reliable, and adequately unbiased British media, such as the BBC. The BBC in particular can be said to have a degree of neutrality higher than most privately-owned media outlets in Britain, as it is a public-service news media, which is scrutinised and is expected to remain objective in its news coverage, at least with regards to the British public and government (BBC, *How We Work*). Due to the policies and controls placed upon the BBC, it can be expected to not provide a party-politically charged coverage of neither norms, discourses, and ideas presented by politicians, nor of any eventual practices that may follow from these norms, discourses and ideas. Furthermore, for the purpose of providing the background of the attacks, local English-speaking media, and official reports will be used. The BBC’s coverage serves as the main point of departure for the 7th July 2005 bombings, and France 24’s coverage of the Paris attacks is utilised respectively in order to present the background of this latter case. France 24 is an international news outlet owned and operated by the French government through the France Médias Monde group. In its press kit, France 24 states that its goal is to convey a ‘French perspective’ (France 24, 2013: *Press Kit*).
Methodological Alternatives:

Whilst the above method is the one best suited for the purposes and scope of this paper, it is by no means the only viable approach. Indeed, it could be at first argued that some of the following methodological alternatives could be preferable. However, as it is demonstrated in this section, they do not, in fact, fulfil the purposes and scope of this study.

The first, and perhaps most significant alternative would be the inclusion of further EU member-states in the study. For instance, the French reactions to the same two terror attacks could potentially provide a more holistic understanding of the discourses, norms, ideas, and practices across the EU, within a similar setting (that is, one domestic terrorist attack and one on foreign, but EU, soil). However, the inclusion of France would detract from the goal of this study to examine the least-likely case, that is, the UK. France, whilst not always in line with the discourses, norms, and ideas of Brussels, is far less of an applicable case. As this paper aims to examine the possible drive to communitarisation in the most unlikely of EU member-states, the comparison of the two countries the French inclusion would entail would not serve this purpose, but rather expand the scope of the study to a degree that would make it more expansive than what the limitations of a Master’s thesis allow.

Furthermore, the choice of terrorist attacks used as instances in this study could be questioned. Indeed, besides the reasons presented in the above segments of the Methodology chapter, the choice could at first appear to be odd. It is after all the case that whilst the two attacks had a significant impact, they did not trigger a massive military reaction, with only the Paris attack being answered in a direct, military manner at all (France 24(a), 2015: France strikes Islamic State group in Syria, Iraq from aircraft carrier). The attacks did however have a major impact on the respective countries, as well as the EU in general. It could be argued that, whilst significantly smaller in scale, these two terrorist attacks influenced their respective societies, and the society of the entire EU, to a degree similar to the way the 9/11 attacks shook the society and political milieu of the USA. As such, these two terrorist constitute the best instances for the
analysis of the British case in relation to the possible counter-terrorist military communitarisation in the EU. Conceptually, other, more recent terrorist attacks in the UK could have been chosen, or other attacks abroad, instead of Paris (such as Nice, Berlin, or Stockholm). However, as elaborated above, these cases were selected with not only their longitudinal distance in mind, but also due to the significance they came to have for their respective nations and the EU as a whole, something which makes them uniquely suited for this theory testing study.
Results and Analysis

As the above method delineates, the norms, discourses, ideas, and practices relating to the communitarisation of EU military cooperation is presented in this part, in order to carry out a comparative theory testing analysis on the results, with the aim of answering the research question “Has the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ changed the way in which the EU approaches military cooperation, despite the unwillingness of member states to cooperate on the matter and to surrender national sovereignty over the military? If so, how?” by disproving the null hypothesis, or indeed, by failing to do so. The two cases are presented individually, and thoroughly. Thereafter, the findings of the two cases are compared, in order to examine any possible developments as to the norms, discourses, ideas, and practices on display, and to apply the theory of constructivist institutionalism upon them.

First and foremost however, in order to present the cases in a holistic manner, and most importantly, in context, a brief history of the events and actions surrounding the events is presented, for both cases. This historical background does not only summarise the events of the attacks themselves, but attempts to also present to the reader a short but comprehensive understanding of the historical and political context within which the tragic terrorist attacks took place. This will not only help provide the reader with all the prerequisite knowledge needed in order to follow the conclusions of the analysis, but will also help contextualise the norms, discourses, ideas, and practices examined below.

2005 London Bombings:

The Events and their Context:
On the morning of Thursday, July 7, four suicide bombers carried out attacks against public transport targets in London, killing 52 people, and inflicting injuries upon more than 770. The first three bombs were set off at around ten minutes to nine in the morning, British summer time, on underground trains, near the Liverpool Street and Edgware road stations, as well as on an underground train between King’s Cross and Russell Square station. The fourth terrorist
bombaro took place on a double-decker bus an hour thereafter, in Tavistock square (BBC, London Blasts (a), What Happened).

According to the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, written under the order of the House of Commons and printed on 11th May 2006, the first group to claim responsibility for the attacks would be “The Secret Organisation Group of Al Qaida [sic] in Europe” (Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 2006: 8). This claim however, which was made a few hours after the attacks, as well as other claims of responsibility the followed it, could not be verified by investigators. The organisation behind these terrorist attacks however, if any, is largely immaterial, as compared to the reasoning of the attackers themselves, and the reaction of the British political authorities, which is the main focus of this study.

The attackers (Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Germaine Lindsay, and Hasib Mir Hussain) were, according to the report, British subjects - and therefore, by extension, also EU citizens. However, from the evidence presented in the report, it would appear that whilst they became increasingly religious, and eventually radicalised, they were well-adjusted and contributing members of their communities, before they carried out their deadly fundamentalist-motivated terrorist attacks (Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 2006: 13-15). The men, who according to the BBC carried out the attacks as a retaliation for perceived injustices against muslims, and a desire to become ‘martyrs’, would appear to have been influenced by the UK’s involvement in the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, a claim also made by the so-called “Secret Organisation Group of Al Qaida [sic] in Europe” (Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, 2006: 8) Moreover, two of the suicide bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer had spent several months in western Pakistan, close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in late 2004, and early 2005, where they allegedly met with individuals from Al-Qaeda, and may have received training (BBC, London Blasts (b), The Investigation: Pakistan).
It is relevant for this study, as it analyses military cooperation and institutional communitarisation through the lens of institutional constructivism, in discourses, norms, ideas, and practices, to highlight the UK’s involvement in US- and NATO-led military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003. In both of these military interventions, the UK played a significant role, both militarily, as well as politically. All of these operations took place under the political leadership of Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, who also was the prime minister at the time of the terrorist attacks in question (Biography.com, 2016: *Tony Blair*), and who in the summer of 2016 came under scrutiny due to the findings of the controversial ‘Chilcot Report’, which alleges that the British participation in the Iraq intervention of 2003 was not carried out within the letter of the law (BBC(b), 2016: *Chilcot report: Findings-at-a-glance*). These interventions, and the British participation therein, demonstrate a clear willingness by the part of the British government at the time to cooperate with other nation-states in military expeditions, and to be part of institutionally-driven projects of military cooperation. In the above cases, the United Kingdom participated fully and with enthusiasm in missions under the auspices of NATO, and US President George W. Bush’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’.

*Discourses, Norms, Ideas, and Practices:*

Following the London bombings of the 7th July, 2005, the entire British political establishment reacted swiftly, as would be expected in such a crisis. Prime Minister Tony Blair, who at the time was attending a G8 meeting in Scotland, released a statement immediately following the bombings, in which he voiced a common desire by the G8 Nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the USA) to fight terrorism united, which, as he stated, posed a real and present threat against all of them (BBC, 7/7/2005: *Tony Blair on bombings in London* (video, 30 seconds - 1 minute in)). He did not make a statement relating to the European Union as an institution, nor indeed, in any other way. The elements of this speech that can be said to have been institutionalist in nature are the general discourse of the G8 standing behind the United Kingdom in this hour of tragedy, and that terrorism, according to Prime Minister Blair, was the common enemy against which all have to fight, in order to prevail (BBC, 7/7/2005: *Tony Blair on bombings in London* (video, 30 seconds - 1 minute, 10 seconds in)). Whilst this
discourse uses institutionalist language and would appear to adopt institutionalist norms, no
mention is made of the EU, or indeed any other formalised international institution the UK is a
part of, or of any possible action within an institutional framework.

Whilst the above statement was made by PM Tony Blair only a short while after the attacks had
taken place, and before he himself had transited to London, following the tragic bombings, the
genral absence of the EU as an institution which could help fight future terrorist attacks,
through the communitarisation of the military of the member-states is noticeable even in
subsequent statements by British politicians. The Prime Minister, as well as other prominent
members of local and national government made statements of solidarity, and tried to ease
ethno-religious tensions by clarifying that the Islamic fundamentalism of the bombers was not
representative of the religion as a whole (BBC(a), 2005: London bombing toll rises to 37).
Furthermore, the main discourse, as exemplified by Tony Blair’s statement from Downing
Street, presented the bombings as an attack against ‘us’ (BBC, On This Day: 2005: Bomb attacks
on London). The official discourse appears therefore to present a clash between the culture of the
terrorists, and that of Britain. It is important however to note, that whilst the EU or Europe were
not mentioned within this discourse, neither is Britain, explicitly. The sentiment - and statement -
can therefore be taken to mean ‘us’ in the sense of the West.

Within the general British political discourse following the attacks, there was a strong wave of
anti-militarism. Notable independent british politician and Member of Parliament George
Galloway (who previously had been a member of Labour) claimed that the attacks were a result
of the British participation in the invasion of Iraq, and that it was, in fact, Prime Minister Tony
Blair’s fault (BBC(b), 2005: Galloway: Bombings price of Iraq). Whilst this hard line against the
government was in a minority in the political sphere, British political commentators, such as
Tariq Ali voiced similar concerns as to the bombings being the result of the UK’s role in Middle
The Conservative opposition also proceeded to place at least part of the blame onto the shoulders of the Blair government. Namely, the two major concerns raised by the Shadow Homeland Affairs Minister Patrick Mercer regarded, firstly, the apparent lack of intelligence with regards to the attack, and secondly, the lowering of the warning level five weeks prior to the attack (BBC(c), 2005: No inquiry into 7 July bombings). This characterises the response of the opposition following the London bombings in general. The opposition too, did not include the EU in their public discourse following the attack, but rather focused on the apparent failures of the intelligence services in preventing the terrorist bombings, and the the shortcomings of the government.

In conclusion, following the four suicide bombings in the public transport system of London on the 7th July, 2005, the British political discourse, on both sides of the isle, did not engage in any form of normative or ideational call for military counterterrorist cooperation within the EU, nor any communitarisation of the EU’s institutions that could be related to the military field. The public political debate that followed regarded the bombings as a British issue, and it was, for the most part, the United Kingdom’s participation in foreign wars, and the competence of the domestic intelligence agencies (MI5 and MI6) (BBC(c), 2005: No inquiry into 7 July bombings; BBC, 2006: At-a-glance: 7 July reports) that became the centre of the political discourse. Furthermore, in terms of practices, what followed was the Terrorism Act 2006, which gave the intelligence agencies more powers to counter and preempt violent extremism and terrorism (Terrorism Act 2006, 2006). In terms of military operations, none would appear to have been carried out as a open and declared response to the bombings. As such, one can conclude that the 7th July, 2005 bombings in London did not bring about a discursive, normative, ideational, or practical drive for the communitarisation of the military aspect of counterterrorism in the context of the EU.
2015 Paris Attacks:

The Events and their Context:

In comparison to the London bombings, just a little over a decade prior, the synchronised terrorist attacks that took place in Paris in the night of Friday, 13th November 2015 and the early hours of Saturday, 14th November 2015 were far more deadly. In total, 129 people were killed, and many more wounded, in a series of coordinated attacks against civilians in Paris (France 24(b), 2015: Timeline of the attacks across the French Capital).

At around twenty minutes past nine in the evening, simultaneous attacks took place in several locations in Paris. To begin with, three suicide bombers set off three bombs outside the Stade de France, in which eighty thousand people, including the then French President François Hollande, were attending a football game between Germany and France. This bombing had a rather small death toll, as only the suicide bombers themselves, as well as one bystander, were killed. At the same time, in the 10th District, twelve people were killed in a restaurant, in the 11th District, eighteen people were gunned down on rue de Charonne, five were killed in a pizzeria near the Place de la République, as well as another person, also near the Place de la République. As this took place, armed men entered the Bataclan theatre, in which a metal concert was taking place, and took the people inside hostage, as well as opening fire on the audience, allegedly shouting “Allahu Akbar” (France 24(b), 2015: Timeline of the attacks across the French Capital). Shortly after midnight, President Hollande declared a state of emergency, closing the country’s borders. A shot while thereafter, the Bataclan theatre was stormed by police, and taken. Eighty-two people were killed, in addition to the four terrorists (France 24(b), 2015: Timeline of the attacks across the French Capital).

Following this attack, troops were deployed to police Paris, as the state of emergency was solidified. On the following day of the attacks, Saturday, the so-called Islamic State1 (IS) (formerly the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant - ISIS/ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attack (France 24(c), 2015: Islamic State group claims deadly Paris attacks).

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1 This name is used here and in the rest of the paper for the purposes of clarity, and is no way an endorsement of this terrorist organisation’s claim to statehood.
The repercussions of the attacks continue to be felt to this day. As a response, the French
government dispatched the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier to the eastern Mediterranean, and
on Monday, 24th November, 2015, eleven days after the deadly and coordinated terrorist attacks
in Paris, French naval aviation launched multiple strikes against IS targets. This marked a
significant increase in French involvement in the US-led fight against the IS. The aerial strikes
by French jets were carried out in two phases. Firstly, the aeroplanes provided air support to Iraqi
forces fighting against the IS in Ramadi and Mosul, in Iraq. Later in the day, French jets also
attacked IS facilities in Raqqa, in Syria (France 24(a), 2015: France strikes Islamic State group
in Syria, Iraq from aircraft carrier). This operation also marked a - temporary - thaw in relations
between Paris and Moscow, as both the naval and aerial aspects of the French deployment of the
Charles de Gaulle in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the French strikes on Syrian soil were
coordinated on both a political and military level between France and Russia. This was due in
part due to the offer of assistance Russia made to France, as well as the control over most parts
of Syrian airspace being in the hands of the Russian aerospace forces, which were at the time
also conducting operations against the IS there, among other targets. Furthermore, the British
prime minister at the time, David Cameron, offered the French president the use of the RAF base
in Akrotiri, on the nearby island of Cyprus (France 24(a), 2015: France strikes Islamic State
group in Syria, Iraq from aircraft carrier). France remained active in fighting the IS, following
the terrorist attack in Nice in the summer of 2016.

In France itself, changes also took place. At the time of writing, the state of emergency has been
extended by the French National Assembly a total of five times, keeping the country in it since
the night of the attacks. The current extension, which will expire in June of 2017, is meant to
cover both the presidential elections, as well as the parliamentary elections (France 24, 2016:
France votes to extend state of emergency for fifth time). This state of emergency, which gives
extraordinary powers to the police, army, and security services has come to characterise the
interior political and social landscape of France since the attack on 13th and 14th November,
2015.
Discourses, Norms, Ideas, and Practices:
The case of the Paris attacks differs quite markedly from that of the London bombings of 2005. To begin with, as outlined in the Research Design segment above, the British political context differs significantly between the two cases. The immediately noticeable and perhaps most significant difference being that in this case, the attacks did not take place on British soil, but rather EU, and specifically French, soil. This sets the scene differently, as it would not be the UK asking for help from its EU partners, but rather offering help. This would potentially mean that the UK would be more eager to promote institutional communitarisation with regards to the military aspect of counterterrorism through discourse, norms, and ideas, as it would not appear weak in doing so.

On the fourteenth of November, the morning after the attacks, the British prime minister, David Cameron, expressed his condolences to President Hollande. In his speech of condolences, David Cameron did not focus on the EU or Europe, but rather emphasised the drive of his government to withstand and deter such attacks from British soil, and that Britain must united fight against terrorism. Like in the case of he London bombings ten years prior, the discourse of the West versus terrorism was a prominent feature, with the PM stating that the UK, “... together with the French and our allies around the world, stand up for all we believe in” (Gov.uk: Prime Minister statement on Paris terrorist attack). Furthermore, David Cameron expressed through his official Twitter account an offer to do “...whatever we can to help” (BBC(a), 2015: Paris attacks: David Cameron offers condolences). This offer was not made within the discursive or normative context of EU cooperation however, and could be perceived as Britain offering to help its bilateral ally, or NATO ally.

The Labour opposition too did not bring the EU, or EU cooperation, into the political discourse either. Rather, Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell wrote a public letter to Chancellor George Osborne voicing not only the support of his party to the PM’s call for British unity in the face of terrorism, but also Labour’s support for the expansion of the security budget (Labour Press, 2015).
Moreover, not only did the British prime minister push the Commons to allow airstrikes and bombings to be carried out against IS targets in Syria, something the British Parliament had previously rejected, but RAF Tornado fighter-bombers carried out raids against IS militants in Iraq on the 16th November, 2015, a few days after the Paris attacks (BBC(b), 2015: PM: I will make case for strikes against IS in Syria). Furthermore, as stated above in the The Events and their Context segment of this case, the British PM also offered the French use of the RAF base in Akrotiri, Cyprus.

Beyond the above-stated instances of British political discourse, norms, ideas, and practices of aerial strikes and bombings following the attacks, there were no such instances in which any prominent politician within the British political scene would call for a closer military counterterrorist cooperation within the framework of the EU. The quite significant discursive and normative positions taken by the PM of the United Kingdom, and emulated by the UK government, whilst being in a spirit of cooperation, did not take an institutionalist character, but would rather appear to have been based upon a rationalist understanding of the nation-state as a sovereign actor which may cooperate with other nation-states when it stands to benefit, but which would not do so out of normative institutionalist reasons. The offers of military assistance to the French government made, and the attacks against IS targets by British fighter-bombers would also appear to have been made in the same spirit, and can therefore be said to differ little in practice from the cooperation between the French and Russian military commands with regards to the former’s operations in Syrian airspace. This, despite the fact that France and the UK are allies not only historically (that is to say here, normatively), but also within the formalised frameworks of both the NATO military alliance, and most importantly for the purposes of this study, the EU.

**Comparison:**

In many ways, the terrorist suicide bombing in London on the 7th July, 2005, and the organised terrorist attacks in Paris in the 13th-14th November, 2015 differ significantly, with regards to the parametres of this study. As highlighted in the above sections, not only did the attacks take place
in different locations (one domestic and one foreign, on EU soil), during different political 
leaderships (Labour and Tory respectively), different UK attitudes to the EU (pro-EU or 
indifferent, and mostly eurosceptic respectively), but also, more than a decade apart. This study 
however has shown that the two cases also share many similarities in terms of the British 
discursive, normative, ideational, and practical approaches to military counterterrorist 
cooperation. That is not to say that British actions were the same in both cases. Rather, it could 
be said that the United Kingdom and its respective governments functioned within the same 
normative understanding of their own national identity, which could be characterised as that of a 
strong, independent, sovereign nation-state. Moreover, in both cases, the terrorists were 
presented as attacking an undefined ‘us’, which can be understood to mean the West and its 
values, norms, and people. Prime Minister Tony Blair did not openly ask for aid in countering 
terrorism after the London bombings, choosing rather to voice the general and common to the G8 
member-states desire to fight terrorism. Following the deadly terrorist attacks in Paris, PM David 
Cameron eagerly offered help to the French retaliatory strikes against the IS in Syria and Iraq, 
both discursively and normatively, but also materially, making RAF infrastructure available to 
the French air force. From this behaviour, it is possible to stipulate that Britain, and British 
political discourse and norms in particular, have a certain aversion to appearing in need of 
assistance whilst at the same time being willing to offer assistance to allied nations in their 
apparent hour of need. Furthermore, in both cases, no mention of the EU as an institution was 
made by the political leadership of Britain, much less the EU as an institution or facilitating actor 
of military counterterrorist cooperation. Rather, the main discourse presented the West, as a 
whole, under attack. The role of the respective opposition parties also differed in these two cases. 
In the first, the opposition placed partial blame on the government for not averting the bombings, 
whilst in the second, perhaps due to the attack having taken place abroad, it placed its support 
behind the government's proposal for increased security funding. Characteristic of both cases 
though was the absence of the EU and of any form of an institutionalist or communitarising drive 
in the political discourse.
Summary and Conclusions

This study set out to test the application of the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism upon the field of military counterterrorist cooperation within the institutional framework of the European Union. To this end, it sought to answer the research question “Has the post-September 11 ‘war on terror’ changed the way in which the EU approaches military cooperation, despite the unwillingness of member states to cooperate on the matter and to surrender national sovereignty over the military? If so, how?”. This was carried out by attempting to disprove the null hypothesis that there has been neither a drive nor any political attempts to put to practise an EU-centred military response to terrorism, for the particular, least-likely case of the UK, in the instances of the 7th July, 2005 London bombings, and the 13th-14th November 2015 Paris attacks.

To this end, this paper made use of a text analysis method in order to analyse any possible statements made by politicians with regards to closer counterterrorist military cooperation under the auspices of the EU, that is, as the theory of constructivist institutionalism would suggest, the communitarisation of the so-called ‘war on terror’. This study however did not find any evidence that could be used to bring the null hypothesis into doubt. In the first case, that of the 2005 London bombings, there was no mention of any cooperation in the military sphere of counterterrorism in the British political discourse. In the case of the November 2015 Paris attacks, the British PM, David Cameron, did indeed both adopt a discourse of solidarity and military aid to the French government, and people, and also put the discourse into practise, by stepping up the military operation against the IS in Iraq, pushing for parliamentary approval to initiate bombings against IS targets in Syria, as well as making the Akrotiri RAF base in Cyprus available to the French armed forces. This however was not institutionalist in nature, as no institutional framework was abided to, with regards to the British discourse and practices following the Paris attacks. Rather, the UK offered help and discursive support to France bilaterally, as one sovereign nation-state to another.
Conclusions of the Study:

In conclusion, this study has not achieved its stated goal of proving the null hypothesis false, as it set out to do. Applying the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism onto the British discourse, norms, ideas, and practices showed that the respective governments of the United Kingdom for the periods following the 7th July, 2005 London bombings, and the 13th-14th November, 2015 Paris attacks demonstrated a lack of institutionalist discursive, normative, and ideational attitude. As shown in the results presented above, the least likely case of the UK did not act in accordance to the expectations set forth by the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism. Indeed, whilst the absence of normative, discursive, and ideational institutionalism in the first case could be explained by the fact that the communitarisation of military cooperation has lagged behind other forms of institutional communitarisation in the EU, some development would be expected, if the theory were to be applicable to this case. As seen by the results of the second instance examined in this study, that of the Paris attacks, there were no changes towards an EU-centric institutionalist attitude by the part of the British government or opposition.

It would be presumptuous however to suggest that the theory is invalidated by the failure of this study to successfully demonstrate its applicability on the possible institutional communitarisation of military counter-terrorist cooperation in an EU context. Indeed, as touched upon in the Literature Review section of this paper, it has been demonstrated that constructivist institutionalism is very much capable of explaining the development of the civilian - and civic - aspects of the evolution of the European Union to its present state. Indeed, it could very well be suggested that Britain, even Britain before the ‘Brexit’ referendum, as it is studied in this paper, is an outlier case, as it would appear that, at least discursively and normatively, certain centres of power within the EU leadership structure have in later months openly spoken in support, and campaigned for the communitarisation of the military sphere within the framework of the EU. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has discussed and would appear to be an adamant supporter of the creation of EU military headquarters, that would
formally centralise the leadership of the military by in essence establishing a supra-national EU military command (BBC(c), 2016: Juncker proposes EU military headquarters).

In conclusion, it would appear that there does indeed exist a discursive and normative drive for the communitarisation of the military sphere within the European Union, as the President of the European Commission himself seems to be a strong supporter of the further centralisation of the EU as an institution, and the strengthening of the military aspect of the union in particular. This however does beg the question of why the UK would not exhibit any signs towards this institutional communitarisation, as would be predictable according to the theory of constructivist institutionalism. Whilst the decisive pro-'Brexit’ vote could be said to mirror a strong underlying anti-EU or anti-communitarisation feeling within the UK, there was no question of a ‘Brexit’ in 2005, and in November 2015, the British government was strongly in support of the United Kingdom remaining in the European Union. It would therefore be more likely that another explanation would be the correct one with regards to the apparent discrepancy in the behaviour of the UK in relation to military communitarisation within the EU.

Alternatively, it could be argued that counterterrorism, and the ‘war on terror’, do not fulfil the requirements to trigger the drive towards EU military communitarisation. It is indeed the case that whilst Commission President Juncker calls for military communitarisation in the EU context, it is not as a counterterrorist measure, but rather, it would appear, as what he considers a natural development of the EU towards centralisation, further institutionalism, and unification. However, counterterrorism has been a pillar of expeditionary military activity since the start of the 21st century in the West, and particularly for the USA and the UK. Therefore, it would be logical to expect that if the United Kingdom were to call for, or partake in the institutional communitarisation of the military within the EU, it would be for the purposes of counterterrorism, in periods where terrorism was, and is a major threat to the security of the EU. Therefore, it would appear that the UK is an anomaly as to the political discursive, normative, and ideational drive towards putting the EU’s military communitarisation into practice.
**Alternative Explanations:**

It is apparent from the results of this study that the United Kingdom, as a case of a country within the institutional framework of the European Union is an outlying case. It deviates from the theoretical prognosis of how a member-state of an institution such like the EU would develop and behave, discursively, normatively, ideationally, and in practice. However, as demonstrated in the Conclusions of the Study segment above, whilst this study was not able to disprove the null hypothesis, as it sets out to do in order to test constructivist institutionalism, it would appear that the theory does apply to the military aspect of EU institutional cooperation.

The UK’s deviation from the theoretically predicted course can be explained in two ways. To begin with, an explanation can be easily found within the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism itself. As explained in the Theory section, constructivist institutionalism understands the relationship between actors and institutions as being reciprocal. It could therefore be argued that, as the UK has always taken a rather distant approach to the EU, preferring to not be involved to the same degree as the continental member-states, it has also been influenced less by the EU, and as such, its discourse, norms, and ideas differ from those of the EU proper. The ‘Brexit’ vote and subsequent British political approach to the EU, and the EU’s approach to the UK, would appear to confirm this understanding.

There are however other theoretical lenses that could be applied to the deviant case of the UK. Rational choice institutionalism, which was discussed briefly earlier in this text may provide the best perspective into how the British political elites of both the Blair and Cameron governments viewed their interactions with the EU. That is not to say that rationalist choice theory is the best theoretical starting point for the examination of the case of the United Kingdom as a member-state of the EU, but rather that rational choice theory, and in particular rational choice institutionalism was the prism through which the respective UK governments viewed their position in the EU. From the position of the UK as a politically and militarily strong nation-state and member-state of the EU, the cost-benefit calculation carried out by the respective UK leaderships may have convinced them that engaging in an EU-centred military discourse, and the
propagation of communitarising norms and ideas would not be to the benefit of the UK, as the cost would be the normative weakening of the United Kingdom’s image as a strong, independent nation-state in the Westphalian sense of the word.

It is evident from the above theoretical examination of the deviant case of the UK with regards to the question of the communitarisation of the military sphere within the institutional context of the EU that the respective British leaderships acted through a rationalist understanding of their position as a member-state of an institution. Moreover, as there has been an irregularly small normative and discursive interaction between the UK and the EU, despite the former’s active membership in the latter, the theoretical and analytical framework of constructivist institutionalism itself provides an explanation to the UK’s deviation. In conclusion, the UK’s deviancy from the behavioural paradigm predicted by the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism can be explained in part by the view the UK political leaderships maintain as to their country’s relationship to the EU, and in part due to the lack of discursive and normative interaction between the actor (UK) and the institution (EU).

Another alternative explanation harkens to the ‘multiple streams framework’ as delineated by Bossong and summarised in the Previous Research segment of this study’s theory section. If, despite its shortcomings, this theoretical framework were to be applied, it could be argued that as there was no real availability of proposals towards counter-terror military communitarisation in the EU (policy stream), and very little, if any, support in the political stream, change, in this case in the form of the aforementioned communitarisation, could not have taken place.

**The Shortcomings of Constructivist Institutionalism as Applied to the Case of the UK:**

The theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism, in the form in which it was tested in this paper revealed a particular shortcoming. This shortcoming is not an inherent problem of the theory itself, but rather, one of the basic assumptions of the theory of constructivist institutionalism and its application in the examination of the EU. As Portela and Ruffa note, EU scholarship tends to take a positive, optimistic view of EU security integration and what
constructivist institutionalist theory would call communitarisation of the security field (Portela and Ruffa, 2015: 547). By extension, it would appear that constructivist institutionalism, as applied to the EU, despite its focus on the interplay between institution and member-state, and the interaction and mutual influence of discourses, norms, ideas, and practices, assumes a certain institutionalist prejudice. That is to say, the formulation of the theory, and the expectations placed on the EU’s development towards further institutional communitarisation assume the willingness of the actors to move towards that end, and indeed, that the actors themselves will share a view of the institution and its functions that coincides with that of the theory.

Furthermore, whilst this theoretical framework, as shown in the Theory section above, purports to see the interaction between institution and member-state, where they each influence each other in terms of discourse, norms, ideas, and practices, it would seem to maintain the normative approach of sociological institutionalism. This connects to the underlying normative assumption of a common drive towards further communitarisation. The theory would appear to assume that both institution and member-states aim for further centralisation and communitarisation, and that the interplay between the two is what decides which road the institution is going to take to achieve this goal. What the case of the UK has shown however, is that the member-state may not at all have this aim, and as such, may not engage in the institution - member-state interplay of discourse, norms, ideas, and practices that constructivist institutionalism predicts. It may indeed be so, that, in the terminology of the theoretical framework itself, the discourse, norms, ideas, and practices of the institution are not legitimised in the eyes of the member-state. Therefore, the theoretical framework must be developed in a manner that places more focus and importance on the discursive, normative, ideational, and practical (in terms of economy, geopolitics, and other factors) milieu of the member-states of any institution under examination.

An actor such as Sweden, which not only has embraced the Duchêrian identity of the EU on a discursive, normative, and ideational level, and which puts this normative paradigm into practice, could be seen as a case of a member-state which would act in accordance to the expectations of the theoretical framework, as Sweden, perhaps more so than most other EU members, has
embraced institutionalisation and communitarisation. The reason Sweden would be expected to conform with the theory is therefore not the universality of the theory in its applicability, but that Sweden, as a state and the political apparatus thereof, shares the same underlying normative values as the theory of constructivist institutionalism. The theory, as it is developed further, must be expanded to encompass in its analytical toolbox an understanding of member-states such as the UK, which have not internalised the institutionalist norms that would lead them to support communitarisation on any field, be it the military or any other.

Additionally, the theory of constructivist institutionalism presents further challenges that must be overcome for it to be truly holistic in its applicability. The theory does not provide the necessary tools in order to distinguish between simple bilateral cooperation, and cooperation that appears bilateral, but is in fact motivated by institutionalist norms and ideas. The aid offered by the British to the French following the Paris attacks for instance, cannot be explained by the theory, as it would appear to take the form of bilateral cooperation. However, whilst it was never stated, it could be the case that it was in fact motivated by values, ideas and norms of institutionalism and comradery amongst EU member-states.

**Research Recommendations (and The Future of Military cooperation in an EU institutional context):**

As demonstrated above, the process of military communitarisation within the European Union has began, at the very least on the normative and discursive level. However, at the time of writing, this is still a very recent development indeed. It is therefore understandable that scientific research has not covered this new development within the institutional structure of the European Union.

This current development therefore presents a unique opportunity for academic students of both constructivist institutionalism - or other, less holistic forms of institutionalism - and students of civil-military relationships. As the events of military communitarisation are still on-going, and the idea could be said to be in its infancy, a researcher could follow the development of the
military aspect of the EU’s institutionalist centralisation, and as such construct a longer-term study in which the intricacies of this evolution of the EU, from a soft-power institution to a militarised one, in terms of discourse, norms, and perhaps in the future, practices. As examined in the above section, the theoretical framework of constructivist institutionalism must be expanded and developed further to this end, in order to be applicable even in cases where the actor does not share the same institutionalist norms and values as the institution.

This however does presuppose that the EU will indeed develop in this direction. Whilst, as stated above, the current President of the European Commission is discursively and normatively an outspoken supporter of this progression, the question over its political and material feasibility remains. To begin with, most EU member-states are also members in NATO, the US-led military alliance, which could be said to already occupy the socio-political and geographic space an EU military command would. As such, it is questionable in what way EU member-states could participate in both military institutions. Furthermore, there are questions of national sovereignty. Governments may very well be reluctant to surrender military control to Brussels, especially in member-states with a high degree of euroscepticism in the public opinion. The question of sovereignty also brings into the forefront the issue of the democratic control of the military, as the EU leadership remains unelected by the EU citizenry. Lastly, but equally importantly, the national military leaderships themselves have not taken publicly a position in the matter, as with regards to the possible changes in command structure, strategy, infrastructure, and logistics such a military centralisation would entail.
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